Pub Date : 2021-12-06DOI: 10.4324/9781003148012-16
K. Steele
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In a ‘hard case’ of comparison between two items, it seems that one is not better or worse than the other and yet nor are they equally good. A common explanation of such cases is that appearances are deceiving: it is indeterminate – vague – which relation holds. I offer two arguments against thinking that hard cases are cases of vagueness. First, arbitrary stipulation in cases of vagueness resolves the vagueness but arbitrary stipulation in hard cases leaves ‘resolutional remainder’. Second, vagueness prohibits ‘normative leakage’, that is, making a series of choices based on comparisons in which you end up with something worse than what you could have had, while hard cases rationally permit such leakage. Indeed, it could be said part of the point of hard cases is to allow rational agents to change normative direction despite the normative costs of doing so. I end by describing how ‘parity’, a fourth, sui generis way items can be compared, solves both of the problems faced by vagueness. Hard cases, I suggest, are cases in which items are on a par. In a hard case of comparison between two items, it seems that that neither is better or worse than the other and yet nor are they equally good. If you are comparing careers in investment banking and interior design, you might judge that the banking career is better in some relevant respects, the design career better in other relevant respects, and yet neither is at least as good as the other overall. Or if you are comparing the evidence for believing that there is a God and the evidence for disbelieving (or withholding judgment), you might judge that the case for belief is better in some respects, worse in others, and yet the evidence for each attitude is not at least as warrant-providing or justifying as the other. As these cases illustrate, hard cases occur in both the practical and theoretical domains. In their simplest form, they are normative comparisons of items, A and B, with respect to a 1 Thanks to the editors of this volume and to the audience at the UK ALPP, especially Matt Kramer, Rae Langton, and Re’em Segev, for comments that led me to make what I hope are useful clarifications, and to Kit Fine for discussion about the varieties of vagueness that saved me from many infelicities and helped me to simplify my arguments.
在比较两个项目的“困难案例”中，似乎没有一个比另一个更好或更差，但它们也不是一样好。对这种情况的一个常见解释是，外表是具有欺骗性的:哪一种关系成立是不确定的——模糊的。我提出两个论点，反对认为困难的案例是模糊的案例。首先，模糊性情况下的任意规定解决了模糊性问题，而硬性情况下的任意规定则留下了“解决余项”。其次，模糊性禁止“规范性泄漏”，也就是说，在比较的基础上做出一系列选择，最终你会得到比你本来可以拥有的更糟糕的东西，而困难的情况理性地允许这种泄漏。事实上，可以说，困难案例的部分意义在于允许理性主体改变规范方向，尽管这样做需要付出规范成本。最后，我描述了“平价”是如何解决模糊性所面临的两个问题的，这是第四种可以比较项目的独特方式。我认为，硬案例是指物品处于同等水平的情况。在两个物品之间进行比较的硬案例中，似乎没有一个比另一个更好或更差，但它们也不是同样好。如果你比较投资银行和室内设计的职业，你可能会判断银行职业在某些相关方面更好，设计职业在其他相关方面更好，但两者都不如另一个整体。或者，如果你正在比较相信上帝存在的证据和不相信上帝存在的证据(或保留判断)，你可能会判断，信仰的情况在某些方面更好，在其他方面更差，然而，每种态度的证据至少不像另一种态度那样提供证据或证明。正如这些案例所说明的那样，在实践和理论领域都有困难的案例。在最简单的形式中，它们是A和B项相对于A的规范性比较1感谢本卷的编辑和英国ALPP的听众，特别是Matt Kramer, Rae Langton和reem Segev，他们的评论使我做出了我希望是有用的澄清，并感谢Kit Fine讨论了各种模糊，使我免于许多错误，并帮助我简化了我的论点。
{"title":"Are Hard Cases Vague Cases?","authors":"R. Chang","doi":"10.4324/9781003148012-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003148012-4","url":null,"abstract":"In a ‘hard case’ of comparison between two items, it seems that one is not better or worse than the other and yet nor are they equally good. A common explanation of such cases is that appearances are deceiving: it is indeterminate – vague – which relation holds. I offer two arguments against thinking that hard cases are cases of vagueness. First, arbitrary stipulation in cases of vagueness resolves the vagueness but arbitrary stipulation in hard cases leaves ‘resolutional remainder’. Second, vagueness prohibits ‘normative leakage’, that is, making a series of choices based on comparisons in which you end up with something worse than what you could have had, while hard cases rationally permit such leakage. Indeed, it could be said part of the point of hard cases is to allow rational agents to change normative direction despite the normative costs of doing so. I end by describing how ‘parity’, a fourth, sui generis way items can be compared, solves both of the problems faced by vagueness. Hard cases, I suggest, are cases in which items are on a par. In a hard case of comparison between two items, it seems that that neither is better or worse than the other and yet nor are they equally good. If you are comparing careers in investment banking and interior design, you might judge that the banking career is better in some relevant respects, the design career better in other relevant respects, and yet neither is at least as good as the other overall. Or if you are comparing the evidence for believing that there is a God and the evidence for disbelieving (or withholding judgment), you might judge that the case for belief is better in some respects, worse in others, and yet the evidence for each attitude is not at least as warrant-providing or justifying as the other. As these cases illustrate, hard cases occur in both the practical and theoretical domains. In their simplest form, they are normative comparisons of items, A and B, with respect to a 1 Thanks to the editors of this volume and to the audience at the UK ALPP, especially Matt Kramer, Rae Langton, and Re’em Segev, for comments that led me to make what I hope are useful clarifications, and to Kit Fine for discussion about the varieties of vagueness that saved me from many infelicities and helped me to simplify my arguments.","PeriodicalId":405623,"journal":{"name":"Value Incommensurability","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116936353","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Spectrum Arguments, Indeterminacy, and Value Superiority","authors":"Henrik Andersson","doi":"10.4324/9781003148012-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003148012-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":405623,"journal":{"name":"Value Incommensurability","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129678588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Population axiology concerns how to evaluate populations in regard to their goodness, that is, how to order populations by the relations “is better than” and “is as good as.” The main problem in population axiology has been to find an adequate theory about the value of populations where the number of people, the quality of their lives, and their identities may vary. This field has been riddled with impossibility results, which seem to show that our considered beliefs are inconsistent in cases where the number of people and their welfare varies.1 There have been many creative but unfortunately failed suggestions for how to eschew these impossibility results.2 Here I shall consider two suggestions to the effect that incommensurability or vagueness could help.3 We shall start, however, by discussing incommensurability and Derek Parfit’s famous “Repugnant Conclusion.”
{"title":"Incommensurability and Vagueness in Population Axiology","authors":"G. Arrhenius","doi":"10.4324/9781003148012-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003148012-9","url":null,"abstract":"Population axiology concerns how to evaluate populations in regard to their goodness, that is, how to order populations by the relations “is better than” and “is as good as.” The main problem in population axiology has been to find an adequate theory about the value of populations where the number of people, the quality of their lives, and their identities may vary. This field has been riddled with impossibility results, which seem to show that our considered beliefs are inconsistent in cases where the number of people and their welfare varies.1 There have been many creative but unfortunately failed suggestions for how to eschew these impossibility results.2 Here I shall consider two suggestions to the effect that incommensurability or vagueness could help.3 We shall start, however, by discussing incommensurability and Derek Parfit’s famous “Repugnant Conclusion.”","PeriodicalId":405623,"journal":{"name":"Value Incommensurability","volume":"93 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128702871","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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