This paper provides an overview of the different kinds of distance-related barriers related to crossborder investment. Expanding the economic footprint of the firm comes at the cost of a corresponding increase in the complexity of coordination. Different forms of governance, whether inside the firm or as part of its network of external relationships, have the aim of reducing uncertainty and creating a more predictable environment. The impact of conventional distancerelated barriers, as well as the more difficult institutional barriers reflecting differences in norms and beliefs, on the costs and methods of coordination adopted by multinational firms are explored.
{"title":"From Access to Acceptance: The Costs of Crossing Borders in the Global Economy","authors":"S. Lundan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2454524","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2454524","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides an overview of the different kinds of distance-related barriers related to crossborder investment. Expanding the economic footprint of the firm comes at the cost of a corresponding increase in the complexity of coordination. Different forms of governance, whether inside the firm or as part of its network of external relationships, have the aim of reducing uncertainty and creating a more predictable environment. The impact of conventional distancerelated barriers, as well as the more difficult institutional barriers reflecting differences in norms and beliefs, on the costs and methods of coordination adopted by multinational firms are explored.","PeriodicalId":410187,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Institutions & Financing Practices (Topic)","volume":"457 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133288859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The subject matter of this paper is a central issue of growing concern in the area of legal regulation of international investments, namely how to ensure through treaty making and treaty application that the promotion and protection of foreign (direct) investment be beneficial for the recipient host countries, especially developing countries, and indeed does not hamper their development efforts. Seen form the point of view of those in charge of promoting development in “developing” host countries – the other side of the coin – the issue is how to ensure that those instruments effectively promote the contribution of foreign investment to the development goals of the recipient countries. My expose and analysis is a legal one: it is beyond my scope to address the economic policy issues concerning specific economic instruments (such as financial or tax incentive) that in a given situation or in respect to a given country may stimulate the flow of FDI in general or specifically according to certain policy choices. Thus, in order to promote investment in preferred sectors (such as mining or manufacturing), in certain part of the territory of that country, or in certain forms (such as joint-ventures), while possibly discouraging or prohibiting FDI which does not conform with those choices. Institutions such as UNCTAD and the World Bank have done great work in this area, studying the implication of such policies, which goes beyond my qualification. Still this remark may be of some interest also for us lawyers pointing out to the limits that legal instruments and legal analysis inherently have when addressing policy issues. In this respect one could note that while the first term of my theme “investment protection” is essentially legal, the second term “sustainable development” is essentially economic or policy-based. I just put to the readers a reflection on the issue of “balancing” such diverse, somehow heterogeneous concepts: it seems to imply an equation where the greatest the protection, the lesser will be the development, and vice-versa, something that cannot be accepted a priori. The interrelation between international legal instruments of protection and the promotion of sustainable development in a host country should consider that such instruments, though potentially significant, have a limited role compared with more sophisticated domestic instruments and policies. Traditionally IIAs, especially BITs, have been rather restricted in scope and generic in content. As I will underline further on, they have not been conceived as policy instruments but rather as a framework of minimum standards expressing in general but at the same time generic terms a pro-investment liberalisation approach.
{"title":"Investment Protection and Sustainable Development: Key Issues","authors":"G. Sacerdoti","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2445366","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2445366","url":null,"abstract":"The subject matter of this paper is a central issue of growing concern in the area of legal regulation of international investments, namely how to ensure through treaty making and treaty application that the promotion and protection of foreign (direct) investment be beneficial for the recipient host countries, especially developing countries, and indeed does not hamper their development efforts. Seen form the point of view of those in charge of promoting development in “developing” host countries – the other side of the coin – the issue is how to ensure that those instruments effectively promote the contribution of foreign investment to the development goals of the recipient countries. My expose and analysis is a legal one: it is beyond my scope to address the economic policy issues concerning specific economic instruments (such as financial or tax incentive) that in a given situation or in respect to a given country may stimulate the flow of FDI in general or specifically according to certain policy choices. Thus, in order to promote investment in preferred sectors (such as mining or manufacturing), in certain part of the territory of that country, or in certain forms (such as joint-ventures), while possibly discouraging or prohibiting FDI which does not conform with those choices. Institutions such as UNCTAD and the World Bank have done great work in this area, studying the implication of such policies, which goes beyond my qualification. Still this remark may be of some interest also for us lawyers pointing out to the limits that legal instruments and legal analysis inherently have when addressing policy issues. In this respect one could note that while the first term of my theme “investment protection” is essentially legal, the second term “sustainable development” is essentially economic or policy-based. I just put to the readers a reflection on the issue of “balancing” such diverse, somehow heterogeneous concepts: it seems to imply an equation where the greatest the protection, the lesser will be the development, and vice-versa, something that cannot be accepted a priori. The interrelation between international legal instruments of protection and the promotion of sustainable development in a host country should consider that such instruments, though potentially significant, have a limited role compared with more sophisticated domestic instruments and policies. Traditionally IIAs, especially BITs, have been rather restricted in scope and generic in content. As I will underline further on, they have not been conceived as policy instruments but rather as a framework of minimum standards expressing in general but at the same time generic terms a pro-investment liberalisation approach.","PeriodicalId":410187,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Institutions & Financing Practices (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130216319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Measuring an intermediation rate is a good way of capturing the importance of the role of financial intermediaries in a given economy and their position in the face of the growth in market financing. Results show a quite sizeable decline in the financial intermediation rate in France over the period concerned, characterised by the strong growth of capital markets and the increasing use made by non-financial agents of non-intermediated financing. This development should nevertheless be treated cautiously, for several reasons. First, because it stems largely from the internationalisation of the financing and investing movements of resident financial institutions (FIs) and of market financing received by non-financial agents. Thus, an increasing proportion of resident FIs' assets are held vis-a-vis non-residents and a growing share of the financing received by residents comes from the "Rest of the world", mainly from non-resident FIs. Second, because an analysis of the revenue of financial intermediaries confirms the change in their price setting practices and a shift in their activities. Lastly, because the choice by non-financial agents is not only made between intermediaries and direct-market access. First of all, this article analyses the changes in the intermediation rate in France and abroad. A growing share Is accounted for by the Rest of the world, while the financing of the national economy by resident FIs has declined. Conversely, resident FIs have developed their operations with the Rest of the world. A broader concept of intermediation is then proposed in order to deal with the so-called decline in financial intermediation. A complementary view of intermediation revenue makes it possible to measure the developments in resident FIs' earnings and to understand the changes that have enabled them to maintain their revenue.
{"title":"Disintermediation or Financial Diversification? The Case of Developed Countries","authors":"M. Boutillier, Jean-Charles Bricongne","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2060114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2060114","url":null,"abstract":"Measuring an intermediation rate is a good way of capturing the importance of the role of financial intermediaries in a given economy and their position in the face of the growth in market financing. Results show a quite sizeable decline in the financial intermediation rate in France over the period concerned, characterised by the strong growth of capital markets and the increasing use made by non-financial agents of non-intermediated financing. This development should nevertheless be treated cautiously, for several reasons. First, because it stems largely from the internationalisation of the financing and investing movements of resident financial institutions (FIs) and of market financing received by non-financial agents. Thus, an increasing proportion of resident FIs' assets are held vis-a-vis non-residents and a growing share of the financing received by residents comes from the \"Rest of the world\", mainly from non-resident FIs. Second, because an analysis of the revenue of financial intermediaries confirms the change in their price setting practices and a shift in their activities. Lastly, because the choice by non-financial agents is not only made between intermediaries and direct-market access. First of all, this article analyses the changes in the intermediation rate in France and abroad. A growing share Is accounted for by the Rest of the world, while the financing of the national economy by resident FIs has declined. Conversely, resident FIs have developed their operations with the Rest of the world. A broader concept of intermediation is then proposed in order to deal with the so-called decline in financial intermediation. A complementary view of intermediation revenue makes it possible to measure the developments in resident FIs' earnings and to understand the changes that have enabled them to maintain their revenue.","PeriodicalId":410187,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Institutions & Financing Practices (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127887588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We construct the topology of business networks across the population of firms in an emerging economy, Pakistan, and estimate the value that membership in large yet diffuse networks brings in terms of access to bank credit and improving financial viability. We link two firms if they have a common director. The resulting topology includes a "giant network" that is order of magnitudes larger than the second largest network. While it displays "small world" properties and comprises 5 percent of all firms, it accesses two-thirds of all bank credit. We estimate the value of joining this giant network by exploiting "incidental" entry and exit of firms over time. Membership increases total external financing by 16.6 percent, reduces the propensity to enter financial distress by 9.5 percent, and better insures firms against industry and location shocks. Firms that join improve financial access by borrowing more from new lenders, particularly those already lending to their (new) giant-network neighbors. Network benefits also depend critically on where a firm connects to in the network and on the firm's pre-existing strength.
{"title":"Bank Credit and Business Networks","authors":"A. Khwaja, Atif R. Mian, Abid Qamar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1763351","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1763351","url":null,"abstract":"We construct the topology of business networks across the population of firms in an emerging economy, Pakistan, and estimate the value that membership in large yet diffuse networks brings in terms of access to bank credit and improving financial viability. We link two firms if they have a common director. The resulting topology includes a \"giant network\" that is order of magnitudes larger than the second largest network. While it displays \"small world\" properties and comprises 5 percent of all firms, it accesses two-thirds of all bank credit. We estimate the value of joining this giant network by exploiting \"incidental\" entry and exit of firms over time. Membership increases total external financing by 16.6 percent, reduces the propensity to enter financial distress by 9.5 percent, and better insures firms against industry and location shocks. Firms that join improve financial access by borrowing more from new lenders, particularly those already lending to their (new) giant-network neighbors. Network benefits also depend critically on where a firm connects to in the network and on the firm's pre-existing strength.","PeriodicalId":410187,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Institutions & Financing Practices (Topic)","volume":"121 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114262939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper considers whether information asymmetries affect the willingness of foreign banks to participate in syndicated loans to corporate borrowers in China. In line with theoretical literature, ownership concentration of the borrowing firm is assumed to influence information asymmetries in the relationship between the borrower and the lender. We analyze how ownership concentration influences the participation of foreign banks in a loan syndicate using a sample of syndicated loans granted to Chinese borrowers in the period 2004-2009 for which we have information on ownership concentration. We observe that greater ownership concentration of the borrowing firm does not positively influence participation of foreign banks in the loan syndicate. Additional estimations using alternative specifications provide similar results. As foreign banks do not react positively to ownership concentration, we conclude that information asymmetries are not exacerbated for foreign banks relative to local banks in China. Moreover, it appears that increased financial leverage discourages foreign bank participation, suggesting that domestic banks are less cautious in their risk management.
{"title":"Foreign Bank Lending and Information Asymmetries in China","authors":"L. Weill, P. Pessarossi, Christophe J. Godlewski","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1732519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1732519","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers whether information asymmetries affect the willingness of foreign banks to participate in syndicated loans to corporate borrowers in China. In line with theoretical literature, ownership concentration of the borrowing firm is assumed to influence information asymmetries in the relationship between the borrower and the lender. We analyze how ownership concentration influences the participation of foreign banks in a loan syndicate using a sample of syndicated loans granted to Chinese borrowers in the period 2004-2009 for which we have information on ownership concentration. We observe that greater ownership concentration of the borrowing firm does not positively influence participation of foreign banks in the loan syndicate. Additional estimations using alternative specifications provide similar results. As foreign banks do not react positively to ownership concentration, we conclude that information asymmetries are not exacerbated for foreign banks relative to local banks in China. Moreover, it appears that increased financial leverage discourages foreign bank participation, suggesting that domestic banks are less cautious in their risk management.","PeriodicalId":410187,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Institutions & Financing Practices (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127789634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the last two decades, the private sector has contracted a substantially larger share in the total amount of foreign-currency international debt (private sector share of external debt), especially in developing countries. In this paper, I empirically examine the effect of this phenomenon on bank loan prices. I find that the private sector share of external debt negatively and significantly impacts the price of bank loans. This result supports the hypothesis that private sector debt contributes to international financial stability to a greater degree than sovereign debt. Nevertheless, this impact is canceled out in the presence of fixed exchange regimes that are unsuitable with respect to fundamentals. In such circumstances, the private sector may take advantage of capital market distortions that are maintained by official authorities and thus exposes the country to further financial instability. Additional results corroborate the observation that the gain in financial stability stems from more efficient use of funds and reduced monitoring costs.
{"title":"Private Sector Share of External Debt and Financial Stability: Evidence from Bank Loans.","authors":"I. Hallak","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1392162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1392162","url":null,"abstract":"In the last two decades, the private sector has contracted a substantially larger share in the total amount of foreign-currency international debt (private sector share of external debt), especially in developing countries. In this paper, I empirically examine the effect of this phenomenon on bank loan prices. I find that the private sector share of external debt negatively and significantly impacts the price of bank loans. This result supports the hypothesis that private sector debt contributes to international financial stability to a greater degree than sovereign debt. Nevertheless, this impact is canceled out in the presence of fixed exchange regimes that are unsuitable with respect to fundamentals. In such circumstances, the private sector may take advantage of capital market distortions that are maintained by official authorities and thus exposes the country to further financial instability. Additional results corroborate the observation that the gain in financial stability stems from more efficient use of funds and reduced monitoring costs.","PeriodicalId":410187,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Institutions & Financing Practices (Topic)","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115211892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article explores empirically the assertion that Islamic Banks have higher credit risk than Conventional Banks. A definition, identification and the way to manage credit risk are given to each Islamic financial tool. This risk is, then, measured on nine Islamic and nine Conventional Banks, using Contingent Claims Analysis (CCA). Merton’s model (1974), based on Black & Scholes’ (1973) option pricing formula, allowed the measure of the Distance-to-Default (DD) and Default probability (DP) from 2005 to 2009. Islamic Banks have a mean DD of 204 significantly higher than conventional Banks (DD = 15). Mean DP equals 0.03 and 0.05 respectively. Afterward, cumulative logistic probability distribution has been used to derive DP from DD. Results are more satisfying; the distribution of DP has larger tails which respond to the critic against the use of a normal distribution.
{"title":"Is Credit Risk Really Higher in Islamic Banks?","authors":"A. Boumediene","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1689885","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1689885","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores empirically the assertion that Islamic Banks have higher credit risk than Conventional Banks. A definition, identification and the way to manage credit risk are given to each Islamic financial tool. This risk is, then, measured on nine Islamic and nine Conventional Banks, using Contingent Claims Analysis (CCA). Merton’s model (1974), based on Black & Scholes’ (1973) option pricing formula, allowed the measure of the Distance-to-Default (DD) and Default probability (DP) from 2005 to 2009. Islamic Banks have a mean DD of 204 significantly higher than conventional Banks (DD = 15). Mean DP equals 0.03 and 0.05 respectively. Afterward, cumulative logistic probability distribution has been used to derive DP from DD. Results are more satisfying; the distribution of DP has larger tails which respond to the critic against the use of a normal distribution.","PeriodicalId":410187,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Institutions & Financing Practices (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132344475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We present a model of sovereign debt in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, government defaults are costly because they destroy the balance sheets of domestic banks. In our model, better financial institutions allow banks to be more leveraged, thereby making them more vulnerable to sovereign defaults. Our predictions: government defaults should lead to declines in private credit, and these declines should be larger in countries where financial institutions are more developed and banks hold more government bonds. In these same countries, government defaults should be less likely. Using a large panel of countries, we find evidence consistent with these predictions.
{"title":"Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks, and Financial Institutions","authors":"N. Gennaioli, Alberto Martín, Stefano Rossi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2023428","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2023428","url":null,"abstract":"We present a model of sovereign debt in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, government defaults are costly because they destroy the balance sheets of domestic banks. In our model, better financial institutions allow banks to be more leveraged, thereby making them more vulnerable to sovereign defaults. Our predictions: government defaults should lead to declines in private credit, and these declines should be larger in countries where financial institutions are more developed and banks hold more government bonds. In these same countries, government defaults should be less likely. Using a large panel of countries, we find evidence consistent with these predictions.","PeriodicalId":410187,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Institutions & Financing Practices (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115913802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The purpose of this paper is to examine the theoretical arguments presented in the literature related to the issue concerning whether domestic firm value may be enhanced via the use of foreign currency debt. Additionally, it adds to the existing literature in three ways. First, it provides an extension of the existing literature into a more general (and perhaps more realistic) setting. Second, a new international debt market equilibrium condition (termed the International Darby Effect) is derived, where all markets equilibrate on an after-tax real basis. And finally, the authors argue that in this new international setting firm value is independent of the currency denomination choice.
{"title":"A Reexamination of Domestic Firm Value & Foreign Currency Borrowing in the Presence of Taxes","authors":"Kenneth P. Moon, W. T. Chittenden","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1392866","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1392866","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to examine the theoretical arguments presented in the literature related to the issue concerning whether domestic firm value may be enhanced via the use of foreign currency debt. Additionally, it adds to the existing literature in three ways. First, it provides an extension of the existing literature into a more general (and perhaps more realistic) setting. Second, a new international debt market equilibrium condition (termed the International Darby Effect) is derived, where all markets equilibrate on an after-tax real basis. And finally, the authors argue that in this new international setting firm value is independent of the currency denomination choice.","PeriodicalId":410187,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Institutions & Financing Practices (Topic)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125411281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-06-01DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2008.00791.x
Robert P. Flood, N. Marion
We use a simple model of international lending to show that an emerging market borrower who might default can be shut out of international capital markets without warning. A modest haircut on obligations, for example, can shut down lending.
{"title":"*Getting Shut Out of the International Capital Markets: It Doesn't Take Much","authors":"Robert P. Flood, N. Marion","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9396.2008.00791.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2008.00791.x","url":null,"abstract":"We use a simple model of international lending to show that an emerging market borrower who might default can be shut out of international capital markets without warning. A modest haircut on obligations, for example, can shut down lending.","PeriodicalId":410187,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Institutions & Financing Practices (Topic)","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116282911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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