Pub Date : 2019-12-09DOI: 10.1163/9789004412866_009
Carl Sharif El-Tobgui
In chapter 5, we discussed Ibn Taymiyya’s charge against the philosophers that their reasoning about the world and metaphysical realities rests upon a fundamentally unsound ontology that confuses, on numerous levels, the realm of external ontological existence with the realm of notional or logical existence in the mind. Specifically, we have seen that the philosophers adopt a realist conception of universals on the basis of which they accord objective ontological status to notional realities (such as universals) that, Ibn Taymiyya insists, enjoy no more than intramental existence. As such intellectual realities are, by definition, unseen (ghayrmashhūd) and imperceptible (ghayrmaḥsūs), the philosophers identify them with the ghayb spoken of in revelation, in contrast to the shāhid realm of our ambient empirical reality. The result is a philosophical ontology that confines the perceptible (maḥsūs) to the empirical (shahāda) while reducing the unseen (ghayb) to themental or intellectual (maʿqūl). Such a scheme entails—incoherently, for Ibn Taymiyya—the affirmation of externally existent realities that are entirely notional and unperceivable (such as universals). Worse, insofar as the ghayb is reduced to the maʿqūl, the philosophers’ schemaat the same timenecessarily precludes the existence of any independent, self-standing entities (aʿyān qāʾima bi-anfusihā) in the ghayb, entities that are inherently perceptible (though veiled to our senses at the current time) and that exist independently of human reason and human minds. It is on the basis of this ontology that the philosophers end up “intellectualizing” the various unseen (ghāʾib) realities affirmed in revelation, as in their identification of angels with the “intellects” of the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic traditions or the broader philosophical view that the events of the afterlife, including the pleasures of paradise and the pains of hell, are merely graphic metaphors for what will essentially be experienced in intellectual, rather than sensory, terms in the hereafter. This confusion in ontology, according to Ibn Taymiyya, has led to a parallel confusion in the rational inferences the philosophers draw about the world.
在第五章中，我们讨论了伊本·泰米亚对哲学家的指责，认为他们对世界和形而上学现实的推理建立在一种根本不健全的本体论上，这种本体论在许多层面上混淆了外部本体论存在的领域与心灵中概念或逻辑存在的领域。具体来说，我们已经看到，哲学家们采用了一种现实主义的共相概念，在此基础上，他们将客观本体论地位赋予了概念现实(如共相)，伊本·泰米亚坚持认为，这些共相只不过是内在存在。根据定义，这样的知识现实是看不见的(ghayrmashhūd)和难以察觉的(ghayrmaḥsūs)，哲学家们将它们与启示中所说的ghayb等同起来，与我们周围经验现实的shāhid领域形成对比。其结果是一种哲学本体论，将可感知的(maḥsūs)限制为经验的(shahāda)，而将不可见的(ghayb)减少为精神或智力的(ma - qūl)。对伊本·泰米亚来说，这样一个方案需要——不连贯地——对完全是概念的、不可感知的外部存在的现实(如共相)的肯定。更糟糕的是，只要ghayb被简化为ma ā qūl，哲学家们的图式同时必然排除了ghayb中任何独立的、自我存在的实体(a ā yān qal ā nima bi- anfushha)的存在，这些实体本质上是可感知的(尽管目前对我们的感官是隐蔽的)，并且独立于人类理性和人类思想而存在。正是在这种本体论的基础上，哲学家们最终将启示中肯定的各种看不见的现实“理智化”，就像他们将天使与亚里士多德和新柏拉图主义传统中的“理智”联系起来一样，或者更广泛的哲学观点认为，来世的事件，包括天堂的快乐和地狱的痛苦，仅仅是对本质上将在智力上体验到的东西的形象隐喻，而不是感官上的。条款见下文。根据伊本·泰米亚的说法，本体论的混乱导致了哲学家对世界的理性推断的混乱。
{"title":"Reason Reconstituted: The Divine Attributes and the Question of Contradiction between Reason and Revelation","authors":"Carl Sharif El-Tobgui","doi":"10.1163/9789004412866_009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004412866_009","url":null,"abstract":"In chapter 5, we discussed Ibn Taymiyya’s charge against the philosophers that their reasoning about the world and metaphysical realities rests upon a fundamentally unsound ontology that confuses, on numerous levels, the realm of external ontological existence with the realm of notional or logical existence in the mind. Specifically, we have seen that the philosophers adopt a realist conception of universals on the basis of which they accord objective ontological status to notional realities (such as universals) that, Ibn Taymiyya insists, enjoy no more than intramental existence. As such intellectual realities are, by definition, unseen (ghayrmashhūd) and imperceptible (ghayrmaḥsūs), the philosophers identify them with the ghayb spoken of in revelation, in contrast to the shāhid realm of our ambient empirical reality. The result is a philosophical ontology that confines the perceptible (maḥsūs) to the empirical (shahāda) while reducing the unseen (ghayb) to themental or intellectual (maʿqūl). Such a scheme entails—incoherently, for Ibn Taymiyya—the affirmation of externally existent realities that are entirely notional and unperceivable (such as universals). Worse, insofar as the ghayb is reduced to the maʿqūl, the philosophers’ schemaat the same timenecessarily precludes the existence of any independent, self-standing entities (aʿyān qāʾima bi-anfusihā) in the ghayb, entities that are inherently perceptible (though veiled to our senses at the current time) and that exist independently of human reason and human minds. It is on the basis of this ontology that the philosophers end up “intellectualizing” the various unseen (ghāʾib) realities affirmed in revelation, as in their identification of angels with the “intellects” of the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic traditions or the broader philosophical view that the events of the afterlife, including the pleasures of paradise and the pains of hell, are merely graphic metaphors for what will essentially be experienced in intellectual, rather than sensory, terms in the hereafter. This confusion in ontology, according to Ibn Taymiyya, has led to a parallel confusion in the rational inferences the philosophers draw about the world.","PeriodicalId":420256,"journal":{"name":"Ibn Taymiyya on Reason and Revelation","volume":"261 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121417025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-09DOI: 10.1163/9789004412866_007
Carl Sharif El-Tobgui
Wehave spoken in previous chapters of an alleged conflict between reason and revelation. Yet the notion that “reason”might contradict “revelation”means little until we define each of these two entities and determine exactly how it is that each one allegedly contradicts the other.When philosophers, theologians, and others assert a contradiction between reason and revelation, this typically means that what are taken to be the unimpeachable conclusions of reason are found to be incongruent with the “literal” (ḥaqīqa) or obvious (ẓāhir) sense of the revealed texts1 (and, most important for Ibn Taymiyya, what those texts assert about thenature and attributes of God). According to IbnTaymiyya, such thinkers essentially take the rational faculty and its deliverances as primary and require that the language of the revealed texts be (re)interpreted in congruence with reason. In other words, for the philosophers and the rationalistic mutakallimūn, the meaning of revelation is ultimately determined not by anything inherent in the texts but on the basis of (allegedly) certain and universal rational conclusions that are reached independently of the texts. Such conclusions can—and, in fact, often do (to a greater or lesser extent depending on the school in question)—contradict the plain sense of revelation, which is then
{"title":"Ṣaḥīḥ al-Manqūl, or What Is Revelation?","authors":"Carl Sharif El-Tobgui","doi":"10.1163/9789004412866_007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004412866_007","url":null,"abstract":"Wehave spoken in previous chapters of an alleged conflict between reason and revelation. Yet the notion that “reason”might contradict “revelation”means little until we define each of these two entities and determine exactly how it is that each one allegedly contradicts the other.When philosophers, theologians, and others assert a contradiction between reason and revelation, this typically means that what are taken to be the unimpeachable conclusions of reason are found to be incongruent with the “literal” (ḥaqīqa) or obvious (ẓāhir) sense of the revealed texts1 (and, most important for Ibn Taymiyya, what those texts assert about thenature and attributes of God). According to IbnTaymiyya, such thinkers essentially take the rational faculty and its deliverances as primary and require that the language of the revealed texts be (re)interpreted in congruence with reason. In other words, for the philosophers and the rationalistic mutakallimūn, the meaning of revelation is ultimately determined not by anything inherent in the texts but on the basis of (allegedly) certain and universal rational conclusions that are reached independently of the texts. Such conclusions can—and, in fact, often do (to a greater or lesser extent depending on the school in question)—contradict the plain sense of revelation, which is then","PeriodicalId":420256,"journal":{"name":"Ibn Taymiyya on Reason and Revelation","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121091083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-09DOI: 10.1163/9789004412866_002
Carl Sharif El-Tobgui
{"title":"Mise en Scène","authors":"Carl Sharif El-Tobgui","doi":"10.1163/9789004412866_002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004412866_002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":420256,"journal":{"name":"Ibn Taymiyya on Reason and Revelation","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126488415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-09DOI: 10.1163/9789004412866_005
Carl Sharif El-Tobgui
The previous chapter provided an overview of the development of the Islamic intellectual tradition over the course of the seven centuries preceding Ibn Taymiyya, with special emphasis on those aspects most relevant to our main concern—the relationship between reason and revelation—as we can piece them together from various Muslim theological, historical, and heresiographical works, as well as the secondary source materials that are based on and that analyze these works. The current section complements this background with a brief overview of the political and social circumstances of Ibn Taymiyya’s tumultuous life, followed by his biography, intellectual profile, reception by his contemporaries, and an overview of his major works that bear relevance to the Darʾ taʿāruḍ. The chaotic intellectual climate into which Ibn Taymiyya was born was matched by the political uncertainty and fragmentation of his times.1 Born in the city of Harran (located in current-day southeastern Turkey near the Syrian border) in the year 661/1263,2 IbnTaymiyya’s family fled southwest toDamascus
{"title":"Ibn Taymiyya: Life, Times, and Intellectual Profile","authors":"Carl Sharif El-Tobgui","doi":"10.1163/9789004412866_005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004412866_005","url":null,"abstract":"The previous chapter provided an overview of the development of the Islamic intellectual tradition over the course of the seven centuries preceding Ibn Taymiyya, with special emphasis on those aspects most relevant to our main concern—the relationship between reason and revelation—as we can piece them together from various Muslim theological, historical, and heresiographical works, as well as the secondary source materials that are based on and that analyze these works. The current section complements this background with a brief overview of the political and social circumstances of Ibn Taymiyya’s tumultuous life, followed by his biography, intellectual profile, reception by his contemporaries, and an overview of his major works that bear relevance to the Darʾ taʿāruḍ. The chaotic intellectual climate into which Ibn Taymiyya was born was matched by the political uncertainty and fragmentation of his times.1 Born in the city of Harran (located in current-day southeastern Turkey near the Syrian border) in the year 661/1263,2 IbnTaymiyya’s family fled southwest toDamascus","PeriodicalId":420256,"journal":{"name":"Ibn Taymiyya on Reason and Revelation","volume":"258 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121300919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：