Pub Date : 2024-09-17DOI: 10.1177/13582291241285336
Erica Howard
In this article it is argued that the CJEU judgment in Parris needs to be revisited to recognise that intersectional discrimination is covered by the EU anti-discrimination Directives. There are several reasons for this. First, a prohibition of intersectional discrimination is now laid down in an EU anti-discrimination Directive (Directive, 2023/970/EC); second, this would fit in with developments in the EU Commission, Council and Parliament; third Parris turns on its own facts; fourth a purposive or capacious interpretation of these Directives already allows for such discrimination to be included in the Directives; fifth, the shift in CJEU case law towards a intra-group comparison for discrimination can make comparisons in intersectional discrimination cases easier. It is argued that without acknowledging that intersectional discrimination is covered by the EU anti-discrimination Directives, victims of such discrimination, like Mr Parris and others, like headscarf wearing women, might be left without a remedy when they suffer discrimination on a combination of grounds.
{"title":"Intersectional discrimination and EU law: Time to revisit Parris","authors":"Erica Howard","doi":"10.1177/13582291241285336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/13582291241285336","url":null,"abstract":"In this article it is argued that the CJEU judgment in Parris needs to be revisited to recognise that intersectional discrimination is covered by the EU anti-discrimination Directives. There are several reasons for this. First, a prohibition of intersectional discrimination is now laid down in an EU anti-discrimination Directive (Directive, 2023/970/EC); second, this would fit in with developments in the EU Commission, Council and Parliament; third Parris turns on its own facts; fourth a purposive or capacious interpretation of these Directives already allows for such discrimination to be included in the Directives; fifth, the shift in CJEU case law towards a intra-group comparison for discrimination can make comparisons in intersectional discrimination cases easier. It is argued that without acknowledging that intersectional discrimination is covered by the EU anti-discrimination Directives, victims of such discrimination, like Mr Parris and others, like headscarf wearing women, might be left without a remedy when they suffer discrimination on a combination of grounds.","PeriodicalId":42250,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Discrimination and the Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142254644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-28DOI: 10.1177/13582291241278800
Laura Carlson, James Hand, Panos Kapotas
{"title":"Editorial - September 2024","authors":"Laura Carlson, James Hand, Panos Kapotas","doi":"10.1177/13582291241278800","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/13582291241278800","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42250,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Discrimination and the Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142204598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-23DOI: 10.1177/13582291241263802
Jasmin Lilian Diab, Bechara Samneh
This paper explores the dual marginalization of LGBTIQ+ Syrian refugees in Lebanon, highlighting the interplay between national policies on deportation and the crackdown on the LGBTIQ+ community post-2019. Lebanon, home to 1.5 million Syrian refugees—the highest per capita globally—is a case study in how social, political, economic, and legal frameworks do not merely overlook refugee challenges but actively intensify their isolation. Particularly for LGBTIQ+ Syrian refugees, everyday experiences of violence, discrimination, stigmatization, and isolation are exacerbated by these frameworks. In 2022, this situation worsened when Lebanon's Minister of Interior, yielding to pressure from religious groups, directed security forces to disrupt gatherings within the LGBTIQ+ community. Employing qualitative research methods, this study delves into the compounded effects of these policies on the intersectional vulnerabilities of queer Syrian refugees. It examines their perceptions of vulnerability and security, underlining the profound impacts of overlapping decisions on deportation and the suppression of LGBTIQ+ rights.
{"title":"On the margins of refuge: Queer Syrian refugees and the politics of belonging and mobility in post-2019 Lebanon","authors":"Jasmin Lilian Diab, Bechara Samneh","doi":"10.1177/13582291241263802","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/13582291241263802","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the dual marginalization of LGBTIQ+ Syrian refugees in Lebanon, highlighting the interplay between national policies on deportation and the crackdown on the LGBTIQ+ community post-2019. Lebanon, home to 1.5 million Syrian refugees—the highest per capita globally—is a case study in how social, political, economic, and legal frameworks do not merely overlook refugee challenges but actively intensify their isolation. Particularly for LGBTIQ+ Syrian refugees, everyday experiences of violence, discrimination, stigmatization, and isolation are exacerbated by these frameworks. In 2022, this situation worsened when Lebanon's Minister of Interior, yielding to pressure from religious groups, directed security forces to disrupt gatherings within the LGBTIQ+ community. Employing qualitative research methods, this study delves into the compounded effects of these policies on the intersectional vulnerabilities of queer Syrian refugees. It examines their perceptions of vulnerability and security, underlining the profound impacts of overlapping decisions on deportation and the suppression of LGBTIQ+ rights.","PeriodicalId":42250,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Discrimination and the Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141778059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-23DOI: 10.1177/13582291241267005
Jamil D Mujuzi
Workers’ rights are provided for under Article 40 of the Constitution (1995) and in other pieces of legislation. Sections 56 and 57 of the Employment Act (2006) (the Act) provide for the rights to maternity leave and paternity leave respectively. Section 56(1) of the Act provides that ‘[a] female employee shall, as a consequence of pregnancy have the right’ to maternity leave as a result of ‘child birth or miscarriage.’ On the other hand, section 57(1) of the Act provides ‘[a] male employee shall, immediately after the delivery or miscarriage of a wife, have the right to’ paternity leave. It is evident that under section 56, for a female employee to qualify for maternity leave, she doesn’t have to be married. However, for a male employee to qualify for paternity leave, he has to be married. The reason for this is explained in the drafting history of section 57. It is argued that this amounts to discrimination on the ground of marital status. It is also argued that section 56(1) is only applicable to biological mothers and excludes adoptive mothers, commissioning parents (in cases of surrogacy) and those who have committed abortion. This is also discriminatory but could be justified in the case of commissioning parents, adoptive parents and those who have committed abortion.
{"title":"The prohibition of discrimination and the workers’ right to maternity or paternity leave in light of the drafting history of Article 40 of the Constitution of Uganda and sections 56 and 57 of the Employment Act","authors":"Jamil D Mujuzi","doi":"10.1177/13582291241267005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/13582291241267005","url":null,"abstract":"Workers’ rights are provided for under Article 40 of the Constitution (1995) and in other pieces of legislation. Sections 56 and 57 of the Employment Act (2006) (the Act) provide for the rights to maternity leave and paternity leave respectively. Section 56(1) of the Act provides that ‘[a] female employee shall, as a consequence of pregnancy have the right’ to maternity leave as a result of ‘child birth or miscarriage.’ On the other hand, section 57(1) of the Act provides ‘[a] male employee shall, immediately after the delivery or miscarriage of a wife, have the right to’ paternity leave. It is evident that under section 56, for a female employee to qualify for maternity leave, she doesn’t have to be married. However, for a male employee to qualify for paternity leave, he has to be married. The reason for this is explained in the drafting history of section 57. It is argued that this amounts to discrimination on the ground of marital status. It is also argued that section 56(1) is only applicable to biological mothers and excludes adoptive mothers, commissioning parents (in cases of surrogacy) and those who have committed abortion. This is also discriminatory but could be justified in the case of commissioning parents, adoptive parents and those who have committed abortion.","PeriodicalId":42250,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Discrimination and the Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141778056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-22DOI: 10.1177/13582291241264181
Oleg M Yaroshenko, Yuliia Yu Ivchuk, Lesya Ju Maliuha, Oleksii S Nesterovych, Olena Ye Lutsenko
Due to the existence of many scientific studies and various statements regarding the legal status of the self-employed person and their legal status in the field of social protection. It is necessary to conduct a thorough analysis of important aspects of this issue. Especially in times of war, when the unemployment rate is steadily increasing and self-employed persons are increasing their value to the state. This is the reason for the relevance of the study. The purpose of this research is: to determine the legal status of the self-employed person in the field of social protection in Ukraine; to analyze the characteristics of legal regulation applicable to the self-employed; to process data on the basic principles of social security for the self-employed. Important steps are also to analyse the most significant problems faced by self-employed persons in the field of social protection and to discuss possible solutions.
{"title":"Legal status of the self-employed person in the field of social protection in Ukraine","authors":"Oleg M Yaroshenko, Yuliia Yu Ivchuk, Lesya Ju Maliuha, Oleksii S Nesterovych, Olena Ye Lutsenko","doi":"10.1177/13582291241264181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/13582291241264181","url":null,"abstract":"Due to the existence of many scientific studies and various statements regarding the legal status of the self-employed person and their legal status in the field of social protection. It is necessary to conduct a thorough analysis of important aspects of this issue. Especially in times of war, when the unemployment rate is steadily increasing and self-employed persons are increasing their value to the state. This is the reason for the relevance of the study. The purpose of this research is: to determine the legal status of the self-employed person in the field of social protection in Ukraine; to analyze the characteristics of legal regulation applicable to the self-employed; to process data on the basic principles of social security for the self-employed. Important steps are also to analyse the most significant problems faced by self-employed persons in the field of social protection and to discuss possible solutions.","PeriodicalId":42250,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Discrimination and the Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141778061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-29DOI: 10.1177/13582291241257201
Anna Capellà Ricart
European Union (EU) seems to have the aim to strengthen the role of equality bodies and encourage the expansion of their scope of application, their functions and their powers. This implies that they can play an essential role in challenging discriminatory decisions made through algorithmic systems. Due to the possibility they have to access information, to issue binding decisions in individual or collective cases of discrimination or to initiate court proceedings in their own name, they seem like the best positioned to offer an effective protection against algorithmic discrimination. In this article, we study the latest regulatory proposals relating to these bodies and which functions they must carry out to help people that have been discriminated against by artificial intelligence systems. Notwithstanding we argue that equality bodies have a privileged position to deal with discriminatory automated decisions, they need independence and human, technical and financial resources to perform all its tasks and to exercise all its competences effectively, and this is not always guaranteed.
{"title":"The role of European equality bodies to address algorithmic discrimination","authors":"Anna Capellà Ricart","doi":"10.1177/13582291241257201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/13582291241257201","url":null,"abstract":"European Union (EU) seems to have the aim to strengthen the role of equality bodies and encourage the expansion of their scope of application, their functions and their powers. This implies that they can play an essential role in challenging discriminatory decisions made through algorithmic systems. Due to the possibility they have to access information, to issue binding decisions in individual or collective cases of discrimination or to initiate court proceedings in their own name, they seem like the best positioned to offer an effective protection against algorithmic discrimination. In this article, we study the latest regulatory proposals relating to these bodies and which functions they must carry out to help people that have been discriminated against by artificial intelligence systems. Notwithstanding we argue that equality bodies have a privileged position to deal with discriminatory automated decisions, they need independence and human, technical and financial resources to perform all its tasks and to exercise all its competences effectively, and this is not always guaranteed.","PeriodicalId":42250,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Discrimination and the Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141195982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-11DOI: 10.1177/13582291241254642
Laura Carlson, James Hand, Panos Kapotas
{"title":"Editorial - June 2024","authors":"Laura Carlson, James Hand, Panos Kapotas","doi":"10.1177/13582291241254642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/13582291241254642","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42250,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Discrimination and the Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140936252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-29DOI: 10.1177/13582291241249674
Donathan Brown, Tomaž Onič, Sebastijan Novak, Katja Plemenitaš
Before the global spotlight ascended upon nationwide efforts to codify into law that Black Lives Matter, specifically, police accountability against the use of excessive force against unarmed civilians, qualified immunity has silently flourished throughout America. Created to shield police officers and other government officials for the actions they engage on the job, this long-standing judicial doctrine continues to proliferate a culture of near-zero accountability when police officers engage in misconduct, which for communities of color, oftentimes results in deadly outcomes against unarmed civilians. This article will first revisit the development and legacy of qualified immunity, followed by analyzing its universal defense from police unions, then shifting to a data-rich illustration of disciplinary data highlighting the systemically designed outcomes of qualified immunity via the New York Police Department, before providing concluding thoughts. Ultimately, this article asserts that the retrogressive outcomes of police disciplinary inquiries, especially with respect to communities of color, is operating as designed, whereas efforts to review and revisit its structure and practices threaten a longstanding culture of disregard and near-zero accountability.
{"title":"An absolute shield: Qualified immunity, police misconduct and black lives matter","authors":"Donathan Brown, Tomaž Onič, Sebastijan Novak, Katja Plemenitaš","doi":"10.1177/13582291241249674","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/13582291241249674","url":null,"abstract":"Before the global spotlight ascended upon nationwide efforts to codify into law that Black Lives Matter, specifically, police accountability against the use of excessive force against unarmed civilians, qualified immunity has silently flourished throughout America. Created to shield police officers and other government officials for the actions they engage on the job, this long-standing judicial doctrine continues to proliferate a culture of near-zero accountability when police officers engage in misconduct, which for communities of color, oftentimes results in deadly outcomes against unarmed civilians. This article will first revisit the development and legacy of qualified immunity, followed by analyzing its universal defense from police unions, then shifting to a data-rich illustration of disciplinary data highlighting the systemically designed outcomes of qualified immunity via the New York Police Department, before providing concluding thoughts. Ultimately, this article asserts that the retrogressive outcomes of police disciplinary inquiries, especially with respect to communities of color, is operating as designed, whereas efforts to review and revisit its structure and practices threaten a longstanding culture of disregard and near-zero accountability.","PeriodicalId":42250,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Discrimination and the Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140840322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-24DOI: 10.1177/13582291241246964
A. I. Tewolde
Dominant theoretical conversations on experiences of racial discrimination are focused on how Black and other non-White people perceive and experience racial discrimination in White majority racial systems; however, research is scant on experiences of racial discrimination of racial minorities in Black majority social systems. This paper addresses this lacuna by exploring perceived experiences of racial discrimination of Coloured people in Johannesburg, South Africa, a racial minority in a Black majority country. Fourteen in-depth individual interviews were conducted with participants. Analysis of the interviews resulted in many interviewees claiming race-based discrimination in housing, employment, service delivery, political representation and education. A few participants, however, claimed that Black South Africans are also experiencing socioeconomic problems like Coloured South Africans. Racial discrimination theory and social exclusion theory are used as perspectives for the study. Based on the findings, I argue that the perceived experiences of racial discrimination of most of the participants of the study can be explained by three interrelated structural forces, namely legacies of historical racial exclusions, the neoliberal macro-economic order and government neglect.
{"title":"Racial discrimination in post-Apartheid South Africa? The stories of Coloured people in Johannesburg, South Africa","authors":"A. I. Tewolde","doi":"10.1177/13582291241246964","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/13582291241246964","url":null,"abstract":"Dominant theoretical conversations on experiences of racial discrimination are focused on how Black and other non-White people perceive and experience racial discrimination in White majority racial systems; however, research is scant on experiences of racial discrimination of racial minorities in Black majority social systems. This paper addresses this lacuna by exploring perceived experiences of racial discrimination of Coloured people in Johannesburg, South Africa, a racial minority in a Black majority country. Fourteen in-depth individual interviews were conducted with participants. Analysis of the interviews resulted in many interviewees claiming race-based discrimination in housing, employment, service delivery, political representation and education. A few participants, however, claimed that Black South Africans are also experiencing socioeconomic problems like Coloured South Africans. Racial discrimination theory and social exclusion theory are used as perspectives for the study. Based on the findings, I argue that the perceived experiences of racial discrimination of most of the participants of the study can be explained by three interrelated structural forces, namely legacies of historical racial exclusions, the neoliberal macro-economic order and government neglect.","PeriodicalId":42250,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Discrimination and the Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140662414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-22DOI: 10.1177/13582291241245394
J. Mujuzi
Article 21 of the Constitution of Uganda (1995) provides for the right to freedom from discrimination. Article 21(3) provides that for the purposes of Article 21, discrimination ‘means to give different treatment to different persons attributable only or mainly to their respective descriptions by sex, race, colour, ethnic origin, tribe, birth, creed or religion, or social or economic standing, political opinion or disability.’ Article 45 of the Constitution provides that ‘[t]he rights, duties, declarations and guarantees relating to the fundamental and other human rights and freedoms specifically mentioned in this Chapter shall not be regarded as excluding others not specifically mentioned.’ In Uganda Law Society and 12 others v Attorney General (13 February 2024), the Constitutional Court invoked Article 45 and held that the list of prohibited grounds under Article 21(3) is not exhaustive. In this article, the author relies on the drafting history of Article 21(3), the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court on Article 21(3) and the literal interpretation of Article 21(3) to argue that the list of prohibited grounds in Article 21(3) is exhaustive and that the Constitutional Court erred when it held to the contrary. The author argues further that Article 45 should not be relied on to read rights into the Constitution. It should be applicable to statutory or common law rights.
{"title":"Between a ‘flexible’ and ‘rigid’ interpretation of the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination under article 21(3) of the constitution of Uganda: Uganda Law Society and 12 others v Attorney General [2024] UGCC 2 (13 February 2024)","authors":"J. Mujuzi","doi":"10.1177/13582291241245394","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/13582291241245394","url":null,"abstract":"Article 21 of the Constitution of Uganda (1995) provides for the right to freedom from discrimination. Article 21(3) provides that for the purposes of Article 21, discrimination ‘means to give different treatment to different persons attributable only or mainly to their respective descriptions by sex, race, colour, ethnic origin, tribe, birth, creed or religion, or social or economic standing, political opinion or disability.’ Article 45 of the Constitution provides that ‘[t]he rights, duties, declarations and guarantees relating to the fundamental and other human rights and freedoms specifically mentioned in this Chapter shall not be regarded as excluding others not specifically mentioned.’ In Uganda Law Society and 12 others v Attorney General (13 February 2024), the Constitutional Court invoked Article 45 and held that the list of prohibited grounds under Article 21(3) is not exhaustive. In this article, the author relies on the drafting history of Article 21(3), the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court on Article 21(3) and the literal interpretation of Article 21(3) to argue that the list of prohibited grounds in Article 21(3) is exhaustive and that the Constitutional Court erred when it held to the contrary. The author argues further that Article 45 should not be relied on to read rights into the Constitution. It should be applicable to statutory or common law rights.","PeriodicalId":42250,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Discrimination and the Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140674471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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