The danger to highway safety posed by the intoxicated driver has been the subject of much recent attention from law enforcement agencies and others. One of the most controversial procedures developed to combat this problem is the sobriety checkpoint. These checkpoints allow police officers to inspect the drivers who pass through them and to examine the viewable contents of their cars in order to check for signs of intoxication.The chief constitutional concern raised by sobriety checkpoints is that although automobile stops occurring at these checkpoints constitute seizures for purposes of the fourth amendment, these seizures are allowed without requiring that police first observe suspicious conduct on the part of the driver. Advocates of sobriety checkpoints respond to this concern by pointing to dictum in the 1979 Supreme Court decision, Delaware v. Prouse. After prohibiting the police procedure of randomly stopping vehicles to inspect for driver's licenses and automobile registrations, the Prouse Court commented, "This holding does not preclude...States from developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative."This article suggests that the dictum in Prouse, when viewed in its proper context, has no application to sobriety checkpoints. A careful application of accepted constitutional principles to sobriety checkpoints demonstrates that the absence of a requirement of particularized suspicion causes these roadblock operations to fail the fourth amendment test of reasonableness. This test of reasonableness requires a balancing of the degree of intrusiveness against the government's interest in using the law enforcement procedure in question.This article will first discuss the type and degree of intrusion produced by sobriety checkpoints on constitutionally protected interests. It will then assess the significance of the requirement of particularized suspicion in ensuring that these constitutional protections are maintained. Next, it will examine those instances in which the Supreme Court has permitted incursions into areas protected by the fourth amendment without requiring the existence of particularized suspicion. The Court's criteria in determining the degree of intrusion to the individual and the nature of the government interest will then be applied to sobriety checkpoints. This approach will lead to a determination of whether sobriety checkpoints satisfy the fourth amendment's requirement of reasonableness.
{"title":"Sobriety Checkpoints: Roadblocks to Fourth Amendment Protections","authors":"S. Grossman","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1413934","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1413934","url":null,"abstract":"The danger to highway safety posed by the intoxicated driver has been the subject of much recent attention from law enforcement agencies and others. One of the most controversial procedures developed to combat this problem is the sobriety checkpoint. These checkpoints allow police officers to inspect the drivers who pass through them and to examine the viewable contents of their cars in order to check for signs of intoxication.The chief constitutional concern raised by sobriety checkpoints is that although automobile stops occurring at these checkpoints constitute seizures for purposes of the fourth amendment, these seizures are allowed without requiring that police first observe suspicious conduct on the part of the driver. Advocates of sobriety checkpoints respond to this concern by pointing to dictum in the 1979 Supreme Court decision, Delaware v. Prouse. After prohibiting the police procedure of randomly stopping vehicles to inspect for driver's licenses and automobile registrations, the Prouse Court commented, \"This holding does not preclude...States from developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative.\"This article suggests that the dictum in Prouse, when viewed in its proper context, has no application to sobriety checkpoints. A careful application of accepted constitutional principles to sobriety checkpoints demonstrates that the absence of a requirement of particularized suspicion causes these roadblock operations to fail the fourth amendment test of reasonableness. This test of reasonableness requires a balancing of the degree of intrusiveness against the government's interest in using the law enforcement procedure in question.This article will first discuss the type and degree of intrusion produced by sobriety checkpoints on constitutionally protected interests. It will then assess the significance of the requirement of particularized suspicion in ensuring that these constitutional protections are maintained. Next, it will examine those instances in which the Supreme Court has permitted incursions into areas protected by the fourth amendment without requiring the existence of particularized suspicion. The Court's criteria in determining the degree of intrusion to the individual and the nature of the government interest will then be applied to sobriety checkpoints. This approach will lead to a determination of whether sobriety checkpoints satisfy the fourth amendment's requirement of reasonableness.","PeriodicalId":423661,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Criminal Procedure (Topic)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1984-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125939209","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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