The decision of HMG to cease UKEF support for the fossil fuel energy sector is a signal achievement in global climate finance. It demonstrates the ambition of the UK – post-Brexit, and post-pandemic – to lead international on climate action. In order to deliver on that ambition important practical issues require consideration. First, how can the decision be implemented such as to maximise its credibility and impact, both domestically and internationally? A central issue to implementation is the imperative to avoid the regulatory displacement of finance from UKEF to other UK public finance entities, such as CDC group and PIDG. More ambitiously, if the UK and other similarly situated jurisdictions are to genuinely become a Paris aligned low carbon economy and society, there is a need to understand the role that GGR (greenhouse gas removal technologies) have to play in the process. A complex matter involving climate finance, but also moral hazard and innovation policy, GGR will be a central plank to going beyond ‘do no harm’ and delivering transformation.
{"title":"Export Credit Agencies: Fossil Fuel Exclusion Policies, Paris Alignment, and Role as Transformational Actors","authors":"N. Ghaleigh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3784752","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3784752","url":null,"abstract":"The decision of HMG to cease UKEF support for the fossil fuel energy sector is a signal achievement in global climate finance. It demonstrates the ambition of the UK – post-Brexit, and post-pandemic – to lead international on climate action. In order to deliver on that ambition important practical issues require consideration. First, how can the decision be implemented such as to maximise its credibility and impact, both domestically and internationally? A central issue to implementation is the imperative to avoid the regulatory displacement of finance from UKEF to other UK public finance entities, such as CDC group and PIDG. More ambitiously, if the UK and other similarly situated jurisdictions are to genuinely become a Paris aligned low carbon economy and society, there is a need to understand the role that GGR (greenhouse gas removal technologies) have to play in the process. A complex matter involving climate finance, but also moral hazard and innovation policy, GGR will be a central plank to going beyond ‘do no harm’ and delivering transformation.","PeriodicalId":423701,"journal":{"name":"AARN: International Law (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132999539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
States across Asia have long engaged in international investment treaty making, and to a lesser extent in investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) proceedings. Engagement has intensified partly as bilateral investment treaties (BITs) proliferated especially from the 1990s, but also Asian states started to conclude more comprehensive bilateral and then regional free trade agreements (FTAs), including within and with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Some nations have been more cautious historically, and recent experiences with ISDS claims have led Indonesia and especially India to terminate many old BITs and press out in new directions. This paper details Asia’s trajectory towards becoming more of a “law maker” by focusing on multilateral initiatives (through soft and hard law), ASEAN and its key member states, China and the “Belt and Road” initiative, India, Japan and Korea, Australia and New Zealand.
{"title":"International Investment Agreements and Investor-State Arbitration in Asia","authors":"Vivienne Bath, L. Nottage","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3544458","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3544458","url":null,"abstract":"States across Asia have long engaged in international investment treaty making, and to a lesser extent in investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) proceedings. Engagement has intensified partly as bilateral investment treaties (BITs) proliferated especially from the 1990s, but also Asian states started to conclude more comprehensive bilateral and then regional free trade agreements (FTAs), including within and with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Some nations have been more cautious historically, and recent experiences with ISDS claims have led Indonesia and especially India to terminate many old BITs and press out in new directions. This paper details Asia’s trajectory towards becoming more of a “law maker” by focusing on multilateral initiatives (through soft and hard law), ASEAN and its key member states, China and the “Belt and Road” initiative, India, Japan and Korea, Australia and New Zealand.","PeriodicalId":423701,"journal":{"name":"AARN: International Law (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121499978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
One of the most longstanding and significant issues in the US-China trade war and international trade regulation in general has been the so-called ‘forced’ technology transfer. To contribute to the ongoing debate over this issue, this article reviews the role of technology transfer in the evolution of China’s foreign direct investment (‘FDI’) regime over the past four decades and shows that the use of foreign investment to promote diffusion of advanced technology and knowhow in the Chinese economy has long been rooted in the heart of China’s FDI policy and remains fundamental for China’s transformation to an innovative economy. This pursuit of economic upgrade and technological advancement is not illegitimate as it is common for countries to use similar policies for similar objectives at different stages of economic development. The question is whether China has done so in breach of its WTO obligations. To answer this question, this article examines China’s new FDI regime and argues that while China has removed the controversial provisions in the relevant legislations, the regime leaves flexibility for China to ‘force’ technology transfer in practice, particularly under the security review and retaliation mechanisms envisaged in the new Foreign Investment Law (FIL). It is submitted that the best way to address these outstanding challenges would be through the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) of the WTO as opposed to unilateral and confrontational approaches which have proven to be counter-productive. While WTO litigation is likely to be limited to ‘as applied’ claims in specific cases, systemic changes may result from a series of successful ‘piecemeal’ attacks over time. Given China’s broad WTO commitments on technology transfer, we call for an increasing use of the existing rules to address any laws and practices that ‘force’ technology transfer instead of negotiating new rules. Technology Transfer, China, Foreign Investment Law, National Security, WTO, Accession Protocol, US-China Trade War
{"title":"Technology Transfer under China’s Foreign Investment Regime: Does the WTO Provide a Solution?","authors":"Weihuan Zhou, huiqin jiang, Qingjiang Kong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3436484","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3436484","url":null,"abstract":"One of the most longstanding and significant issues in the US-China trade war and international trade regulation in general has been the so-called ‘forced’ technology transfer. To contribute to the ongoing debate over this issue, this article reviews the role of technology transfer in the evolution of China’s foreign direct investment (‘FDI’) regime over the past four decades and shows that the use of foreign investment to promote diffusion of advanced technology and knowhow in the Chinese economy has long been rooted in the heart of China’s FDI policy and remains fundamental for China’s transformation to an innovative economy. This pursuit of economic upgrade and technological advancement is not illegitimate as it is common for countries to use similar policies for similar objectives at different stages of economic development. The question is whether China has done so in breach of its WTO obligations. To answer this question, this article examines China’s new FDI regime and argues that while China has removed the controversial provisions in the relevant legislations, the regime leaves flexibility for China to ‘force’ technology transfer in practice, particularly under the security review and retaliation mechanisms envisaged in the new Foreign Investment Law (FIL). It is submitted that the best way to address these outstanding challenges would be through the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) of the WTO as opposed to unilateral and confrontational approaches which have proven to be counter-productive. While WTO litigation is likely to be limited to ‘as applied’ claims in specific cases, systemic changes may result from a series of successful ‘piecemeal’ attacks over time. Given China’s broad WTO commitments on technology transfer, we call for an increasing use of the existing rules to address any laws and practices that ‘force’ technology transfer instead of negotiating new rules.\u0000Technology Transfer, China, Foreign Investment Law, National Security, WTO, Accession Protocol, US-China Trade War","PeriodicalId":423701,"journal":{"name":"AARN: International Law (Topic)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128958519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This working paper examines the European Pillar of Social Rights' practical use in the context of European ‘soft’ governance. It studies how the EPSR has been deployed in the 2018 European Semester and suggests some areas for reform in order to enhance its role in coordinating social policy.
{"title":"A European Social Semester? The European Pillar of Social Rights in practice","authors":"Björn Hacker","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3402869","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3402869","url":null,"abstract":"This working paper examines the European Pillar of Social Rights' practical use in the context of European ‘soft’ governance. It studies how the EPSR has been deployed in the 2018 European Semester and suggests some areas for reform in order to enhance its role in coordinating social policy.","PeriodicalId":423701,"journal":{"name":"AARN: International Law (Topic)","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132401054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
China is incrementally developing a new, decentralized model of trade governance through a web of finance, trade, and investment initiatives involving memorandum of understanding, contracts, and trade and investment treaties, supported by an indigenous innovation policy that is transnational in its reach. In this way, China could create a vast, Sino-centric, legal order in which the Chinese state plays the nodal role. It is a hub and spokes model, with China at the hub. In this article, we first examine China’s export of an infrastructure-based development model, implemented through Chinese state-owned and private enterprise investments and commercial contracts (Part B), before turning to China’s development of a complementary web of free trade and investment agreements (Part C), and an indigenous innovation policy (Part D). The paper theorizes and empirically traces how these Chinese initiatives shape the evolving ecology of the transnational legal order for trade.
{"title":"A New Chinese Economic Order?","authors":"G. Shaffer, Henry Gao","doi":"10.1093/JIEL/JGAA013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JIEL/JGAA013","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 China is incrementally developing a new, decentralized model of trade governance through a web of finance, trade, and investment initiatives involving memorandum of understanding, contracts, and trade and investment treaties, supported by an indigenous innovation policy that is transnational in its reach. In this way, China could create a vast, Sino-centric, legal order in which the Chinese state plays the nodal role. It is a hub and spokes model, with China at the hub. In this article, we first examine China’s export of an infrastructure-based development model, implemented through Chinese state-owned and private enterprise investments and commercial contracts (Part B), before turning to China’s development of a complementary web of free trade and investment agreements (Part C), and an indigenous innovation policy (Part D). The paper theorizes and empirically traces how these Chinese initiatives shape the evolving ecology of the transnational legal order for trade.","PeriodicalId":423701,"journal":{"name":"AARN: International Law (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131723008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Following a series of cases brought against Italy in relation to non-conviction based confiscation, the European Court of Human Rights engaged in a judicial dialogue with the Italian Constitutional Court over the correct interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights and in particular Article 7. This article elaborates on the background of this dialogue and analyses the European Court's position in its most recent judgement in this saga: GIEM and Others v Italy.
{"title":"The Dialogue between the ECHR and the Italian Constitutional Court: The Saga of 'Giem and Others V Italy","authors":"I. Motoc, Markos Volikas","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3336144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3336144","url":null,"abstract":"Following a series of cases brought against Italy in relation to non-conviction based confiscation, the European Court of Human Rights engaged in a judicial dialogue with the Italian Constitutional Court over the correct interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights and in particular Article 7. This article elaborates on the background of this dialogue and analyses the European Court's position in its most recent judgement in this saga: GIEM and Others v Italy.","PeriodicalId":423701,"journal":{"name":"AARN: International Law (Topic)","volume":"302 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114819444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The selection process for non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) consists of nomination and election stages. Although a great deal of research has explored the determinants of nominees and elected members, far less effort has been expended on identifying the determinants of candidates. This article conducts the first empirical analysis of the nomination process by focusing on the Asia-Pacific Group for the period 1990-2013. I demonstrate that pre-existing practices within regional groups significantly affect countries’ decisions to run and the degrees to which the preferences of UN members come into play. In the Arab Group, where countries have developed a pattern of rotation, the number of years countries have been waiting outside the UNSC is the only determinant of running for election. In contrast, in the Non-Arab Group, where pre-election contests have been observed frequently, countries’ expectations regarding the likelihood of winning at the General Assembly largely shape their decisions to run. However, the expected high returns from temporary membership occasionally drive members to make a bid despite their seemingly low probability of winning.
{"title":"Regional Caucus Groupings and the Nomination Process for Non-Permanent Members","authors":"Yukari Iwanami","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3169142","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3169142","url":null,"abstract":"The selection process for non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) consists of nomination and election stages. Although a great deal of research has explored the determinants of nominees and elected members, far less effort has been expended on identifying the determinants of candidates. This article conducts the first empirical analysis of the nomination process by focusing on the Asia-Pacific Group for the period 1990-2013. I demonstrate that pre-existing practices within regional groups significantly affect countries’ decisions to run and the degrees to which the preferences of UN members come into play. In the Arab Group, where countries have developed a pattern of rotation, the number of years countries have been waiting outside the UNSC is the only determinant of running for election. In contrast, in the Non-Arab Group, where pre-election contests have been observed frequently, countries’ expectations regarding the likelihood of winning at the General Assembly largely shape their decisions to run. However, the expected high returns from temporary membership occasionally drive members to make a bid despite their seemingly low probability of winning.","PeriodicalId":423701,"journal":{"name":"AARN: International Law (Topic)","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122532536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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