Abstract Pandemics present two emergencies: a war against a pathogen and an economic recession. Historically, the US has been forced to relax its antitrust enforcement policies during its largest wartime mobilizations in order to urgently produce goods and services needed in the war effort. Likewise, when the COVID-19 pandemic began, companies should have been allowed to collaborate with each other and with the US government to adequately respond to the increased demand for healthcare goods and services. Guidance from antitrust agencies during the coronavirus pandemic suggested a willingness to allow such collaborations, but the guidance lacked specificity. This article suggests specific policies that the antitrust agencies should implement during pandemics in order to give companies confidence that they can legally engage in collaborations that will hasten the production and distribution of urgently needed healthcare goods and services. However, relaxing antitrust laws has historically caused and prolonged economic downturns. Thus, during a pandemic, the federal government should relax antitrust laws, but that relaxation could exacerbate the inevitable economic downturn caused by social distancing policies. Accordingly, this article suggests how the US government could use non-antitrust regulations to mitigate the systemic financial risk created by that relaxation in antitrust laws.
{"title":"Competition policy during pandemics: how to urgently produce healthcare goods and services while avoiding economic disaster","authors":"Nicolo Banks","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnab005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnab005","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Pandemics present two emergencies: a war against a pathogen and an economic recession. Historically, the US has been forced to relax its antitrust enforcement policies during its largest wartime mobilizations in order to urgently produce goods and services needed in the war effort. Likewise, when the COVID-19 pandemic began, companies should have been allowed to collaborate with each other and with the US government to adequately respond to the increased demand for healthcare goods and services. Guidance from antitrust agencies during the coronavirus pandemic suggested a willingness to allow such collaborations, but the guidance lacked specificity. This article suggests specific policies that the antitrust agencies should implement during pandemics in order to give companies confidence that they can legally engage in collaborations that will hasten the production and distribution of urgently needed healthcare goods and services. However, relaxing antitrust laws has historically caused and prolonged economic downturns. Thus, during a pandemic, the federal government should relax antitrust laws, but that relaxation could exacerbate the inevitable economic downturn caused by social distancing policies. Accordingly, this article suggests how the US government could use non-antitrust regulations to mitigate the systemic financial risk created by that relaxation in antitrust laws.","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45174524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Following the rules to the wrong path","authors":"P. F. D. Azevedo","doi":"10.1093/JAENFO/JNAB006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JAENFO/JNAB006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JAENFO/JNAB006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49253193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
After years of debate, Hong Kong’s new competition law, the Competition Ordinance (CO), took effect in December 2015. Laying out rules to support competitive markets and creating the institutions to administer and enforce those rules, the CO is a modern competition law in many respects, following many best-practices and respecting recent learning in competition economics. This article argues, however, that—at least from an economist’s perspective—in its drafting a series of decisions were made that weaken the law. None is that unusual or critical on its own, however collectively they leave the law less powerful than competition enthusiasts might desire in a modern market economy. We discuss the implications of these decisions and go on to consider some other more unique aspects of the law that might need reconsideration at some point. Finally, we document and discuss the early activities of the Competition Commission of Hong Kong. We conclude that Hong Kong is off to a good start with its new law and its enforcement but that several reforms have the potential to bring a more robust competition policy regime.
{"title":"Toward a more robust competition policy regime for Hong Kong","authors":"P. Lin, T. W. Ross","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnaa039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnaa039","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 After years of debate, Hong Kong’s new competition law, the Competition Ordinance (CO), took effect in December 2015. Laying out rules to support competitive markets and creating the institutions to administer and enforce those rules, the CO is a modern competition law in many respects, following many best-practices and respecting recent learning in competition economics. This article argues, however, that—at least from an economist’s perspective—in its drafting a series of decisions were made that weaken the law. None is that unusual or critical on its own, however collectively they leave the law less powerful than competition enthusiasts might desire in a modern market economy. We discuss the implications of these decisions and go on to consider some other more unique aspects of the law that might need reconsideration at some point. Finally, we document and discuss the early activities of the Competition Commission of Hong Kong. We conclude that Hong Kong is off to a good start with its new law and its enforcement but that several reforms have the potential to bring a more robust competition policy regime.","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":"9 1","pages":"109-134"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/jaenfo/jnaa039","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48469646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many of the traditional tools used by competition authorities to assess relevant markets or the intensity of competition between firms are difficult to use or inadequate to assess competition issues between ecosystems in the digital world. Further economic thinking and an understanding of the business models of ecosystems are required to allow competition authorities to make informed and relevant decisions about competition on digital markets. This article reviews some of the challenges they face.
{"title":"Changing the way we think: competition, platforms and ecosystems","authors":"F. Jenny","doi":"10.1093/JAENFO/JNAB003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JAENFO/JNAB003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Many of the traditional tools used by competition authorities to assess relevant markets or the intensity of competition between firms are difficult to use or inadequate to assess competition issues between ecosystems in the digital world. Further economic thinking and an understanding of the business models of ecosystems are required to allow competition authorities to make informed and relevant decisions about competition on digital markets. This article reviews some of the challenges they face.","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48694854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the originally published version of this manuscript, important author amendments were inadvertently omitted prior to publishing. Oxford University Press acknowledges the error and would like to apologize. The errors have now been corrected online.
{"title":"The role of economics and the type of legal standards in antitrust enforcement by DGCOMP: an empirical investigation","authors":"Katsoulacos Y, Makri G.","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnab001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnab001","url":null,"abstract":"<span>In the originally published version of this manuscript, important author amendments were inadvertently omitted prior to publishing. Oxford University Press acknowledges the error and would like to apologize. The errors have now been corrected online.</span>","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":"37 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138512391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Grab–Uber merger: challenges faced by a young competition agency","authors":"John Arvin Bernabe","doi":"10.1093/JAENFO/JNAA050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JAENFO/JNAA050","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":"8 1","pages":"627-637"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43878773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The instrument of concurrency, whereby UK regulatory authorities share and often, in practice, lead in the application of competition policy, is an important feature of the UK competition law regime. Several studies examined its pros and cons from a theoretical perspective. This is the first article to take a different approach and critically assesses Ofcom’s application of its concurrent competition law powers to the telecoms sector. This review identifies a number of shortfalls and provides several recommendations on how Ofcom could improve its record in applying its competition law powers to the telecoms sector to benefit consumers. This raises some serious questions as to whether concurrency improves the application of competition law.
{"title":"Ofcom’s record as a competition authority: an assessment of decisions in telecoms","authors":"Crocioni P.","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnaa057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnaa057","url":null,"abstract":"<span><div>ABSTRACT</div>The instrument of concurrency, whereby UK regulatory authorities share and often, in practice, lead in the application of competition policy, is an important feature of the UK competition law regime. Several studies examined its pros and cons from a theoretical perspective. This is the first article to take a different approach and critically assesses Ofcom’s application of its concurrent competition law powers to the telecoms sector. This review identifies a number of shortfalls and provides several recommendations on how Ofcom could improve its record in applying its competition law powers to the telecoms sector to benefit consumers. This raises some serious questions as to whether concurrency improves the application of competition law.</span>","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":"32 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138512384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The correct welfare assessment of vertical agreements in competition law is a difficult craft. The more mature jurisdictions such as the EU and the US have struggled to develop the optimal framework. This article scrutinizes vertical agreements cases of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) that is now 11 years old. The objective is to assist the CCI in strengthening its legal and economic framework vis-à-vis vertical agreements in its formative stage. The scrutiny of some leading cases revealed three types of infirmities in CCI’s cases. First, there are some legal ambiguities in the interpretation of the legislation. Secondly, the economic analysis is largely incoherent and truncated. Thirdly, there is a visible overreliance on the EU jurisprudence that does not conform to the legislative scheme of the Indian Competition Act, 2002. The article draws out some lessons towards the end.
{"title":"Vertical restraints under Indian Competition Law: whither law and economics","authors":"Vikas Kathuria","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnab002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnab002","url":null,"abstract":"The correct welfare assessment of vertical agreements in competition law is a difficult craft. The more mature jurisdictions such as the EU and the US have struggled to develop the optimal framework. This article scrutinizes vertical agreements cases of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) that is now 11 years old. The objective is to assist the CCI in strengthening its legal and economic framework vis-à-vis vertical agreements in its formative stage. The scrutiny of some leading cases revealed three types of infirmities in CCI’s cases. First, there are some legal ambiguities in the interpretation of the legislation. Secondly, the economic analysis is largely incoherent and truncated. Thirdly, there is a visible overreliance on the EU jurisprudence that does not conform to the legislative scheme of the Indian Competition Act, 2002. The article draws out some lessons towards the end.","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":"32 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138512385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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