Database-driven spectrum access is regarded as an effective spectrum redistribution mechanism. However, dialoguing with the spectrum database requires both primary and secondary users to reveal their sensitive data to the spectrum database manager (SDM), leading to serious privacy concerns. In this paper, we show that the SDM can perform database operations (both updates and queries) without knowing any information about the users' sensitive inputs and the database contents, by combining garbled circuits and secret sharing. Our design uses data-oblivious sorting networks to leverage parallelism of query operations, yielding an efficient query algorithm. We further combine secure computations with authentication techniques to get a verification mechanism for correctness checking. As far as we know, our proposal is the first secure and verifiable database-driven spectrum sharing scheme protecting both primary users' (PUs') and secondary users' (SUs') privacies. Finally, we fully implement our system, and demonstrate that even on commodity PC, our implementation suffers mild performance overhead.
{"title":"Towards Secure and Verifiable Database-Driven Spectrum Sharing","authors":"Zhili Chen, Lin Chen, Hong Zhong","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2017.17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2017.17","url":null,"abstract":"Database-driven spectrum access is regarded as an effective spectrum redistribution mechanism. However, dialoguing with the spectrum database requires both primary and secondary users to reveal their sensitive data to the spectrum database manager (SDM), leading to serious privacy concerns. In this paper, we show that the SDM can perform database operations (both updates and queries) without knowing any information about the users' sensitive inputs and the database contents, by combining garbled circuits and secret sharing. Our design uses data-oblivious sorting networks to leverage parallelism of query operations, yielding an efficient query algorithm. We further combine secure computations with authentication techniques to get a verification mechanism for correctness checking. As far as we know, our proposal is the first secure and verifiable database-driven spectrum sharing scheme protecting both primary users' (PUs') and secondary users' (SUs') privacies. Finally, we fully implement our system, and demonstrate that even on commodity PC, our implementation suffers mild performance overhead.","PeriodicalId":426928,"journal":{"name":"2017 47th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128139414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Reliable and highly available computer networks must implement resilient fast rerouting mechanisms: upon a link or node failure, an alternative route is determined quickly, without involving the network control plane. Designing such fast failover mechanisms capable of dealing with multiple concurrent failures however is challenging, as failover rules need to be installed proactively, i.e., ahead of time, without knowledge of the actual failures happening at runtime. Indeed, only little is known today about the design of resilient routing algorithms. This paper presents a deterministic local failover mechanism which we prove to result in a minimum network load for a wide range of communication patterns, solving an open problem. Our mechanism relies on the key insight that resilient routing essentially constitutes a distributed algorithm without coordination. Accordingly, we build upon the theory of combinatorial designs and develop a novel deterministic failover mechanism based on symmetric block design theory which tolerates a maximal number of Ω(n) link failures in an n-node network and in the worst-case, while always ensuring routing connectivity. In particular, we show that at least Ω(ϕ2) link failures are needed to generate a maximum link load of at least ϕ, which matches an existing bound on the number of link failures needed for an optimal failover scheme. We complement our formal analysis with simulations, showing that our approach outperforms prior schemes not only in the worst-case.
{"title":"Load-Optimal Local Fast Rerouting for Resilient Networks","authors":"Y. Pignolet, S. Schmid, Gilles Trédan","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2017.43","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2017.43","url":null,"abstract":"Reliable and highly available computer networks must implement resilient fast rerouting mechanisms: upon a link or node failure, an alternative route is determined quickly, without involving the network control plane. Designing such fast failover mechanisms capable of dealing with multiple concurrent failures however is challenging, as failover rules need to be installed proactively, i.e., ahead of time, without knowledge of the actual failures happening at runtime. Indeed, only little is known today about the design of resilient routing algorithms. This paper presents a deterministic local failover mechanism which we prove to result in a minimum network load for a wide range of communication patterns, solving an open problem. Our mechanism relies on the key insight that resilient routing essentially constitutes a distributed algorithm without coordination. Accordingly, we build upon the theory of combinatorial designs and develop a novel deterministic failover mechanism based on symmetric block design theory which tolerates a maximal number of Ω(n) link failures in an n-node network and in the worst-case, while always ensuring routing connectivity. In particular, we show that at least Ω(ϕ2) link failures are needed to generate a maximum link load of at least ϕ, which matches an existing bound on the number of link failures needed for an optimal failover scheme. We complement our formal analysis with simulations, showing that our approach outperforms prior schemes not only in the worst-case.","PeriodicalId":426928,"journal":{"name":"2017 47th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133946359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
William H. Hawkins, Jason Hiser, M. Co, A. Nguyen-Tuong, J. Davidson
To quickly patch security vulnerabilities there has been keen interest in securing binaries in situ. Unfortunately, the state of the art in static binary rewriting does not allow the transformed program to be both space and time efficient. A primary limitation is that leading static rewriters require that the original copy of the code remains in the transformed binary, thereby incurring file size overhead of at least 100%. This paper presents Zipr, a static binary rewriter that removes this limitation and enables both space and time efficient transformation of arbitrary binaries. We describe results from applying Zipr in the DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge (CGC), the first fully automated cyber-hacking contest. The CGC rules penalized competitors for producing a patched binary whose on-disk size was 20% larger than the original, whose CPU utilization was 5% more than the original, and whose memory use was 5% more than the original. Zipr's efficiency enabled our automated system, Xandra, to apply both code diversity and control flow integrity security techniques to secure challenge binaries provided by DARPA, resulting in Xandra having the best security score in the competition, remaining within the required space and time performance envelope, and winning a $1M cash prize.
{"title":"Zipr: Efficient Static Binary Rewriting for Security","authors":"William H. Hawkins, Jason Hiser, M. Co, A. Nguyen-Tuong, J. Davidson","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2017.27","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2017.27","url":null,"abstract":"To quickly patch security vulnerabilities there has been keen interest in securing binaries in situ. Unfortunately, the state of the art in static binary rewriting does not allow the transformed program to be both space and time efficient. A primary limitation is that leading static rewriters require that the original copy of the code remains in the transformed binary, thereby incurring file size overhead of at least 100%. This paper presents Zipr, a static binary rewriter that removes this limitation and enables both space and time efficient transformation of arbitrary binaries. We describe results from applying Zipr in the DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge (CGC), the first fully automated cyber-hacking contest. The CGC rules penalized competitors for producing a patched binary whose on-disk size was 20% larger than the original, whose CPU utilization was 5% more than the original, and whose memory use was 5% more than the original. Zipr's efficiency enabled our automated system, Xandra, to apply both code diversity and control flow integrity security techniques to secure challenge binaries provided by DARPA, resulting in Xandra having the best security score in the competition, remaining within the required space and time performance envelope, and winning a $1M cash prize.","PeriodicalId":426928,"journal":{"name":"2017 47th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128569525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
D. D. Dunn, S. Mitchell, Imran Sajjad, Ryan M. Gerdes, Rajnikant Sharma, Ming Li
We show that a stream of automated vehicles traveling along the highway can be destabilized to catastrophic effect through modification of the control laws of individual vehicles. Specifically, one active attacker who introduces errors, in addition to one or many passive attackers who amplify the error, may, by the modification of a single parameter, induce oscillatory traffic jams that cause delay, driver discomfort, excess energy expenditure, and increased risk of accidents that could result in serious injury or death. We determine the conditions under which an attacker(s) is able to violate the primary design criterion of automated vehicle streams, known as string stability, to guarantee system instability. Furthermore, we prove that once the stream has been destabilized it will continually deviate from the desired state, even in the absence of additional input to the system—i.e. the jammed condition will self-perpetuate. Through a comparison with a behavioral human driver model, this work demonstrates that automated vehicle systems are more vulnerable to disruption than their non-automated counterparts. The postulated attack is demonstrated on a scaled system and identification of attackers is discussed.
{"title":"Regular: Attacker-Induced Traffic Flow Instability in a Stream of Semi-Automated Vehicles","authors":"D. D. Dunn, S. Mitchell, Imran Sajjad, Ryan M. Gerdes, Rajnikant Sharma, Ming Li","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2017.61","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2017.61","url":null,"abstract":"We show that a stream of automated vehicles traveling along the highway can be destabilized to catastrophic effect through modification of the control laws of individual vehicles. Specifically, one active attacker who introduces errors, in addition to one or many passive attackers who amplify the error, may, by the modification of a single parameter, induce oscillatory traffic jams that cause delay, driver discomfort, excess energy expenditure, and increased risk of accidents that could result in serious injury or death. We determine the conditions under which an attacker(s) is able to violate the primary design criterion of automated vehicle streams, known as string stability, to guarantee system instability. Furthermore, we prove that once the stream has been destabilized it will continually deviate from the desired state, even in the absence of additional input to the system—i.e. the jammed condition will self-perpetuate. Through a comparison with a behavioral human driver model, this work demonstrates that automated vehicle systems are more vulnerable to disruption than their non-automated counterparts. The postulated attack is demonstrated on a scaled system and identification of attackers is discussed.","PeriodicalId":426928,"journal":{"name":"2017 47th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124496767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Md. Endadul Hoque, Omar Chowdhury, Sze Yiu Chau, C. Nita-Rotaru, Ninghui Li
Network protocol implementations must comply with their specifications that include properties describing the correct operational behavior of the protocol in response to different temporal orderings of network events. Due to inconsistent interpretations of the specification, developers can unknowingly introduce semantic bugs, which cause the implementations to violate the respective properties. Detecting such bugs in stateful protocols becomes significantly difficult as their operations depend on their internal state machines and the complex interactions between the protocol logic. In this paper, we present an automated tool to help developers analyze their protocol implementations and detect semantic bugs violating the temporal properties of the protocols. Given an implementation, our tool (1) extracts the implemented finite state machine (FSM) of the protocol from the source code by symbolically exploring the code and (2) determines whether the extracted FSM violates given temporal properties by using an off-the-shelf model checker. We demonstrated the efficacy of our tool by applying it on 6 protocol implementations. We detected 11 semantic bugs (2 with security implications) when we analyzed these implementations against properties obtained from their publicly available specifications.
{"title":"Analyzing Operational Behavior of Stateful Protocol Implementations for Detecting Semantic Bugs","authors":"Md. Endadul Hoque, Omar Chowdhury, Sze Yiu Chau, C. Nita-Rotaru, Ninghui Li","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2017.36","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2017.36","url":null,"abstract":"Network protocol implementations must comply with their specifications that include properties describing the correct operational behavior of the protocol in response to different temporal orderings of network events. Due to inconsistent interpretations of the specification, developers can unknowingly introduce semantic bugs, which cause the implementations to violate the respective properties. Detecting such bugs in stateful protocols becomes significantly difficult as their operations depend on their internal state machines and the complex interactions between the protocol logic. In this paper, we present an automated tool to help developers analyze their protocol implementations and detect semantic bugs violating the temporal properties of the protocols. Given an implementation, our tool (1) extracts the implemented finite state machine (FSM) of the protocol from the source code by symbolically exploring the code and (2) determines whether the extracted FSM violates given temporal properties by using an off-the-shelf model checker. We demonstrated the efficacy of our tool by applying it on 6 protocol implementations. We detected 11 semantic bugs (2 with security implications) when we analyzed these implementations against properties obtained from their publicly available specifications.","PeriodicalId":426928,"journal":{"name":"2017 47th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123961934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We revisit the problem of preserving causality in Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) atomic broadcast protocols, a requirement first proposed by Reiter and Birman (TOPLAS 1994). While over the past three decades, this requirement has been met through the deployment of expensive public-key threshold cryptosystems, we propose three novel, secure causal BFT protocols without using public-key cryptography. We implement and evaluate these protocols, showing that they significantly outperform existing constructions that use threshold cryptosystems.
{"title":"Secure Causal Atomic Broadcast, Revisited","authors":"Sisi Duan, M. Reiter, Haibin Zhang","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2017.64","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2017.64","url":null,"abstract":"We revisit the problem of preserving causality in Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) atomic broadcast protocols, a requirement first proposed by Reiter and Birman (TOPLAS 1994). While over the past three decades, this requirement has been met through the deployment of expensive public-key threshold cryptosystems, we propose three novel, secure causal BFT protocols without using public-key cryptography. We implement and evaluate these protocols, showing that they significantly outperform existing constructions that use threshold cryptosystems.","PeriodicalId":426928,"journal":{"name":"2017 47th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128361463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent studies have shown that technology and voltage scaling are expected to increase the likelihood that particle-induced soft errors manifest as multiple-bit errors. This raises concerns about the validity of using single bit-flips for assessing the impact of soft errors in fault injection experiments. The goal of this paper is to investigate whether multiple-bit errors could cause a higher percentage of silent data corruptions (SDCs) compared to single-bit errors. Based on 2700 fault injection campaigns with 15 benchmark programs, featuring a total of 27 million experiments, our results show that single-bit errors in most cases yields a higher percentage of SDCs compared to multiple-bit errors. However, in 8% of the campaigns we observed a higher percentage of SDCs for multiple-bit errors. For most of these campaigns, the highest percentage of SDCs was obtained by flipping at most 3 bits. Moreover, we propose three ways of pruning the error space based on the results.
{"title":"One Bit is (Not) Enough: An Empirical Study of the Impact of Single and Multiple Bit-Flip Errors","authors":"B. Sangchoolie, K. Pattabiraman, J. Karlsson","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2017.30","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2017.30","url":null,"abstract":"Recent studies have shown that technology and voltage scaling are expected to increase the likelihood that particle-induced soft errors manifest as multiple-bit errors. This raises concerns about the validity of using single bit-flips for assessing the impact of soft errors in fault injection experiments. The goal of this paper is to investigate whether multiple-bit errors could cause a higher percentage of silent data corruptions (SDCs) compared to single-bit errors. Based on 2700 fault injection campaigns with 15 benchmark programs, featuring a total of 27 million experiments, our results show that single-bit errors in most cases yields a higher percentage of SDCs compared to multiple-bit errors. However, in 8% of the campaigns we observed a higher percentage of SDCs for multiple-bit errors. For most of these campaigns, the highest percentage of SDCs was obtained by flipping at most 3 bits. Moreover, we propose three ways of pruning the error space based on the results.","PeriodicalId":426928,"journal":{"name":"2017 47th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126645402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we present a large-scale study of global trends in software download events, with an analysis of both benign and malicious downloads, and a categorization of events for which no ground truth is currently available. Our measurement study is based on a unique, real-world dataset collected at Trend Micro containing more than 3 million in-the-wild web-based software download events involving hundreds of thousands of Internet machines, collected over a period of seven months. Somewhat surprisingly, we found that despite our best efforts and the use of multiple sources of ground truth, more than 83% of all downloaded software files remain unknown, i.e. cannot be classified as benign or malicious, even two years after they were first observed. If we consider the number of machines that have downloaded at least one unknown file, we find that more than 69% of the entire machine/user population downloaded one or more unknown software file. Because the accuracy of malware detection systems reported in the academic literature is typically assessed only over software files that can be labeled, our findings raise concerns on their actual effectiveness in large-scale real-world deployments, and on their ability to defend the majority of Internet machines from infection. To better understand what these unknown software files may be, we perform a detailed analysis of their properties. We then explore whether it is possible to extend the labeling of software downloads by building a rule-based system that automatically learns from the available ground truth and can be used to identify many more benign and malicious files with very high confidence. This allows us to greatly expand the number of software files that can be labeled with high confidence, thus providing results that can benefit the evaluation of future malware detection systems.
{"title":"Exploring the Long Tail of (Malicious) Software Downloads","authors":"Babak Rahbarinia, Marco Balduzzi, R. Perdisci","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2017.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2017.19","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we present a large-scale study of global trends in software download events, with an analysis of both benign and malicious downloads, and a categorization of events for which no ground truth is currently available. Our measurement study is based on a unique, real-world dataset collected at Trend Micro containing more than 3 million in-the-wild web-based software download events involving hundreds of thousands of Internet machines, collected over a period of seven months. Somewhat surprisingly, we found that despite our best efforts and the use of multiple sources of ground truth, more than 83% of all downloaded software files remain unknown, i.e. cannot be classified as benign or malicious, even two years after they were first observed. If we consider the number of machines that have downloaded at least one unknown file, we find that more than 69% of the entire machine/user population downloaded one or more unknown software file. Because the accuracy of malware detection systems reported in the academic literature is typically assessed only over software files that can be labeled, our findings raise concerns on their actual effectiveness in large-scale real-world deployments, and on their ability to defend the majority of Internet machines from infection. To better understand what these unknown software files may be, we perform a detailed analysis of their properties. We then explore whether it is possible to extend the labeling of software downloads by building a rule-based system that automatically learns from the available ground truth and can be used to identify many more benign and malicious files with very high confidence. This allows us to greatly expand the number of software files that can be labeled with high confidence, thus providing results that can benefit the evaluation of future malware detection systems.","PeriodicalId":426928,"journal":{"name":"2017 47th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130017308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Concolic execution has achieved great success in many binary analysis tasks. However, it is still not a primary option for industrial usage. A well-known reason is that concolic execution cannot scale up to large-size programs. Many research efforts have focused on improving its scalability. Nonetheless, we find that, even when processing small-size programs, concolic execution suffers a great deal from the accuracy and scalability issues. This paper systematically investigates the challenges that can be introduced even by small-size programs, such as symbolic array and symbolic jump. We further verify that the proposed challenges are non-trivial via real-world experiments with three most popular concolic execution tools: BAP, Triton, and Angr. Among a set of 22 logic bombs we designed, Angr can solve only four cases correctly, while BAP and Triton perform much worse. The results imply that current tools are still primitive for practical industrial usage. We summarize the reasons and release the bombs as open source to facilitate further study.
{"title":"Concolic Execution on Small-Size Binaries: Challenges and Empirical Study","authors":"Hui Xu, Yangfan Zhou, Yu Kang, Michael R. Lyu","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2017.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2017.11","url":null,"abstract":"Concolic execution has achieved great success in many binary analysis tasks. However, it is still not a primary option for industrial usage. A well-known reason is that concolic execution cannot scale up to large-size programs. Many research efforts have focused on improving its scalability. Nonetheless, we find that, even when processing small-size programs, concolic execution suffers a great deal from the accuracy and scalability issues. This paper systematically investigates the challenges that can be introduced even by small-size programs, such as symbolic array and symbolic jump. We further verify that the proposed challenges are non-trivial via real-world experiments with three most popular concolic execution tools: BAP, Triton, and Angr. Among a set of 22 logic bombs we designed, Angr can solve only four cases correctly, while BAP and Triton perform much worse. The results imply that current tools are still primitive for practical industrial usage. We summarize the reasons and release the bombs as open source to facilitate further study.","PeriodicalId":426928,"journal":{"name":"2017 47th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"252 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122707709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ibéria Medeiros, Miguel Beatriz, N. Neves, M. Correia
Despite the significant efforts put in building more secure web applications, cases of high impact breaches continue to appear. Vulnerabilities in web applications are often created due to inconsistencies in the way SQL queries are believed to be run and the way they are actually executed by a Database Management System (DBMS). This paper presents a demonstration of SEPTIC, a mechanism that detects and blocks injection attacks inside the DBMS. The demonstration considers a scenario of a non-trivial PHP web application, backed by a MySQL DBMS, which was modified to include SEPTIC. It presents how SEPTIC blocks injection attacks without compromising the application correctness and performance. In addition, SEPTIC is compared to alternative approaches, such as sanitizations carried out with standard functions provided language and a web application firewall.
{"title":"Demonstrating a Tool for Injection Attack Prevention in MySQL","authors":"Ibéria Medeiros, Miguel Beatriz, N. Neves, M. Correia","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2017.38","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2017.38","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the significant efforts put in building more secure web applications, cases of high impact breaches continue to appear. Vulnerabilities in web applications are often created due to inconsistencies in the way SQL queries are believed to be run and the way they are actually executed by a Database Management System (DBMS). This paper presents a demonstration of SEPTIC, a mechanism that detects and blocks injection attacks inside the DBMS. The demonstration considers a scenario of a non-trivial PHP web application, backed by a MySQL DBMS, which was modified to include SEPTIC. It presents how SEPTIC blocks injection attacks without compromising the application correctness and performance. In addition, SEPTIC is compared to alternative approaches, such as sanitizations carried out with standard functions provided language and a web application firewall.","PeriodicalId":426928,"journal":{"name":"2017 47th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"112 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127216974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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