The problem of setting the requirements for voting systems is as old as democracy. With the advent of voting machinery in the 19th century, the problem became more difficult. In most cases, it was the technologists who set out to formally articulate requirements. In many cases, these are clearly stated, as such, in patent applications of the era. Sadly, some of these requirements have been repeatedly forgotten in subsequent years. By the early 20th century, several authors produced concise summaries of these requirements, but their efforts reflect strong vendor bias.
{"title":"Early Requirements for Mechanical Voting Systems","authors":"Douglas W. Jones","doi":"10.1109/RE-VOTE.2009.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/RE-VOTE.2009.3","url":null,"abstract":"The problem of setting the requirements for voting systems is as old as democracy. With the advent of voting machinery in the 19th century, the problem became more difficult. In most cases, it was the technologists who set out to formally articulate requirements. In many cases, these are clearly stated, as such, in patent applications of the era. Sadly, some of these requirements have been repeatedly forgotten in subsequent years. By the early 20th century, several authors produced concise summaries of these requirements, but their efforts reflect strong vendor bias.","PeriodicalId":432365,"journal":{"name":"2009 First International Workshop on Requirements Engineering for e-Voting Systems","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126541374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Service Provider for remote electronic elections. [8] introduced the concept of the Voting Service Provider, a professional and qualified trusted third party which operates a secure remote electronic election on behalf of the election host. The intention is to release the election host of the complex operation of an electronic voting system thereby enabling secure and practical electronic elections. In this paper we consider a specific election scenario to specify a Voting Service Provider in detail. We show how its architecture and processes have to be set up in this scenario. We propose safeguards for the implementation of the security requirements towards the operational environment based on IT-Grundschutz. Our specification shows how to put the Voting Service Provider concept into practice. Additionally, it can be used as a basis for evaluation purposes.
远程电子选举服务提供商。[8]引入了投票服务提供商(Voting Service Provider)的概念，这是一个专业的、合格的、受信任的第三方，代表选举主办方进行安全的远程电子选举。这样做的目的是使选举主办者不必进行电子投票系统的复杂操作，从而能够进行安全和实际的电子选举。在本文中，我们考虑一个特定的选举场景来详细指定投票服务提供商。我们将展示如何在此场景中设置其体系结构和流程。我们提出了基于IT-Grundschutz的操作环境安全需求实现的保障措施。我们的规范展示了如何将投票服务提供者概念付诸实践。此外，它可以用作评估目的的基础。
{"title":"Specification of a Voting Service Provider","authors":"Axel Schmidt, L. Langer, J. Buchmann, M. Volkamer","doi":"10.1109/RE-VOTE.2009.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/RE-VOTE.2009.8","url":null,"abstract":"Service Provider for remote electronic elections. [8] introduced the concept of the Voting Service Provider, a professional and qualified trusted third party which operates a secure remote electronic election on behalf of the election host. The intention is to release the election host of the complex operation of an electronic voting system thereby enabling secure and practical electronic elections. In this paper we consider a specific election scenario to specify a Voting Service Provider in detail. We show how its architecture and processes have to be set up in this scenario. We propose safeguards for the implementation of the security requirements towards the operational environment based on IT-Grundschutz. Our specification shows how to put the Voting Service Provider concept into practice. Additionally, it can be used as a basis for evaluation purposes.","PeriodicalId":432365,"journal":{"name":"2009 First International Workshop on Requirements Engineering for e-Voting Systems","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1899-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116654018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Komminist Weldemariam, Andrea Mattioli, Adolfo Villafiorita
This paper discusses our approach and experiences on structuring and maintaining requirements for an e-voting system we have built and deployed for elections. Issues related to integrating laws and recommendation for e-voting systems, managing different elections and configurations, supporting a spiral development, yielded problems and approaches to help maintain integrity of requirements and a coherent view of the system. Moreover, the relationship between requirements and system architecture is based on finite state machines, that bridge the gap between the laws and the actual behavior of the machine.
{"title":"Managing Requirements for E-Voting Systems: Issues and Approaches","authors":"Komminist Weldemariam, Andrea Mattioli, Adolfo Villafiorita","doi":"10.1109/RE-VOTE.2009.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/RE-VOTE.2009.7","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses our approach and experiences on structuring and maintaining requirements for an e-voting system we have built and deployed for elections. Issues related to integrating laws and recommendation for e-voting systems, managing different elections and configurations, supporting a spiral development, yielded problems and approaches to help maintain integrity of requirements and a coherent view of the system. Moreover, the relationship between requirements and system architecture is based on finite state machines, that bridge the gap between the laws and the actual behavior of the machine.","PeriodicalId":432365,"journal":{"name":"2009 First International Workshop on Requirements Engineering for e-Voting Systems","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1899-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126289312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It comes with many risks but brings also many benefits. Instead of flat out rejecting the technology as uncontrollably dangerous, we advocate in this paper a different technological angle that renders electronic elections trustworthy beyond the usual levels of doubt. We exploit the trust that voters currently have into the democratic process and model our techniques around that observation accordingly. In particular, we propose a technique of trace emitting computations to record the individual steps of an electronic voting machine for a posteriori validation on an acceptably small trusted computing base. Our technology enables us to prove that an electronic elections preserves the voter's intent, assuming that the voting machine and the trace verifier are independent.
{"title":"Electronic Elections: Trust Through Engineering","authors":"C. Schürmann","doi":"10.1109/RE-VOTE.2009.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/RE-VOTE.2009.4","url":null,"abstract":"It comes with many risks but brings also many benefits. Instead of flat out rejecting the technology as uncontrollably dangerous, we advocate in this paper a different technological angle that renders electronic elections trustworthy beyond the usual levels of doubt. We exploit the trust that voters currently have into the democratic process and model our techniques around that observation accordingly. In particular, we propose a technique of trace emitting computations to record the individual steps of an electronic voting machine for a posteriori validation on an acceptably small trusted computing base. Our technology enables us to prove that an electronic elections preserves the voter's intent, assuming that the voting machine and the trace verifier are independent.","PeriodicalId":432365,"journal":{"name":"2009 First International Workshop on Requirements Engineering for e-Voting Systems","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1899-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121450283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
L. Langer, Axel Schmidt, J. Buchmann, M. Volkamer, Alexander Stolfik
Electronic voting schemes are expected to meet the basic security requirements for electronic voting. However, very different opinions about these requirements exist in the e-voting community. This is due to the fact that the security requirements comprise different levels at which they can be met. For example, universal verifiability may, or may not, include verifying eligibility of the voters who participated in the election. This paper provides definitions of different levels of election secrecy and verifiability. We also investigate whether there exists an order for the different levels and provide adversary models. The resulting compilation is useful since it may not be necessary, or even possible, to achieve the maximum level for all the security requirements in parallel. Thus, appropriate levels of the requirements can be selected for different types of elections, e.g. parliamentary elections vs. elections in associations.
{"title":"Towards a Framework on the Security Requirements for Electronic Voting Protocols","authors":"L. Langer, Axel Schmidt, J. Buchmann, M. Volkamer, Alexander Stolfik","doi":"10.1109/RE-VOTE.2009.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/RE-VOTE.2009.9","url":null,"abstract":"Electronic voting schemes are expected to meet the basic security requirements for electronic voting. However, very different opinions about these requirements exist in the e-voting community. This is due to the fact that the security requirements comprise different levels at which they can be met. For example, universal verifiability may, or may not, include verifying eligibility of the voters who participated in the election. This paper provides definitions of different levels of election secrecy and verifiability. We also investigate whether there exists an order for the different levels and provide adversary models. The resulting compilation is useful since it may not be necessary, or even possible, to achieve the maximum level for all the security requirements in parallel. Thus, appropriate levels of the requirements can be selected for different types of elections, e.g. parliamentary elections vs. elections in associations.","PeriodicalId":432365,"journal":{"name":"2009 First International Workshop on Requirements Engineering for e-Voting Systems","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1899-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129571773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Internet voting gets more and more popular. It is generally accepted that an Internet voting system needs to be evaluated. The existing evaluation frameworks try to be as system-independent as possible. Because of that distributed trust concepts like separation of duty for the voting servers, four eyes principle for administrators and the election commission, as well as the multiplicity of control functions like for the counting of votes cannot be demanded precisely. This article proposes to extend the evaluation of Internet voting systems by the computation of a so called k-resilience value. This value defines the robustness of a system and helps to identify vulnerabilities. Besides the introduction and discussion of this value, it is computed for existing Internet voting
{"title":"Determine the Resilience of Evaluated Internet Voting Systems","authors":"M. Volkamer, Rüdiger Grimm","doi":"10.1109/RE-VOTE.2009.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/RE-VOTE.2009.2","url":null,"abstract":"Internet voting gets more and more popular. It is generally accepted that an Internet voting system needs to be evaluated. The existing evaluation frameworks try to be as system-independent as possible. Because of that distributed trust concepts like separation of duty for the voting servers, four eyes principle for administrators and the election commission, as well as the multiplicity of control functions like for the counting of votes cannot be demanded precisely. This article proposes to extend the evaluation of Internet voting systems by the computation of a so called k-resilience value. This value defines the robustness of a system and helps to identify vulnerabilities. Besides the introduction and discussion of this value, it is computed for existing Internet voting","PeriodicalId":432365,"journal":{"name":"2009 First International Workshop on Requirements Engineering for e-Voting Systems","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1899-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122449274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Federal standards require that electronic voting machines log information about the voting system behavior to support post-election audits and investigations. Our study examines what additional voter interaction information should be collected to allow investigation of human factors issues of the voting systems used in an election, while at the same time preserving voter privacy. We have focused on simulating touch screen interface errors that have been hypothesized as the cause of problems in past elections, such as miscalibration and insensitivity. The preliminary data gathered indicates that event logs which record voter interaction information may allow investigators to detect the existence of interface problems in deployed voting systems. This information can be collected without compromising secret ballot rights. We believe that any voting system using a touch screen interface could benefit by logging these events.
{"title":"Improving Voting System Event Logs","authors":"Andrea L. Mascher, P. Cotton, Douglas W. Jones","doi":"10.1109/RE-VOTE.2009.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/RE-VOTE.2009.6","url":null,"abstract":"Federal standards require that electronic voting machines log information about the voting system behavior to support post-election audits and investigations. Our study examines what additional voter interaction information should be collected to allow investigation of human factors issues of the voting systems used in an election, while at the same time preserving voter privacy. We have focused on simulating touch screen interface errors that have been hypothesized as the cause of problems in past elections, such as miscalibration and insensitivity. The preliminary data gathered indicates that event logs which record voter interaction information may allow investigators to detect the existence of interface problems in deployed voting systems. This information can be collected without compromising secret ballot rights. We believe that any voting system using a touch screen interface could benefit by logging these events.","PeriodicalId":432365,"journal":{"name":"2009 First International Workshop on Requirements Engineering for e-Voting Systems","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1899-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121054134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
D. Bismark, J. Heather, R. Peel, Steve A. Schneider, Zhe Xia, P. Ryan
Implementing an electronic voting system for the first time can be difficult, since requirements are sometimes hard to specify and keep changing, resources are scarce in an academic setting, the gap between theory and practice is wider than anticipated, adhering to a formal development lifecycle is inconvenient and delivery on time is very hard. This paper describes all of the work done by the Pr^et `a Voter team in the run-up to VoComp in 2007 and enumerates a number of lessons learned.
第一次实现电子投票系统可能会很困难，因为需求有时很难指定并且不断变化，学术环境中的资源是稀缺的，理论与实践之间的差距比预期的要大，坚持正式的开发生命周期是不方便的，并且按时交付非常困难。本文描述了Pr^et ' a Voter团队在2007年VoComp筹备阶段所做的所有工作，并列举了一些经验教训。
{"title":"Experiences Gained from the first Prêt à Voter Implementation","authors":"D. Bismark, J. Heather, R. Peel, Steve A. Schneider, Zhe Xia, P. Ryan","doi":"10.1109/RE-VOTE.2009.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/RE-VOTE.2009.5","url":null,"abstract":"Implementing an electronic voting system for the first time can be difficult, since requirements are sometimes hard to specify and keep changing, resources are scarce in an academic setting, the gap between theory and practice is wider than anticipated, adhering to a formal development lifecycle is inconvenient and delivery on time is very hard. This paper describes all of the work done by the Pr^et `a Voter team in the run-up to VoComp in 2007 and enumerates a number of lessons learned.","PeriodicalId":432365,"journal":{"name":"2009 First International Workshop on Requirements Engineering for e-Voting Systems","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1899-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127519337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There continues to be a requirement for better models, tools, and techniques for conducting risk assessment of voting systems. We propose a model of risk and a technique for risk assessment, which builds on threat trees and Monte Carlo simulation. The goal is to provide a means of facilitating informed decisions regarding voting system security standards through a rational and parsimonious quantification of intuition or estimation of risk. Such a means should support an evaluation of trade-offs, sensitivity analysis, cost-benefit analysis, and estimation of residual risk of current and proposed voting systems, technologies and controls.
{"title":"A Risk Assessment Model for Voting Systems using Threat Trees and Monte Carlo Simulation","authors":"J. Pardue, J. Landry, Alec Yasinsac","doi":"10.1109/RE-VOTE.2009.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/RE-VOTE.2009.1","url":null,"abstract":"There continues to be a requirement for better models, tools, and techniques for conducting risk assessment of voting systems. We propose a model of risk and a technique for risk assessment, which builds on threat trees and Monte Carlo simulation. The goal is to provide a means of facilitating informed decisions regarding voting system security standards through a rational and parsimonious quantification of intuition or estimation of risk. Such a means should support an evaluation of trade-offs, sensitivity analysis, cost-benefit analysis, and estimation of residual risk of current and proposed voting systems, technologies and controls.","PeriodicalId":432365,"journal":{"name":"2009 First International Workshop on Requirements Engineering for e-Voting Systems","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1899-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128999867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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