The purpose of my talk this evening * is to convince you that American pragmatism is not to be simply identified with positivism. By positivism I understand a rather extreme form of nominalism which developed along the lines of classical empiricism. By nominalism I understand any philosophical doctrine which denies the reality of general ideas as part of the ontological structure of things. A nominalistics view of reality makes of it nothing but a set of actual entities each of which is a discrete « absolute » and between which there are no real connections. Such a world is devoid of qualities and of causal relations. It is a world about which only statements of actual contingent fact can be made. To it no necessary statements apply since they are all nothing but logical truths. Admittedly this is an incomplete characterization of positivism but it is sufficient for our purpose since these essential notes of that form of nomnalism are what I intend to deny of pragmatism as developed by Charles S. Peirce. Let it also be said immediately that certain forms of classical rationalism are also nominalisfcic and hve developted into a form of positivism all their own. The rationalism of Descartes, with its emphasis upon intuition of clear and distinct ideas ultimately makes of the world a set of discrete, absolute and actual entities. The only difference between the rationalism of Descartes and the empiricism of Locke or Hume is that for the former the ultimate building-blocks are abstract ideas while for the latter they are sense data. Both, however,
我今晚演讲的目的是要让你们相信，美国的实用主义不能简单地等同于实证主义。我对实证主义的理解是一种相当极端的唯名论形式，它沿着古典经验主义的路线发展。我把唯名论理解为任何否认一般观念作为事物本体论结构一部分的实在性的哲学学说。唯名论的实在观把实在看成是一组实在的实体，每一个实体都是离散的“绝对”，它们之间没有实在的联系。这样的世界缺乏品质和因果关系。这是一个只有对实际偶然事实的陈述才能形成的世界。它没有必要的陈述，因为它们都是逻辑真理。诚然，这是对实证主义的一个不完整的描述，但对于我们的目的来说，这已经足够了，因为我打算否认查尔斯·s·皮尔斯(Charles S. Peirce)所发展的实用主义，因为这种形式的唯名主义的这些基本注释。我们还要立即指出，古典理性主义的某些形式也是唯名论的，并且已经发展成为一种完全属于它们自己的实证主义形式。笛卡儿的理性主义，以其强调的直观的清晰和明确的想法，最终使世界成为一组离散的，绝对的和实际的实体。笛卡儿的理性主义与洛克或休谟的经验主义的唯一区别在于，对于笛卡儿来说，最终的构成材料是抽象概念，而对于后者来说，它们是感觉材料。然而,这两个
{"title":"Peirce’s Pragmatic Maxim:","authors":"Potter Vincent","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvh4zg94.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvh4zg94.11","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of my talk this evening * is to convince you that American pragmatism is not to be simply identified with positivism. By positivism I understand a rather extreme form of nominalism which developed along the lines of classical empiricism. By nominalism I understand any philosophical doctrine which denies the reality of general ideas as part of the ontological structure of things. A nominalistics view of reality makes of it nothing but a set of actual entities each of which is a discrete « absolute » and between which there are no real connections. Such a world is devoid of qualities and of causal relations. It is a world about which only statements of actual contingent fact can be made. To it no necessary statements apply since they are all nothing but logical truths. Admittedly this is an incomplete characterization of positivism but it is sufficient for our purpose since these essential notes of that form of nomnalism are what I intend to deny of pragmatism as developed by Charles S. Peirce. Let it also be said immediately that certain forms of classical rationalism are also nominalisfcic and hve developted into a form of positivism all their own. The rationalism of Descartes, with its emphasis upon intuition of clear and distinct ideas ultimately makes of the world a set of discrete, absolute and actual entities. The only difference between the rationalism of Descartes and the empiricism of Locke or Hume is that for the former the ultimate building-blocks are abstract ideas while for the latter they are sense data. Both, however,","PeriodicalId":432689,"journal":{"name":"Peirce's Philosophical Perspectives","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127875540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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