Pub Date : 2021-11-11DOI: 10.1163/15685349-05904001
Tamer Nawar
It has long been thought that Augustine holds that corporeal objects cannot act upon incorporeal souls. However, precisely how and why Augustine imposes limitations upon the causal powers of corporeal objects remains obscure. In this paper, the author clarifies Augustine’s views about the causal and dependence relations between body and soul. He argues that, contrary to what is often thought, Augustine allows that corporeal objects do act upon souls and merely rules out that corporeal objects exercise a particular kind of causal power (that of efficient or sustaining causes). He clarifies how Augustine conceives of the kind of causal influence exercised by souls and bodies.
{"title":"The Roots of Occasionalism? Causation, Metaphysical Dependence, and Soul-Body Relations in Augustine","authors":"Tamer Nawar","doi":"10.1163/15685349-05904001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15685349-05904001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 It has long been thought that Augustine holds that corporeal objects cannot act upon incorporeal souls. However, precisely how and why Augustine imposes limitations upon the causal powers of corporeal objects remains obscure. In this paper, the author clarifies Augustine’s views about the causal and dependence relations between body and soul. He argues that, contrary to what is often thought, Augustine allows that corporeal objects do act upon souls and merely rules out that corporeal objects exercise a particular kind of causal power (that of efficient or sustaining causes). He clarifies how Augustine conceives of the kind of causal influence exercised by souls and bodies.","PeriodicalId":43373,"journal":{"name":"VIVARIUM-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47813815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-13DOI: 10.1163/15685349-12341403
D. Poirel
Three conclusions can be drawn from the study of the word ratio and its derivatives in the works of Hugh of Saint-Victor († 1141). First, the approximately 1500 occurrences present an exceptional diversity of meanings. Second, these meanings are not tightly separated from each other, but tend to tile or merge: not only are there many passages where the translator can legitimately hesitate between two or more interpretations, but the author himself plays on this malleability of significations, as if to refer his reader to an original cohesion of the meanings. Third, it is therefore possible to reconstitute a complex but unified notion of reason, underlying all the uses identified; and it is surely no coincidence that this common notion corresponds very precisely to the Victorine educational program, as Hugh defined it in his Didascalicon.
{"title":"La raison chez Hugues de Saint-Victor : du feuilleté des acceptions à la cohérence d’un sens, d’une pensée, d’un programme éducatif","authors":"D. Poirel","doi":"10.1163/15685349-12341403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15685349-12341403","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Three conclusions can be drawn from the study of the word ratio and its derivatives in the works of Hugh of Saint-Victor († 1141). First, the approximately 1500 occurrences present an exceptional diversity of meanings. Second, these meanings are not tightly separated from each other, but tend to tile or merge: not only are there many passages where the translator can legitimately hesitate between two or more interpretations, but the author himself plays on this malleability of significations, as if to refer his reader to an original cohesion of the meanings. Third, it is therefore possible to reconstitute a complex but unified notion of reason, underlying all the uses identified; and it is surely no coincidence that this common notion corresponds very precisely to the Victorine educational program, as Hugh defined it in his Didascalicon.","PeriodicalId":43373,"journal":{"name":"VIVARIUM-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45302454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-13DOI: 10.1163/15685349-12341401
Mattia Mantovani
This article is devoted to Roger Bacon’s understanding of perspectiva as “the first of all natural sciences.” After considering a few alternative medieval definitions and classifications of this discipline – such as al-Fārābī’s, Grosseteste’s and Kilwardby’s – the author turns to Bacon’s arguments for according to perspectiva so exceptional a role. He shows that Bacon’s arguments are grounded in his peculiar understanding of the visual process: according to Bacon, vision is indeed the only sense in which perception takes place “by reasoning” (per sillogismum). The author argues that this theory of perception also lays the foundations for Bacon’s – prima facie amiss – claim that “concerning vision alone, and no other sense, have philosophers developed a separate science.” The author explores this point by contrasting with one another Bacon’s conception of perspectiva and of music, and closes with some more general remarks on the implications of Bacon’s account of the visual process for his theory of knowledge. Based on his theory of a “vision by reasoning,” the author concludes that Bacon came to reinterpret perspectiva as the organon of visual knowledge.
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Pub Date : 2021-08-13DOI: 10.1163/15685349-12341404
P. Hartman
Some of my mental states are conscious and some of them are not. Sometimes I am so focused on the wine in front of me that I am unaware that I am thinking about it. But sometimes, of course, I take a reflexive step back and become aware of my thinking about the wine in front of me. What marks the difference between a conscious mental state and an unconscious one? In this article, the author focuses on Durand of St.-Pourçain’s rejection of the higher-order theory of state consciousness, according to which a mental act is conscious when there is another, suitably related, mental (reflex) act that exists at the same time with it. Durand rejects such higher-order theories on the grounds that they violate the thesis that a given mental power can have or elicit only one mental act at a given time. The author first goes over some of Durand’s general arguments for this thesis. He then turns to Durand’s application of the thesis to the issue of state consciousness and reflex acts. He closes by considering the objection that Durand’s same-order theory of state consciousness makes consciousness ubiquitous.
{"title":"Durand of St.-Pourçain on Reflex Acts and State Consciousness","authors":"P. Hartman","doi":"10.1163/15685349-12341404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15685349-12341404","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Some of my mental states are conscious and some of them are not. Sometimes I am so focused on the wine in front of me that I am unaware that I am thinking about it. But sometimes, of course, I take a reflexive step back and become aware of my thinking about the wine in front of me. What marks the difference between a conscious mental state and an unconscious one? In this article, the author focuses on Durand of St.-Pourçain’s rejection of the higher-order theory of state consciousness, according to which a mental act is conscious when there is another, suitably related, mental (reflex) act that exists at the same time with it. Durand rejects such higher-order theories on the grounds that they violate the thesis that a given mental power can have or elicit only one mental act at a given time. The author first goes over some of Durand’s general arguments for this thesis. He then turns to Durand’s application of the thesis to the issue of state consciousness and reflex acts. He closes by considering the objection that Durand’s same-order theory of state consciousness makes consciousness ubiquitous.","PeriodicalId":43373,"journal":{"name":"VIVARIUM-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41270603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-13DOI: 10.1163/15685349-12341402
C. Nothaft
This article examines and edits an anonymous text from the late 1330s (Quesitum fuit utrum per interrogationes …), which was written to refute the arguments presented in a lost quaestio disputata by an unknown Parisian philosopher. At the heart of this scholastic dispute was the question whether the astrological branch known as interrogations was an effective and legitimate means of predicting the future. The philosopher’s negative answers to this question as well as the rebuttals preserved in our anonymous text offer valuable new insights into the debate over astrology that raged at the University of Paris during the fourteenth century. Besides arguing at length for the internal coherence and philosophical soundness of interrogations, the text contains a bold defence against the Augustinian view that astrologers consort with demons. This defence was later rebutted as part of an anti-astrological polemic by the astronomer Heinrich Selder, who is known to have studied in Paris during the 1370s.
本文研究并编辑了一篇13世纪30年代末的匿名文本（Quesitum fuit utrum per questionones…），该文本是为了反驳一位不知名的巴黎哲学家在一篇遗失的quaestio discuta中提出的论点而写的。这场学术争论的核心是一个问题，即被称为疑问的占星术分支是否是预测未来的有效和合法的手段。这位哲学家对这个问题的否定回答，以及我们匿名文本中保留的反驳，为14世纪巴黎大学关于占星术的争论提供了宝贵的新见解。除了对审问的内在连贯性和哲学合理性进行了详尽的论证外，文本还对奥古斯丁的占星家与魔鬼交往的观点进行了大胆的辩护。这一辩护后来被天文学家海因里希·塞尔德（Heinrich Selder）反驳为反占星术争论的一部分，众所周知，他在1370年代曾在巴黎学习。
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Pub Date : 2021-02-26DOI: 10.1163/15685349-12341394
Can Laurens Löwe
The natural world, as Latin medieval Aristotelians see it, is a dynamic place.* Material substances are endowed with real active and passive powers or potencies (potentiae), which enable them to produce and undergo changes, respectively. For example, according to medieval thinkers, if a fire burns a log of wood, this occurs due to the log’s passive power of combustibility as well as the fire’s active power of heat. These natural powers, scholastic philosophers hold, are present in virtue of the very essences (essentiae) of their bearers, that is, in virtue of those features that make their bearers the kinds of things they are. Fire’s active power of heat, for instance, follows from the very nature of fire, and the combustibility of wood derives from its essence. How are we to understand these essences that empower material substances? Most Latin medieval Aristotelians conceive of them hylomorphically.1 On their account, the essence of a material substance, be it inanimate or animate, involves two different types of components: matter and at least one substantial form, though some medieval thinkers countenance more than one such form.2 Very roughly, a substance’s matter accounts for its being a material substance, while its substantial form(s) account(s) for its being the specific kind of material substance it is, say, a piece of wood or a cat. According to medieval Aristotelians, both types of components are intimately connected with powers, but with different ones. Matter has a power or potency (the latter term being more commonly used in the secondary
{"title":"Introduction: Special Issue on Powers and Essences","authors":"Can Laurens Löwe","doi":"10.1163/15685349-12341394","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15685349-12341394","url":null,"abstract":"The natural world, as Latin medieval Aristotelians see it, is a dynamic place.* Material substances are endowed with real active and passive powers or potencies (potentiae), which enable them to produce and undergo changes, respectively. For example, according to medieval thinkers, if a fire burns a log of wood, this occurs due to the log’s passive power of combustibility as well as the fire’s active power of heat. These natural powers, scholastic philosophers hold, are present in virtue of the very essences (essentiae) of their bearers, that is, in virtue of those features that make their bearers the kinds of things they are. Fire’s active power of heat, for instance, follows from the very nature of fire, and the combustibility of wood derives from its essence. How are we to understand these essences that empower material substances? Most Latin medieval Aristotelians conceive of them hylomorphically.1 On their account, the essence of a material substance, be it inanimate or animate, involves two different types of components: matter and at least one substantial form, though some medieval thinkers countenance more than one such form.2 Very roughly, a substance’s matter accounts for its being a material substance, while its substantial form(s) account(s) for its being the specific kind of material substance it is, say, a piece of wood or a cat. According to medieval Aristotelians, both types of components are intimately connected with powers, but with different ones. Matter has a power or potency (the latter term being more commonly used in the secondary","PeriodicalId":43373,"journal":{"name":"VIVARIUM-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47718408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-22DOI: 10.1163/15685349-12341392
... ...
{"title":"NoticeThe Retraction of Articles Due to Plagiarism","authors":"... ...","doi":"10.1163/15685349-12341392","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15685349-12341392","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43373,"journal":{"name":"VIVARIUM-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/15685349-12341392","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45439140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-22DOI: 10.1163/15685349-12341391
M. Thakkar
Two recent publications have greatly increased the amount of Wyclif available in translation: the Trialogus, translated by Stephen Lahey, and a thematic anthology translated by Stephen Penn. This review article documents the failings that make these translations worse than useless. A post mortem leads the author to claim that the publication of these volumes, the first of which has already been warmly received, is a sign of a gathering crisis in medieval studies, and one that we should take steps to avert.
{"title":"Duces caecorum: On Two Recent Translations of Wyclif","authors":"M. Thakkar","doi":"10.1163/15685349-12341391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15685349-12341391","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Two recent publications have greatly increased the amount of Wyclif available in translation: the Trialogus, translated by Stephen Lahey, and a thematic anthology translated by Stephen Penn. This review article documents the failings that make these translations worse than useless. A post mortem leads the author to claim that the publication of these volumes, the first of which has already been warmly received, is a sign of a gathering crisis in medieval studies, and one that we should take steps to avert.","PeriodicalId":43373,"journal":{"name":"VIVARIUM-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47957818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Preparation for Work","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv2175h4r.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv2175h4r.13","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43373,"journal":{"name":"VIVARIUM-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76191359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Worker and the Man","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv2175h4r.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv2175h4r.15","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43373,"journal":{"name":"VIVARIUM-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84646195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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