Oliver Crisp proposes “chastened theism” as a theologically realist alternative to classical theism and theistic personalism. I critique his chastened theism and propose the alternative of Christian Pure Act theism, a “chastened” version of theological nonrealism.
{"title":"God Is Not Chastened","authors":"Steven Nemes","doi":"10.5840/pc20212314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/pc20212314","url":null,"abstract":"Oliver Crisp proposes “chastened theism” as a theologically realist alternative to classical theism and theistic personalism. I critique his chastened theism and propose the alternative of Christian Pure Act theism, a “chastened” version of theological nonrealism.","PeriodicalId":434758,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Christi","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117199227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Richard Swinburne is an emergent dualist. One feature of his view is the need for a “thisness” or haecceity that makes each soul the soul that it is, distinct from other souls that may be indistinguishable from it in all qualitative respects. I argue that there is no need for thisnesses.
Richard Swinburne是一个新兴的二元论者。他的观点的一个特点是需要一种“本然性”或“完美性”，使每个灵魂成为它本来的样子，与其他灵魂区别开来，这些灵魂可能在所有质的方面都无法与它区分开来。我认为没有必要这样做。
{"title":"The Need for Thisnesses","authors":"W. Hasker","doi":"10.5840/pc202123113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/pc202123113","url":null,"abstract":"Richard Swinburne is an emergent dualist. One feature of his view is the need for a “thisness” or haecceity that makes each soul the soul that it is, distinct from other souls that may be indistinguishable from it in all qualitative respects. I argue that there is no need for thisnesses.","PeriodicalId":434758,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Christi","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126227969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this essay I respond to my interlocutors in the symposium on my monograph, Analyzing Doctrine. Addressing each of them in the order in which their essays are printed, I consider and reply to comments by William Lane Craig, Steven Nemes, N. Gray Sutanto, Jordan Wessling and Joanna Leidenhag.
{"title":"Response to My Interlocutors","authors":"Oliver D. Crisp","doi":"10.5840/pc20212318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/pc20212318","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay I respond to my interlocutors in the symposium on my monograph, Analyzing Doctrine. Addressing each of them in the order in which their essays are printed, I consider and reply to comments by William Lane Craig, Steven Nemes, N. Gray Sutanto, Jordan Wessling and Joanna Leidenhag.","PeriodicalId":434758,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Christi","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117023145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Aquinas, Original Sin, and the Challenge of Evolution, Daniel W. Houck","authors":"W. Jeremiah","doi":"10.5840/pc202123119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/pc202123119","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":434758,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Christi","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122584862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Trenton Merricks holds to a physicalist view of the Incarnation according to which the Son transformed into a physical object (the body of Jesus) at the Incarnation. R. T. Mullins, in “Physicalist Christology and the Two Sons Worry,” claims that Merricks’s account is Nestorian since it entails that it is metaphysically possible for the human nature of Christ to be a person independently of the Son’s incarnation. While I am not a physicalist, in this essay I defend Merricks’s view against Mullins’s claim. I argue that if the Son is numerically identical to the body of Jesus, then it is not possible for the body of Jesus to exist independently of the Son’s incarnation.
{"title":"Physicalism and the Incarnation","authors":"Keith Hess","doi":"10.5840/pc202123116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/pc202123116","url":null,"abstract":"Trenton Merricks holds to a physicalist view of the Incarnation according to which the Son transformed into a physical object (the body of Jesus) at the Incarnation. R. T. Mullins, in “Physicalist Christology and the Two Sons Worry,” claims that Merricks’s account is Nestorian since it entails that it is metaphysically possible for the human nature of Christ to be a person independently of the Son’s incarnation. While I am not a physicalist, in this essay I defend Merricks’s view against Mullins’s claim. I argue that if the Son is numerically identical to the body of Jesus, then it is not possible for the body of Jesus to exist independently of the Son’s incarnation.","PeriodicalId":434758,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Christi","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122336990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Personal Identity and Applied Ethics: A Historical and Philosophical Introduction, Andrea Sauchelli","authors":"Keith Hess","doi":"10.5840/pc202123120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/pc202123120","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":434758,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Christi","volume":"139 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126174860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I address an epistemic and related ontological dificulty with the doctrine of biblical inerrancy. The ontological problem: If biblical inerrancy applies to the original autographs, why would God allow these to disappear from the scene? The epistemological problem: Given that the original autographs are gone, we lack a way to know exactly what the original writings were. The first problem is solved by distinguishing text types and tokens, and claiming that semantic meaning and inerrancy are underivative features types. The second is resolved by claiming that in the actual world, we are epistemically better off with the original tokens gone.
{"title":"The Epistemic Advantage of Lost Autographic Tokens of the Bible","authors":"J. Moreland","doi":"10.5840/pc202123115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/pc202123115","url":null,"abstract":"I address an epistemic and related ontological dificulty with the doctrine of biblical inerrancy. The ontological problem: If biblical inerrancy applies to the original autographs, why would God allow these to disappear from the scene? The epistemological problem: Given that the original autographs are gone, we lack a way to know exactly what the original writings were. The first problem is solved by distinguishing text types and tokens, and claiming that semantic meaning and inerrancy are underivative features types. The second is resolved by claiming that in the actual world, we are epistemically better off with the original tokens gone.","PeriodicalId":434758,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Christi","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129103185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
George Berkeley is famous for the metaphysical principle esse is percipi or percipere (“to be is to be perceived or to be a perceiver”). Many Berkeleyan idealists take this principle to be incompatible with Platonic realism about abstract objects, and thus opt either for nominalism or divine conceptualism on which they are construed as divine ideas. In this paper, I argue that Berkeleyan idealism is consistent with a Platonic realism in which abstracta exist outside the divine mind. This allows the Berkeleyan to expand Berkeley’s principle to read: esse is percipi or percipere or abstractum.
乔治·伯克利以他的形而上学原则esse is percipi或percipere而闻名(“存在就是被感知，或者成为一个感知者”)。许多贝克莱唯心主义者认为这一原则与柏拉图关于抽象对象的现实主义不相容，因此选择唯名论或神性概念论，在唯名论或神性概念论的基础上，它们被解释为神性的理念。在本文中，我认为贝克莱的唯心主义与柏拉图的现实主义是一致的，在柏拉图的现实主义中，抽象存在于神圣的心灵之外。这使得贝克莱主义者将贝克莱的原则扩展为:感知或感知或抽象。
{"title":"Or Abstractum","authors":"Steven B. Cowan","doi":"10.5840/pc202123114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/pc202123114","url":null,"abstract":"George Berkeley is famous for the metaphysical principle esse is percipi or percipere (“to be is to be perceived or to be a perceiver”). Many Berkeleyan idealists take this principle to be incompatible with Platonic realism about abstract objects, and thus opt either for nominalism or divine conceptualism on which they are construed as divine ideas. In this paper, I argue that Berkeleyan idealism is consistent with a Platonic realism in which abstracta exist outside the divine mind. This allows the Berkeleyan to expand Berkeley’s principle to read: esse is percipi or percipere or abstractum.","PeriodicalId":434758,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Christi","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126693559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A key takeaway from the recent volume Theistic Evolution: A Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Critique is that no version of theistic evolution that adheres largely to consensus views in biology is a plausible option for orthodox Christians. In this paper we argue that this is false: contrary to the arguments in the volume, evolutionary theory, properly understood, is perfectly compatible with traditional Christian commitments. In addition, we argue that the lines between Intelligent Design and theistic evolution are not as sharp as most scholars have assumed, such that many who self-identify as Intelligent Design adherents would also qualify as theistic evolutionists.
{"title":"Mere Theistic Evolution","authors":"M. Murray, J. Churchill","doi":"10.5840/pc20202212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/pc20202212","url":null,"abstract":"A key takeaway from the recent volume Theistic Evolution: A Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Critique is that no version of theistic evolution that adheres largely to consensus views in biology is a plausible option for orthodox Christians. In this paper we argue that this is false: contrary to the arguments in the volume, evolutionary theory, properly understood, is perfectly compatible with traditional Christian commitments. In addition, we argue that the lines between Intelligent Design and theistic evolution are not as sharp as most scholars have assumed, such that many who self-identify as Intelligent Design adherents would also qualify as theistic evolutionists.","PeriodicalId":434758,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Christi","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134455823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this essay we respond to the comments of Tom McCall, William Lane Craig, and Stephen C. Meyer on mere theistic evolution.
在这篇文章中，我们回应汤姆·麦考尔，威廉·莱恩·克雷格和斯蒂芬·c·迈耶对纯粹有神论进化的评论。
{"title":"Replies to Commentators on Mere Theistic Evolution","authors":"M. Murray, J. Churchill","doi":"10.5840/pc20202216","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/pc20202216","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay we respond to the comments of Tom McCall, William Lane Craig, and Stephen C. Meyer on mere theistic evolution.","PeriodicalId":434758,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Christi","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127915942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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