Graham Priest has recently proposed a solution to the problem of the One and the Many which involves inconsistent objects and a non-transitive identity relation. We show that his solution entails either that the object everything is identical with the object nothing or that they are mutual parts; depending on whether Priest goes for an extensional or a non-extensional mereology.
Graham Priest最近提出了一个解决“一和多”问题的方法,该问题涉及不一致的对象和非传递的同一关系。我们证明,他的解决方案要么意味着对象一切都与对象无关,要么意味着它们是相互的部分;这取决于普里斯特是选择外延的还是非外延的修辞。
{"title":"On the Overlap Between Everything and Nothing","authors":"Massimiliano Carrara, Filippo Mancini, Jeroen Smid","doi":"10.12775/llp.2021.013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/llp.2021.013","url":null,"abstract":"Graham Priest has recently proposed a solution to the problem of the One and the Many which involves inconsistent objects and a non-transitive identity relation. We show that his solution entails either that the object everything is identical with the object nothing or that they are mutual parts; depending on whether Priest goes for an extensional or a non-extensional mereology.","PeriodicalId":43501,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45390723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The present paper offers the rule of existential generalization (EG) that is uniformly applicable within extensional, intensional and hyperintensional contexts. In contradistinction to Quine and his followers, quantification into various modal contexts and some belief attitudes is possible without obstacles. The hyperintensional logic deployed in this paper incorporates explicit substitution and so the rule (EG) is fully specified inside the logic. The logic is equipped with a natural deduction system within which (EG) is derived from its rules for the existential quantifier, substitution and functional application. This shows that (EG) is not primitive, as often assumed even in advanced writings on natural deduction. Arguments involving existential generalisation are shown to be valid if the sequents containing their premises and conclusions are derivable using the rule (EG). The invalidity of arguments seemingly employing (EG) is explained with recourse to the definition of substitution.
{"title":"The Rule of Existential Generalisation and Explicit Substitution","authors":"J. Raclavský","doi":"10.12775/llp.2021.011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/llp.2021.011","url":null,"abstract":"The present paper offers the rule of existential generalization (EG) that is uniformly applicable within extensional, intensional and hyperintensional contexts. In contradistinction to Quine and his followers, quantification into various modal contexts and some belief attitudes is possible without obstacles. The hyperintensional logic deployed in this paper incorporates explicit substitution and so the rule (EG) is fully specified inside the logic. The logic is equipped with a natural deduction system within which (EG) is derived from its rules for the existential quantifier, substitution and functional application. This shows that (EG) is not primitive, as often assumed even in advanced writings on natural deduction. Arguments involving existential generalisation are shown to be valid if the sequents containing their premises and conclusions are derivable using the rule (EG). The invalidity of arguments seemingly employing (EG) is explained with recourse to the definition of substitution.","PeriodicalId":43501,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49232730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we consider a set of quite interesting threeand four-valued logics and prove normalisation theorem for their natural deduction formulations. Among the logics in question are the Logic of Paradox, First Degree Entailment, Strong Kleene logic, and some of their implicative extensions, including RM3 and RM3 . Also, we present a detailed version of Prawitz’s proof of Nelson’s logic N4 and its extension by intuitionist negation.
{"title":"Normalisation for Some Quite Interesting Many-Valued Logics","authors":"Nils Kürbis, Y. Petrukhin","doi":"10.12775/llp.2021.009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/llp.2021.009","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we consider a set of quite interesting threeand four-valued logics and prove normalisation theorem for their natural deduction formulations. Among the logics in question are the Logic of Paradox, First Degree Entailment, Strong Kleene logic, and some of their implicative extensions, including RM3 and RM3 . Also, we present a detailed version of Prawitz’s proof of Nelson’s logic N4 and its extension by intuitionist negation.","PeriodicalId":43501,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45196496","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Angell’s logic of analytic containment AC has been shown to be characterized by a 9-valued matrix NC by Ferguson, and by a 16-valued matrix by Fine. It is shown that the former is the image of a surjective homomorphism from the latter, i.e., an epimorphic image. Some candidate 7-valued matrices are ruled out as characteristic of AC. Whether matrices with fewer than 9 values exist remains an open question. The results were obtained with the help of the MUltlog system for investigating finite-valued logics; the results serve as an example of the usefulness of techniques from computational algebra in logic. A tableau proof system for NC is also provided. .
{"title":"Epimorphism between Fine and Ferguson’s Matrices for Angell’s AC","authors":"R. Zach","doi":"10.12775/LLP.2022.025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2022.025","url":null,"abstract":"Angell’s logic of analytic containment AC has been shown to be characterized by a 9-valued matrix NC by Ferguson, and by a 16-valued matrix by Fine. It is shown that the former is the image of a surjective homomorphism from the latter, i.e., an epimorphic image. Some candidate 7-valued matrices are ruled out as characteristic of AC. Whether matrices with fewer than 9 values exist remains an open question. The results were obtained with the help of the MUltlog system for investigating finite-valued logics; the results serve as an example of the usefulness of techniques from computational algebra in logic. A tableau proof system for NC is also provided.\u0000.","PeriodicalId":43501,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49159973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
. If two self-connected individuals are connected, it follows in classical extensional mereotopology that the sum of those individuals is self-connected too. Since mainland Europe and mainland Asia, for example, are both self-connected and connected to each other, mainland Eurasia is also self-connected. In contrast, in non-extensional mereotopologies, two individuals may have more than one sum, in which case it does not follow from their being self-connected and connected that the sum of those individuals is self-connected too. Nevertheless, one would still expect it to follow that a sum of connected self-connected individuals is self-connected too. In this paper, we present some surprising countermodels which show that this conjecture is incorrect.
{"title":"Extension and Self-Connection","authors":"Ben Blumson, Manikaran Singh","doi":"10.12775/LLP.2021.008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2021.008","url":null,"abstract":". If two self-connected individuals are connected, it follows in classical extensional mereotopology that the sum of those individuals is self-connected too. Since mainland Europe and mainland Asia, for example, are both self-connected and connected to each other, mainland Eurasia is also self-connected. In contrast, in non-extensional mereotopologies, two individuals may have more than one sum, in which case it does not follow from their being self-connected and connected that the sum of those individuals is self-connected too. Nevertheless, one would still expect it to follow that a sum of connected self-connected individuals is self-connected too. In this paper, we present some surprising countermodels which show that this conjecture is incorrect.","PeriodicalId":43501,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"1"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42158433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Peirce’s Triadic Logic and Its (Overlooked) Connexive Expansion","authors":"A. Belikov","doi":"10.12775/LLP.2021.007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2021.007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43501,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"1"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43314704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The first part of the paper contains a probabilistic axiomatic extension of the conditional system WV, here named WVPr. This system is extended with the axiom (Pr4): PrA = 1 ⊃ A. The resulting system, named WVPr∗, is proved to be consistent and non-trivial, in the sense that it does not contain the wff (Triv): A ≡ A. Extending WVPr∗ with the so-called Generalized Stalnaker’s Thesis (GST) yields the (first) Lewis’s Triviality Result (LTriv) in the form (♦(A ∧ B) ∧ ♦(A ∧ ¬B)) ⊃ PrB|A = PrB. In §4 it is shown that a consequence of this theorem is the thesis (CT1): ¬A ⊃ (A > B ⊃ A J B). It is then proven that (CT1) subjoined to the conditional system WVPr∗ yields the collapse formula (Triv). The final result is that WVPr∗+(GST) is equivalent to WVPr∗+(Triv). In the last section a discussion is opened about the intuitive and philosophical plausibility of axiom (Pr4) and its role in the derivation of (Triv).
{"title":"A Syntactical Analysis of Lewis’s Triviality Result","authors":"C. Pizzi","doi":"10.12775/LLP.2021.006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2021.006","url":null,"abstract":"The first part of the paper contains a probabilistic axiomatic extension of the conditional system WV, here named WVPr. This system is extended with the axiom (Pr4): PrA = 1 ⊃ A. The resulting system, named WVPr∗, is proved to be consistent and non-trivial, in the sense that it does not contain the wff (Triv): A ≡ A. Extending WVPr∗ with the so-called Generalized Stalnaker’s Thesis (GST) yields the (first) Lewis’s Triviality Result (LTriv) in the form (♦(A ∧ B) ∧ ♦(A ∧ ¬B)) ⊃ PrB|A = PrB. In §4 it is shown that a consequence of this theorem is the thesis (CT1): ¬A ⊃ (A > B ⊃ A J B). It is then proven that (CT1) subjoined to the conditional system WVPr∗ yields the collapse formula (Triv). The final result is that WVPr∗+(GST) is equivalent to WVPr∗+(Triv). In the last section a discussion is opened about the intuitive and philosophical plausibility of axiom (Pr4) and its role in the derivation of (Triv).","PeriodicalId":43501,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"1"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41689538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We explore the notion of a measure in a mereological structure and we deal with the difficulties arising. We show that measure theory on connection spaces is closely related to measure theory on the class of ortholattices and we present an approach akin to Dempster’s and Shafer’s. Finally, the paper contains some suggestions for further research.
{"title":"Defining Measures in a Mereological Space (an exploratory paper)","authors":"G. Barbieri, Giangiacomo Gerla","doi":"10.12775/LLP.2021.005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2021.005","url":null,"abstract":"We explore the notion of a measure in a mereological structure and we deal with the difficulties arising. We show that measure theory on connection spaces is closely related to measure theory on the class of ortholattices and we present an approach akin to Dempster’s and Shafer’s. Finally, the paper contains some suggestions for further research.","PeriodicalId":43501,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"1"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42570839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The logics BN4 and E4 can be considered as the 4-valued logics of the relevant conditional and (relevant) entailment, respectively. The logic BN4 was developed by Brady in 1982 and the logic E4 by Robles and Méndez in 2016. The aim of this paper is to investigate the implicative variants (of both systems) which contain Routley and Meyer’s logic B and endow them with a Belnap-Dunn type bivalent semantics.
{"title":"Belnap-Dunn Semantics for the Variants of BN4 and E4 which Contain Routley and Meyer’s Logic B","authors":"Sandra M. López","doi":"10.12775/LLP.2021.004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2021.004","url":null,"abstract":"The logics BN4 and E4 can be considered as the 4-valued logics of the relevant conditional and (relevant) entailment, respectively. The logic BN4 was developed by Brady in 1982 and the logic E4 by Robles and Méndez in 2016. The aim of this paper is to investigate the implicative variants (of both systems) which contain Routley and Meyer’s logic B and endow them with a Belnap-Dunn type bivalent semantics.","PeriodicalId":43501,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"1"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45830443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Modal multilattice logics with Tarski, Kuratowski, and Halmos operators","authors":"Oleg M. Grigoriev, Y. Petrukhin","doi":"10.12775/LLP.2021.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2021.003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43501,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"1"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45070008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}