Pub Date : 2021-01-21DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198712732.003.0008
S. Iatridou
This chapter explores a number of grammatical properties that conditionals display, with one of its main goals being to show that grammatical form matters: different syntactic expressions of conditionality come with a different range of possible meanings. It also argues that we should not identify the semantic notion ‘conditionals’ with the syntactic expression if p, q. The syntactic construction if p, q is merely one of several syntactic paths that lead to a conditional semantics. The grammatical expression of conditionality determines the range of meanings possible. Overly narrowing conditional semantics to only one syntactic construction makes it harder to identify where each of the elements of meaning originates.
{"title":"Grammar Matters","authors":"S. Iatridou","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198712732.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198712732.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explores a number of grammatical properties that conditionals display, with one of its main goals being to show that grammatical form matters: different syntactic expressions of conditionality come with a different range of possible meanings. It also argues that we should not identify the semantic notion ‘conditionals’ with the syntactic expression if p, q. The syntactic construction if p, q is merely one of several syntactic paths that lead to a conditional semantics. The grammatical expression of conditionality determines the range of meanings possible. Overly narrowing conditional semantics to only one syntactic construction makes it harder to identify where each of the elements of meaning originates.","PeriodicalId":435814,"journal":{"name":"Conditionals, Paradox, and Probability","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117032298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-21DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198712732.003.0014
A. Hájek
This chapter assimilates the Sorites Paradox and the Preface Paradox, drawing parallels between reasoning with uncertainty and reasoning with vague concepts (a theme that Dorothy Edgington has explored). It discusses experiments in which subjects are taken along soritical series of coloured patches, displaying so-called reverse hysteresis in their responses. The chapter offers an explanation of why reverse hysteresis is rational there. It presents a variant of the Preface Paradox—the Progressive Preface Paradox—that is analogous to the Sorites Paradox and its associated experiments, and it offers an analogous explanation of why reverse hysteresis is again rational. The explanation’s central idea is that ‘belief’ is context-dependent.
{"title":"Hysteresis Hypotheses","authors":"A. Hájek","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198712732.003.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198712732.003.0014","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter assimilates the Sorites Paradox and the Preface Paradox, drawing parallels between reasoning with uncertainty and reasoning with vague concepts (a theme that Dorothy Edgington has explored). It discusses experiments in which subjects are taken along soritical series of coloured patches, displaying so-called reverse hysteresis in their responses. The chapter offers an explanation of why reverse hysteresis is rational there. It presents a variant of the Preface Paradox—the Progressive Preface Paradox—that is analogous to the Sorites Paradox and its associated experiments, and it offers an analogous explanation of why reverse hysteresis is again rational. The explanation’s central idea is that ‘belief’ is context-dependent.","PeriodicalId":435814,"journal":{"name":"Conditionals, Paradox, and Probability","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124777864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-27DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198810346.003.0012
Robert Stalnaker
Dorothy Edgington has been a resolute defender of an NTV account of conditionals, according to which a conditional does not express a proposition that makes a categorical claim about the world, but instead make a qualified claim, or express a conditional belief, qualified by or conditional on the proposition expressed by the antecedent. Unlike some philosophers who defend an NTV view for indicative conditionals, but not for subjunctive or counterfactual conditionals, Edgington argues for the more radical thesis that both kinds of conditionals should be given a non-propositional analysis. This chapter considers Edgington’s NTV account of subjunctive conditionals, the role of objective probability in the account, and its relation to the possible-worlds propositional analysis of subjunctive conditionals.
{"title":"Counterfactuals and Probability","authors":"Robert Stalnaker","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198810346.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198810346.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"Dorothy Edgington has been a resolute defender of an NTV account of conditionals, according to which a conditional does not express a proposition that makes a categorical claim about the world, but instead make a qualified claim, or express a conditional belief, qualified by or conditional on the proposition expressed by the antecedent. Unlike some philosophers who defend an NTV view for indicative conditionals, but not for subjunctive or counterfactual conditionals, Edgington argues for the more radical thesis that both kinds of conditionals should be given a non-propositional analysis. This chapter considers Edgington’s NTV account of subjunctive conditionals, the role of objective probability in the account, and its relation to the possible-worlds propositional analysis of subjunctive conditionals.","PeriodicalId":435814,"journal":{"name":"Conditionals, Paradox, and Probability","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124900078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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