This study investigates the effect of transactional leadership behaviour on workers emotional labour in Nigerian hospitality industry. Cross sectional research survey was employed in the study. Two hundred and sixty workers were surveyed from twenty selected four star hotels in Abakaliki with a sample size of one hundred and fifty five. Questionnaire was used as an instrument for data collection. Cronbach α was used to determine the instrument reliability. Linear regression was used to analysed the hypotheses. The study found that transactional leadership behaviour dimensions have positive significant effect on the measures of workers emotional labour in Nigerian hospitality industry. This study concludes that transactional leadership behaviour that is measured in term of transactional leadership behaviour dimensions such as contingent rewards and active management by exception increases workers emotional labour in Nigerian hospitality industry. The implication of this study is that hospitality practitioners and managers should employ transactional leadership behaviour to influence their workers by rewarding them for their performance and effectiveness.
{"title":"Transactional Leadership Behaviour and Workers Emotional Labour in Nigerian Hospitality Industry","authors":"Friday Ogbu Edeh (PhD)","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3637401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3637401","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the effect of transactional leadership behaviour on workers emotional labour in Nigerian hospitality industry. Cross sectional research survey was employed in the study. Two hundred and sixty workers were surveyed from twenty selected four star hotels in Abakaliki with a sample size of one hundred and fifty five. Questionnaire was used as an instrument for data collection. Cronbach α was used to determine the instrument reliability. Linear regression was used to analysed the hypotheses. The study found that transactional leadership behaviour dimensions have positive significant effect on the measures of workers emotional labour in Nigerian hospitality industry. This study concludes that transactional leadership behaviour that is measured in term of transactional leadership behaviour dimensions such as contingent rewards and active management by exception increases workers emotional labour in Nigerian hospitality industry. The implication of this study is that hospitality practitioners and managers should employ transactional leadership behaviour to influence their workers by rewarding them for their performance and effectiveness.","PeriodicalId":438029,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Motivational Theories (Topic)","volume":"212 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132470264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Effective consultation is critical for improving the audit of estimates. In an experiment where audit managers acted as consultants to other auditors, we examine conditions in which consultants either recommend estimates that differ substantially from advice-seekers’ assessments (contrariness) or recommend narrower reasonable ranges of estimates (precision). Psychology theory argues that both of these attributes can improve estimates. We examine whether these attributes depend on consultants' status motives, that is, the desire to gain respect from or power over others. We find that active status motives lead consultants with higher specialized knowledge to provide recommendations that are less contrary, but more precise. However, consultants increase precision by tightening range bounds in a manner that is not counter to management's preference and thus unlikely to prompt the audit team to challenge the estimate. We also find that higher consultant decision authority constrains precision. Our findings suggest limits to consultation's potential effectiveness in improving estimates. For instance, our findings suggest that firms and standard setters direct consultants to focus scrutiny on the range bound that is most likely to constrain management opportunism.
{"title":"If You Want My Advice: Status Motives and Audit Consultations About Accounting Estimates","authors":"W. Knechel, J. Leiby","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2798939","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2798939","url":null,"abstract":"Effective consultation is critical for improving the audit of estimates. In an experiment where audit managers acted as consultants to other auditors, we examine conditions in which consultants either recommend estimates that differ substantially from advice-seekers’ assessments (contrariness) or recommend narrower reasonable ranges of estimates (precision). Psychology theory argues that both of these attributes can improve estimates. We examine whether these attributes depend on consultants' status motives, that is, the desire to gain respect from or power over others. We find that active status motives lead consultants with higher specialized knowledge to provide recommendations that are less contrary, but more precise. However, consultants increase precision by tightening range bounds in a manner that is not counter to management's preference and thus unlikely to prompt the audit team to challenge the estimate. We also find that higher consultant decision authority constrains precision. Our findings suggest limits to consultation's potential effectiveness in improving estimates. For instance, our findings suggest that firms and standard setters direct consultants to focus scrutiny on the range bound that is most likely to constrain management opportunism.","PeriodicalId":438029,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Motivational Theories (Topic)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123957567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Theories on incentive systems and motivation have changed dramatically since the turn of the twentieth century. They started out by viewing the worker as inherently lazy and opposing work which gave birth to piece-rate and cash-bonus systems. Around mid-century, scholars adopt a different view, in which the worker is seen as having different and more complex needs than just money. They find that workers want interesting projects, recognition by co-workers and superiors, and to grow, both in the job and as a person. Cash bonus systems are found to be harmful if improperly organized. Intrinsic motivators are shown to be superior to extrinsic ones and more valued and managers are encouraged to adopt incentive systems that take such motivators into account. Incentive systems can have a big impact on the successful adoption of strategy and a link has been found between the two. The future of this type of research lies within exploring non-monetary rewards in various contexts, designing alternative incentive systems and researching their applicability in business as well as linking application of incentive systems to the evolving research agenda in business research.
{"title":"The Evolution of Motivation and Incentive Systems Research: A Literature Review","authors":"S. Hilmarsson, Páll Rikhardsson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1965646","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1965646","url":null,"abstract":"Theories on incentive systems and motivation have changed dramatically since the turn of the twentieth century. They started out by viewing the worker as inherently lazy and opposing work which gave birth to piece-rate and cash-bonus systems. Around mid-century, scholars adopt a different view, in which the worker is seen as having different and more complex needs than just money. They find that workers want interesting projects, recognition by co-workers and superiors, and to grow, both in the job and as a person. Cash bonus systems are found to be harmful if improperly organized. Intrinsic motivators are shown to be superior to extrinsic ones and more valued and managers are encouraged to adopt incentive systems that take such motivators into account. Incentive systems can have a big impact on the successful adoption of strategy and a link has been found between the two. The future of this type of research lies within exploring non-monetary rewards in various contexts, designing alternative incentive systems and researching their applicability in business as well as linking application of incentive systems to the evolving research agenda in business research.","PeriodicalId":438029,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Motivational Theories (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125966429","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many street-level bureaucrats (such as caseworkers) have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a model of such a street-level bureaucracy and study the implications of its personnel policy on the self-selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ in altruism towards clients. When bureaucrats are paid flat wages, they do not sanction, and the most altruistic types sort into bureaucracy. Pay-for-performance induces some bureaucrats to sanction, but necessitates an increase in expected wage compensation, which can result in sorting from both the top and bottom of the altruism distribution. We also show how client composition affects sorting and why street-level bureaucrats often experience an overload of clients.
{"title":"Incentives and the Sorting of Altruistic Agents into Street-Level Bureaucracies","authors":"Margaretha Buurman, Robert Dur","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1304650","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1304650","url":null,"abstract":"Many street-level bureaucrats (such as caseworkers) have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a model of such a street-level bureaucracy and study the implications of its personnel policy on the self-selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ in altruism towards clients. When bureaucrats are paid flat wages, they do not sanction, and the most altruistic types sort into bureaucracy. Pay-for-performance induces some bureaucrats to sanction, but necessitates an increase in expected wage compensation, which can result in sorting from both the top and bottom of the altruism distribution. We also show how client composition affects sorting and why street-level bureaucrats often experience an overload of clients.","PeriodicalId":438029,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Motivational Theories (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123950367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Fighting collusion has long been a challenge in organizations, whilst favoritism in organizations has long been attacked as one of the most important sources of workplace conflicts. This paper links the phenomena of collusion and favoritism together which seem to be irrelevant. We show that favoritism cannot benefit organizations where collusion is not a serious concern; meanwhile favoritism is not effective in dealing with well-organized collusion; however, strategic use of favoritism can bring conflicts among collusive subordinates and undermine the efficiency of collusion, therefore it is effective in fighting collusion.
{"title":"Collusion and Strategic Favoritism in Organizations","authors":"Zhijun Chen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1259229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1259229","url":null,"abstract":"Fighting collusion has long been a challenge in organizations, whilst favoritism in organizations has long been attacked as one of the most important sources of workplace conflicts. This paper links the phenomena of collusion and favoritism together which seem to be irrelevant. We show that favoritism cannot benefit organizations where collusion is not a serious concern; meanwhile favoritism is not effective in dealing with well-organized collusion; however, strategic use of favoritism can bring conflicts among collusive subordinates and undermine the efficiency of collusion, therefore it is effective in fighting collusion.","PeriodicalId":438029,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Motivational Theories (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114839516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides new evidence on the relationship between managerial incentives and firm risk using a hand-collected database of 3307 executive year observations. We find that the relation between pay performance sensitivity and firm risk exhibits a nonlinear relationship with firm size: for small to medium-sized quoted companies there is a negative relation between pay performance sensitivity and risk consistent with the standard agency theory model; but for large quoted companies the relationship becomes unstable under different model specifications. We argue that the model of compensation practices advanced by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) does not apply to all ranges of the company size distribution and, indeed, for all types of directors. Also, the support found for the model advanced by Core and Guay (2001) is not robust to different model specifications. We conclude that neither model can fully explain the relationship between pay performance sensitivity and risk in the UK.
{"title":"Agency Theory Versus Managerial Ownership Theories: Understanding the Non-Linear Relationship between Managerial Incentives and Firm Risk","authors":"Susanne Espenlaub, K. Stathopoulos, M. Walker","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.842006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.842006","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides new evidence on the relationship between managerial incentives and firm risk using a hand-collected database of 3307 executive year observations. We find that the relation between pay performance sensitivity and firm risk exhibits a nonlinear relationship with firm size: for small to medium-sized quoted companies there is a negative relation between pay performance sensitivity and risk consistent with the standard agency theory model; but for large quoted companies the relationship becomes unstable under different model specifications. We argue that the model of compensation practices advanced by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) does not apply to all ranges of the company size distribution and, indeed, for all types of directors. Also, the support found for the model advanced by Core and Guay (2001) is not robust to different model specifications. We conclude that neither model can fully explain the relationship between pay performance sensitivity and risk in the UK.","PeriodicalId":438029,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Motivational Theories (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128849239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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