{"title":"JLR volume 38 issue 1 Cover and Front matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/jlr.2023.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2023.3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Religion","volume":"T153 1","pages":"f1 - f5"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82641359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In his article “Gender Identity Discrimination and Freedom of Religion,” Patrick Parkinson raises the important question of how the government should reconcile conflicts between the rights of religious people and the rights of transgender and gender-nonconforming people. By focusing on whether gender identity is best defined as a medical issue or a belief system, however, Parkinson does little to answer it. Whether gender identity is a medical issue may be relevant to determining the sincerity of an individual’s faith-based objection to complying with an antidiscrimination law. It has no bearing, however, on the strength of trans and gender-nonconforming individuals’ countervailing interest in being protected from discrimination. Defining gender identity as a belief system does no more to undermine this interest. This should be apparent to defenders of religious exemptions, who assert that belief systems offer a basis for extending, rather than contracting, legal protections. Characterizing an individual’s gender identity as either a medical issue or a belief system thus does not show why that individual’s interests should give way to the interests of religious objectors through an exemption. To reach this conclusion, one must instead turn to other values, such as those implicit—though inadequately defended—in Parkinson’s article.
Patrick Parkinson在《性别认同歧视与宗教自由》(Gender Identity Discrimination and Freedom of Religion)一文中提出了一个重要问题，即政府应如何协调宗教人士的权利与跨性别者和性别不符合者的权利之间的冲突。然而，通过关注性别认同最好被定义为一种医学问题还是一种信仰体系，帕金森几乎没有回答这个问题。性别认同是否属于医疗问题，可能与确定个人基于信仰反对遵守反歧视法的诚意有关。然而，这与跨性别者和性别不一致的个人在保护自己免受歧视方面的对抗利益的强弱无关。将性别认同定义为一种信仰体系并不会破坏这种兴趣。对于宗教豁免的捍卫者来说，这应该是显而易见的，他们断言，信仰体系提供了扩展而不是收缩法律保护的基础。因此，将个人的性别认同定性为医疗问题或信仰体系并不能说明为什么个人的利益应该通过豁免让位给宗教反对者的利益。为了得出这个结论，我们必须转向其他的价值观，比如那些隐含的——尽管在帕金森的文章中没有充分辩护的价值观。
{"title":"The Limits of Defining Identity in Religion-Gender Conflicts: A Response to Patrick Parkinson","authors":"Laura Portuondo, C. E. Haupt","doi":"10.1017/jlr.2022.57","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2022.57","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In his article “Gender Identity Discrimination and Freedom of Religion,” Patrick Parkinson raises the important question of how the government should reconcile conflicts between the rights of religious people and the rights of transgender and gender-nonconforming people. By focusing on whether gender identity is best defined as a medical issue or a belief system, however, Parkinson does little to answer it. Whether gender identity is a medical issue may be relevant to determining the sincerity of an individual’s faith-based objection to complying with an antidiscrimination law. It has no bearing, however, on the strength of trans and gender-nonconforming individuals’ countervailing interest in being protected from discrimination. Defining gender identity as a belief system does no more to undermine this interest. This should be apparent to defenders of religious exemptions, who assert that belief systems offer a basis for extending, rather than contracting, legal protections. Characterizing an individual’s gender identity as either a medical issue or a belief system thus does not show why that individual’s interests should give way to the interests of religious objectors through an exemption. To reach this conclusion, one must instead turn to other values, such as those implicit—though inadequately defended—in Parkinson’s article.","PeriodicalId":44042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Religion","volume":"167 1","pages":"38 - 45"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89056321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The history of English law is a discipline within legal study that has long been well served by scholars. More recently within this field there has been a renaissance in the scholarship on the history of the legal profession, with a focus on the common lawyers, trained at the Inns of Court, including that by Sir John Baker, who in his work Monuments of Endlesse Labours: English Canonists and Their Work, 1300–1900 (1998), produced a splendid collection of short biographies of the English civilians. However, what this field of scholarship has lacked is a substantial study of thewhole community of lawyers in Englandwho practiced in the church courts both before and after the sixteenth century Reformation. There could hardly be anyone more qualified than the legal historian R. H. Helmholz to undertake this work and fill this gap for, as he says in the preface to his The Profession of Ecclesiastical Lawyers: An Historical Introduction, “it has enabled me to make good use of information uncovered in the course of my research from the archives of the English ecclesiastical courts—a task and pleasure that has occupied virtually all of my academic career, now over fifty years in length” (ix). What makes this work so valuable is that it is more than a history of the ecclesiastical law or even a history of the church courts. Rather the study comes alive because it delves into the lives and personalities of those who practiced ecclesiastical law from the medieval period to the nineteenth century. As Helmholz says in making a comparison to his earlier works, “I have endeavoured to put [the people] back” (ix). The book is organized into two parts. In the first, “The Profession Described” Helmholz surveys the profession in the period, looking at the law that regulated the professional conduct of the lawyers, the nature of the lawyers’ education, and their reaction to both the English Reformation and the build-up to the English Civil War. He begins with terminology and categorization: in the same way that the common law divides its lawyers into barristers and attorneys, so those who administered the church law are either advocates or proctors. Helmholz describes this highly stratified and regulated profession, from the regulators (pope to archbishop) to the professional ethics applicable to these lawyers. Next, he deals with their education: the study of civil and canon law at the universities, subjects studied, mode of study, and methods of assessment. In his chapter on the reaction of the
{"title":"The Profession of Ecclesiastical Lawyers: An Historical Introduction. By R. H. Helmholz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. Pp. 248. $116.00 (cloth); $34.99 (paper); $28.00 (digital). ISBN: 9781108499064.","authors":"Stephen Coleman","doi":"10.1017/jlr.2022.48","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2022.48","url":null,"abstract":"The history of English law is a discipline within legal study that has long been well served by scholars. More recently within this field there has been a renaissance in the scholarship on the history of the legal profession, with a focus on the common lawyers, trained at the Inns of Court, including that by Sir John Baker, who in his work Monuments of Endlesse Labours: English Canonists and Their Work, 1300–1900 (1998), produced a splendid collection of short biographies of the English civilians. However, what this field of scholarship has lacked is a substantial study of thewhole community of lawyers in Englandwho practiced in the church courts both before and after the sixteenth century Reformation. There could hardly be anyone more qualified than the legal historian R. H. Helmholz to undertake this work and fill this gap for, as he says in the preface to his The Profession of Ecclesiastical Lawyers: An Historical Introduction, “it has enabled me to make good use of information uncovered in the course of my research from the archives of the English ecclesiastical courts—a task and pleasure that has occupied virtually all of my academic career, now over fifty years in length” (ix). What makes this work so valuable is that it is more than a history of the ecclesiastical law or even a history of the church courts. Rather the study comes alive because it delves into the lives and personalities of those who practiced ecclesiastical law from the medieval period to the nineteenth century. As Helmholz says in making a comparison to his earlier works, “I have endeavoured to put [the people] back” (ix). The book is organized into two parts. In the first, “The Profession Described” Helmholz surveys the profession in the period, looking at the law that regulated the professional conduct of the lawyers, the nature of the lawyers’ education, and their reaction to both the English Reformation and the build-up to the English Civil War. He begins with terminology and categorization: in the same way that the common law divides its lawyers into barristers and attorneys, so those who administered the church law are either advocates or proctors. Helmholz describes this highly stratified and regulated profession, from the regulators (pope to archbishop) to the professional ethics applicable to these lawyers. Next, he deals with their education: the study of civil and canon law at the universities, subjects studied, mode of study, and methods of assessment. In his chapter on the reaction of the","PeriodicalId":44042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Religion","volume":"29 22 1","pages":"168 - 169"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81079708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This review essay registers sincere appreciation for John Witte’s singular contribution to defending the importance of the history and interpretation of rights in the Western tradition, especially as related to Christian thought and practice. It also proposes to amend and refine his approach by highlighting the difference between natural and religious justifications of rights, and by suggesting reasons for favoring the former.
{"title":"Religion and the Justification of Rights","authors":"David H. Little","doi":"10.1017/jlr.2022.53","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2022.53","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This review essay registers sincere appreciation for John Witte’s singular contribution to defending the importance of the history and interpretation of rights in the Western tradition, especially as related to Christian thought and practice. It also proposes to amend and refine his approach by highlighting the difference between natural and religious justifications of rights, and by suggesting reasons for favoring the former.","PeriodicalId":44042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Religion","volume":"1 1","pages":"141 - 157"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86506493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"JLR volume 38 issue 1 Cover and Back matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/jlr.2023.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2023.2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Religion","volume":"35 1","pages":"b1 - b2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83246415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Is there a legitimate basis for religious exemptions from laws that prohibit gender identity discrimination on the basis of people’s beliefs? The author argues that much depends upon how gender dysphoria is understood. If it is seen as a problem requiring medical diagnosis and treatment, then arguably there is no religious basis for discrimination, except in a few situations where being a biological male or female is theologically essential to a particular role. Transgender identification, understood as a medical issue, fits within a belief system that God created two sexes of human beings, male and female. Within that belief system one can make room for an understanding that there are those who experience disorders of sex development and those who have such a profound sense of being born in the wrong body that they undertake steps toward medical transition to align their bodies, as far as possible, with the opposite sex. However, recent reinterpretations of what it means to be transgender involve an assertion that it should not be seen as a medical issue, that affirmation of a person’s self-declared gender identity, with or without having hormonal treatment or surgery, is a matter of human rights and that the law should recognize that people may have a gender that, however described, is nonbinary. These views rely on certain beliefs and positions that have a very weak basis in science. They challenge religious beliefs, which accord with mainstream scientific understanding, that human beings are intrinsically a sexually dimorphic species. People of faith need the freedom to reject beliefs that are incompatible with their worldviews. That does not mean that ill-treatment of someone on the basis of their gender identity can ever be justified; but it does support a religious exemption from a legal obligation to accept someone else’s self-declared gender identity. It is one thing to ask me to respect your beliefs about yourself. It is another to ask me to act toward you as if I share your beliefs.
{"title":"Gender Identity Discrimination and Religious Freedom","authors":"P. Parkinson","doi":"10.1017/jlr.2022.45","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2022.45","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Is there a legitimate basis for religious exemptions from laws that prohibit gender identity discrimination on the basis of people’s beliefs? The author argues that much depends upon how gender dysphoria is understood. If it is seen as a problem requiring medical diagnosis and treatment, then arguably there is no religious basis for discrimination, except in a few situations where being a biological male or female is theologically essential to a particular role. Transgender identification, understood as a medical issue, fits within a belief system that God created two sexes of human beings, male and female. Within that belief system one can make room for an understanding that there are those who experience disorders of sex development and those who have such a profound sense of being born in the wrong body that they undertake steps toward medical transition to align their bodies, as far as possible, with the opposite sex. However, recent reinterpretations of what it means to be transgender involve an assertion that it should not be seen as a medical issue, that affirmation of a person’s self-declared gender identity, with or without having hormonal treatment or surgery, is a matter of human rights and that the law should recognize that people may have a gender that, however described, is nonbinary. These views rely on certain beliefs and positions that have a very weak basis in science. They challenge religious beliefs, which accord with mainstream scientific understanding, that human beings are intrinsically a sexually dimorphic species. People of faith need the freedom to reject beliefs that are incompatible with their worldviews. That does not mean that ill-treatment of someone on the basis of their gender identity can ever be justified; but it does support a religious exemption from a legal obligation to accept someone else’s self-declared gender identity. It is one thing to ask me to respect your beliefs about yourself. It is another to ask me to act toward you as if I share your beliefs.","PeriodicalId":44042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Religion","volume":"13 1","pages":"10 - 37"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76074212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Setting the Table: An Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Rabbi Yechiel Mikhel Epstein’s Arukh Hashulhan. By Michael J. Broyde and Shlomo C. Pill. Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2021. Pp. 428. $139.00 (cloth); $150.00 (digital). ISBN: 9781644690703.","authors":"Levi Cooper","doi":"10.1017/jlr.2022.56","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2022.56","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Religion","volume":"12 2 1","pages":"170 - 175"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79889638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Nation of Immigrants: Sojourners in Biblical Israel’s Tradition and Law. By Richard H. Hiers. Eugene: Resource Publications, 2021. Pp. 98. $30.00 (cloth); $15.00 (paper); $15.00 (digital). ISBN: 9781725287730.","authors":"Safwat Marzouk","doi":"10.1017/jlr.2022.49","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2022.49","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Religion","volume":"120 4 1","pages":"180 - 181"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82871487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In his ambitious book, The End of Law? Law, Theology, and Neuroscience, David W. Opderbeck takes on the difficult question of the relationship between religion and science. He is particularly concerned with what he calls “neurolaw,” a term that refers to the attempt to reduce all legal phenomena to psychology (2–3). Reduction of the subtle art of legal judgment to psychological determinism is, for him, an exemplar of the goal of natural sciences, and it has resulted in materialist ontologies that dispense with transcendence (51). Relying on The Last Human: A Guide to Twenty-Two Species of Extinct Humans,1 Opderbeck argues that the anthropological record does not find evidence of an essence of human nature (107–17). Human beings, he believes, are defined by their cultural and social traits, which include language and law. To understand human nature, he argues, one must examine the sociocultural features of human groups. Reduction is impossible. He argues instead, following Steven Horst, for a “cognitive pluralism” in which reduction of each academic discipline constitutes its own domain of theories about how creatures survive and evolve (139–41).2 Science itself is a sociocultural phenomenon that, for Opderbeck, has no special or unique epistemological or metaphysical claim. In this way, he attempts to domesticate science by positioning it alongside other cultural forms, such as art, music, and theology. Opderbeck’s theological method seeks knowledge of the transcendent by examining the limits of knowledge ofmoral rectitude. This is not an apophatic theory, however, for he argues that theology seeks knowledge of the transcendent through sociocultural phenomena that arise from the struggle of a people to find a sense of moral righteousness (104). For him, neoAristotelianmetaphysics is the site for the development of Christian understanding, and thus, he believes, advances a recovery of Aristotle’s hylomorphism (substance and form) andmoral teleology (final causes). His claim appears to be that an Aristotelian hylomorphism is necessary to maintain a metaphysically teleological conception of the moral good (171–73).
{"title":"The End of Law? Law, Theology, and Neuroscience. By David W. Opderbeck. Eugene: Cascade Books, 2021. Pp. 262. $46.00 (cloth); $31.00 (paper); $31.00 (digital). ISBN: 9781498223911.","authors":"Kevin P. Lee","doi":"10.1017/jlr.2022.50","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2022.50","url":null,"abstract":"In his ambitious book, The End of Law? Law, Theology, and Neuroscience, David W. Opderbeck takes on the difficult question of the relationship between religion and science. He is particularly concerned with what he calls “neurolaw,” a term that refers to the attempt to reduce all legal phenomena to psychology (2–3). Reduction of the subtle art of legal judgment to psychological determinism is, for him, an exemplar of the goal of natural sciences, and it has resulted in materialist ontologies that dispense with transcendence (51). Relying on The Last Human: A Guide to Twenty-Two Species of Extinct Humans,1 Opderbeck argues that the anthropological record does not find evidence of an essence of human nature (107–17). Human beings, he believes, are defined by their cultural and social traits, which include language and law. To understand human nature, he argues, one must examine the sociocultural features of human groups. Reduction is impossible. He argues instead, following Steven Horst, for a “cognitive pluralism” in which reduction of each academic discipline constitutes its own domain of theories about how creatures survive and evolve (139–41).2 Science itself is a sociocultural phenomenon that, for Opderbeck, has no special or unique epistemological or metaphysical claim. In this way, he attempts to domesticate science by positioning it alongside other cultural forms, such as art, music, and theology. Opderbeck’s theological method seeks knowledge of the transcendent by examining the limits of knowledge ofmoral rectitude. This is not an apophatic theory, however, for he argues that theology seeks knowledge of the transcendent through sociocultural phenomena that arise from the struggle of a people to find a sense of moral righteousness (104). For him, neoAristotelianmetaphysics is the site for the development of Christian understanding, and thus, he believes, advances a recovery of Aristotle’s hylomorphism (substance and form) andmoral teleology (final causes). His claim appears to be that an Aristotelian hylomorphism is necessary to maintain a metaphysically teleological conception of the moral good (171–73).","PeriodicalId":44042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Religion","volume":"89 1","pages":"176 - 179"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77622863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The author first presents an uncritical user’s guide to the book, then discusses why Witte, Nichols, and Garnett should consider including key chapters of the story of US religious liberty in the next edition. The author then deconstructs the normative and methodological assumptions of the book.
{"title":"American Religious Liberty without (Much) Theory","authors":"N. Chapman","doi":"10.1017/jlr.2022.52","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2022.52","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The author first presents an uncritical user’s guide to the book, then discusses why Witte, Nichols, and Garnett should consider including key chapters of the story of US religious liberty in the next edition. The author then deconstructs the normative and methodological assumptions of the book.","PeriodicalId":44042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Religion","volume":"38 1","pages":"126 - 140"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81558631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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