El nuevo marco legal para el sistema financiero crea un espacio más favorable para procesar la lucha para recomponer el patrón de acumulación y redefinir las hegemonías al interior del mismo, con una lógica que favorece la reconquista de posiciones por parte de los viejos banqueros. Sin embargo no parecen estar totalmente definidos los escenarios posibles en el desarrollo de este proceso.
{"title":"Numéro 3","authors":"Viejos Protagonistas y Nuevas, Contradicciones","doi":"10.25518/1782-2041.1003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25518/1782-2041.1003","url":null,"abstract":"El nuevo marco legal para el sistema financiero crea un espacio más favorable para procesar la lucha para recomponer el patrón de acumulación y redefinir las hegemonías al interior del mismo, con una lógica que favorece la reconquista de posiciones por parte de los viejos banqueros. Sin embargo no parecen estar totalmente definidos los escenarios posibles en el desarrollo de este proceso.","PeriodicalId":440728,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122483731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, I will pursue three aims. First, I would like to demonstrate the non-transcendental character of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, namely, his claim that a strict division between a priori and a posteriori is an abstraction that derives from a more primordial unity that is given in our lived experience. I will criticize authors such as H. Dreyfus and T. Carman who treat the body and bodily character of our existence as a classical Kantian a priori that functions as a condition of experience without itself being a part of the experience. The claim I would like to defend in this regard is that reflections on the conditions of our experience must themselves be a part of our experience. The second task is to show how Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of temporality helps him to avoid this strict division between a priori and a posteriori. Based on this, I will elucidate some of the most obscure passages of Phenomenology of Perception. Finally, I will claim that the notion of optimal grip can neither be explained by the reference to our body, as Carman claims, or to brains, organisms and their copings with the environment, as Dreyfus argues. Instead, I will claim that the maximal grip is rather a consolidation or intensification of the temporal ecstasy.
{"title":"Numéro 1","authors":"","doi":"10.25518/1782-2041.1235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25518/1782-2041.1235","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I will pursue three aims. First, I would like to demonstrate the non-transcendental character of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, namely, his claim that a strict division between a priori and a posteriori is an abstraction that derives from a more primordial unity that is given in our lived experience. I will criticize authors such as H. Dreyfus and T. Carman who treat the body and bodily character of our existence as a classical Kantian a priori that functions as a condition of experience without itself being a part of the experience. The claim I would like to defend in this regard is that reflections on the conditions of our experience must themselves be a part of our experience. The second task is to show how Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of temporality helps him to avoid this strict division between a priori and a posteriori. Based on this, I will elucidate some of the most obscure passages of Phenomenology of Perception. Finally, I will claim that the notion of optimal grip can neither be explained by the reference to our body, as Carman claims, or to brains, organisms and their copings with the environment, as Dreyfus argues. Instead, I will claim that the maximal grip is rather a consolidation or intensification of the temporal ecstasy.","PeriodicalId":440728,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121246554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Le texte qui suit est la version originelle de l’article « Husserl et la no ready-made theory » paru en 2011 dans le présent Bulletin (voir la note de l’éditeur en fin de numéro). Brisart s’en prend dans ce texte à ce qu’il dénomme la théorie du ready-made, à savoir le réalisme métaphysique sous toutes ses formes. Il montre d’abord qu’en conceptualisant l’expérience, la phénoménologie de Husserl — comme la critique kantienne — a pour résultat une remise en cause radicale du mythe du donné ou de l’objet. Ensuite, il suggère que Husserl, parce qu’il n’a pas su s’affranchir de Frege, est resté tributaire d’un certain mythe de la signification.
{"title":"Textes posthumes III : La contribution de Husserl à la « no ready-made theory »","authors":"R. Brisart","doi":"10.25518/1782-2041.1093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25518/1782-2041.1093","url":null,"abstract":"Le texte qui suit est la version originelle de l’article « Husserl et la no ready-made theory » paru en 2011 dans le présent Bulletin (voir la note de l’éditeur en fin de numéro). Brisart s’en prend dans ce texte à ce qu’il dénomme la théorie du ready-made, à savoir le réalisme métaphysique sous toutes ses formes. Il montre d’abord qu’en conceptualisant l’expérience, la phénoménologie de Husserl — comme la critique kantienne — a pour résultat une remise en cause radicale du mythe du donné ou de l’objet. Ensuite, il suggère que Husserl, parce qu’il n’a pas su s’affranchir de Frege, est resté tributaire d’un certain mythe de la signification.","PeriodicalId":440728,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129367928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Prenant acte des développements les plus récents de la tradition phénoménologique, du côté des sciences cognitives d’une part, et du côté de la vie, d’autre part, le présent article se propose d’évaluer à quelles conditions ces développements sont susceptibles d’informer la phénoménologie sur ses propres « pré-conditions ». Montrant comment le projet dit de « naturalisation » de la phénoménologie et la phénoménologie de la vie dans sa version barbarassienne convergent en pointant une même insuffisance de l’effort phénoménologique traditionnel, l’auteur propose, à partir de l’accointance philosophique, étonnante au premier abord, de ces deux courants de pensée, d’indiquer comment la phénoménologie peut espérer achever l’enquête sur ses propres « pré-conditions » en s’intégrant le cognitif naturaliste au moyen d’une conception réévaluée de la nature elle-même.
{"title":"Vie et nature dans la phénoménologie contemporaine : vers un enrichissement du naturalisme","authors":"N. Zaslawski","doi":"10.25518/1782-2041.1051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25518/1782-2041.1051","url":null,"abstract":"Prenant acte des développements les plus récents de la tradition phénoménologique, du côté des sciences cognitives d’une part, et du côté de la vie, d’autre part, le présent article se propose d’évaluer à quelles conditions ces développements sont susceptibles d’informer la phénoménologie sur ses propres « pré-conditions ». Montrant comment le projet dit de « naturalisation » de la phénoménologie et la phénoménologie de la vie dans sa version barbarassienne convergent en pointant une même insuffisance de l’effort phénoménologique traditionnel, l’auteur propose, à partir de l’accointance philosophique, étonnante au premier abord, de ces deux courants de pensée, d’indiquer comment la phénoménologie peut espérer achever l’enquête sur ses propres « pré-conditions » en s’intégrant le cognitif naturaliste au moyen d’une conception réévaluée de la nature elle-même.","PeriodicalId":440728,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique","volume":"162 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133649342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article is addressing one of the central but maybe the most ambiguous and multilayered concepts of Husserl’s phenomenology. Husserl’s insisting on a form of intentionality that implies not just conscious directedness towards objects, but also a constitutive function of mental acts, led to some serious accusations of his (not only transcendental) idealism and solipsism. Justification of such accusations depends exclusively on whether we understand constitution in an ontological sense, as a creative process which brings worldly entities into being, or in an epistemological sense, as a process which enables us to identify and to interpret a particular givenness as something. In early stages of phenomenology, a so-called “hylomorphic” theory of constitution prevailed, which stated that object of our experience can be present for us only if some sense-data (hyle) is formed in our intentional acts by a meaning-giving component (which Husserl called morphe in his Ideas I). This theory proved to be unsatisfying when Husserl turned to a phenomenological description of temporal objects, discovering that not just objects, but also intentional acts have a distinct temporal structure. However, the analysis of temporal constitution reaches even further, because the idea of the “living present”, and its triadic structure of retention-primal impression-protention, holds the key to an explanation of horizon-intentionality, and offers the answer to an essential transcendental question: How is it possible for us to be aware of the world towards which all of our intentional life is directed, and from which all of the motivation for our actions originates?
{"title":"The constitutive function of intentionality in Husserl’s phenomenology","authors":"Nebojša Mudri","doi":"10.25518/1782-2041.1284","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25518/1782-2041.1284","url":null,"abstract":"The article is addressing one of the central but maybe the most ambiguous and multilayered concepts of Husserl’s phenomenology. Husserl’s insisting on a form of intentionality that implies not just conscious directedness towards objects, but also a constitutive function of mental acts, led to some serious accusations of his (not only transcendental) idealism and solipsism. Justification of such accusations depends exclusively on whether we understand constitution in an ontological sense, as a creative process which brings worldly entities into being, or in an epistemological sense, as a process which enables us to identify and to interpret a particular givenness as something. In early stages of phenomenology, a so-called “hylomorphic” theory of constitution prevailed, which stated that object of our experience can be present for us only if some sense-data (hyle) is formed in our intentional acts by a meaning-giving component (which Husserl called morphe in his Ideas I). This theory proved to be unsatisfying when Husserl turned to a phenomenological description of temporal objects, discovering that not just objects, but also intentional acts have a distinct temporal structure. However, the analysis of temporal constitution reaches even further, because the idea of the “living present”, and its triadic structure of retention-primal impression-protention, holds the key to an explanation of horizon-intentionality, and offers the answer to an essential transcendental question: How is it possible for us to be aware of the world towards which all of our intentional life is directed, and from which all of the motivation for our actions originates?","PeriodicalId":440728,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126080407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Militares e Política, Marcelo Macedo Corrêa, oitava edição, Militares e Política
This article presents a reflection on the political history of the nationalist newspaper “O Semanário”, with the timeframes the period between the beginning of the government of national development Kubitschek (1956 1961) and civil-military coup of 1964. Two goals guide the direction of this paper: (i) present the historical background of “O Semanário” political prominence as an actor in that period, in particular, from woven alliances between military and civilian sectors, which together outlined political-economic projects for society as a whole, (ii) explain the proposed vehicle for the period around themes such as economic and industrial development of the country and the approval of the proposed basic reforms.
{"title":"Numéro 8","authors":"Militares e Política, Marcelo Macedo Corrêa, oitava edição, Militares e Política","doi":"10.25518/1782-2041.916","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25518/1782-2041.916","url":null,"abstract":"This article presents a reflection on the political history of the nationalist newspaper “O Semanário”, with the timeframes the period between the beginning of the government of national development Kubitschek (1956 1961) and civil-military coup of 1964. Two goals guide the direction of this paper: (i) present the historical background of “O Semanário” political prominence as an actor in that period, in particular, from woven alliances between military and civilian sectors, which together outlined political-economic projects for society as a whole, (ii) explain the proposed vehicle for the period around themes such as economic and industrial development of the country and the approval of the proposed basic reforms.","PeriodicalId":440728,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique","volume":"476 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127549650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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