Annals of Finance最新文献

We study today’s two-tier money creation and destruction system: Commercial banks create bank deposits (privately created money) through loans to firms or asset purchases from the private sector. Bank deposits are destroyed when households buy bank equity or when firms repay loans. Central banks create electronic central bank money (publicly created money or reserves) through loans to commercial banks. In a simple general equilibrium setting, we show that symmetric equilibria yield the first-best level of money creation and lending when prices are flexible, regardless of monetary policy and capital regulation. When prices are rigid, we identify the circumstances in which money creation is excessive or breaks down and the ones in which an adequate combination of monetary policy and capital regulation can restore efficiency. Finally, we provide a series of extensions and generalizations of the results.

In this paper, we introduce and analyze the fractional Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (BN-S) stochastic volatility model. The proposed model is based upon two desirable properties of the long-term variance process suggested by the empirical data: long-term memory and jumps. The proposed model incorporates the long-term memory and positive autocorrelation properties of fractional Brownian motion with (H>1/2), and the jump properties of the BN-S model. We find arbitrage-free prices for variance and volatility swaps for this new model. Because fractional Brownian motion is still a Gaussian process, we derive some new expressions for the distributions of integrals of continuous Gaussian processes as we work towards an analytic expression for the prices of these swaps. The model is analyzed in connection to the quadratic hedging problem and some related analytical results are developed. The amount of derivatives required to minimize a quadratic hedging error is obtained. Finally, we provide some numerical analysis based on the VIX data. Numerical results show the efficiency of the proposed model compared to the Heston model and the classical BN-S model.

This paper investigates the effect of model uncertainty on the performance of commodity-based portfolios. We consider a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility maximizer investor in a complete market, with independent ambiguity-aversion levels for the three factors explaining the term structure of future prices, namely, spot prices, convenience yield (CY) and interest rates (IRs), as proposed in the seminal work of Schwartz (J Finance 52(3): 923–973, 1997). This generic investor is interested in the speculative component of the investment rather than possessing/consuming the physical commodity. We obtain closed-form solutions for optimal investments, optimal perturbations (alternative model) and value functions in line with the robust portfolio setting of Maenhout (Rev Financial Stud 17(4): 951–983, 2004). Our main focus is on the effect of convenience yield’s uncertainty on the optimal analysis. We estimate the model by applying a combination of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) and Kalman Filter (KF) techniques, to two commodities: West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and copper future prices. The analysis demonstrates that uncertainty on the CY factor could be the largest contributor to the under-performance of a commodities portfolio, with wealth equivalent losses (WELs) in the ranges of 33% to 88% (WTI), and 7% to 31% (copper). Moreover, small variations, of up 25%, on CY’s covariance parameters could lead to a WEL of up to 40% (WTI, lesser volatility of CY).

The general consensus on the need to enhance the resilience of the financial system has led to the imposition of higher capital requirements for certain institutions, supposedly based on their contribution to systemic risk. Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) are divided into buckets based on their required additional capital buffers ranging from 1% to 3.5%. We measure the marginal contribution to systemic risk of 26 G-SIBs using the Distressed Insurance Premium methodology proposed by Huang et al. (J Bank Financ 33:2036–2049, 2009) and examine ranking consistency with that using the SRISK of Acharya et al. (Am Econ Rev 102:59–64, 2012). We then compare the bucketing using the two academic approaches and supervisory buckets. Because it leads to capital surcharges, bucketing should be consistent, irrespective of methodology. Instead, discrepancies in the allocation between buckets emerge and this suggests the complementary use of other methodologies.

In this paper, I propose a tractable model of sovereign default and the inter-state spillovers emanating from default. A coalition of nations may choose to insure against default, and the behavior of the coalition is used to examine the magnitude of the international spillovers. A voting structure for the coalition is proposed to examine idiosyncratic spillovers. The model is calibrated to the recent Greek Debt crisis to understand the spillovers from a default, and the moral hazard effect of the Troika. I find that spillover effects are large. If the rest of the world defaulted, this would create a loss equivalent to a permanent 9% decrease in government spending. Counterfactual experiments reveal that default would be prevalent without the IMF, suggesting that the own-penalty to defaulting has decreased since the IMF’s creation.

We show that the standard notion of residual income (RI) does not fulfill additive coherence. This gives rise to ambiguities and inconsistencies. The pitfall resides in the capital charge, which blends a non-market value with a market rate. We solve the problem by using a capital charge based on economic return, obtained as the product of a market value and a market rate. The resultant economic RI enjoys additivity. The economic RI is naturally associated to the average Return on Investment (ratio of total income to total invested capital). Subtracting the respective cost of capital (ratio of total economic return to total invested capital) the marginal economic efficiency of the capital is correctly captured. Economic RI guarantees consistency among the various sets of incomes, book values, economic values, accounting rates, and costs of capital, under an investment perspective as well as a financing one, both at a period level and at an aggregate level, either assuming time-invariant or time-varying costs of capital. Therefore, the economic RI offers a coherent tool for the assessment of a project’s or firm’s economic efficiency.

We introduce a new system of stochastic differential equations which models dependence of market beta and unsystematic risk upon size, measured by market capitalization. We fit our model using size deciles data from Kenneth French’s data library. This model is somewhat similar to generalized volatility-stabilized models. The novelty of our work is twofold. First, we take into account the difference between price and total returns (in other words, between market size and wealth processes). Second, we work with actual market data. We study the long-term properties of this system of equations, and reproduce observed linearity of the capital distribution curve. In the “Appendix”, we analyze size-based real-world index funds.

Incorporation of technical risk in compound real options has been considered in Cassimon et al. (2011) concerning the valuation of multi-stage pharmaceutical R&D. There, the technical success probabilities at each development stage were assumed to be generated independently of each other. This assumption can be unrealistic in many applied problems, pharmaceutical R&D included. We present a valuation procedure dealing with dependent success probabilities and random development stage times. This greater flexibility allows a better description of the sequence of decision stages and results, which in turn, impact the value of the considered project. The theoretical results are illustrated through a numerical example that shows the implementation of the model to a pharmaceutical R&D problem.

This paper proposes a two-stage sealed-bid model for the execution of portfolios. An asset manager auctions a portfolio of securities to a set of brokers who are unaware of the specific details about individual securities. We prove that our mechanism may reduce the costs of execution for the asset manager and may mitigate the “winner’s curse” for participating brokers.

In a mean-variance framework with a representative agent, any linear model for the cross section of expected returns can be supported as an equilibrium as long as the market portfolio is spanned by the factor mimicking portfolios. Any set of factors is admissible as long as the spanning condition is satisfied. Factors based on size, book-to-market, momentum, investment, profitability, behavioral biases, principal components, or any combination of these can be used as equilibrium factors. An equilibrium model with M risk factors can be reduced to a collection of M models where each model has a single risk factor, which is covariance with the market portfolio.