Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1007/s11158-023-09643-x
Matteo Boccacci
Abstract Does domination make us unfree? Republicans argue that it does. Thus, they contend that the liberal conception of freedom is inadequate as it is not (wholly) able to account for domination. I provide a new approach to this controversy. The liberal conception of freedom has the potential to account for domination, but we must adjust the scope of our analysis: claims about domination are best understood not as claims about quantities of liberal freedom, but as claims about the value of liberal freedom. Even if the master is benevolent and indeed does not interfere much with the slave’s choices and actions, the relation of domination affects the quality of the slave’s liberal freedom. To argue for this point, I provide a taxonomy of the value of freedom and then, on this basis, point to several ways in which freedom under domination lacks value.
{"title":"Domination and Freedom: Quality, not Quantity*","authors":"Matteo Boccacci","doi":"10.1007/s11158-023-09643-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09643-x","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Does domination make us unfree? Republicans argue that it does. Thus, they contend that the liberal conception of freedom is inadequate as it is not (wholly) able to account for domination. I provide a new approach to this controversy. The liberal conception of freedom has the potential to account for domination, but we must adjust the scope of our analysis: claims about domination are best understood not as claims about quantities of liberal freedom, but as claims about the value of liberal freedom. Even if the master is benevolent and indeed does not interfere much with the slave’s choices and actions, the relation of domination affects the quality of the slave’s liberal freedom. To argue for this point, I provide a taxonomy of the value of freedom and then, on this basis, point to several ways in which freedom under domination lacks value.","PeriodicalId":45474,"journal":{"name":"Res Publica-A Journal of Moral Legal and Political Philosophy","volume":"2 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135972661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1007/s11158-023-09640-0
Claudia Landwehr, Armin Schäfer
Abstract In the eyes of its citizens, liberal democracy is connected to at least three promises—the promises of autonomy, equality and rationality. To what extent citizens can view these promises as being fulfilled will affect political trust and support for democracy. The rise of populism and trends towards technocratic government have rightly been interpreted as arising from a gap between normative aspirations and institutional and practical realities. Does this mean that we should adjust our ideals to reality, or that we should strive to bring realities closer to the ideal? Self-proclaimed ‘realists’ argue that democratic ideals are unattainable and that we should therefore settle for a second-best alternative, such as a competitive oligarchy. Against this position, we point out that deliberative democracy offers an attractive ideal for successful representation that can inform democratic innovation. However, deliberative democracy also remains institutionally underdetermined and needs to develop better criteria that enable us to determine if, how and under what conditions the attempt to fulfil democracy’s promises succeeds in practice. In this paper, we suggest a criterion of deliberative responsiveness as a measure for representative democracy’s success in fulfilling promises of autonomy, equality and rationality. We go on to show in what respects these promises tend to be broken in contemporary representative democracies and discuss strategies for institutional reform that have potential to counteract these problems.
{"title":"The Promise of Representative Democracy: Deliberative Responsiveness","authors":"Claudia Landwehr, Armin Schäfer","doi":"10.1007/s11158-023-09640-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09640-0","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the eyes of its citizens, liberal democracy is connected to at least three promises—the promises of autonomy, equality and rationality. To what extent citizens can view these promises as being fulfilled will affect political trust and support for democracy. The rise of populism and trends towards technocratic government have rightly been interpreted as arising from a gap between normative aspirations and institutional and practical realities. Does this mean that we should adjust our ideals to reality, or that we should strive to bring realities closer to the ideal? Self-proclaimed ‘realists’ argue that democratic ideals are unattainable and that we should therefore settle for a second-best alternative, such as a competitive oligarchy. Against this position, we point out that deliberative democracy offers an attractive ideal for successful representation that can inform democratic innovation. However, deliberative democracy also remains institutionally underdetermined and needs to develop better criteria that enable us to determine if, how and under what conditions the attempt to fulfil democracy’s promises succeeds in practice. In this paper, we suggest a criterion of deliberative responsiveness as a measure for representative democracy’s success in fulfilling promises of autonomy, equality and rationality. We go on to show in what respects these promises tend to be broken in contemporary representative democracies and discuss strategies for institutional reform that have potential to counteract these problems.","PeriodicalId":45474,"journal":{"name":"Res Publica-A Journal of Moral Legal and Political Philosophy","volume":"4 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135933378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-30DOI: 10.1007/s11158-023-09638-8
Andre Leo Rusavuk
Abstract Proponents of the duty to vote (DTV) argue that in normal circumstances, citizens have the moral duty to vote in political elections. Discussions about DTV analyze what the duty is, who has this duty, when they have it, and why they have it. Missing are answers to the Specification Question: to which elections does DTV apply? A dilemma arises for some supporters of DTV—in this paper, I focus on Julia Maskivker’s work—because either answer is problematic. First, I argue that it is implausible that DTV applies to all elections because this makes the duty too costly for the voter. Second, I argue that there are no good reasons why under normal circumstances DTV applies only to some elections. I consider objections but conclude that the dilemma is successful and therefore the case for DTV is incomplete.
{"title":"Which Elections? A Dilemma for Proponents of the Duty to Vote","authors":"Andre Leo Rusavuk","doi":"10.1007/s11158-023-09638-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09638-8","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Proponents of the duty to vote (DTV) argue that in normal circumstances, citizens have the moral duty to vote in political elections. Discussions about DTV analyze what the duty is, who has this duty, when they have it, and why they have it. Missing are answers to the Specification Question: to which elections does DTV apply? A dilemma arises for some supporters of DTV—in this paper, I focus on Julia Maskivker’s work—because either answer is problematic. First, I argue that it is implausible that DTV applies to all elections because this makes the duty too costly for the voter. Second, I argue that there are no good reasons why under normal circumstances DTV applies only to some elections. I consider objections but conclude that the dilemma is successful and therefore the case for DTV is incomplete.","PeriodicalId":45474,"journal":{"name":"Res Publica-A Journal of Moral Legal and Political Philosophy","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136022967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-27DOI: 10.1007/s11158-023-09644-w
Matthew Talbert
{"title":"Blaming Reasonable Wrongdoers","authors":"Matthew Talbert","doi":"10.1007/s11158-023-09644-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09644-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45474,"journal":{"name":"Res Publica-A Journal of Moral Legal and Political Philosophy","volume":"141 3-4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136317699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-25DOI: 10.1007/s11158-023-09641-z
Manuel Almagro
{"title":"On a Columnar Self: Two Senses of Expressing Partisanship","authors":"Manuel Almagro","doi":"10.1007/s11158-023-09641-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09641-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45474,"journal":{"name":"Res Publica-A Journal of Moral Legal and Political Philosophy","volume":"AES-10 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135169476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-25DOI: 10.1007/s11158-023-09639-7
Eric Scarffe
{"title":"Hessler’s New Feminist Approach to Human Rights Theorizing","authors":"Eric Scarffe","doi":"10.1007/s11158-023-09639-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09639-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45474,"journal":{"name":"Res Publica-A Journal of Moral Legal and Political Philosophy","volume":"6 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135219114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-19DOI: 10.1007/s11158-023-09636-w
Jessica Sutherland
Abstract We typically see child soldiers as not morally responsible because of their age and/or because they are victims of adult exploitation. Work on child soldiers and their moral responsibility is relatively sparse within just war thinking and political philosophy (Thomason in Ethical Theory Moral Pract , 19:115–127, 2016a; Thomason in Seeing child soldiers as morally compromised warriors [Online]. The Critique. Available: http://www.thecritique.com/articles/seeing-child-soldiers-as-morally-compromised-warriors/ [Accessed 2 April 2020], 2016b), and instead focuses mostly on whether child soldiers are liable to attack (McMahan, in Gates, Reich (eds) Child soldiers in the age of fractured states , University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, PA, 2010; Vaha in J Military Ethics , 10:36–51, 2011). This paper brings these two areas together. Many of us have the intuition that combatants should exercise at least some constraint when fighting against child soldiers. I will argue that, contra McMahan (2010), exercising restraint in this way is a requirement of justice. I will argue that agents can be more or less liable to attack (liability to attack is on a spectrum) in defensive killing cases depending on how morally responsible they are for the threat they cause. I will outline how, whilst child soldiers are not wholly responsible for the threat they cause to combatants, their responsibility is also not completely diminished. I will argue that child soldiers are therefore liable to attack, but to a lesser extent than fully responsible agents. I will show that combatants fighting against child soldiers are therefore required, as a matter of justice, to use the most proportionate method of attack which may not always be to kill the child soldier. I will conclude that combatants are therefore required, as a matter of justice, to exercise a degree of restraint when fighting against child soldiers.
我们通常认为儿童兵没有道德责任，因为他们的年龄和/或因为他们是成人剥削的受害者。在正义战争思想和政治哲学中，关于儿童兵及其道德责任的研究相对较少(Thomason in Ethical Theory and moral practice, 19:115-127, 2016a;将童兵视为道德妥协的战士[在线]。批判。可获得:http://www.thecritique.com/articles/seeing-child-soldiers-as-morally-compromised-warriors/[访问日期:2020年4月2日]，2016b)，相反，主要关注儿童兵是否容易受到攻击(McMahan, in Gates, Reich(编辑)支离破碎的国家时代的儿童兵，匹兹堡大学出版社，匹兹堡，宾夕法尼亚州，2010;[J] .军事伦理学，2011,10:36-51。本文将这两个领域结合在一起。我们中的许多人都有一种直觉，即战斗人员在与儿童兵作战时至少应该行使一些约束。我认为，与McMahan(2010)相反，以这种方式行使约束是正义的要求。我认为，在防御性杀人案件中，行为人或多或少会倾向于攻击(攻击的倾向是一个范围)，这取决于他们对自己造成的威胁负有多大的道德责任。我将概述，虽然儿童兵对他们对战斗人员造成的威胁不负有全部责任，但他们的责任也没有完全减轻。我认为，儿童兵因此有可能发动攻击，但其程度比完全负责任的特工要小。因此，我将说明，作为正义问题，与儿童兵作战的战斗人员必须使用最相称的攻击方法，这种方法不一定总是杀死儿童兵。因此，我的结论是，作为正义问题，战斗人员在与儿童兵作战时必须保持一定程度的克制。
{"title":"The Spectrum of Liability to Defensive Harm and the Case of Child Soldiers","authors":"Jessica Sutherland","doi":"10.1007/s11158-023-09636-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09636-w","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We typically see child soldiers as not morally responsible because of their age and/or because they are victims of adult exploitation. Work on child soldiers and their moral responsibility is relatively sparse within just war thinking and political philosophy (Thomason in Ethical Theory Moral Pract , 19:115–127, 2016a; Thomason in Seeing child soldiers as morally compromised warriors [Online]. The Critique. Available: http://www.thecritique.com/articles/seeing-child-soldiers-as-morally-compromised-warriors/ [Accessed 2 April 2020], 2016b), and instead focuses mostly on whether child soldiers are liable to attack (McMahan, in Gates, Reich (eds) Child soldiers in the age of fractured states , University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, PA, 2010; Vaha in J Military Ethics , 10:36–51, 2011). This paper brings these two areas together. Many of us have the intuition that combatants should exercise at least some constraint when fighting against child soldiers. I will argue that, contra McMahan (2010), exercising restraint in this way is a requirement of justice. I will argue that agents can be more or less liable to attack (liability to attack is on a spectrum) in defensive killing cases depending on how morally responsible they are for the threat they cause. I will outline how, whilst child soldiers are not wholly responsible for the threat they cause to combatants, their responsibility is also not completely diminished. I will argue that child soldiers are therefore liable to attack, but to a lesser extent than fully responsible agents. I will show that combatants fighting against child soldiers are therefore required, as a matter of justice, to use the most proportionate method of attack which may not always be to kill the child soldier. I will conclude that combatants are therefore required, as a matter of justice, to exercise a degree of restraint when fighting against child soldiers.","PeriodicalId":45474,"journal":{"name":"Res Publica-A Journal of Moral Legal and Political Philosophy","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135730320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-18DOI: 10.1007/s11158-023-09633-z
Jesse Spafford
Abstract Under what circumstances can people convert natural resources into private property? John Locke famously answered this question by positing what has become known as the Lockean proviso : a person has the power to unilaterally appropriate natural resources ‘at least where there is enough and as good left in common for others’. This Lockean proviso has been widely embraced by right-libertarians who maintain that a relevant act appropriates only if others are not left worse off. However, this proviso is multiply ambiguous with there being various ways of specifying its distinct elements. Daniel Attas has argued that all proposed specifications render the proviso either implausible or unsatisfied. However, there are three seemingly plausible specifications that he either fails to consider or does not adequately address. This paper attempts to show that these specifications are either unacceptable, go unsatisfied, or fail to support right-libertarianism.
{"title":"When ‘Enough and as Good’ is Not Good Enough","authors":"Jesse Spafford","doi":"10.1007/s11158-023-09633-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09633-z","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Under what circumstances can people convert natural resources into private property? John Locke famously answered this question by positing what has become known as the Lockean proviso : a person has the power to unilaterally appropriate natural resources ‘at least where there is enough and as good left in common for others’. This Lockean proviso has been widely embraced by right-libertarians who maintain that a relevant act appropriates only if others are not left worse off. However, this proviso is multiply ambiguous with there being various ways of specifying its distinct elements. Daniel Attas has argued that all proposed specifications render the proviso either implausible or unsatisfied. However, there are three seemingly plausible specifications that he either fails to consider or does not adequately address. This paper attempts to show that these specifications are either unacceptable, go unsatisfied, or fail to support right-libertarianism.","PeriodicalId":45474,"journal":{"name":"Res Publica-A Journal of Moral Legal and Political Philosophy","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135883812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-18DOI: 10.1007/s11158-023-09635-x
Simone Chambers, Mark E. Warren
Abstract The field of deliberative democracy now generally recognizes the co-dependence of deliberation and voting. The field tends to emphasize what deliberation accomplishes for vote-based decisions. In this paper, we reverse this now common view to ask: In what ways does voting benefit deliberation? We discuss seven ways voting can complement and sometimes enhance deliberation. First, voting furnishes deliberation with a feasible and fair closure mechanism. Second, the power to vote implies equal recognition and status, both morally and strategically, which is a condition of democratic deliberation. Third, voting politicizes deliberation by injecting the strategic features of politics into deliberation—effectively internalizing conflict into deliberative processes, without which they can become detached from their political environments. Fourth, anticipation of voting may induce authenticity by revealing preferences, as what one says will count. Fifth, voting preserves expressions of dissent, helping to push back against socially induced pressures for consensus. Sixth, voting defines the issues, such that deliberation is focused, and thus more likely to be effective. And, seventh, within contexts where votes are public—as in representative contexts, voting can induce accountability, particularly for one’s claims. We then use these points to discuss four general types of institutions—general elections, legislatures, minipublics, and minipublics embedded in referendum processes—that combine talking and voting, with the aim of identifying designs that do a better or worse job of capitalizing upon the strengths of each.
{"title":"Why Deliberation and Voting Belong Together","authors":"Simone Chambers, Mark E. Warren","doi":"10.1007/s11158-023-09635-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09635-x","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The field of deliberative democracy now generally recognizes the co-dependence of deliberation and voting. The field tends to emphasize what deliberation accomplishes for vote-based decisions. In this paper, we reverse this now common view to ask: In what ways does voting benefit deliberation? We discuss seven ways voting can complement and sometimes enhance deliberation. First, voting furnishes deliberation with a feasible and fair closure mechanism. Second, the power to vote implies equal recognition and status, both morally and strategically, which is a condition of democratic deliberation. Third, voting politicizes deliberation by injecting the strategic features of politics into deliberation—effectively internalizing conflict into deliberative processes, without which they can become detached from their political environments. Fourth, anticipation of voting may induce authenticity by revealing preferences, as what one says will count. Fifth, voting preserves expressions of dissent, helping to push back against socially induced pressures for consensus. Sixth, voting defines the issues, such that deliberation is focused, and thus more likely to be effective. And, seventh, within contexts where votes are public—as in representative contexts, voting can induce accountability, particularly for one’s claims. We then use these points to discuss four general types of institutions—general elections, legislatures, minipublics, and minipublics embedded in referendum processes—that combine talking and voting, with the aim of identifying designs that do a better or worse job of capitalizing upon the strengths of each.","PeriodicalId":45474,"journal":{"name":"Res Publica-A Journal of Moral Legal and Political Philosophy","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135888727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-16DOI: 10.1007/s11158-023-09637-9
Harrison Frye
{"title":"Is Belief in Political Obligation Ideological?","authors":"Harrison Frye","doi":"10.1007/s11158-023-09637-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09637-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45474,"journal":{"name":"Res Publica-A Journal of Moral Legal and Political Philosophy","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136113100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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