Abstract A substantial share of customers in emerging markets use dual-SIM phones and subscribe to two mobile networks. A primary motive for so called multi-simming is to take advantage of cheap on-net services from both networks. In our modelling effort, we augment the seminal model of competing telephone networks á la Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998b) by a segment of flexible price hunters that may choose to multi-sim. According to our findings, in equilibrium, the networks set a high off-net price in the linear tariffs to achieve segmentation. This induces the price hunters to multi-sim. We show that increased deployment of dual-SIM phones may induce a mixing equilibrium with high expected on-net prices. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, deployment of a technology that increases substitutability, and thereby competition, may end up raising prices.
{"title":"Mobile Telephony in Emerging Markets: The Importance of Dual-SIM Phones","authors":"Kjetil Andersson,Daniel Göller","doi":"10.1515/rne-2020-0040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rne-2020-0040","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A substantial share of customers in emerging markets use dual-SIM phones and subscribe to two mobile networks. A primary motive for so called multi-simming is to take advantage of cheap on-net services from both networks. In our modelling effort, we augment the seminal model of competing telephone networks á la Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998b) by a segment of flexible price hunters that may choose to multi-sim. According to our findings, in equilibrium, the networks set a high off-net price in the linear tariffs to achieve segmentation. This induces the price hunters to multi-sim. We show that increased deployment of dual-SIM phones may induce a mixing equilibrium with high expected on-net prices. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, deployment of a technology that increases substitutability, and thereby competition, may end up raising prices.","PeriodicalId":45659,"journal":{"name":"Review of Network Economics","volume":"56 1","pages":"189-219"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138540308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We use data from the two leading US platforms, Prosper and Lending Club, to explore the drivers of the growing consumer demand for peer-to-peer (P2P) credit. Despite the online nature of new entrants, we rely on the spatial autoregressive model because spatial effects play an important role. Our findings suggest that the initial growth of P2P lending was spurred by the global financial crisis, but its growth after 2011 occurred in counties that were underserved by bank branches. The growth of P2P lending is slower in counties with high bank concentration and this factor is the most robust, stable over time and economically important in our study. Counties with lower population density, lower share of educated and young people experience lower growth of P2P lending, consistent with the hypothesis that learning costs deter the entry of new entrants.
{"title":"The Expansion of Peer-to-Peer Lending","authors":"Olena Havrylchyk, Carlotta Mariotto, Talal-Ur- Rahim, Marianne Verdier","doi":"10.1515/rne-2020-0033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rne-2020-0033","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We use data from the two leading US platforms, Prosper and Lending Club, to explore the drivers of the growing consumer demand for peer-to-peer (P2P) credit. Despite the online nature of new entrants, we rely on the spatial autoregressive model because spatial effects play an important role. Our findings suggest that the initial growth of P2P lending was spurred by the global financial crisis, but its growth after 2011 occurred in counties that were underserved by bank branches. The growth of P2P lending is slower in counties with high bank concentration and this factor is the most robust, stable over time and economically important in our study. Counties with lower population density, lower share of educated and young people experience lower growth of P2P lending, consistent with the hypothesis that learning costs deter the entry of new entrants.","PeriodicalId":45659,"journal":{"name":"Review of Network Economics","volume":"6 1","pages":"145 - 187"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78548679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper develops a theoretical framework to discuss the positive role of imitative works where creators often have private information about their creative abilities and may need outside investment. Within this framework, we consider the impact of three types of copyright protection during the different stages: the production, distribution, and consumption of creative works. Different types of enforcement can discourage imitation (production-side enforcement), limit distribution (supply-side enforcement), and restrict consumption (demand-side enforcement) of unauthorized copies of creative works. The last two types of infringement are called end-user piracy since these involve end-users, who actively search and illegally access creative works. The main results show that substitutability exists between copyright protection against end-user piracy since both types of enforcement increase the creator’s incentive with a higher return. However, it cannot solve the inefficient investment problem due to information asymmetry. There exists complementarity between copyright protection against end-user piracy and imitation. When weak protection against end-user piracy yields the overproduction of creative works, a high level of protection against imitation can minimize the related inefficiencies. However, when end-user piracy enforcement increases and brings underproduction, imitative works can benefit society.
{"title":"Is Imitation Bad for the Production of Creative Works?","authors":"S. Bae, Kyeongwon Yoo","doi":"10.1515/rne-2020-0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rne-2020-0012","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper develops a theoretical framework to discuss the positive role of imitative works where creators often have private information about their creative abilities and may need outside investment. Within this framework, we consider the impact of three types of copyright protection during the different stages: the production, distribution, and consumption of creative works. Different types of enforcement can discourage imitation (production-side enforcement), limit distribution (supply-side enforcement), and restrict consumption (demand-side enforcement) of unauthorized copies of creative works. The last two types of infringement are called end-user piracy since these involve end-users, who actively search and illegally access creative works. The main results show that substitutability exists between copyright protection against end-user piracy since both types of enforcement increase the creator’s incentive with a higher return. However, it cannot solve the inefficient investment problem due to information asymmetry. There exists complementarity between copyright protection against end-user piracy and imitation. When weak protection against end-user piracy yields the overproduction of creative works, a high level of protection against imitation can minimize the related inefficiencies. However, when end-user piracy enforcement increases and brings underproduction, imitative works can benefit society.","PeriodicalId":45659,"journal":{"name":"Review of Network Economics","volume":"91 1","pages":"115 - 144"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88298137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this paper, we analyze the effects on content provision in the news market of single-homing (i.e. when readers consume news from just one outlet) and multi-homing (i.e. when readers can choose to consume news from competing outlets). Media firms compete on content provision and on advertising revenues. Readers have an ideal variety of content and experience a disutility from consuming news that differs from their ideal variety. In addition, readers have a preference for single-homing and for multi-homing. In this set-up, we show that media firms only diversify content with single-homing, but not with multi-homing. The reason for this is that competition for readers and advertising is lower under multi-homing than under single-homing, since multi-homing readers consume from all media outlets. We derive the consequences of single-homing and multi-homing for profits, consumer surplus and social welfare. We also discuss the implications of our results for the current debate in the media market related with social media and echo chambers.
{"title":"Content Provision in the Media Market with Single-Homing and Multi-Homing Consumers","authors":"Armando José Garcia Pires","doi":"10.1515/rne-2020-0021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rne-2020-0021","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, we analyze the effects on content provision in the news market of single-homing (i.e. when readers consume news from just one outlet) and multi-homing (i.e. when readers can choose to consume news from competing outlets). Media firms compete on content provision and on advertising revenues. Readers have an ideal variety of content and experience a disutility from consuming news that differs from their ideal variety. In addition, readers have a preference for single-homing and for multi-homing. In this set-up, we show that media firms only diversify content with single-homing, but not with multi-homing. The reason for this is that competition for readers and advertising is lower under multi-homing than under single-homing, since multi-homing readers consume from all media outlets. We derive the consequences of single-homing and multi-homing for profits, consumer surplus and social welfare. We also discuss the implications of our results for the current debate in the media market related with social media and echo chambers.","PeriodicalId":45659,"journal":{"name":"Review of Network Economics","volume":"74 1","pages":"43 - 83"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89002240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In 2008, former FCC Commissioner McDowell warned that Net Neutrality regulatory rulings could change every two to four years with election results His prediction was prescient. The democrat-led Wheeler Commission used technical definitions of telecommunication and information services to place all carriers under light touch Title II common carrier regulations. The succeeding republican-led Pai Commission rescinded the Wheeler Commission’s Order. The problem with both orders is that telecommunications and information services as separate categories are losing relevance in the online economy. A new approach to Net Neutrality policy is introduced that recognizes the emergence of large platforms and Internet service providers (ISPs) competing against each other. The recommendation is to break regulatory silos and develop a holistic oversight of the online ecosystem that examines in an integrated way anticompetitive behavior associated with communication, information, and services.
{"title":"The Net Neutrality Debate is Outdated: Time for a New Wider View","authors":"Victor Glass","doi":"10.1515/rne-2020-0026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rne-2020-0026","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In 2008, former FCC Commissioner McDowell warned that Net Neutrality regulatory rulings could change every two to four years with election results His prediction was prescient. The democrat-led Wheeler Commission used technical definitions of telecommunication and information services to place all carriers under light touch Title II common carrier regulations. The succeeding republican-led Pai Commission rescinded the Wheeler Commission’s Order. The problem with both orders is that telecommunications and information services as separate categories are losing relevance in the online economy. A new approach to Net Neutrality policy is introduced that recognizes the emergence of large platforms and Internet service providers (ISPs) competing against each other. The recommendation is to break regulatory silos and develop a holistic oversight of the online ecosystem that examines in an integrated way anticompetitive behavior associated with communication, information, and services.","PeriodicalId":45659,"journal":{"name":"Review of Network Economics","volume":"84 1","pages":"243 - 276"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79808573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We study how quality uncertainty among consumers affects price competition in the presence of network effects. Our main result is that quality uncertainty has non-monotonic effects on firms’ price setting behavior. Prices and industry profit is first falling, then increasing, in quality uncertainty. In addition we show that quality uncertainty can force a high quality provider to be aggressive to the point where its price in the first period is below that of a low quality provider. We also analyse the incentives for compatibility under quality uncertainty, and find that when quality uncertainty is sufficiently high, compatibility may be used as a means of softening price competition.
{"title":"Competition in Markets with Quality Uncertainty and Network Effects","authors":"Bjørn-Atle Reme","doi":"10.1515/rne-2019-0061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rne-2019-0061","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study how quality uncertainty among consumers affects price competition in the presence of network effects. Our main result is that quality uncertainty has non-monotonic effects on firms’ price setting behavior. Prices and industry profit is first falling, then increasing, in quality uncertainty. In addition we show that quality uncertainty can force a high quality provider to be aggressive to the point where its price in the first period is below that of a low quality provider. We also analyse the incentives for compatibility under quality uncertainty, and find that when quality uncertainty is sufficiently high, compatibility may be used as a means of softening price competition.","PeriodicalId":45659,"journal":{"name":"Review of Network Economics","volume":"98 1","pages":"205 - 242"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85984626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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