Pub Date : 2021-08-13DOI: 10.1108/ijaim-10-2020-0172
Ozgur Ozdemir, Erhan Kilincarslan
Purpose This study aims to examine the governance role of shareholders and board of directors in determining firm performance through an eclectic multi-theoretic model that integrates structure and incentive functions of agency theory and capability aspect of the resource-based view. Design/methodology/approach The research model uses a large panel data set of 2,364 UK firms over the period 2000–2010 and uses alternative specifications of the model to improve robustness. Findings The results show that the industry experience of major shareholders as a proxy for shareholder capability has a significant positive impact on investee firm performance. The findings also reveal that the lock-in effect of the largest shareholder has a positive impact on performance, whereas the monitoring effectiveness of shareholders is not associated with ownership concentration. Moreover, the results indicate the underlying capabilities of the board of directors and their impact on corporate performance – particularly, the interlocking directorates of executives have a positive impact on firm performance but those of non-executives have a negative one. However, the previous directorship experience of non-executives has a positive impact on performance. Research limitations/implications This study presents a more comprehensive and complete understanding of the governance-performance relationship beyond the narrow or partial explanations provided by single-theory-based studies or those of investigating the effect of various governance tools separately. Practical implications This study provides more insights into the capability dimension of shareholders and the role of incentives in motivating shareholders to exercise stronger oversight on the management rather than just using ownership concentration. Hence, the study can serve as valuable guidance for investors, corporate managers and policymakers. Originality/value To the best of the knowledge, this is the first comprehensive study that uses an eclectic philosophical approach, integrating the agency theory and resource-based view, to not only examine the impact of board of directors but also investigate the governance role of shareholders in modern corporations to understand how shareholders acquire the requisite skills and information, the best practices and processes, and ultimately use the scarce and inimitable resources that help investee firms in improving their performance.
{"title":"The governance role of shareholders and board of directors on firm performance: an eclectic governance-performance model","authors":"Ozgur Ozdemir, Erhan Kilincarslan","doi":"10.1108/ijaim-10-2020-0172","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/ijaim-10-2020-0172","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Purpose\u0000This study aims to examine the governance role of shareholders and board of directors in determining firm performance through an eclectic multi-theoretic model that integrates structure and incentive functions of agency theory and capability aspect of the resource-based view.\u0000\u0000\u0000Design/methodology/approach\u0000The research model uses a large panel data set of 2,364 UK firms over the period 2000–2010 and uses alternative specifications of the model to improve robustness.\u0000\u0000\u0000Findings\u0000The results show that the industry experience of major shareholders as a proxy for shareholder capability has a significant positive impact on investee firm performance. The findings also reveal that the lock-in effect of the largest shareholder has a positive impact on performance, whereas the monitoring effectiveness of shareholders is not associated with ownership concentration. Moreover, the results indicate the underlying capabilities of the board of directors and their impact on corporate performance – particularly, the interlocking directorates of executives have a positive impact on firm performance but those of non-executives have a negative one. However, the previous directorship experience of non-executives has a positive impact on performance.\u0000\u0000\u0000Research limitations/implications\u0000This study presents a more comprehensive and complete understanding of the governance-performance relationship beyond the narrow or partial explanations provided by single-theory-based studies or those of investigating the effect of various governance tools separately.\u0000\u0000\u0000Practical implications\u0000This study provides more insights into the capability dimension of shareholders and the role of incentives in motivating shareholders to exercise stronger oversight on the management rather than just using ownership concentration. Hence, the study can serve as valuable guidance for investors, corporate managers and policymakers.\u0000\u0000\u0000Originality/value\u0000To the best of the knowledge, this is the first comprehensive study that uses an eclectic philosophical approach, integrating the agency theory and resource-based view, to not only examine the impact of board of directors but also investigate the governance role of shareholders in modern corporations to understand how shareholders acquire the requisite skills and information, the best practices and processes, and ultimately use the scarce and inimitable resources that help investee firms in improving their performance.\u0000","PeriodicalId":46371,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Accounting and Information Management","volume":"13 4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":30.2,"publicationDate":"2021-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78327503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-03DOI: 10.1108/IJAIM-01-2021-0027
M. Du, Frank O. Kwabi, Tianle Yang
Purpose Drawing on three theoretical frameworks, this paper aims to examine the effects of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the interaction between SOEs and prior acquisition experience of Chinese domestic and cross-border acquirers. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of 4,116 firms consisting of 3,939 domestic mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and 177 cross-border M&As over the period 2004–2017, this study adopts both accounting- and market-based performance measures, namely, return on assets, return on equity and buy-and-hold abnormal return to analyse the effects of SOEs and the interaction between SOEs and prior acquisition experience on acquirers’ performance. Findings First, this paper finds SOEs to exert a positive influence on acquirer performance, contrary to agency theory but in line with the resource-based view. However, the positive relationship between SOEs and performance appears more pronounced for domestic M&A compared to cross-border M&As. Second, this study also finds prior acquisition experience and the combined effect of SOE and prior acquisition experience to have a positive and significant bearing on performance. Research limitations/implications The limitation of this study is the lack of cross-border M&A data with all the relevant information compared to domestic M&A. Thus, the cross-border M&A sample appears lower compared to the domestic M&A sample. Practical implications The results imply that the moderating role of prior acquisition experience on the relationship between SOEs and performance appears to be crucial for cross-border M&A performance compared to domestic M&A.