Under China’s policy interventions, the financial shared service center (FSSC), as an innovative application of information technology in corporate accounting systems, has shifted from being primarily market-driven to being jointly promoted by government policies and market forces. Using data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2022 and manually collected FSSC data, this study compares the effectiveness of government promotion versus market forces in driving FSSC implementation. We employ Cox proportional hazards models to investigate the drivers of firms establishing FSSCs. We find that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) establish FSSCs primarily in response to government promotion, whereas non-SOEs are motivated by market competition. Using propensity score matching and multi-period DID models, we find that FSSCs implemented by non-SOEs significantly improve financial reporting quality, whereas those established by SOEs show no measurable impact. These results hold after a series of robustness tests. Furthermore, cross-sectional analysis shows that the effectiveness of FSSCs is particularly pronounced in firms with more subsidiaries, wider geographic dispersion of subsidiaries, stronger subsidiary control, lower earnings management incentives, and adoption of robotic process automation (RPA), with such effects exclusively present in non-SOEs. Our results suggest that market-driven FSSCs generate substantive improvements, while government-promoted implementations fail to yield measurable outcomes. Therefore, when promoting FSSCs, the government needs to pay more attention to firms’ actual conditions and enhance follow-up supervision.
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