International Environmental Agreements-Politics Law and Economics最新文献

Environmental human rights defenders (EHRDs) play a key role in the realization of the environmental rule of law and in strengthening social and ecological sustainability. States have the duty to protect and empower the EHRDs, while businesses, investors, and financial institutions also have responsibilities to respect human rights. Although the literature on human rights defenders is comprehensive, the article offers a theoretical analysis of the challenges facing the EHRDs by using Lawrence Lessig’s New Chicago School approach to explore the opportunities for bridging the gap between the theory and practice concerning the protection of EHRDs. The article endeavors to contribute to the literature by methodologically explaining the importance of legal regulation and State intervention for creating a safe and just space for the activities of the EHRDs. It demonstrates the effects of the four modalities in Lessig’s theory—i.e. the law, the social norms (culture), the architecture (technology), and the market—on the behavior of EHRDs, and ultimately on democracies while emphasizing the power of law as one of these modalities and being one of the imperative elements of the environmental rule of law. It argues that the adoption of international agreements, laws and policies regulating culture, technology, and markets, would empower civil society and encourage broad participation in the decision-making processes both within the States and the businesses to ensure accountable, transparent, and inclusive governance. It concludes that strengthened legal protection mechanisms for the rights of the rights’ defenders is an urgent need to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals and the environmental rule of law.

The international forest regime—if there ever was such a thing—traditionally developed on the fringes of various environmental treaty regimes. In recent years, however, the regime’s boundaries have conquered new, historically hostile territories. The last two decades have indeed witnessed the emergence, and then proliferation, of a new generation of free trade agreements that incorporate commitments pertaining to forests. These commitments have developed along two lines: either through the establishment of linkages to pre-existing forest-related obligations enshrined in multilateral environmental agreements or through the creation of new forest commitments. To the extent that such trade-forest commitments have now become part and parcel of the international law governing forests, their existence raises important policy choice questions that have not been addressed yet. This article aims to fill this gap by answering the following question: should we, for the sake of the protection of our forests, welcome such a development or, on the contrary, oppose it? Using a legal-dogmatic approach, this article provides, based on a cross-study analysis of a selection of trade agreements including forest-related provisions, a doctrinal evaluation of the fitness of these commitments to achieve forest protection and identifies the opportunities and risks associated therewith. In so doing, this article debates the adequacy of international trade law for regulating forests.

This paper investigates the regional implementation of an International Environmental Agreement, the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, especially as waterfowl habitat (Ramsar), using the Arctic as a case study. With almost a quarter of the world’s wetlands located in the Arctic, accounting for the planet’s largest regional storehouse of carbon, the region is facing threats from climate change-induced permafrost degradation and increasing human activities. Therefore, effective management of these wetlands is crucial for global climate change adaptation and mitigation. The research question addressed by this paper is how effective Arctic states are in achieving the goals outlined in the Ramsar Convention. To address this question, the study employs several methods, including compiling and analyzing data on the status and trends of Ramsar-designated wetlands in the Arctic, comparing state performance against Ramsar commitments, assessing Ramsar reporting mechanisms to monitor implementation progress, and considering potential modifications to enhance the relevance of Ramsar reporting.

There is debate about whether complex problems should be addressed technocratically or whether they should be politicized. While many tend to favour technocratic decision-making and evidence based policy, for others politicization of policy problems is fundamental for significant policy change. But politicization does not always lead to problem solving. Nor is it always necessary. This paper addresses the question: Under what circumstances should problems be politicized, and what is the effect of such politicization? It adds politicization, through windows of opportunity, to the split ladder of participation to assess policy change through two case studies: successful and unsuccessful constitutional change in Ecuador (2008) and Chile respectively (2022). It argues that where there is no agreement on either science or policy, politicization is required to address lack of consensus in values, but constitutional protection is needed to protect minorities and the vulnerable, their access and human right to water. De-politicization stymies policy change potentially harming democracy. This paper argues for a citizen engaged exploration of the complex problem of climate change and its impacts on water, but a targeted politicization coincident with, but developed well in advance of, windows of opportunity. Moreover, policy framing correlated with complex problems continues to be a key consideration. Furthermore, alliances of disparate actors, elections of new political leaders and considerations of property rights and justice issues are paramount. Significant constitutional policy change reflects social learning, but subsequent court actions by policy entrepreneurs is required to effectively implement this change. Framing constitutional change to protect rights to water and effect international agreements (including the Warsaw International Mechanism under the climate change regime) advances water justice and may increase success.

A new legally binding agreement for the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ) was adopted by consensus on 19th June, 2023. Setting new regulations and filling regulatory gaps of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea are expected to be informed by “best available science”. It is critical to understand how science entered the negotiations, which defined the global scientific knowledge base of decision-makers. This paper presents various pathways over which scientific input entered the BBNJ negotiations, using empirical data, collected through collaborative event ethnography, including participant observation and semi-structured interviews at the BBNJ negotiation site. Results show that scientific input in the BBNJ negotiations was not systematic and transparent but dependent on (a) available national scientific capacity, (b) financial resources, (c) established contacts and (d) active involvement of actors. Results of the study call for formalised science-policy interfaces, initiated by the UN Secretariat to guarantee a global knowledge base for decision-making. Keywords: international negotiations; United Nations; marine biodiversity; BBNJ; ocean protection; science-policy interfaces.

International regimes, defined as sets of norms and rules around which members’ expectations converge, are providing structures for facilitating cooperation in a given issue area. Two main lines of environmental regime scholarship prevailed thus far: one on structural design aspects of international institutions and one on their effects and effectiveness. However, questions on how such effects are achieved in detail largely remain unanswered. Against this background, this study aims to analyze the institutional design conditions under which regional regimes produce strong or weak policies. We do so by qualitatively comparing, using a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), nine regional regimes across the world towards their ability of producing regime forest policies as an illustrative issue area. Three structural conditions were identified as being influential on regime policy: (i) The degree of formalization (ii) The existence of hegemonic/powerful member state(s) and (iii) Scope or issue specificity bearing the identity of a regime. Our results showed that no one condition on its own was necessary to produce either strong or weak regime forest policy. However, all three conditions, through three different configurations, created a robust pathway for producing strong regime policy. In addition, the combination that showed the presence of all three conditions was related to weak regime policy. These results open several prospects for future research on the relationship between regimes´ structures and regime policy.

Driven by the motivation to raise the ambition level of climate action and to foster the transformation of economies, current climate policy discourse revolves around ways to improve cooperation between industrialized countries and emerging economies. We identify three broad types of initiatives—multilateral-cross sectoral, multilateral, sector specific, and climate and development partnerships—and assess them for potentials to deliver on such objectives with a specific focus on industry transformation. This paper provides new reflections on the institutionalization of international climate cooperation. Specifically, we demonstrate the urgent need to understand what values, norms, and underlying principles drive a cooperation in order to draw conclusions on how to best institutionalize climate cooperation rules.in-use. We conclude that an overemphasis on a CO₂ price and on carbon border adjustment mechanisms, such as in the context of the initial proposals for a cross-sectoral climate club envisaged by G7 countries, would have contributed to a further polarization of the international landscape. We find, however, that multilateral, sectoral alliances play an important role for international goal setting and the convergence on standards, metrics, and benchmarks. Based on our analysis, we recommend strengthening multilateral, sector-specific partnerships. These can be focused on sectoral topics as a connector between countries, allowing for a strategically-aligned, increasingly deep collaboration. However, for any initiative to succeed, processes of international institutionalization will be needed in order to agree on rules for implementation based on aligned interests and equity. Building such institutions may well serve as a steppingstone toward more durable cooperation structures between developed economies and emerging economies. In sum, no existing cooperation approach is perfect, but three actions may be taken to move the agenda forward: First, reform of the carbon border adjustment mechanism and removing it from the center of climate club discussions, second, coupling sectoral alliances with climate and development partnerships, and three, designing them in a way to address fears of political influence seeking and superimposition of global north agendas on the global south.

Commitments to emissions reductions following the landmark Paris Climate Change Agreement have proliferated. Though it is promising that 145 countries have declared a net-zero emissions target, with 33 enshrining this goal into law, comparison of country-level emissions inventories can only be effectively carried out with uniform and consistent data. The extent to which greenhouse gas (GHG) inventory comparison is possible, and the ancillary climate governance implications, are the motivation for this article. Based on time-series correlation analyses over 32 years and 43 Annex-I countries, we uncover issues that are likely to inveigh against country-country comparison of GHGs—with the potential to weaken climate governance systems that are based mainly on emissions inventory tracking. First, the Global Warming Potentials (GWPs)—which convert each respective GHG into carbon equivalents (CO₂-e), and are revised with each IPCC report—are not immediately or consistently integrated into GHG inventories. Second, GHGs apart from carbon dioxide, based on the data analysis, do not appear to be tracked uniformly. Should comparison of emissions remain a cornerstone of global climate governance, an overhaul of country-level GHG inventories is called for, specifically to enable effective reporting and tracking of GHGs apart from only carbon dioxide.

Often perceived as a green nation, Ireland’s climate action reputation ranges from being regarded as a climate ‘laggard’ to being applauded as one of the first states to introduce supply-side ‘keep it in the ground’ (KIIG) legislation. In line with UNFCCC and IPCC advice, Ireland has committed to reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 51% by 2030 and reaching net zero by 2050. However such ambitions have not yet translated into sufficient transformations required to achieve the goals of a Paris Agreement compliant pathway. Major challenges surround Ireland’s transition to net zero, for example, the country’s fossil fuel dependency means oil and gas (mostly imported) account for around 80% of primary energy while emissions from agriculture, transport and electricity generation are increasing, rather than decreasing. Ireland is failing to meet national and EU GHG reduction targets, has had to buy emissions quotas to comply with legal requirements, and its interim 2030 target is below the EU’s Climate Law ambition. Contradictory policies, especially those influenced by ROI’s neoliberal orientation, undermine climate action and mean Ireland struggles to achieve GHG reductions, despite the state’s climate change legislation and policies. Concentrating on supply-side climate policy, this article examines key issues hampering Ireland’s ability to reconcile its climate ambitious with policy and practice. Adopting a critical political economy analysis, we explore multi-level drivers of climate and energy policies, examining challenges like the war in Ukraine, which prompted the Irish state to re-consider where and how it sources gas and oil, in turn threatening existing KIIG measures. In critically analysing challenges and contradictions, we identify multiple ideological, political and economic factors, in particular, the neoliberal, globalised economic model influencing the State’s current unsustainable, risky and contradictory policy direction. We conclude by articulating specific barriers hampering Ireland’s climate ambitions that must be addressed to enable a just transition to a sustainable future.

Abstract

To achieve the climate goals of the Paris Agreement, the bulk of identified fossil fuel resources cannot be burned and have to stay in the ground. This fact leads to a situation where a significant part of the fossil fuels already recorded in company balance sheets will become stranded assets in the near future. Since 2015, central banks have identified climate change as a large risk for financial stability, stranded assets constituting a significant element of this risk. To protect the economy from this risk, central banks need novel tools. The aim of this paper is to outline a new “climate bailout” tool which would enable fossil fuel industry actors, both in the Global North and Global South to sell their potentially stranded assets to central banks (mainly from the Global North) upon committing themselves to invest the received money into new and additional renewable energy (RE). Multilateral development banks and other development finance institutions would support this process, while central banks would take a new kind of long-term, low-yield green climate asset onto their balance sheets. The newly financed RE would substitute for lost fossil fuel energy supply and stabilise related prices. We demonstrate that a climate bailout would not only be in line with the general mandates of central banks, namely maintaining price stability and preserving the stability of the financial sector, but would also provide a new tool for central banks to counter fossil fuel price shock-induced inflation (fossilflation). We show how countries both from the Global South and the Global North could benefit from the implementation of this new financial tool.