Pub Date : 2023-10-04DOI: 10.29053/2523-1367/2025/v5a11
Muriel Sognigbé-Sangbana
Les organisations non gouvernementales font partie des acteurs les plus remarquables du paysage africain des droits de l’homme. Elles étaient déjà présentes à la genèse du système où elles se sont illustrées par leur plaidoyer en faveur de l’adoption des textes fondateurs: la Charte africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples et ses protocoles. Leur présence estégalement notoire dans les différents mécanismes de mise en œuvre des droits garantis. Elles interviennent aussi bien dans les procédures dites administratives que dans les procédures quasi-juridictionnelles et juridictionnelles. Elles sont par ailleurs actives, tant dans les procédures contentieuses que consultatives. Cette prégnance des ONG dans le systèmeafricain des droits de l’homme soulève des questions. Sur leur contribution à la protection des droits de l’homme en Afrique. L’objet de cette étude est de mettre en lumière cette contribution des ONG en systématisant leur rôle dans le contentieux devant les trois organes de contrôle. Ce rôle est double. Il s’entend d’un droit de dénonciation des violations des droits de l’homme devant les organes de contrôle et d’un droit de participation aux procédures devant elles.
{"title":"Les organisations non gouvernementales dans le système africain des droits de l’homme: essai de systématisation du rôle des ONG dans le contentieux régional des droits de l’homme en Afrique","authors":"Muriel Sognigbé-Sangbana","doi":"10.29053/2523-1367/2025/v5a11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29053/2523-1367/2025/v5a11","url":null,"abstract":"Les organisations non gouvernementales font partie des acteurs les plus remarquables du paysage africain des droits de l’homme. Elles étaient déjà présentes à la genèse du système où elles se sont illustrées par leur plaidoyer en faveur de l’adoption des textes fondateurs: la Charte africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples et ses protocoles. Leur présence estégalement notoire dans les différents mécanismes de mise en œuvre des droits garantis. Elles interviennent aussi bien dans les procédures dites administratives que dans les procédures quasi-juridictionnelles et juridictionnelles. Elles sont par ailleurs actives, tant dans les procédures contentieuses que consultatives. Cette prégnance des ONG dans le systèmeafricain des droits de l’homme soulève des questions. Sur leur contribution à la protection des droits de l’homme en Afrique. L’objet de cette étude est de mettre en lumière cette contribution des ONG en systématisant leur rôle dans le contentieux devant les trois organes de contrôle. Ce rôle est double. Il s’entend d’un droit de dénonciation des violations des droits de l’homme devant les organes de contrôle et d’un droit de participation aux procédures devant elles.","PeriodicalId":474847,"journal":{"name":"African human rights yearbook","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135645256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-04DOI: 10.29053/2523-1367/2022/v6a2
Zelalem Mogessie Teferra
Under exceptional circumstances, international (human rights) courts issue orders on provisional measures preventing a party or parties before them from taking some actions pending the final determination of a case. The main purpose of such orders is to avoid a situation where the final disposition of a matter is pre-emptively rendered fully or partly meaningless by the conduct of a party. Article 27 of the Protocol Establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights also envisages the possibility where ‘in cases of extreme gravity and urgency’, the Court may adopt provisional measures to ‘avoid irreparable harm to persons’. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Court), relying on this provision, has thus far issued about 50 orders of provisional measures, all of which were against respondent states. This article interrogates the Court’s practice in this regard, with the view to fleshing out its jurisprudential inconsistencies and proposing recommendations to rectify the occasional misapplication of the procedure. Close scrutiny of the Court’s jurisprudence reveals not only glaring discrepancies in approach but also, at times, unnecessary recourse to these measures even when situations do not necessarily warrant their adoption. As evidenced by the backlash from some states, which have openly expressed their refusal to comply with the Court’s orders, the unwarranted use of provisional measures is likely to render the procedure ineffective and may also negatively affect the legitimacy of the Court in the eyes of its creators, the states. Therefore, the Court should fully and strictly adhere to the legal and factual conditions required to adopt provisional measures and always be alive to the intended purpose and nature of provisional measures. The Court particularly needs to adopt a balanced approach without being too liberal or too strict, as this would be overstepping its power or abdicating its responsibility to protect human rights.
{"title":"Provisional measures in international human rights law: the practice of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights","authors":"Zelalem Mogessie Teferra","doi":"10.29053/2523-1367/2022/v6a2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29053/2523-1367/2022/v6a2","url":null,"abstract":"Under exceptional circumstances, international (human rights) courts issue orders on provisional measures preventing a party or parties before them from taking some actions pending the final determination of a case. The main purpose of such orders is to avoid a situation where the final disposition of a matter is pre-emptively rendered fully or partly meaningless by the conduct of a party. Article 27 of the Protocol Establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights also envisages the possibility where ‘in cases of extreme gravity and urgency’, the Court may adopt provisional measures to ‘avoid irreparable harm to persons’. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Court), relying on this provision, has thus far issued about 50 orders of provisional measures, all of which were against respondent states. This article interrogates the Court’s practice in this regard, with the view to fleshing out its jurisprudential inconsistencies and proposing recommendations to rectify the occasional misapplication of the procedure. Close scrutiny of the Court’s jurisprudence reveals not only glaring discrepancies in approach but also, at times, unnecessary recourse to these measures even when situations do not necessarily warrant their adoption. As evidenced by the backlash from some states, which have openly expressed their refusal to comply with the Court’s orders, the unwarranted use of provisional measures is likely to render the procedure ineffective and may also negatively affect the legitimacy of the Court in the eyes of its creators, the states. Therefore, the Court should fully and strictly adhere to the legal and factual conditions required to adopt provisional measures and always be alive to the intended purpose and nature of provisional measures. The Court particularly needs to adopt a balanced approach without being too liberal or too strict, as this would be overstepping its power or abdicating its responsibility to protect human rights.","PeriodicalId":474847,"journal":{"name":"African human rights yearbook","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135645401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-04DOI: 10.29053/2523-1367/2021/v5a12
Andrew Songa
This article outlines the challenge of statelessness in Kenya and proceeds to focus on two seminal cases filed by the Nubian community against the Kenyan state: one before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the other at the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Attention then turns to Kenya’s transitionaljustice agenda and its interaction with the plight of stateless persons in Kenya. Through the experiences of the Nubian, Makonde and Shona communities, the article also explores the role of community-led activism infurthering the cause of ending statelessness in Kenya. It concludes with key lessons to be learned from utilising litigation, transitional justice and community-led activism as part of the struggle for the rights of stateless persons in Kenya. It relies on desk-review and research of the Nubian cases, Kenya’s truth commission report and other official inquires, civil society reports, the 2010 Constitution and related laws.
{"title":"Addressing statelessness in Kenya through a confluence of litigation, transitional justice, and community activism: reflecting on the cases of the Nubian, Makonde and Shona communities","authors":"Andrew Songa","doi":"10.29053/2523-1367/2021/v5a12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29053/2523-1367/2021/v5a12","url":null,"abstract":"This article outlines the challenge of statelessness in Kenya and proceeds to focus on two seminal cases filed by the Nubian community against the Kenyan state: one before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the other at the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Attention then turns to Kenya’s transitionaljustice agenda and its interaction with the plight of stateless persons in Kenya. Through the experiences of the Nubian, Makonde and Shona communities, the article also explores the role of community-led activism infurthering the cause of ending statelessness in Kenya. It concludes with key lessons to be learned from utilising litigation, transitional justice and community-led activism as part of the struggle for the rights of stateless persons in Kenya. It relies on desk-review and research of the Nubian cases, Kenya’s truth commission report and other official inquires, civil society reports, the 2010 Constitution and related laws.","PeriodicalId":474847,"journal":{"name":"African human rights yearbook","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135646244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-04DOI: 10.29053/2523-1367/2025/v5a13
Olivier Baraka Bahoze
Le présent article s’inspire du thème de l’Union africaine pour l’année 2021 – «Arts, culture et patrimoine: leviers pour l’édification de l’Afrique que nous voulons» – pour aborder la question du retour ou de la restitution des biens culturels africains acquis de façon irrégulière durant les périodes de la colonisation et de l’esclavage. Il part du constat selon lequel lesystème africain dispose d’un corpus normatif et jurisprudentiel substantiel en matière des droits culturels. Cependant, ses principaux instruments ignorent cependant la question du retour des biens culturels. Cette questiontrouve un relai favorable dans une mosaïque des textes disparates – qui réglementent le secteur de la culture en général – dont l’émanation institutionnelle est aussi multiple que diversifiée (Union africaine, UNESCOet Assemblée générale des Nations Unies). L’analyse de ces textes permet d’établir un lien de causalité entre retour des biens culturels africains et effectivité des droits culturels. Cet article avance l’hypothèse selon laquelle le retour de ces biens serait non seulement un mode de réparation du crime colonial mais surtout une contribution à l’effectivité des droits culturels. Parlant des blocages qui minent la concrétisation du rapatriement de ces biens, cet article critique le développement d’un certain nationalisme artistique et culturel – consécutif au caractère fragmentaire des politiques étatiques en la matière – générateur d’innombrables impasses. Il préconise en palliatif l’harmonisation des politiques culturelles à l’échelle régionale
{"title":"Effectivité des droits culturels et retour des biens culturels africains pillés sous l’empire colonial: pallier les écarts entre textes et contexte","authors":"Olivier Baraka Bahoze","doi":"10.29053/2523-1367/2025/v5a13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29053/2523-1367/2025/v5a13","url":null,"abstract":"Le présent article s’inspire du thème de l’Union africaine pour l’année 2021 – «Arts, culture et patrimoine: leviers pour l’édification de l’Afrique que nous voulons» – pour aborder la question du retour ou de la restitution des biens culturels africains acquis de façon irrégulière durant les périodes de la colonisation et de l’esclavage. Il part du constat selon lequel lesystème africain dispose d’un corpus normatif et jurisprudentiel substantiel en matière des droits culturels. Cependant, ses principaux instruments ignorent cependant la question du retour des biens culturels. Cette questiontrouve un relai favorable dans une mosaïque des textes disparates – qui réglementent le secteur de la culture en général – dont l’émanation institutionnelle est aussi multiple que diversifiée (Union africaine, UNESCOet Assemblée générale des Nations Unies). L’analyse de ces textes permet d’établir un lien de causalité entre retour des biens culturels africains et effectivité des droits culturels. Cet article avance l’hypothèse selon laquelle le retour de ces biens serait non seulement un mode de réparation du crime colonial mais surtout une contribution à l’effectivité des droits culturels. Parlant des blocages qui minent la concrétisation du rapatriement de ces biens, cet article critique le développement d’un certain nationalisme artistique et culturel – consécutif au caractère fragmentaire des politiques étatiques en la matière – générateur d’innombrables impasses. Il préconise en palliatif l’harmonisation des politiques culturelles à l’échelle régionale","PeriodicalId":474847,"journal":{"name":"African human rights yearbook","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135645261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-04DOI: 10.29053/2523-1367/2021/v5a21
Stefaan Smis, Olalekan Bello
Nearly two decades after the landmark decision in Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria, in which the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights found that Nigeria had breached its obligations to protect, promote, and fulfil the rights of the Ogoni people in the country’s Niger Delta region, it is relevant to enquire how the decision has been implemented and whether it has significantly improved the situation of the Ogoni people. After the announcement of the Commission’s decision and the return to democratic rule in Nigeria, the general expectation was that Nigeria would without further delay implement the Commission’s recommendations. However, 20 years after the decision the Ogoni people are still demanding for their basic rights to be respected. This article, which mainly looks at the Commission’s decision from the perspective of the victims and through a socio-legal perspective, exposes this implementation gap. By doing so, it also points to the ineffectiveness of the monitoring mechanism of compliance with the Commission’s recommendations.
{"title":"Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria: two decades on – questioning the continued implementation gap","authors":"Stefaan Smis, Olalekan Bello","doi":"10.29053/2523-1367/2021/v5a21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29053/2523-1367/2021/v5a21","url":null,"abstract":"Nearly two decades after the landmark decision in Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria, in which the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights found that Nigeria had breached its obligations to protect, promote, and fulfil the rights of the Ogoni people in the country’s Niger Delta region, it is relevant to enquire how the decision has been implemented and whether it has significantly improved the situation of the Ogoni people. After the announcement of the Commission’s decision and the return to democratic rule in Nigeria, the general expectation was that Nigeria would without further delay implement the Commission’s recommendations. However, 20 years after the decision the Ogoni people are still demanding for their basic rights to be respected. This article, which mainly looks at the Commission’s decision from the perspective of the victims and through a socio-legal perspective, exposes this implementation gap. By doing so, it also points to the ineffectiveness of the monitoring mechanism of compliance with the Commission’s recommendations.","PeriodicalId":474847,"journal":{"name":"African human rights yearbook","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135645264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-04DOI: 10.29053/2523-1367/2022/v6a10
Wubeshet Tiruneh
It has been two decades since the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Commission) rendered its landmark decision in SERAC and CESR v Nigeria. In this landmark judgment, and later in IHRDA and Others v DRC, the Commission explicitly affirmed states’ obligation to investigate, prosecute and redress corporate human right abuses as part of the obligation ‘to adopt legislative or other measures’ under article 1 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (AfricanCharter). Similarly, states’ obligation to ensure a remedy for corporate human rights abuses is also one of the issues clarified under the ‘Third Pillar’ of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. However, as this obligation is not adequately translated into practice at the national level, corporate human rights abuses committed in Africa continue to be met with impunity and lack of access to effective remedy. Over the last several years, African victims who are denied justice in their domestic jurisdictions have increasingly been turning to home states of corporations to seek remedies. Victims’ access to home state remedies has, however, been significantly restricted in recent years due to various legal barriers, particularly jurisdictional challenges. The article therefore aims to highlight the increasing restriction on African victims’ access to home state remedies and show the need for strengthening domestic remedies in Africa
{"title":"Holding corporations liable for human rights abuses committed in Africa: the need for strengthening domestic remedies","authors":"Wubeshet Tiruneh","doi":"10.29053/2523-1367/2022/v6a10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29053/2523-1367/2022/v6a10","url":null,"abstract":"It has been two decades since the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Commission) rendered its landmark decision in SERAC and CESR v Nigeria. In this landmark judgment, and later in IHRDA and Others v DRC, the Commission explicitly affirmed states’ obligation to investigate, prosecute and redress corporate human right abuses as part of the obligation ‘to adopt legislative or other measures’ under article 1 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (AfricanCharter). Similarly, states’ obligation to ensure a remedy for corporate human rights abuses is also one of the issues clarified under the ‘Third Pillar’ of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. However, as this obligation is not adequately translated into practice at the national level, corporate human rights abuses committed in Africa continue to be met with impunity and lack of access to effective remedy. Over the last several years, African victims who are denied justice in their domestic jurisdictions have increasingly been turning to home states of corporations to seek remedies. Victims’ access to home state remedies has, however, been significantly restricted in recent years due to various legal barriers, particularly jurisdictional challenges. The article therefore aims to highlight the increasing restriction on African victims’ access to home state remedies and show the need for strengthening domestic remedies in Africa","PeriodicalId":474847,"journal":{"name":"African human rights yearbook","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135645402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-04DOI: 10.29053/2523-1367/2022/v6a8
Kamgang Simeu Christelle Corinne
Cet article questionne l’existence d’un droit humain à l’eau dans le système africain de protection des droits de l’homme. L’exégèse révèle que sur le plan régional, les conventions ne concourent qu’indirectement à la reconnaissance d’un droit de l’homme à l’eau, alors que ce dernier est expressément consacré par certains textes en vigueur sur le plan sousrégional ; ceux-ci lui accordant une base juridique distincte de celle d’autres droits de l’homme. La casuistique révèle pour sa part les occasionsmanquées par le juge régional de consacrer ce droit de l’homme afin de lui garantir une véritable protection par les États. L’auteur souligne cependant la contribution du droit mou de la Commission africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples à la consécration explicite d’un droit humain à l’eau et les différentes obligations étatiques qui en découlent afin d’assurer soneffectivité. Ceci constitue donc une avancée notable en matière de protection des droits de l’homme. Il propose que les organes de contrôle puissent se référer à ce droit mou pour consacrer un droit humain à l’eau dans le développement subséquent de leur jurisprudence, de même qu’il peut servir de boussole pour stimuler et guider des réformes juridiques internes visant une véritable garantie de ce droit
{"title":"Le droit humain à l’eau: un droit dans l’ombre d’autres droits de l’homme dans le système africain de protection des droits de l’homme?","authors":"Kamgang Simeu Christelle Corinne","doi":"10.29053/2523-1367/2022/v6a8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29053/2523-1367/2022/v6a8","url":null,"abstract":"Cet article questionne l’existence d’un droit humain à l’eau dans le système africain de protection des droits de l’homme. L’exégèse révèle que sur le plan régional, les conventions ne concourent qu’indirectement à la reconnaissance d’un droit de l’homme à l’eau, alors que ce dernier est expressément consacré par certains textes en vigueur sur le plan sousrégional ; ceux-ci lui accordant une base juridique distincte de celle d’autres droits de l’homme. La casuistique révèle pour sa part les occasionsmanquées par le juge régional de consacrer ce droit de l’homme afin de lui garantir une véritable protection par les États. L’auteur souligne cependant la contribution du droit mou de la Commission africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples à la consécration explicite d’un droit humain à l’eau et les différentes obligations étatiques qui en découlent afin d’assurer soneffectivité. Ceci constitue donc une avancée notable en matière de protection des droits de l’homme. Il propose que les organes de contrôle puissent se référer à ce droit mou pour consacrer un droit humain à l’eau dans le développement subséquent de leur jurisprudence, de même qu’il peut servir de boussole pour stimuler et guider des réformes juridiques internes visant une véritable garantie de ce droit","PeriodicalId":474847,"journal":{"name":"African human rights yearbook","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135645445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-04DOI: 10.29053/2523-1367/2021/v5a9
Tonny Raymond Kirabira
This article explores the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the domestic implementation of the African Union Transitional Justice Policy (AUTJP). It uses Uganda as a prism through which to examine the implementation of two key constitutive elements of the AUTJP: criminal prosecutions and traditional justice. Besides reflections based on theauthor’s experience in Uganda, the analysis rests on an extensive study and review of literature and qualitative interviews. The article argues that NGOs have the potential to sequence the constitutive TJ elements of the AUTJP, where there are competing narratives of peace versus justice. While local NGOs are pivotal in fostering local ownership of TJ, the findings reveal thecritical role of NGO networks in the domestic implementation of TJ. The article concludes that there is a compelling case to be made for the continued involvement of NGOs in the domestic implementation of TJ
{"title":"The role of NGOs in the domestic implementation of the African Union Transitional Justice Policy Framework: perspectives from Uganda","authors":"Tonny Raymond Kirabira","doi":"10.29053/2523-1367/2021/v5a9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29053/2523-1367/2021/v5a9","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the domestic implementation of the African Union Transitional Justice Policy (AUTJP). It uses Uganda as a prism through which to examine the implementation of two key constitutive elements of the AUTJP: criminal prosecutions and traditional justice. Besides reflections based on theauthor’s experience in Uganda, the analysis rests on an extensive study and review of literature and qualitative interviews. The article argues that NGOs have the potential to sequence the constitutive TJ elements of the AUTJP, where there are competing narratives of peace versus justice. While local NGOs are pivotal in fostering local ownership of TJ, the findings reveal thecritical role of NGO networks in the domestic implementation of TJ. The article concludes that there is a compelling case to be made for the continued involvement of NGOs in the domestic implementation of TJ","PeriodicalId":474847,"journal":{"name":"African human rights yearbook","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135646095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-04DOI: 10.29053/2523-1367/2021/v5a7
Tomiwa Ilor
Today, in any society where crime is possible, communication surveillance is a necessary evil. This is because technologies now offer faster means of preventing crime while they are also capable of undermining the right to privacy. However, protecting privacy should not be mutually exclusive of ensuring public safety. This article argues that while communication surveillance may be permissible under narrow and limited circumstances, the laws made to regulate it in Nigeria, South Africa andUganda do not comply with international human rights standards. In demonstrating this, this article analyses the major laws in these countries alongside the various international human rights principles that must be complied with in framing a rights-respecting law on communication surveillance. The major contribution of this article is that communicationsurveillance laws can be designed in compliance with international human rights standards in the countries under focus. These include Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda carrying out specific legal reforms targeted at problematic laws on communication surveillance in order to bring them in line with international human rights standards. This can also be supportedby developing a more robust set of comprehensive guidelines through the African Commission and Human and Peoples’ Rights and ensuring that Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda embark on critical and strategic training for stakeholders involved in the enforcement and implementation of communication surveillance laws in these countries.
{"title":"Framing a human rights approach to communication surveillance laws through the African human rights system in Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda","authors":"Tomiwa Ilor","doi":"10.29053/2523-1367/2021/v5a7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29053/2523-1367/2021/v5a7","url":null,"abstract":"Today, in any society where crime is possible, communication surveillance is a necessary evil. This is because technologies now offer faster means of preventing crime while they are also capable of undermining the right to privacy. However, protecting privacy should not be mutually exclusive of ensuring public safety. This article argues that while communication surveillance may be permissible under narrow and limited circumstances, the laws made to regulate it in Nigeria, South Africa andUganda do not comply with international human rights standards. In demonstrating this, this article analyses the major laws in these countries alongside the various international human rights principles that must be complied with in framing a rights-respecting law on communication surveillance. The major contribution of this article is that communicationsurveillance laws can be designed in compliance with international human rights standards in the countries under focus. These include Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda carrying out specific legal reforms targeted at problematic laws on communication surveillance in order to bring them in line with international human rights standards. This can also be supportedby developing a more robust set of comprehensive guidelines through the African Commission and Human and Peoples’ Rights and ensuring that Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda embark on critical and strategic training for stakeholders involved in the enforcement and implementation of communication surveillance laws in these countries.","PeriodicalId":474847,"journal":{"name":"African human rights yearbook","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135646235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-04DOI: 10.29053/2523-1367/2022/v6a9
Abdoulaye Sylla
Cette contribution étudie et démontre les raisons pour lesquelles les différents systèmes et modèles de justice – expérimentés, initialement, par l’Organisation de l’Unité africaine (OUA) et, actuellement, par l’Unionafricaine (UA) – sont fluctuants et instables. En effet, la Charte de l’OUA n’avait pas créé une Cour de justice, mais une Commission de médiation, de conciliation et d’arbitrage, chargée d’arbitrer les différends. Analogiquement, la Charte africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples de 1981 n’avait pas, non plus, institué une Cour, mais la Commission africaine desdroits de l’homme et des peuples dont les recommandations ne sont pas contraignantes. Pour combler les lacunes de cette Commission, l’OUA adopta, en 1998, à Ouagadougou, le Protocole instituant la Cour africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples dont les décisions sont, quant à elles, contraignantes. Cependant, entre-temps, l’OUA disparut avant l’entrée envigueur de cette Cour. De son côté, l’Acte constitutif de l’Union africaine (UA), qui remplaça la Charte de l’OUA en 2000, a prévu sa propre Cour de justice, qui sera instituée, trois ans plus tard, par un protocole adopté à Maputo en 2003. Ainsi, deux cours séparées et spécialisées devaient, parallèlement, exister à l’échelle continentale. Toutefois, pour des raisons de rationalisation, les deux protocoles, instituant respectivement ces deux cours, ont été fusionnés et substitués par le Protocole de Sharm El-Sheikh de 2008, qui crée la Cour africaine de justice et des droits de l’homme. Mais la structure interne et les compétences de cette future et unique Cour ont finalement été révisées et amendées par le Protocole adopté à Malabo en2014: une section pénale, compétente pour 14 catégories de crimes, a été insérée au sein de la Cour projetée. Instable et aléatoire, le système judiciaire de l’UA est, à ce jour, incertain dans son ensemble, d’autant plus que les réformes de 2008 et celles de 2014, moins réalistes, suscitent plus de questions qu’elles n’en résolvent. Les méthodes exégétique, positiviste,analytique et historique ont permis de démontrer que ces deux derniers Protocoles réformateurs – respectivement de 2008 et de 2014 – risquent de ne pas entrer en vigueur à cause des incidences et des conséquences normatives et procédurales tant sur le statut, les compétences et la composition de la Cour initiale que sur la protection juridictionnelle des droits de l’homme à l’échelle du continent africain.
{"title":"Les réformes du système judiciaire de l’Union africaine: enjeux juridicoinstitutionnels sur la Cour africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples","authors":"Abdoulaye Sylla","doi":"10.29053/2523-1367/2022/v6a9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29053/2523-1367/2022/v6a9","url":null,"abstract":"Cette contribution étudie et démontre les raisons pour lesquelles les différents systèmes et modèles de justice – expérimentés, initialement, par l’Organisation de l’Unité africaine (OUA) et, actuellement, par l’Unionafricaine (UA) – sont fluctuants et instables. En effet, la Charte de l’OUA n’avait pas créé une Cour de justice, mais une Commission de médiation, de conciliation et d’arbitrage, chargée d’arbitrer les différends. Analogiquement, la Charte africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples de 1981 n’avait pas, non plus, institué une Cour, mais la Commission africaine desdroits de l’homme et des peuples dont les recommandations ne sont pas contraignantes. Pour combler les lacunes de cette Commission, l’OUA adopta, en 1998, à Ouagadougou, le Protocole instituant la Cour africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples dont les décisions sont, quant à elles, contraignantes. Cependant, entre-temps, l’OUA disparut avant l’entrée envigueur de cette Cour. De son côté, l’Acte constitutif de l’Union africaine (UA), qui remplaça la Charte de l’OUA en 2000, a prévu sa propre Cour de justice, qui sera instituée, trois ans plus tard, par un protocole adopté à Maputo en 2003. Ainsi, deux cours séparées et spécialisées devaient, parallèlement, exister à l’échelle continentale. Toutefois, pour des raisons de rationalisation, les deux protocoles, instituant respectivement ces deux cours, ont été fusionnés et substitués par le Protocole de Sharm El-Sheikh de 2008, qui crée la Cour africaine de justice et des droits de l’homme. Mais la structure interne et les compétences de cette future et unique Cour ont finalement été révisées et amendées par le Protocole adopté à Malabo en2014: une section pénale, compétente pour 14 catégories de crimes, a été insérée au sein de la Cour projetée. Instable et aléatoire, le système judiciaire de l’UA est, à ce jour, incertain dans son ensemble, d’autant plus que les réformes de 2008 et celles de 2014, moins réalistes, suscitent plus de questions qu’elles n’en résolvent. Les méthodes exégétique, positiviste,analytique et historique ont permis de démontrer que ces deux derniers Protocoles réformateurs – respectivement de 2008 et de 2014 – risquent de ne pas entrer en vigueur à cause des incidences et des conséquences normatives et procédurales tant sur le statut, les compétences et la composition de la Cour initiale que sur la protection juridictionnelle des droits de l’homme à l’échelle du continent africain.","PeriodicalId":474847,"journal":{"name":"African human rights yearbook","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135645972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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