Journal of Financial Research最新文献

This study examines the association between artificial intelligence innovation (AII) and stock price crash risk (SPCR). AII serves as a governance mechanism that can bolster strength in internal controls, leading to increased financial transparency and thereby reducing the likelihood of future SPCR. The results hold after accounting for possible endogeneity issues Further, we find that monitoring through corporate governance mechanisms, level of following by equity analysts, and the reduced information asymmetry constitute important channels that mediate the association between AII and SPCR. Additionally, the relationship between AII and SPCR varies across corporate life cycle stages and workplace culture.

We use tail events at different levels of severity to define an asset's tail risk and to decompose the latter into a systematic and an idiosyncratic component. The systematic component captures an asset's tendency to experience joint tail losses with the market and generalizes a classic tail dependence coefficient. However, the idiosyncratic component consists of two parts: idiosyncratic tail risk that leads to asset-specific tail losses and tail risk cushioning that dampens the tail losses emanating from the market. Tail risk cushioning is a novel concept that arises naturally in our framework, is consistent with the previous two and completes the taxonomy of tail risk. We examine the performance of our tail risk decomposition on a large dataset, confirming some previous results on tail risk and uncovering new theoretical and empirical findings.

Personal connections (based on prior employment, educational, or social club membership overlaps) between top executives and board members of the bidding firm and those of the bidder financial advisor affect Mergers and Acquisition (M&A) outcomes. M&A deals where bidder top managers share past personal work-related connections with their advisors are associated with 1.7% lower bidder announcement returns compared to the returns for deals without such connections. We also show M&A deals advised by personally connected financial advisors are more likely to be completed but take longer to get finalized. Last, when connections exist, the bidder CEO receives a higher cash bonus upon completion of the deal, and the financial advisors are rewarded by higher advisor fees. Overall, our findings suggest that personal connections between bidders and their financial advisors could be detrimental.

In this article, we examine foreign corporate shareholders in China. We find that they play an active and effective corporate governance role that improves firm performance. The results are robust to tests that address endogeneity, selection bias, and direction-of-causality concerns. The methods for which foreign corporations exert effective oversight are identified: (1) they actively and effectively monitor firms (i.e., they are more likely to fire [reward] managers for poor [good] firm performance), (2) they invest more in innovation, (3) they are better at selecting investment projects, and (4) they help generate more foreign sales.

Does information leakage in a target's social networks increase its stock price prior to a merger announcement? Evidence reveals that a target with more social connections indeed experiences a higher pre-announcement price run-up. This effect does not exist during or after the merger announcement, or in windows ending two months before the announcement. It is more pronounced among targets with severe asymmetric information, and weaker when the information about the upcoming merger is publicly available prior to the announcement. It is also weaker in expedited deals such as tender offers.

We examine the impact of asset versus equity acquisitions in generating firm value for financial institutions. We find that acquirers experience statistically and economically significantly higher cumulative abnormal returns in asset acquisitions compared to equity acquisitions. We analyze the announcement-period returns and find that investors' reaction to asset acquisitions by financial institutions is met more favorably than are equity acquisitions. When employing the difference-in-differences approach, we find that asset acquisitions entail improved operating performance.

We examine whether institutional shareholders’ distraction affects corporate debt maturity decisions. We find that firms with distracted shareholders are associated with lengthened debt maturity. The effect becomes stronger for firms with high information asymmetry or those with high levels of financial constraint. When distraction is high and debt maturity is low, firms hold more cash and use that cash in value-destroying acquisitions. This supports the prevalence of agency problems when institutional shareholders are distracted. The impact of distraction is persistent and affects the debt maturity decision in the future. Our findings are robust to endogeneity and other concerns.

We study how granting shareholders an advisory compensation vote affects the subsequent demand for shareholder voting rights. We find that the voting premium decreases when shareholders are given the right to disapprove firm compensation plans, consistent with shareholders preemptively negotiating concessions, which results in a diminished need to use their votes. Potential concessions extend beyond compensation; firms that experience a decrease in voting premiums also experience changes to investment and dividend policy, as well as the number of independent directors. The same firms experience positive abnormal stock returns over the following year.

Iceberg orders are partially disclosed limit orders that only reveal a small portion of their hidden volume at any time. Once traded, the iceberg order automatically replenishes until all its hidden volume executes. Consistent with theory, icebergs appeal to both information and liquidity traders. Information traders place orders at aggressive prices in the limit order book, which transact immediately as marketable orders. Liquidity traders use non-aggressive orders, which sit on the book as limit orders. Iceberg traders adjust the aggressiveness of their orders as market conditions change. We find the market discovers iceberg orders through repeated replenishments.

In this article, we describe a comprehensive model for obtaining a critical gross recovery rate (GRR) for the short sale of a defaulted mortgage. Our model includes the following factors: settlement period, settlement cost, discounted sale/auction price, opportunity cost, failure probability of the short sale, and lender's willingness for the short sale. The results show that using the short sale yields a lower settlement cost, shorter settlement period, but higher loss given default (LGD). The real GRR of a short sale is about 8%–9% less than the critical GRR calculated from our model. This means the lender's willingness for the short sale is high in reality. The sensitivity analyses show that the lender's likelihood of approving a short sale is low if the settlement cost, contract rate, interest rate, and failure probability of the short sale are high. The greater the expected LGD of a foreclosure, the stronger the lender's willingness to approve the short sale. Also, a higher GRR of short sale leads to a lower expected LGD of short sale. This increases the probability of approval for the short sale. Finally, the Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives (HAFA) program helped struggling homeowners successfully use a short sale as an alternative to foreclosure, but the HAFA program became less effective as housing prices went up. Our model and analyses should help lenders make the optimal decision about how to efficiently deal with the collateral from a defaulted mortgage to mitigate their LGD.