This article shows how many disputes within Internet law are rooted in a common problem, the problem of perspective. Whenever we apply law to the Internet, we must first choose a perspective from which to model the facts of the Internet. Do we follow reality or virtual reality? We can adopt a user's internal perspective, and view the Internet as the virtual world of cyberspace, or else we can adopt an external perspective and view the Internet as a physical network. The article explains how the problem of perspective pervades the law of the Internet, and offers several strategies that courts can use to select a perspective in a given case.
{"title":"The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law","authors":"Orin S. Kerr","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.310020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.310020","url":null,"abstract":"This article shows how many disputes within Internet law are rooted in a common problem, the problem of perspective. Whenever we apply law to the Internet, we must first choose a perspective from which to model the facts of the Internet. Do we follow reality or virtual reality? We can adopt a user's internal perspective, and view the Internet as the virtual world of cyberspace, or else we can adopt an external perspective and view the Internet as a physical network. The article explains how the problem of perspective pervades the law of the Internet, and offers several strategies that courts can use to select a perspective in a given case.","PeriodicalId":47702,"journal":{"name":"Georgetown Law Journal","volume":"63 1","pages":"357"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2002-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83447632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This piece is a response to an article by Andrew Guzman, which proffers an efficiency framework for choice-of-law problems in interjurisdictional conflicts. The response incorporates insights from public choice theory into choice of law to draw two conclusions. First, public choice theory confounds our attempts to draw normative conclusions about efficient choice-of-law policies. Second, assuming that we can overcome these difficulties to ascertain the content of efficient choice-of-law policies, public choice theory exposes the practical difficulties of moving courts toward more efficient choice-of-law decisions. In short, the problem is both more difficult and more elusive than others, including Guzman, have presupposed.
{"title":"Economics, Public Choice and the Perennial Conflict of Laws","authors":"O. O'Connor, A. Erin","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.293000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.293000","url":null,"abstract":"This piece is a response to an article by Andrew Guzman, which proffers an efficiency framework for choice-of-law problems in interjurisdictional conflicts. The response incorporates insights from public choice theory into choice of law to draw two conclusions. First, public choice theory confounds our attempts to draw normative conclusions about efficient choice-of-law policies. Second, assuming that we can overcome these difficulties to ascertain the content of efficient choice-of-law policies, public choice theory exposes the practical difficulties of moving courts toward more efficient choice-of-law decisions. In short, the problem is both more difficult and more elusive than others, including Guzman, have presupposed.","PeriodicalId":47702,"journal":{"name":"Georgetown Law Journal","volume":"12 1","pages":"941"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2001-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75346911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
peculiarities uncertainties in primary ballot access cases, constitutionality in the abstract. The position of the primary in the overall electoral scheme, the type of office for which the primary is nominating candidates, and the nature of the state or party interests used to justify the law will all bear on whether a given set of rules violates voter or candidate rights. Because the current case law is hampered by uncomfortable analogies to general election ballot access cases or other party autonomy or freedom of association cases, much work remains to be done in constructing a coherent jurisprudence of primary ballot access. Although several of the ideas expressed in this Article must be tagged thought experiments given the treacherous directions toward which they might lead, I hope they provide a starting point for such a discussion.
{"title":"Candidates v. Parties: The Constitutional Constraints on Primary Ballot Access Laws","authors":"N. Persily","doi":"10.7916/D8PN9G3B","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/D8PN9G3B","url":null,"abstract":"peculiarities uncertainties in primary ballot access cases, constitutionality in the abstract. The position of the primary in the overall electoral scheme, the type of office for which the primary is nominating candidates, and the nature of the state or party interests used to justify the law will all bear on whether a given set of rules violates voter or candidate rights. Because the current case law is hampered by uncomfortable analogies to general election ballot access cases or other party autonomy or freedom of association cases, much work remains to be done in constructing a coherent jurisprudence of primary ballot access. Although several of the ideas expressed in this Article must be tagged thought experiments given the treacherous directions toward which they might lead, I hope they provide a starting point for such a discussion.","PeriodicalId":47702,"journal":{"name":"Georgetown Law Journal","volume":"10 1","pages":"2181-2225"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2001-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74862398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The American law of parent and child is conventionally understood to be extremely deferential to parental prerogatives and highly reluctant to intervene. But this picture, endorsed by legal authorities and popular commentators from the nineteenth century to the present day, reflects only one tradition in the law's regulation of parenthood. Since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, there has also been massive legal intervention into the parental relation. This second legal tradition, moreover, has been guided by norms wholly different from those conventionally associated with family law, often evincing a radical suspicion of parental autonomy and an eager willingness to reshape family relations. This Article explores how the divide in the laws and norms governing the parental relation emerged and maintained itself, tracing an important chapter in the history of the law's regulation of family life. It then uses this history to examine why the divide has survived the modern constitutional era.
{"title":"Parenthood Divided: A Legal History of the Bifurcated Law of Parental Relations","authors":"J. Hasday","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.271688","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.271688","url":null,"abstract":"The American law of parent and child is conventionally understood to be extremely deferential to parental prerogatives and highly reluctant to intervene. But this picture, endorsed by legal authorities and popular commentators from the nineteenth century to the present day, reflects only one tradition in the law's regulation of parenthood. Since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, there has also been massive legal intervention into the parental relation. This second legal tradition, moreover, has been guided by norms wholly different from those conventionally associated with family law, often evincing a radical suspicion of parental autonomy and an eager willingness to reshape family relations. This Article explores how the divide in the laws and norms governing the parental relation emerged and maintained itself, tracing an important chapter in the history of the law's regulation of family life. It then uses this history to examine why the divide has survived the modern constitutional era.","PeriodicalId":47702,"journal":{"name":"Georgetown Law Journal","volume":"124 1","pages":"299-386"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2001-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76901924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Internet offers the fastest reproduction and distribution of information ever known, presenting fundamental challenges to copyright law. Practically anyone with a personal computer can receive and send information over the Internet, and so practically anyone has access to copyrighted works and can duplicate them, adapt them, or disseminate them. From the perspective of a copyright holder, even a single innocent use represents a threat. This Article examines the controversial proposal that Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") be held liable for the copyright infringements of the subscribers. The Article takes the position that the existing case law considering ISP liability for subscriber copyright infringement - under theories of direct liability, vicarious liability, and contributory liability - thus far has struck an acceptable balance between the property interests of copyright holders and the First Amendment rights of subscribers. The Article supports this contention with an examination of the rationales underlying the closely analogous field of enterprise liability in tort. It then examines recent Congressional legislation - the Digital Millenium Copyright Act ("DMCA") - providing "safe harbors" for ISP liability. The Article concludes that the DMCA, unless properly interpreted, threatens to upset the balance struck by the case law by creating an incentive to unduly restrict the free speech of subscribers.
{"title":"Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment","authors":"Alfred C. Yen","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.236478","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.236478","url":null,"abstract":"The Internet offers the fastest reproduction and distribution of information ever known, presenting fundamental challenges to copyright law. Practically anyone with a personal computer can receive and send information over the Internet, and so practically anyone has access to copyrighted works and can duplicate them, adapt them, or disseminate them. From the perspective of a copyright holder, even a single innocent use represents a threat. This Article examines the controversial proposal that Internet Service Providers (\"ISPs\") be held liable for the copyright infringements of the subscribers. The Article takes the position that the existing case law considering ISP liability for subscriber copyright infringement - under theories of direct liability, vicarious liability, and contributory liability - thus far has struck an acceptable balance between the property interests of copyright holders and the First Amendment rights of subscribers. The Article supports this contention with an examination of the rationales underlying the closely analogous field of enterprise liability in tort. It then examines recent Congressional legislation - the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (\"DMCA\") - providing \"safe harbors\" for ISP liability. The Article concludes that the DMCA, unless properly interpreted, threatens to upset the balance struck by the case law by creating an incentive to unduly restrict the free speech of subscribers.","PeriodicalId":47702,"journal":{"name":"Georgetown Law Journal","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2000-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75214299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper presents a framework for understanding the relationship between rational choice and emotional behavior. Emotions are interpreted as temporary albeit predictable changes in preferences, abilities, and beliefs. People act rationally in anticipation of their own emotional reactions to provocations and other stimuli; they also act rationally when under the influence of emotion. The law needs to take account of both of these effects. The paper discusses (1) the sanction for murders committed under the influence of rage or hate, (2) the treatment of prejudicial evidence such as gory photographs, (3) safety regulation when individuals are subject to fear or dread, (4) contract and judicial remedies when parties become angry at each other, and (5) cost-benefit analysis of projects that provoke emotional responses.
{"title":"Law and the Emotions","authors":"E. Posner","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.241389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.241389","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a framework for understanding the relationship between rational choice and emotional behavior. Emotions are interpreted as temporary albeit predictable changes in preferences, abilities, and beliefs. People act rationally in anticipation of their own emotional reactions to provocations and other stimuli; they also act rationally when under the influence of emotion. The law needs to take account of both of these effects. The paper discusses (1) the sanction for murders committed under the influence of rage or hate, (2) the treatment of prejudicial evidence such as gory photographs, (3) safety regulation when individuals are subject to fear or dread, (4) contract and judicial remedies when parties become angry at each other, and (5) cost-benefit analysis of projects that provoke emotional responses.","PeriodicalId":47702,"journal":{"name":"Georgetown Law Journal","volume":"48 1","pages":"1977"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2000-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73534285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This Article develops a new approach to choice of law. Founded on economic principles rather than the notions of sovereignty that are typically used by choice of law scholars, it seeks to build new foundations for choice of law scholarship. The analysis in the Article makes it possible to discuss alternative choice of law rules in terms of their impact on the well-being of individuals. In other words, it makes it possible to consider questions of efficiency within a choice of law discussion. The Article traces how the self-interested behavior of nations is at odds with globally efficient rules, and shows how choice of law rules can impact the incentives of countries. The analysis yields eight “choice of law lessons†that help explain the impact of choice of law rules. From these lessons emerge several policies that provide countries with an incentive to regulate more efficiently. The Article then applies its analysis to several specific substantive law topics – bankruptcy, securities, and antitrust – demonstrating how the framework of the Article can be applied in particular cases. The role of international institutions is also examined. It is shown that they represent an effective tool to facilitate negotiations over choice of law issues in certain cases, but not in others. This discussion informs a variety of current issues. For example, it explains why negotiations over international competition policy and environmental policy should be carried out within the WTO rather than in a separate forum.
{"title":"Choice of Law: New Foundations","authors":"Andrew T. Guzman","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.237802","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.237802","url":null,"abstract":"This Article develops a new approach to choice of law. Founded on economic principles rather than the notions of sovereignty that are typically used by choice of law scholars, it seeks to build new foundations for choice of law scholarship. The analysis in the Article makes it possible to discuss alternative choice of law rules in terms of their impact on the well-being of individuals. In other words, it makes it possible to consider questions of efficiency within a choice of law discussion. The Article traces how the self-interested behavior of nations is at odds with globally efficient rules, and shows how choice of law rules can impact the incentives of countries. The analysis yields eight “choice of law lessons†that help explain the impact of choice of law rules. From these lessons emerge several policies that provide countries with an incentive to regulate more efficiently. The Article then applies its analysis to several specific substantive law topics – bankruptcy, securities, and antitrust – demonstrating how the framework of the Article can be applied in particular cases. The role of international institutions is also examined. It is shown that they represent an effective tool to facilitate negotiations over choice of law issues in certain cases, but not in others. This discussion informs a variety of current issues. For example, it explains why negotiations over international competition policy and environmental policy should be carried out within the WTO rather than in a separate forum.","PeriodicalId":47702,"journal":{"name":"Georgetown Law Journal","volume":"24 1","pages":"883"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2000-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74365810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores the constitutional implications of race-neutral affirmative action, i.e., governmental efforts to pursue affirmative action goals, such as remedying discrimination and promoting diversity, through non-racial means. For example, to increase minority enrollment, some public universities give weight in the admission process to economic background. This paper suggests that such "race-neutral" policies may be just as unconstitutional as racial preferences if they are motivated by arguably discriminatory (against whites) purposes. I then present two doctrinal defenses of race-neutral affirmative action. First, assuming that strict scrutiny would apply to such policies, I argue that remedying discrimination, even so-called "societal discrimination," should qualify as compelling when pursued through race-neutral means. Second, I argue that race-neutral affirmative action should only be subject to rational basis review. The principal point here is that the purposes of remedying racial discrimination and promoting diversity are not themselves "racially discriminatory" purposes that trigger heightened review. Policies that pursue such purposes without discriminating by race as a means thereto are therefore constitutionally unobjectionable.
{"title":"The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action","authors":"Kim Forde-Mazrui","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.198911","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.198911","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the constitutional implications of race-neutral affirmative action, i.e., governmental efforts to pursue affirmative action goals, such as remedying discrimination and promoting diversity, through non-racial means. For example, to increase minority enrollment, some public universities give weight in the admission process to economic background. This paper suggests that such \"race-neutral\" policies may be just as unconstitutional as racial preferences if they are motivated by arguably discriminatory (against whites) purposes. I then present two doctrinal defenses of race-neutral affirmative action. First, assuming that strict scrutiny would apply to such policies, I argue that remedying discrimination, even so-called \"societal discrimination,\" should qualify as compelling when pursued through race-neutral means. Second, I argue that race-neutral affirmative action should only be subject to rational basis review. The principal point here is that the purposes of remedying racial discrimination and promoting diversity are not themselves \"racially discriminatory\" purposes that trigger heightened review. Policies that pursue such purposes without discriminating by race as a means thereto are therefore constitutionally unobjectionable.","PeriodicalId":47702,"journal":{"name":"Georgetown Law Journal","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"1999-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84973540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1996-01-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197513248.003.0016
Gerald B. Wetlaufer
This article discusses integrative bargaining. Opportunities for integrative bargaining are often unrecognized and unexploited. As a result, both the parties to negotiations and society as a whole are worse off than would otherwise have been the case. The article offers three conclusions. First, opportunities for integrative bargaining are not nearly as pervasive as is sometimes authoritatively asserted. Second, the claim that opportunities for integrative bargaining make good behavior a simple matter of rational, pecuniary self-interest is not nearly as strong as is sometimes claimed, both because opportunities for integrative bargaining are less pervasive than has been asserted and because, even when such opportunities may exist, the case for good behavior is weaker than has been claimed. Third, and accordingly, the case for good behavior cannot rest entirely on pecuniary self-interest. The article then outlines the opportunities for integrative bargaining, which includes differences between the parties in terms of (1) their interests, (2) their projections concerning possible future events, (3) their willingness to accept risks, and (4) their time preferences regarding payment or performance.
{"title":"The Limits of Integrative Bargaining","authors":"Gerald B. Wetlaufer","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197513248.003.0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197513248.003.0016","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses integrative bargaining. Opportunities for integrative bargaining are often unrecognized and unexploited. As a result, both the parties to negotiations and society as a whole are worse off than would otherwise have been the case. The article offers three conclusions. First, opportunities for integrative bargaining are not nearly as pervasive as is sometimes authoritatively asserted. Second, the claim that opportunities for integrative bargaining make good behavior a simple matter of rational, pecuniary self-interest is not nearly as strong as is sometimes claimed, both because opportunities for integrative bargaining are less pervasive than has been asserted and because, even when such opportunities may exist, the case for good behavior is weaker than has been claimed. Third, and accordingly, the case for good behavior cannot rest entirely on pecuniary self-interest. The article then outlines the opportunities for integrative bargaining, which includes differences between the parties in terms of (1) their interests, (2) their projections concerning possible future events, (3) their willingness to accept risks, and (4) their time preferences regarding payment or performance.","PeriodicalId":47702,"journal":{"name":"Georgetown Law Journal","volume":"10 3 1","pages":"369"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"1996-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80757290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This note argues that rapes perpetrated with government involvement and for political purposes should be classified as torture rather than ill-treatment under international law.' Part I of this note addresses the legal and social significance of viewing rape as ill-treatment rather than torture. As a legal matter, the classification of rape as ill-treatment systematically denies rape survivors" the protections and remedies available to torture survivors under international treaties and domestic laws. On a societal level, the separation of rape from torture perpetuates myths about rape and denies women an equal right to dignity, as protected by international human rights law. To determine whether governmental rapes should be classified as torture or ill-treatment, Part II analyzes the difference between the international legal definitions of these two forms of abuse. This Part traces major events in the evolution of these two concepts with regard to several international and regional conventions. Ultimately, this Part suggests that one of the most significant legal distinction between torture and ill-treatment is that torture is understood as inflicting more pain and suffering than ill-treatment. Part III argues that the severe suffering caused by rape is comparable to that inflicted by torture, thus justifying the treatment of rape as torture under international law. This Part begins by comparing medical studies of rape survivors with similar studies of torture survivors. This comparison reveals that the psychological aftermath of rape is strikingly similar in intensity and duration to that experienced by other torture survivors. This Part then argues that, because of the unique impact of rape as a method of torture, rape may inflict even more trauma than other forms of torture, thereby inflicting "torture plus" on women. Part III concludes that, when government officials rape for political purposes, such rapes inflict at least torture and not merely ill-treatment. This note was cited favorably in three federal appellate decisions: 99 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1996), 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), and 333 F.3d 463 (3rd Cir. 2003))
{"title":"Torture By Means of Rape","authors":"Evelyn Aswad","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3474128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3474128","url":null,"abstract":"This note argues that rapes perpetrated with government involvement and for political purposes should be classified as torture rather than ill-treatment under international law.' Part I of this note addresses the legal and social significance of viewing rape as ill-treatment rather than torture. As a legal matter, the classification of rape as ill-treatment systematically denies rape survivors\" the protections and remedies available to torture survivors under international treaties and domestic laws. On a societal level, the separation of rape from torture perpetuates myths about rape and denies women an equal right to dignity, as protected by international human rights law. To determine whether governmental rapes should be classified as torture or ill-treatment, Part II analyzes the difference between the international legal definitions of these two forms of abuse. This Part traces major events in the evolution of these two concepts with regard to several international and regional conventions. Ultimately, this Part suggests that one of the most significant legal distinction between torture and ill-treatment is that torture is understood as inflicting more pain and suffering than ill-treatment. Part III argues that the severe suffering caused by rape is comparable to that inflicted by torture, thus justifying the treatment of rape as torture under international law. This Part begins by comparing medical studies of rape survivors with similar studies of torture survivors. This comparison reveals that the psychological aftermath of rape is strikingly similar in intensity and duration to that experienced by other torture survivors. This Part then argues that, because of the unique impact of rape as a method of torture, rape may inflict even more trauma than other forms of torture, thereby inflicting \"torture plus\" on women. Part III concludes that, when government officials rape for political purposes, such rapes inflict at least torture and not merely ill-treatment. This note was cited favorably in three federal appellate decisions: 99 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1996), 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), and 333 F.3d 463 (3rd Cir. 2003))","PeriodicalId":47702,"journal":{"name":"Georgetown Law Journal","volume":"61 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"1996-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91048446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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