Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.36644/mlr.121.4.recognizing
Eugene Lee
The Trump Administration’s travel ban and separation of families at the U.S.- Mexico border drew newfound attention to the constitutional due process right to family unity. But even before then, the right to family unity has had a substantial history. Rooted in the Supreme Court’s line of privacy rights cases, the right to family unity is amorphous. This ambiguity has given rise to disagreement regarding not only legal doctrine surrounding the right but also whether the right even exists. This Note clarifies this disagreement by offering a historical account of the right to family unity and an overview of three categories of immigration cases in which litigants assert this right. Acknowledging that a substantive resolution of the problem of family separation in immigration will require legislative and executive intervention, this Note argues instead that courts should adopt two recommendations that would, as a matter of judicial process, more fully recognize the right. These measures would validate the dignitary interests of immigrant families and signal to the legislative and executive branches the constitutional implications of their longstanding inaction.
{"title":"Recognizing the Right to Family Unity in Immigration Law","authors":"Eugene Lee","doi":"10.36644/mlr.121.4.recognizing","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36644/mlr.121.4.recognizing","url":null,"abstract":"The Trump Administration’s travel ban and separation of families at the U.S.- Mexico border drew newfound attention to the constitutional due process right to family unity. But even before then, the right to family unity has had a substantial history. Rooted in the Supreme Court’s line of privacy rights cases, the right to family unity is amorphous. This ambiguity has given rise to disagreement regarding not only legal doctrine surrounding the right but also whether the right even exists. This Note clarifies this disagreement by offering a historical account of the right to family unity and an overview of three categories of immigration cases in which litigants assert this right. Acknowledging that a substantive resolution of the problem of family separation in immigration will require legislative and executive intervention, this Note argues instead that courts should adopt two recommendations that would, as a matter of judicial process, more fully recognize the right. These measures would validate the dignitary interests of immigrant families and signal to the legislative and executive branches the constitutional implications of their longstanding inaction.","PeriodicalId":47790,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69686212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.36644/mlr.122.1.death
Shay Collins
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a), parties to foreign legal proceedings can obtain discovery orders from United States federal courts. In other words, if a foreign party needs physical evidence located in—or testimony from a person residing in—the United States to support their claim or defense, they can ask a district court to order the production of that evidence. For almost two decades, § 1782(a) practice has operated as a procedural Wild West. Judges routinely consider § 1782(a) applications ex parte—that is, without giving the parties subject to the resulting discovery orders a chance to oppose them—and grant those applications at a staggering rate: more than 90% of the time. In its June 2022 decision in ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., the Supreme Court transformed § 1782 jurisprudence for the worse. The Court held that private arbitral tribunals do not fall under § 1782(a)’s scope and that, as a result, parties cannot obtain discovery for use in foreign private arbitration under the provision. This Note argues that, after ZF Automotive, § 1782(a) jurisprudence contains two dangers: (1) it subjects some parties to burdensome discovery orders with few procedural safeguards, and (2) it prevents parties who have chosen to arbitrate rather than litigate from obtaining discovery entirely. This Note contributes to existing scholarship by proposing structural changes that would improve § 1782(a) practice. Specifically, it argues that courts cannot root out the procedural flaws that plague § 1782(a), and that, consequently, Congress should enact a new and improved § 1782 to address these manifold problems.
根据《美国法典》第28编第1782(a)条，外国法律诉讼的当事人可以从美国联邦法院获得证据开示令。换句话说，如果外国当事人需要在美国境内的实物证据或居住在美国的人的证词来支持他们的索赔或辩护，他们可以要求地区法院下令出示该证据。近二十年来，§1782(a)的实践一直是程序性的蛮荒西部。法官通常会考虑§1782(a)条款的单方面申请——也就是说，不给受发现令影响的当事人反对的机会——并以惊人的速度批准这些申请:超过90%的时间。在2022年6月ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd的判决中，最高法院将§1782的判例向更坏的方向转变。法院认为，私人仲裁庭不属于第1782(a)条的适用范围，因此，当事人不能根据该条款获得在外国私人仲裁中使用的证据开示。本说明认为，在采埃孚汽车之后，§1782(a)判例包含两个危险:(1)它使一些当事人接受繁重的发现令，几乎没有程序保障，(2)它阻止了选择仲裁而不是诉讼的当事人完全获得发现。本说明通过提出将改进§1782(a)实践的结构性变化，对现有学术做出贡献。具体来说，它认为法院不能根除困扰1782(a)条的程序缺陷，因此，国会应该颁布一个新的和改进的1782条来解决这些多重问题。
{"title":"The Death Knell and the Wild West: Two Dangers of Domestic Discovery in Foreign Adjudications","authors":"Shay Collins","doi":"10.36644/mlr.122.1.death","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36644/mlr.122.1.death","url":null,"abstract":"Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a), parties to foreign legal proceedings can obtain discovery orders from United States federal courts. In other words, if a foreign party needs physical evidence located in—or testimony from a person residing in—the United States to support their claim or defense, they can ask a district court to order the production of that evidence. For almost two decades, § 1782(a) practice has operated as a procedural Wild West. Judges routinely consider § 1782(a) applications ex parte—that is, without giving the parties subject to the resulting discovery orders a chance to oppose them—and grant those applications at a staggering rate: more than 90% of the time. In its June 2022 decision in ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., the Supreme Court transformed § 1782 jurisprudence for the worse. The Court held that private arbitral tribunals do not fall under § 1782(a)’s scope and that, as a result, parties cannot obtain discovery for use in foreign private arbitration under the provision. This Note argues that, after ZF Automotive, § 1782(a) jurisprudence contains two dangers: (1) it subjects some parties to burdensome discovery orders with few procedural safeguards, and (2) it prevents parties who have chosen to arbitrate rather than litigate from obtaining discovery entirely. This Note contributes to existing scholarship by proposing structural changes that would improve § 1782(a) practice. Specifically, it argues that courts cannot root out the procedural flaws that plague § 1782(a), and that, consequently, Congress should enact a new and improved § 1782 to address these manifold problems.","PeriodicalId":47790,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135560306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.36644/mlr.121.6.geography
A. Eisenberg
A Review of Coal, Cages, Crisis: The Rise of the Prison Economy in Central Appalachia. By Judah Schept.
煤、牢笼、危机:阿巴拉契亚中部监狱经济的兴起。作者:Judah Schept。
{"title":"The Geography of Unfreedom","authors":"A. Eisenberg","doi":"10.36644/mlr.121.6.geography","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36644/mlr.121.6.geography","url":null,"abstract":"A Review of Coal, Cages, Crisis: The Rise of the Prison Economy in Central Appalachia. By Judah Schept.","PeriodicalId":47790,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69686889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.36644/mlr.121.6.sisters
Paul Butler
A Review of Becoming Abolitionists: Police, Protests, and the Pursuit of Freedom. By Derecka Purnell and a review of Progressive Prosecution: Race and Reform in Criminal Justice. Edited by Kim Taylor-Thompson and Anthony C. Thompson.
{"title":"Sisters Gonna Work It Out: Black Women as Reformers and Radicals in the Criminal Legal System","authors":"Paul Butler","doi":"10.36644/mlr.121.6.sisters","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36644/mlr.121.6.sisters","url":null,"abstract":"A Review of Becoming Abolitionists: Police, Protests, and the Pursuit of Freedom. By Derecka Purnell and a review of Progressive Prosecution: Race and Reform in Criminal Justice. Edited by Kim Taylor-Thompson and Anthony C. Thompson.","PeriodicalId":47790,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69687419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.36644/mlr.121.6.nepantla
G. Torres
A Review of Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza. By Gloria Anzaldúa.
《无主之地》/《La Frontera: The New Mestiza》综述。Gloria Anzaldúa。
{"title":"Nepantla/Coatlicue/Conocimiento","authors":"G. Torres","doi":"10.36644/mlr.121.6.nepantla","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36644/mlr.121.6.nepantla","url":null,"abstract":"A Review of Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza. By Gloria Anzaldúa.","PeriodicalId":47790,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69687844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.36644/mlr.121.6.beyond.more
Ngozi Okidegbe
A Review of McCleskey v. Kemp. By Mario Barnes, in Critical Race Judgments: Rewritten U.S. Court Opinions on Race and the Law 557, 581. Edited by Bennett Capers, Devon W. Carbado, R.A. Lenhardt and Angela Onwuachi-Willig.
{"title":"Beyond More Accurate Algorithms: Takeaways from McCleskey Revisited","authors":"Ngozi Okidegbe","doi":"10.36644/mlr.121.6.beyond.more","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36644/mlr.121.6.beyond.more","url":null,"abstract":"A Review of McCleskey v. Kemp. By Mario Barnes, in Critical Race Judgments: Rewritten U.S. Court Opinions on Race and the Law 557, 581. Edited by Bennett Capers, Devon W. Carbado, R.A. Lenhardt and Angela Onwuachi-Willig.","PeriodicalId":47790,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69686872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.36644/mlr.121.7.gotta
Kathryn Buggs
Disgorgement is an equitable monetary remedy that requires a defendant to give up all ill-gotten gains from their illegal conduct. Unlike damages, which can be compensatory, deterrent, or even punitive in nature, disgorgement focuses primarily on deterring future illegal conduct. It relies on the simple moral premise that wrongdoers should not be allowed to retain the profits of their wrongdoing. Especially in antitrust litigation involving complex, multilayered supply chains, damages can underestimate the true harm suffered as a result of anticompetitive conduct. Disgorgement, if calculated properly and litigated thoughtfully, has the potential to provide redress for the full amount of harm and therefore act as a more efficient deterrent. Federal and state antitrust enforcers have sought disgorgement for anticompetitive conduct with limited success, and a recent Supreme Court decision casts doubt on the Federal Trade Commission’s authority to seek disgorgement altogether. Still, there is bipartisan support in Congress and the White House to restore the FTC’s disgorgement authority. This Note proposes enacting legislation to that effect, including a provision that would allow state attorneys general or private plaintiffs to seek disgorgement on the FTC’s behalf (called a “qui tam” provision). Further, this Note outlines how leveraging existing litigation tools can alleviate concerns that disgorgement will lead to duplicative recovery. By restoring the FTC’s authority to seek disgorgement and creating a qui tam mechanism for private enforcement, antitrust plaintiffs will benefit from increased leverage, enabling them to both recover the totality of harm caused by anticompetitive conduct and deter such conduct in the future.
{"title":"Gotta Get Those Ill-Gotten Gains: Improving the FTC's Authority to Seek Disgorgement in Antitrust Cases","authors":"Kathryn Buggs","doi":"10.36644/mlr.121.7.gotta","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36644/mlr.121.7.gotta","url":null,"abstract":"Disgorgement is an equitable monetary remedy that requires a defendant to give up all ill-gotten gains from their illegal conduct. Unlike damages, which can be compensatory, deterrent, or even punitive in nature, disgorgement focuses primarily on deterring future illegal conduct. It relies on the simple moral premise that wrongdoers should not be allowed to retain the profits of their wrongdoing. Especially in antitrust litigation involving complex, multilayered supply chains, damages can underestimate the true harm suffered as a result of anticompetitive conduct. Disgorgement, if calculated properly and litigated thoughtfully, has the potential to provide redress for the full amount of harm and therefore act as a more efficient deterrent. Federal and state antitrust enforcers have sought disgorgement for anticompetitive conduct with limited success, and a recent Supreme Court decision casts doubt on the Federal Trade Commission’s authority to seek disgorgement altogether. Still, there is bipartisan support in Congress and the White House to restore the FTC’s disgorgement authority. This Note proposes enacting legislation to that effect, including a provision that would allow state attorneys general or private plaintiffs to seek disgorgement on the FTC’s behalf (called a “qui tam” provision). Further, this Note outlines how leveraging existing litigation tools can alleviate concerns that disgorgement will lead to duplicative recovery. By restoring the FTC’s authority to seek disgorgement and creating a qui tam mechanism for private enforcement, antitrust plaintiffs will benefit from increased leverage, enabling them to both recover the totality of harm caused by anticompetitive conduct and deter such conduct in the future.","PeriodicalId":47790,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69687642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.36644/mlr.121.8.title
Elena Meth
Nearly sixty years after the adoption of Title VII and over thirty since intersectionality theory was brought into legal discourse by Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently failed to meaningfully implement intersectionality into its decisionmaking. While there is certainly no shortage of scholarship on intersectionality and the Court’s failure to recognize it, this remains an overlooked failure by the Supreme Court. This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview of Title VII and intersectional discrimination theory. I then explain how the EEOC and the Supreme Court have historically handled intersectional discrimination cases. Part II compares and contrasts some of the most influential feminist, political, and legal theories on sex discrimination with intersectionality. Though these theories might seem incompatible, I then offer a brief discussion of how they can be understood in concert. I also explain how the Court can improve its Title VII decisionmaking. Part III provides a framework for courts, plaintiffs, and defendants in Title VII discrimination cases to incorporate intersectional theory and, most importantly, to recognize the unique harms experienced by plaintiffs bringing Title VII claims.
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Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.36644/mlr.121.8.telegraph
Evelyn Atkinson
At the turn of the twentieth century, state courts were roiled by claims against telegraph corporations for mental anguish resulting from the failure to deliver telegrams involving the death or injury of a family member. Although these “telegraph cases” at first may seem a bizarre outlier, they in fact reveal an important and understudied moment of transformation in the nature of the relationship between the corporation and the public: the role of affective relations in the development of the category of the public utility corporation. Even as powerful corporations were recast as private, rights-bearing, profit-making market actors in constitutional law, a significant minority of rural state courts deviated from the common law to impose liability for mental anguish on negligent telegraph corporations. They did so on the basis that telegraph companies bore a duty to protect the emotional wellbeing and family connections of their customers. In this, courts gave voice to the popular view, voiced by telegraph users and promoted by the companies themselves, of the telegraph corporation as a faithful servant of individual families and communities. In so doing, they embedded the historical and popular perception of the corporation as “servant” into the definition of “public service.” This Article exposes the private law of the public service corporation and the noneconomic dimension of the legal category of “public utility.” Current scholarship has focused on how turn-of-the-century jurists developed the category of “public utility” or “public service” corporation to justify state economic regulations that would otherwise infringe on corporations’ newfound constitutional rights. The telegraph cases reveal a concurrent and complementary development in tort law: the imposition of affective responsibilities on certain corporations as well. Illuminating this doctrine offers an example of how the public utility category could be mobilized to protect the emotional as well as economic wellbeing of the public today.
{"title":"Telegraph Torts: The Lost Lineage of the Public Service Corporation","authors":"Evelyn Atkinson","doi":"10.36644/mlr.121.8.telegraph","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36644/mlr.121.8.telegraph","url":null,"abstract":"At the turn of the twentieth century, state courts were roiled by claims against telegraph corporations for mental anguish resulting from the failure to deliver telegrams involving the death or injury of a family member. Although these “telegraph cases” at first may seem a bizarre outlier, they in fact reveal an important and understudied moment of transformation in the nature of the relationship between the corporation and the public: the role of affective relations in the development of the category of the public utility corporation. Even as powerful corporations were recast as private, rights-bearing, profit-making market actors in constitutional law, a significant minority of rural state courts deviated from the common law to impose liability for mental anguish on negligent telegraph corporations. They did so on the basis that telegraph companies bore a duty to protect the emotional wellbeing and family connections of their customers. In this, courts gave voice to the popular view, voiced by telegraph users and promoted by the companies themselves, of the telegraph corporation as a faithful servant of individual families and communities. In so doing, they embedded the historical and popular perception of the corporation as “servant” into the definition of “public service.” This Article exposes the private law of the public service corporation and the noneconomic dimension of the legal category of “public utility.” Current scholarship has focused on how turn-of-the-century jurists developed the category of “public utility” or “public service” corporation to justify state economic regulations that would otherwise infringe on corporations’ newfound constitutional rights. The telegraph cases reveal a concurrent and complementary development in tort law: the imposition of affective responsibilities on certain corporations as well. Illuminating this doctrine offers an example of how the public utility category could be mobilized to protect the emotional as well as economic wellbeing of the public today.","PeriodicalId":47790,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135954667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.36644/mlr.121.6.indian
M. Pearl, Matthew L.M. Fletcher
A Review of Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl By Matthew L.M. Fletcher and Kathryn E. Fort, in Critical Race Judgments: Rewritten U.S. Court Opinions on Race and the Law 452, 471. Edited by Bennett Capers, Devon W. Carbado, R.A. Lenhardt and Angela Onwuachi-Willig.
Matthew L.M. Fletcher和Kathryn E. Fort对收养夫妇诉女婴案的回顾，《关键的种族判决:重写美国法院关于种族和法律的意见》，第452,471页。本内特·卡佩斯、德文·w·卡巴多、R.A.伦哈特和安吉拉·翁武契-威利编辑。
{"title":"The Indian Child Welfare Act in the Multiverse","authors":"M. Pearl, Matthew L.M. Fletcher","doi":"10.36644/mlr.121.6.indian","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36644/mlr.121.6.indian","url":null,"abstract":"A Review of Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl By Matthew L.M. Fletcher and Kathryn E. Fort, in Critical Race Judgments: Rewritten U.S. Court Opinions on Race and the Law 452, 471. Edited by Bennett Capers, Devon W. Carbado, R.A. Lenhardt and Angela Onwuachi-Willig.","PeriodicalId":47790,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69687015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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