Pub Date : 2023-11-20DOI: 10.1007/s11750-023-00662-8
A. Tighazoui, C. Sauvey, N. Sauer
{"title":"Heuristics for flow shop rescheduling with mixed blocking constraints","authors":"A. Tighazoui, C. Sauvey, N. Sauer","doi":"10.1007/s11750-023-00662-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-023-00662-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49432,"journal":{"name":"Top","volume":"3 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139256380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-03DOI: 10.1007/s11750-023-00661-9
Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo, Iago Núñez Lugilde, Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo, Estela Sánchez-Rodríguez
{"title":"On properties of the set of awards vectors for a claims problem","authors":"Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo, Iago Núñez Lugilde, Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo, Estela Sánchez-Rodríguez","doi":"10.1007/s11750-023-00661-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-023-00661-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49432,"journal":{"name":"Top","volume":"45 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135819863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-11DOI: 10.1007/s11750-023-00660-w
Dimitri Thomopulos, Claudia d'Ambrosio, Wim van Ackooij, Marc Stéfanon
Handling cascading reservoir systems is an important energy management optimization problem. The difficulty of these problems stems, in part, from the modeling of the hydro-production function. Data are not always easy to come by. To remedy this issue, this paper proposes and describes a realistic instance generator, building instances of varying difficulty. No specific data format for these problems is currently available in the literature. In addition, both notation and formulations tend to vary widely. Instances and case studies are poorly available or otherwise not applicable to different variants of these problems. The purpose of the generator is also a first attempt to develop a shared data format useful for different variants of hydro unit commitment problems and seeks to mediate the needs of different sectors interested in the optimization of hydropower plants.
{"title":"Generating hydro unit commitment instances","authors":"Dimitri Thomopulos, Claudia d'Ambrosio, Wim van Ackooij, Marc Stéfanon","doi":"10.1007/s11750-023-00660-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-023-00660-w","url":null,"abstract":"Handling cascading reservoir systems is an important energy management optimization problem. The difficulty of these problems stems, in part, from the modeling of the hydro-production function. Data are not always easy to come by. To remedy this issue, this paper proposes and describes a realistic instance generator, building instances of varying difficulty. No specific data format for these problems is currently available in the literature. In addition, both notation and formulations tend to vary widely. Instances and case studies are poorly available or otherwise not applicable to different variants of these problems. The purpose of the generator is also a first attempt to develop a shared data format useful for different variants of hydro unit commitment problems and seeks to mediate the needs of different sectors interested in the optimization of hydropower plants.","PeriodicalId":49432,"journal":{"name":"Top","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136057937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-28DOI: 10.1007/s11750-023-00659-3
A. Zapata, A. M. Mármol, L. Monroy
Abstract Berge’s notion of equilibrium represents a complementary alternative to the Nash equilibrium when modeling socioeconomic behavior and human interactions. While the notion of Nash equilibrium is based on self-interest, as players seek to maximize their own payoffs given the action of the other players, the idea behind Berge equilibrium is mutual support, as given the action of one of the players, all others select their actions looking for her best interest. However, because of the demanding conditions involved, the existence of Berge equilibria is rarely guaranteed. In this paper, we propose vector-valued normal-form games as a unified framework in which to study and extend the concept of Berge equilibrium. Based on the equilibria of the so-called altruistic game, we introduce new equilibrium concepts which constitute different relaxations of Berge’s notion, although they still retain the underlying idea of mutual support. We establish the links between these new equilibria, Nash equilibrium, Berge equilibrium, and other related concepts already existing in the literature. Our approach has the advantage that it permits the incorporation of preference information to identify the equilibria which are consistent with different altruistic attitudes of the players.
{"title":"Berge equilibria and the equilibria of the altruistic game","authors":"A. Zapata, A. M. Mármol, L. Monroy","doi":"10.1007/s11750-023-00659-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-023-00659-3","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Berge’s notion of equilibrium represents a complementary alternative to the Nash equilibrium when modeling socioeconomic behavior and human interactions. While the notion of Nash equilibrium is based on self-interest, as players seek to maximize their own payoffs given the action of the other players, the idea behind Berge equilibrium is mutual support, as given the action of one of the players, all others select their actions looking for her best interest. However, because of the demanding conditions involved, the existence of Berge equilibria is rarely guaranteed. In this paper, we propose vector-valued normal-form games as a unified framework in which to study and extend the concept of Berge equilibrium. Based on the equilibria of the so-called altruistic game, we introduce new equilibrium concepts which constitute different relaxations of Berge’s notion, although they still retain the underlying idea of mutual support. We establish the links between these new equilibria, Nash equilibrium, Berge equilibrium, and other related concepts already existing in the literature. Our approach has the advantage that it permits the incorporation of preference information to identify the equilibria which are consistent with different altruistic attitudes of the players.","PeriodicalId":49432,"journal":{"name":"Top","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135387268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-06DOI: 10.1007/s11750-023-00657-5
Padraigh Jarvis, Laura Climent, Alejandro Arbelaez
{"title":"Smart and sustainable scheduling of charging events for electric buses","authors":"Padraigh Jarvis, Laura Climent, Alejandro Arbelaez","doi":"10.1007/s11750-023-00657-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-023-00657-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49432,"journal":{"name":"Top","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85308689","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-10DOI: 10.1007/s11750-023-00656-6
Tiria Andersen, S. Belward, M. Sankupellay, Trina S. Myers, Carla Chen
{"title":"Reoptimisation strategies for dynamic vehicle routing problems with proximity-dependent nodes","authors":"Tiria Andersen, S. Belward, M. Sankupellay, Trina S. Myers, Carla Chen","doi":"10.1007/s11750-023-00656-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-023-00656-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49432,"journal":{"name":"Top","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-21"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79803855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-10DOI: 10.1007/s11750-023-00655-7
Qiuli Liu, W. Ching, Xianping Guo
{"title":"Zero-sum stochastic games with the average-value-at-risk criterion","authors":"Qiuli Liu, W. Ching, Xianping Guo","doi":"10.1007/s11750-023-00655-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-023-00655-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49432,"journal":{"name":"Top","volume":"12 1","pages":"1-30"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87251509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-17DOI: 10.1007/s11750-023-00654-8
E. C. Gavilán, C. Manuel, R. Brink
{"title":"Directed communication in games with directed graphs","authors":"E. C. Gavilán, C. Manuel, R. Brink","doi":"10.1007/s11750-023-00654-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-023-00654-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49432,"journal":{"name":"Top","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-34"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74990911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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