Nursing Philosophy最新文献

When researchers and scholars claim their work is based on a philosophical idea or a philosopher's corpus of ideas (and theory/theorist can be substituted for philosophy/philosopher), and when 'basing' signifies something significant rather than subsidiary or inconsequential, what level of understanding and expertise can readers reasonably expect authors to possess? In this paper, some of the uses to which philosophical ideas and named philosophers (Martin Heidegger and Leo Strauss) are put in exegesis is critiqued. Considering problematic instances of idea-name use may enable the question: 'Can philosophy benefit nurses and/or nursing?' to be better understood if not answered.

In this study, we discuss the colonial project as an eliminatory structure of indigenous ways of knowing and doing that is built into Canadian social and health institutions. We elaborate on the role nursing plays in maintaining systemic racism, marginalization and discrimination of Indigenous Peoples. Based on historical practices and present-day circumstances, we argue that changing language in research and school curriculums turns decolonization into what Tuck and Yang call a 'metaphor'. Rather, we propose decolonization as a political project where nurses acknowledge their involvement in colonial harms and disrupt the assumptions that continue to shape how nurses interact with Indigenous people, including knowledge systems that perpetuate colonial interests and privilege. Decolonization requires nurses to understand the colonial practices that led to dispossession of land, erasure of knowledge, culture and identity, while upholding indigenous ways of knowing and doing in health, healing and living. As a political manifesto that liberates indigenous life from oppressive structures of colonialism and capitalism, The Red Deal is presented as a visionary platform for decolonization. The aim of this study is to articulate three dimensions of caretaking within The Red Deal as a framework to decolonize nursing knowledge development and practice. Based on the philosophical dimension embedded in The Red Deal that revoke norms and knowledge assumptions of capitalism that destroy indigenous ways of knowing and doing, we underscore an approach toward decolonizing nursing. Our approach rejects the apolitical nature of nursing as well as the unilateral western scientific knowledge approach to knowledge development and recognition. A critical emancipatory approach that addresses the socio-political and historical context of health care, recognizes dispossession of land and adopts a 'multilogical' vision of knowledge that gives space for representation and voice is needed for true decolonization of nursing.

In this paper, we argue that nurses need to be aware of how the production of space in specific contexts - including health care systems and research institutions - perpetuates marginalized populations' state of social otherness. Lefebvre's idea regarding spatial triad is mobilized in this paper, as it pertains to two-spirited, lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and queer populations (2SLGBTQ*). We believe that nurses can create counter-spaces within health care systems and research institutions that challenge normative discourses. Lefebvre's work provides us the necessary tools to understand how various places or environments produce identities. In understanding Lefebvre's principles, we believe that nurses can play an essential role in creating counter-spaces, thereby instigating counter-institutional practices, for those who experience otherness.

This article presents a novel theoretical approach to explore nurse executives' paradoxical identity and agency of executive and nurse in homecare organizations. This complex phenomenon has yet to be well theorized or analyzed. Through a synthesis of literature, we demonstrate that Critical Management Studies, as informed by Foucault, and the Sociology of Ignorance, can create a different understanding of the complex interplay between knowledge and nonknowledge (ignorance) that positions nurse executives in both influential and precarious ways in homecare organizations. This theoretical framework has the potential to allow for the explicit exploration of nurse executives' strategic epistemic and discursive positioning and highlights hierarchal power structures within homecare organizations. We posit that this framework, that spans nursing, management and sociology disciplines, sets a different understanding of homecare organizations as epistemic landscapes, exposing institutional knowledge and ignorance dynamics that remain largely concealed and unchallenged, yet are integral to understanding nurse executives' epistemic agency.

Dignity is one of the essential values and central concepts in nursing care. Dignity can be threatened due to radical life changes; therefore, this idiographic case study aimed to explore the sense of dignity experienced by a woman with multiple sclerosis. An interpretative phenomenological analysis was adopted, using data collected through a face-to-face semistructured interview with Emily, a 45-year-old woman. The study was approved by the local ethics committee. Six personal experiential themes were identified: To be ruled by a sick body; Silent progression; Loss of independence as a burden for the family; Will to fight for the meaning of life; Maintaining dignity-in-relation; Dignified care in a period of greater vulnerability. Emily's dignity is based on the effort to fight for a meaningful life, utilization of her full potential, maintain independence in activities of daily living and support in relationships. Continuous changes in functional ability, loss of self-control and an uncertain future have a negative impact on the experience of her dignity. In the context of dignified health care, she considers individual care and maintaining autonomy important. The idiographic case study can contribute to a better understanding of the experience of a woman suffering from multiple sclerosis. It is possible to carry out interventions that aim to support her dignity, improve her quality of life and contribute to individually oriented health care.

In recent years, the phenomenon of moral distress has been critically examined-and for a good reason. There have been a number of different definitions suggested, some that claimed to be consistent with the original definition but in fact referred to different epistemological states. In this paper, we re-examine moral distress by exploring its relationship with moral agency. We critically examine three conceptions of moral agency and argue that two of these conceptions risk placing nurses' values at the center of moral action when it ought to be the patient's values that shape nurses' obligations. We propose that the conception of moral agency advanced by Aimee Milliken which re-centers patient values, should be more broadly accepted within nursing. We utilize a case example to demonstrate a situation in which the values of a patient's parents (surrogates) justifiably constrained nurses' moral agency, creating moral distress. Through an examination of constraints on nurse agency in this case, we illustrate the problematic nature of 'narrow' moral distress and the value of re-considering moral distress.  Finally, we provide an action-oriented proposal identifying mediating steps that we argue have utility for nurses (and other healthcare professionals) to mediate between experiences of narrow moral distress and the exercise of moral agency.

McCaffery's definition of pain has proven to be one of the most consequential in nursing and healthcare more generally. She put forward this definition in response to the persistent undertreatment of pain. However, despite raising her definition to the status of a dogma, the undertreatment remains a real problem. This essay explores the contention that McCaffery's definition of pain elides critical aspects of it, aspects that demand consideration when treating pain. In section I, I set the stage. I discuss how McCaffery's definition and her understanding of pain science interrelate. In section II, I raise three problems for this understanding. In section III, I argue that these problems stem from an incoherency in her definition. Finally, in section IV, I draw from hospice nursing as well as philosophy and the social sciences to redefine 'pain' so that an intersubjective feature of it is foregrounded. I also briefly discuss one implication this redefinition has for pain management.