We investigate the extent to which trade-offs involving the sharing of personal information exhibit consistency with an underlying rational preference for privacy. In an experiment, people engage in trade-offs across two domains of personal information sharing, allowing us to classify whether their choices satisfy the generalized axiom of revealed preference. They also subsequently price the sharing of their personal information. Sixty-three percent of subjects act consistently with a rational preference ordering when allocating privacy levels, a level comparable to that observed in other domains. Individuals who are inconsistent when engaging in simple privacy trade-offs exhibit substantially more costly preference reversals when pricing personal information sharing. Only one-third of subjects exhibit consistency across both the selection of personal information to share and the pricing of such information sharing. Our results imply that monetizing personal information can have distinct welfare consequences for people with different degrees of rationality in their underlying ability to make sensible trade-offs involving personal information. We also provide evidence that preferences elicited over choices in our experiment correlate with real-world privacy behaviors. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: This work was supported by Forschungskredit (University of Zurich) [Grant FK-17-017] and Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung [Grant 174630] to Y.S. Lee. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.00807 .
我们研究了涉及个人信息共享的权衡在多大程度上与潜在的理性隐私偏好相一致。在一项实验中，人们在个人信息共享的两个领域中进行权衡，使我们能够对他们的选择是否符合广义的揭示偏好公理进行分类。随后，他们还对个人信息的共享进行了定价。63%的受试者在分配隐私级别时始终按照理性偏好排序行事，这一水平与在其他领域观察到的水平相当。在简单的隐私权权衡中表现出不一致的个体，在对个人信息共享进行定价时，会表现出代价更高的偏好逆转。只有三分之一的受试者在选择共享个人信息和为共享信息定价时表现出一致性。我们的研究结果表明，个人信息货币化可能会对不同理性程度的人产生不同的福利后果，而这些人在涉及个人信息时做出明智权衡的基本能力是不同的。我们还提供了证据，证明在我们的实验中引出的选择偏好与现实世界中的隐私行为相关。本文已被行为经济学与决策分析专业的陈艳接受。资助：本研究得到了苏黎世大学 Forschungskredit [Grant FK-17-017] 和 Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung [Grant 174630] 的资助。补充材料：在线附录和数据文件见 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.00807 。
{"title":"Revealed Privacy Preferences: Are Privacy Choices Rational?","authors":"Yi-Shan Lee, Roberto A. Weber","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.00807","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.00807","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the extent to which trade-offs involving the sharing of personal information exhibit consistency with an underlying rational preference for privacy. In an experiment, people engage in trade-offs across two domains of personal information sharing, allowing us to classify whether their choices satisfy the generalized axiom of revealed preference. They also subsequently price the sharing of their personal information. Sixty-three percent of subjects act consistently with a rational preference ordering when allocating privacy levels, a level comparable to that observed in other domains. Individuals who are inconsistent when engaging in simple privacy trade-offs exhibit substantially more costly preference reversals when pricing personal information sharing. Only one-third of subjects exhibit consistency across both the selection of personal information to share and the pricing of such information sharing. Our results imply that monetizing personal information can have distinct welfare consequences for people with different degrees of rationality in their underlying ability to make sensible trade-offs involving personal information. We also provide evidence that preferences elicited over choices in our experiment correlate with real-world privacy behaviors. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: This work was supported by Forschungskredit (University of Zurich) [Grant FK-17-017] and Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung [Grant 174630] to Y.S. Lee. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.00807 .","PeriodicalId":49890,"journal":{"name":"Management Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141354949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Consumption of Values","authors":"Stefania Minardi, Fan Wang, Itzhak Gilboa","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2023.01632","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01632","url":null,"abstract":"Management Science, Ahead of Print. <br/>","PeriodicalId":49890,"journal":{"name":"Management Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141528365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Andrew Daw, Antonio Castellanos, Galit B. Yom-Tov, Jamol Pender, Leor Gruendlinger
Management Science, Ahead of Print.
管理科学》，印刷版前。
{"title":"The Co-Production of Service: Modeling Services in Contact Centers Using Hawkes Processes","authors":"Andrew Daw, Antonio Castellanos, Galit B. Yom-Tov, Jamol Pender, Leor Gruendlinger","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2021.04060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.04060","url":null,"abstract":"Management Science, Ahead of Print. <br/>","PeriodicalId":49890,"journal":{"name":"Management Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141528262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Risks to Human Capital","authors":"Mehran Ebrahimian, Jessica A. Wachter","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.03068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03068","url":null,"abstract":"Management Science, Ahead of Print. <br/>","PeriodicalId":49890,"journal":{"name":"Management Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141502215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Best Decisions Are Not the Best Advice: Making Adherence-Aware Recommendations","authors":"Julien Grand-Clément, Jean Pauphilet","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2023.01851","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01851","url":null,"abstract":"Management Science, Ahead of Print. <br/>","PeriodicalId":49890,"journal":{"name":"Management Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141528264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tele-driving refers to a novel concept by which drivers can remotely operate vehicles (without being physically in the vehicle). By putting the human back in the loop, tele-driving has emerged recently as a more viable alternative to fully automated vehicles with ride-hailing (and other on-demand transportation-enabled services) being an important application. Because remote drivers can be operated as a shared resource (any driver can be assigned to any customer regardless of trip origin or destination), it may be possible for such services to deploy fewer drivers than vehicles without significantly reducing service quality. In this paper, we examine the extent to which this is possible. Using a spatial queueing model that captures the dynamics of both pickup and trip times, we show that the impact of reducing the number of drivers depends crucially on system workload relative to the number of vehicles. In particular, when workload is sufficiently high relative to the number of vehicles, we show that, perhaps surprisingly, reducing the number of drivers relative to the number of vehicles can actually improve service level (e.g., as measured by the amount of demand fulfilled in the case of impatient customers). Having fewer drivers than vehicles ensures that there are always idle vehicles; the fewer the drivers, the likelier it is for there to be more idle vehicles. Consequently, the fewer the drivers, the likelier it is for the pickup times to be shorter (making overall shorter service times likelier). The impact of shorter service time is particularly significant when the workload is high, and in this case, it is enough to overcome the loss in driver capacity. When workload is sufficiently low relative to the number of vehicles, we show that it is possible to significantly reduce the number of drivers without significantly reducing service level. In systems in which customers are patient and willing to queue up for the service, we show that reducing the number of drivers can also reduce delay, including stabilizing a system that may otherwise be unstable. In general, relative to a system in which the number of vehicles equals the number of drivers (as in a system with in-vehicle drivers), a system with remote drivers can result in savings in the number of drivers either without significantly degrading performance or actually improving performance. We discuss how these results can, in part, be explained by the interplay of two counteracting forces: (1) having fewer drivers increasing service rate and (2) having fewer drivers reducing the number of servers with the relative strength of these forces depending on system workload. This paper was accepted by Baris Ata, stochastic models and simulation. Funding: This work was supported by the US National Science Foundation [Grant SCC-1831140], and the Guangdong (China) Provincial Key Laboratory of Mathematical Foundations for Artificial Intelligence [2023B1212010001]. Supplemental Material: The online
远程驾驶指的是一种新概念，驾驶员可以远程操作车辆（无需亲自上车）。通过将人重新置于环路中，远程驾驶近来已成为全自动驾驶汽车的一种更可行的替代方案，而叫车服务（和其他按需运输服务）则是其中的一个重要应用。由于远程驾驶员可以作为共享资源运营（任何驾驶员都可以被分配给任何客户，无论其行程起点或目的地如何），因此此类服务有可能在不显著降低服务质量的情况下部署比车辆更少的驾驶员。在本文中，我们将研究这种可能性的程度。我们使用一个空间排队模型来捕捉取车和行程时间的动态变化，结果表明，减少司机数量的影响在很大程度上取决于系统相对于车辆数量的工作量。特别是，当工作量相对于车辆数量足够大时，我们的研究表明，相对于车辆数量减少司机数量实际上可以提高服务水平（例如，通过满足不耐烦客户的需求量来衡量），这或许令人惊讶。驾驶员人数少于车辆数，就会确保总有闲置车辆；驾驶员人数越少，闲置车辆就越多。因此，司机人数越少，取货时间就越短（整体服务时间就越短）。在工作量大的情况下，缩短服务时间的影响尤为显著，在这种情况下，缩短服务时间足以克服驾驶员能力的损失。当工作量相对于车辆数量足够低时，我们的研究表明，可以在不显著降低服务水平的情况下大幅减少驾驶员数量。在客户有耐心并愿意排队等候服务的系统中，我们证明减少司机数量也能减少延迟，包括稳定原本可能不稳定的系统。一般来说，相对于车辆数量与司机数量相等的系统（如使用车内司机的系统），使用远程司机的系统可以在不明显降低性能或实际提高性能的情况下节省司机数量。我们将讨论如何通过两种相互抵消的力量来部分解释这些结果：(1) 减少驱动程序可提高服务率，(2) 减少驱动程序可减少服务器数量，这两种力量的相对强度取决于系统工作量。本文已被随机模型与仿真部门的 Baris Ata 接收。资助：本研究得到了美国国家科学基金会 [SCC-1831140] 和广东省（中国）人工智能数学基础省级重点实验室 [2023B1212010001] 的资助。补充材料：在线附录和数据文件请访问 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01687 。
{"title":"Human in the Loop Automation: Ride-Hailing with Remote (Tele-)Drivers","authors":"Saif Benjaafar, Zicheng Wang, Xiaotang Yang","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.01687","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01687","url":null,"abstract":"Tele-driving refers to a novel concept by which drivers can remotely operate vehicles (without being physically in the vehicle). By putting the human back in the loop, tele-driving has emerged recently as a more viable alternative to fully automated vehicles with ride-hailing (and other on-demand transportation-enabled services) being an important application. Because remote drivers can be operated as a shared resource (any driver can be assigned to any customer regardless of trip origin or destination), it may be possible for such services to deploy fewer drivers than vehicles without significantly reducing service quality. In this paper, we examine the extent to which this is possible. Using a spatial queueing model that captures the dynamics of both pickup and trip times, we show that the impact of reducing the number of drivers depends crucially on system workload relative to the number of vehicles. In particular, when workload is sufficiently high relative to the number of vehicles, we show that, perhaps surprisingly, reducing the number of drivers relative to the number of vehicles can actually improve service level (e.g., as measured by the amount of demand fulfilled in the case of impatient customers). Having fewer drivers than vehicles ensures that there are always idle vehicles; the fewer the drivers, the likelier it is for there to be more idle vehicles. Consequently, the fewer the drivers, the likelier it is for the pickup times to be shorter (making overall shorter service times likelier). The impact of shorter service time is particularly significant when the workload is high, and in this case, it is enough to overcome the loss in driver capacity. When workload is sufficiently low relative to the number of vehicles, we show that it is possible to significantly reduce the number of drivers without significantly reducing service level. In systems in which customers are patient and willing to queue up for the service, we show that reducing the number of drivers can also reduce delay, including stabilizing a system that may otherwise be unstable. In general, relative to a system in which the number of vehicles equals the number of drivers (as in a system with in-vehicle drivers), a system with remote drivers can result in savings in the number of drivers either without significantly degrading performance or actually improving performance. We discuss how these results can, in part, be explained by the interplay of two counteracting forces: (1) having fewer drivers increasing service rate and (2) having fewer drivers reducing the number of servers with the relative strength of these forces depending on system workload. This paper was accepted by Baris Ata, stochastic models and simulation. Funding: This work was supported by the US National Science Foundation [Grant SCC-1831140], and the Guangdong (China) Provincial Key Laboratory of Mathematical Foundations for Artificial Intelligence [2023B1212010001]. Supplemental Material: The online ","PeriodicalId":49890,"journal":{"name":"Management Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141362213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Robustness of Idiosyncratic Volatility Effect","authors":"Alexander Barinov","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.04140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.04140","url":null,"abstract":"Management Science, Ahead of Print. <br/>","PeriodicalId":49890,"journal":{"name":"Management Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141528263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the mobile video games industry, a common in-app purchase is for additional “moves” or “time” in single-player puzzle games. We call these in-app purchases bonus actions. In some games, bonus actions can only be purchased in advance of attempting a level of the game (pure advance sales (PAS)), yet in other games, bonus actions can only be purchased in a “spot” market that appears when an initial attempt to pass the level fails (pure spot sales). Some games offer both advance and spot purchases (hybrid advance sales). This paper studies these selling strategies for bonus actions in video games. Such a question is novel to in-app tools selling in video games, and it cannot be answered by previous advance selling studies focusing on end goods. We model the selling of bonus actions as a stochastic extensive form game. We show how the distribution of skill among players (i.e., their inherent ability to pass the level) and the inherent randomness of the game influence selling strategies. For casual games, where low-skill players have a sufficiently high probability of success in each attempt, if the proportion of high-skill players is either sufficiently large or sufficiently small, firms should adopt PAS and shut down the “spot” market. Furthermore, the player welfare-maximizing selling strategy is to sell only in the spot market. Hence, no “win-win” strategy exists for casual games. However, PAS can be a win-win for hardcore games, where low-skill players have a sufficiently low success probability for each attempt. This paper was accepted by Hemant Bhargava, information systems. Funding: C. T. Ryan received funding from NSERC Discovery [Grant RGPIN-2020-06488]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.02348 .
{"title":"Selling Bonus Actions in Video Games","authors":"Lifei Sheng, Xuying Zhao, Christopher Thomas Ryan","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.02348","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.02348","url":null,"abstract":"In the mobile video games industry, a common in-app purchase is for additional “moves” or “time” in single-player puzzle games. We call these in-app purchases bonus actions. In some games, bonus actions can only be purchased in advance of attempting a level of the game (pure advance sales (PAS)), yet in other games, bonus actions can only be purchased in a “spot” market that appears when an initial attempt to pass the level fails (pure spot sales). Some games offer both advance and spot purchases (hybrid advance sales). This paper studies these selling strategies for bonus actions in video games. Such a question is novel to in-app tools selling in video games, and it cannot be answered by previous advance selling studies focusing on end goods. We model the selling of bonus actions as a stochastic extensive form game. We show how the distribution of skill among players (i.e., their inherent ability to pass the level) and the inherent randomness of the game influence selling strategies. For casual games, where low-skill players have a sufficiently high probability of success in each attempt, if the proportion of high-skill players is either sufficiently large or sufficiently small, firms should adopt PAS and shut down the “spot” market. Furthermore, the player welfare-maximizing selling strategy is to sell only in the spot market. Hence, no “win-win” strategy exists for casual games. However, PAS can be a win-win for hardcore games, where low-skill players have a sufficiently low success probability for each attempt. This paper was accepted by Hemant Bhargava, information systems. Funding: C. T. Ryan received funding from NSERC Discovery [Grant RGPIN-2020-06488]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.02348 .","PeriodicalId":49890,"journal":{"name":"Management Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141364838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Bo Cowgill, Jonathan M. V. Davis, B. Pablo Montagnes, Patryk Perkowski
Management Science, Ahead of Print.
管理科学》，印刷版前。
{"title":"Stable Matching on the Job? Theory and Evidence on Internal Talent Markets","authors":"Bo Cowgill, Jonathan M. V. Davis, B. Pablo Montagnes, Patryk Perkowski","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2023.01373","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01373","url":null,"abstract":"Management Science, Ahead of Print. <br/>","PeriodicalId":49890,"journal":{"name":"Management Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141547703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using a uniquely constructed data set of trades by corporate insiders in all stocks, we find that, after insider trading regulations become stricter, insiders are 20% more likely to trade in peer stocks and that such trades become more profitable. The increase in both the probability and profitability of peer-stock trades is driven by the insider’s information that is fungible to industry peers. Stricter insider trading laws are designed to improve liquidity and price informativeness in capital markets. We show that peer trading dampens these intended benefits of the insider trading regulation. This paper was accepted by Ranjani Krishnan, accounting. Funding: This work was supported by NSE-NYU Stern Initiative on the Study of Indian Financial Markets. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.02907 .
利用独特构建的公司内部人在所有股票中的交易数据集，我们发现，在内幕交易监管变得更加严格之后，内部人交易同行股票的可能性增加了 20%，而且此类交易的利润也变得更高。同业股票交易概率和盈利能力的提高是由内幕交易者的信息所驱动的，而这些信息在业内同业中是可替代的。更严格的内幕交易法旨在提高资本市场的流动性和价格信息性。我们的研究表明，同行交易会削弱内幕交易监管的这些预期效益。本文由 Ranjani Krishnan 会计接受。资助：本研究得到了 NSE-NYU Stern Initiative on the Study of Indian Financial Markets 的支持。补充材料：在线附录和数据文件请访问 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.02907 。
{"title":"Insider Trading Restrictions and Informed Trading in Peer Stocks","authors":"Prachi Deuskar, Aditi Khatri, Jayanthi Sunder","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.02907","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.02907","url":null,"abstract":"Using a uniquely constructed data set of trades by corporate insiders in all stocks, we find that, after insider trading regulations become stricter, insiders are 20% more likely to trade in peer stocks and that such trades become more profitable. The increase in both the probability and profitability of peer-stock trades is driven by the insider’s information that is fungible to industry peers. Stricter insider trading laws are designed to improve liquidity and price informativeness in capital markets. We show that peer trading dampens these intended benefits of the insider trading regulation. This paper was accepted by Ranjani Krishnan, accounting. Funding: This work was supported by NSE-NYU Stern Initiative on the Study of Indian Financial Markets. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.02907 .","PeriodicalId":49890,"journal":{"name":"Management Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141386089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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