Ring signature is widely used to protect users’ privacy in electronic voting (e-voting) and cryptocurrencies due to its untraceable characteristic. Since the ring signature cannot be traced, there is no way to prevent signature misuse, which may lead to repeated voting in e-voting systems. As a variant of ring signature, the linkable ring signature maintains anonymity while allowing one to check whether two signatures are generated by the same signer. However, most existing lattice-based linkable ring signature schemes rely on traditional public key infrastructure (PKI), which suffers from complex certificate management and low efficiency. To address these limitations, this paper proposes an efficient certificate-less linkable ring signature (CL-LRS) scheme over lattices based on the module short integer solution (M-SIS) problem. This scheme eliminates certificate management and key escrow issues, and effectively prevents repeated voting in anonymous e-voting systems. Through security analysis, our scheme is proven to be anonymous, unforgeable and linkable in random oracle model (ROM). Compared to existing similar schemes, whose signature sizes grow linearly with ring size, our scheme reduces the signature size to a logarithmic level. For a ring with 256 members, the optimal signature size among comparable schemes is 513.03 KiB, whereas ours achieves 179.12 KiB. Specifically, with each doubling of the ring size, the signature size increases by only 0.29%, significantly outperforming existing schemes. Finally, we apply our scheme to the e-voting scenario by providing the e-voting system model and the application process.
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