The March 2023 turmoil, the most significant banking stress since the Great Financial Crisis, exposed vulnerabilities in governance, risk management, and supervisory practices. This article delves into this multifaceted financial turmoil, offering critical insights into the dynamics of systemic banking stress, regulatory responses, and the evolving challenges financial authorities face.
{"title":"Lessons from the March 2023 bank turmoil","authors":"Elena Carletti, Samir Kiuhan-Vásquez","doi":"10.15375/zbb-2024-0114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15375/zbb-2024-0114","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The March 2023 turmoil, the most significant banking stress since the Great Financial Crisis, exposed vulnerabilities in governance, risk management, and supervisory practices. This article delves into this multifaceted financial turmoil, offering critical insights into the dynamics of systemic banking stress, regulatory responses, and the evolving challenges financial authorities face.","PeriodicalId":509014,"journal":{"name":"Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft","volume":"10 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139776236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Credit Suisse (CS) failure in March 2023 was the first time that the crisis management and resolution framework put in place after the global financial crisis (GFC) was faced with a serious test. Long-standing problems with management, organisation and culture had led to a gradual erosion of confidence and eventually depositor flight. Despite advance planning for resolution in close cooperation with their foreign counterparts, the Swiss authorities chose not to execute their resolution plan for CS. Instead, the Swiss government issued emergency regulations to facilitate a takeover of Credit Suisse by UBS. The approach that was chosen departed from the pre-ordained one, but it addressed the bank’s failure in a manner that maintained financial stability and prevented contagion. The episode taught important lessons about the implementation of international resolution standards.
{"title":"The failure of a global systemically important bank – Lessons for crisis management and resolution","authors":"Eva H. G. Hüpkes","doi":"10.15375/zbb-2024-0116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15375/zbb-2024-0116","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The Credit Suisse (CS) failure in March 2023 was the first time that the crisis management and resolution framework put in place after the global financial crisis (GFC) was faced with a serious test. Long-standing problems with management, organisation and culture had led to a gradual erosion of confidence and eventually depositor flight. Despite advance planning for resolution in close cooperation with their foreign counterparts, the Swiss authorities chose not to execute their resolution plan for CS. Instead, the Swiss government issued emergency regulations to facilitate a takeover of Credit Suisse by UBS. The approach that was chosen departed from the pre-ordained one, but it addressed the bank’s failure in a manner that maintained financial stability and prevented contagion. The episode taught important lessons about the implementation of international resolution standards.","PeriodicalId":509014,"journal":{"name":"Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft","volume":"101 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139776795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article deals in particular with the right to property of shareholders and creditors suffering from the negative consequences of bank resolution. Although the General Court recognizes the possibility of de facto infringements or expropriations falling within the scope of Article 17 of the Charter, the Court of Justice is reluctant in that regard. The application of the “no creditors worse off principle” may provide for the necessary protection under the condition, however, that a valuable ex ante evaluation of the bank´s assets is assured.
{"title":"Bank Resolution and Fundamental Rights","authors":"Juliane Kokott","doi":"10.15375/zbb-2024-0109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15375/zbb-2024-0109","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article deals in particular with the right to property of shareholders and creditors suffering from the negative consequences of bank resolution. Although the General Court recognizes the possibility of de facto infringements or expropriations falling within the scope of Article 17 of the Charter, the Court of Justice is reluctant in that regard. The application of the “no creditors worse off principle” may provide for the necessary protection under the condition, however, that a valuable ex ante evaluation of the bank´s assets is assured.","PeriodicalId":509014,"journal":{"name":"Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft","volume":"37 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139834974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Christian Nowak, Anna Elisabeth Freiin von Preuschen-von Lewinski
When dealing with the resolution of a banking group under EU regulation there are two different approaches: Single point of entry (SPE) versus Multiple Point of Entry (MPE). In a MPE strategy, the resolution authority is taking separate resolution actions at the level of individual legal entities of the group. In a SPE strategy, the resolution authority is taking a resolution action at the level of a single entity, usually the parent undertaking, which, consequently, becomes the so called “resolution entity” building together with its subsidiaries the “resolution group”. The general idea in a SPE strategy is, that losses at subsidiary level are first streamed up to the parent undertaking (resolution entity), i. e. capital is streamed down from the parent undertaking to the subsidiary to cover its losses and ensure its recapitalisation. This leads to losses at the resolution entity level, which, if the resolution entity meets the conditions for resolution, are taken care of by applying resolution tools to the resolution entity. This procedure is not necessarily a two-step approach but could also be completed in one go. In the following, we focus on different ways to upstream losses from the subsidiary to the parent undertaking and to recapitalise the subsidiary.
{"title":"How to make a SPE resolution strategy work in the EU","authors":"Christian Nowak, Anna Elisabeth Freiin von Preuschen-von Lewinski","doi":"10.15375/zbb-2024-0106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15375/zbb-2024-0106","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 When dealing with the resolution of a banking group under EU regulation there are two different approaches: Single point of entry (SPE) versus Multiple Point of Entry (MPE). In a MPE strategy, the resolution authority is taking separate resolution actions at the level of individual legal entities of the group. In a SPE strategy, the resolution authority is taking a resolution action at the level of a single entity, usually the parent undertaking, which, consequently, becomes the so called “resolution entity” building together with its subsidiaries the “resolution group”.\u0000 The general idea in a SPE strategy is, that losses at subsidiary level are first streamed up to the parent undertaking (resolution entity), i. e. capital is streamed down from the parent undertaking to the subsidiary to cover its losses and ensure its recapitalisation. This leads to losses at the resolution entity level, which, if the resolution entity meets the conditions for resolution, are taken care of by applying resolution tools to the resolution entity. This procedure is not necessarily a two-step approach but could also be completed in one go. In the following, we focus on different ways to upstream losses from the subsidiary to the parent undertaking and to recapitalise the subsidiary.","PeriodicalId":509014,"journal":{"name":"Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft","volume":"342 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139835328","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Credit Suisse (CS) failure in March 2023 was the first time that the crisis management and resolution framework put in place after the global financial crisis (GFC) was faced with a serious test. Long-standing problems with management, organisation and culture had led to a gradual erosion of confidence and eventually depositor flight. Despite advance planning for resolution in close cooperation with their foreign counterparts, the Swiss authorities chose not to execute their resolution plan for CS. Instead, the Swiss government issued emergency regulations to facilitate a takeover of Credit Suisse by UBS. The approach that was chosen departed from the pre-ordained one, but it addressed the bank’s failure in a manner that maintained financial stability and prevented contagion. The episode taught important lessons about the implementation of international resolution standards.
{"title":"The failure of a global systemically important bank – Lessons for crisis management and resolution","authors":"Eva H. G. Hüpkes","doi":"10.15375/zbb-2024-0116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15375/zbb-2024-0116","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The Credit Suisse (CS) failure in March 2023 was the first time that the crisis management and resolution framework put in place after the global financial crisis (GFC) was faced with a serious test. Long-standing problems with management, organisation and culture had led to a gradual erosion of confidence and eventually depositor flight. Despite advance planning for resolution in close cooperation with their foreign counterparts, the Swiss authorities chose not to execute their resolution plan for CS. Instead, the Swiss government issued emergency regulations to facilitate a takeover of Credit Suisse by UBS. The approach that was chosen departed from the pre-ordained one, but it addressed the bank’s failure in a manner that maintained financial stability and prevented contagion. The episode taught important lessons about the implementation of international resolution standards.","PeriodicalId":509014,"journal":{"name":"Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft","volume":"44 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139836375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article deals in particular with the right to property of shareholders and creditors suffering from the negative consequences of bank resolution. Although the General Court recognizes the possibility of de facto infringements or expropriations falling within the scope of Article 17 of the Charter, the Court of Justice is reluctant in that regard. The application of the “no creditors worse off principle” may provide for the necessary protection under the condition, however, that a valuable ex ante evaluation of the bank´s assets is assured.
{"title":"Bank Resolution and Fundamental Rights","authors":"Juliane Kokott","doi":"10.15375/zbb-2024-0109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15375/zbb-2024-0109","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article deals in particular with the right to property of shareholders and creditors suffering from the negative consequences of bank resolution. Although the General Court recognizes the possibility of de facto infringements or expropriations falling within the scope of Article 17 of the Charter, the Court of Justice is reluctant in that regard. The application of the “no creditors worse off principle” may provide for the necessary protection under the condition, however, that a valuable ex ante evaluation of the bank´s assets is assured.","PeriodicalId":509014,"journal":{"name":"Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft","volume":"8 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139775274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article summarises and puts into context the limited but important case law of the European Court of Human Rights concerning bank resolution procedures, in particular under Article 6 (the right to a fair trial before an independent and impartial tribunal established by law) and Article 1 of the First Protocol (the right of property), as well as the important issue of who has standing under Article 34 to bring proceedings in the name or on behalf of an affected affected bank, its (former) management, share holders, bond holders, creditors or others affected.
{"title":"Bank Resolution and Fundamental Rights – A view from Strasbourg","authors":"T. Eicke","doi":"10.15375/zbb-2024-0110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15375/zbb-2024-0110","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article summarises and puts into context the limited but important case law of the European Court of Human Rights concerning bank resolution procedures, in particular under Article 6 (the right to a fair trial before an independent and impartial tribunal established by law) and Article 1 of the First Protocol (the right of property), as well as the important issue of who has standing under Article 34 to bring proceedings in the name or on behalf of an affected affected bank, its (former) management, share holders, bond holders, creditors or others affected.","PeriodicalId":509014,"journal":{"name":"Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft","volume":"16 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139776577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"SRB Legal Conference 2023: EU and Banking Union Law in a European and Global Context","authors":"Karl-Philipp Wojcik","doi":"10.15375/zbb-2024-0103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15375/zbb-2024-0103","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":509014,"journal":{"name":"Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft","volume":"431 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139833992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This note considers human rights review of resolution decisions and processes – a context in which property rights can be limited or suspended given the operation of resolution decisions, including bail-in and sale decisions – in the context of the UK resolution regime and the relevance of the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (the Charter) following the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. It outlines the UK framework, considers the current approach to rights review, and closes with the implications of the UK withdrawal from the EU on rights review, ex ante and ex post, against the Convention and Charter.
{"title":"Bank Resolution and the European Convention on Human Rights – A Note from the UK","authors":"Niamh Moloney","doi":"10.15375/zbb-2024-0111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15375/zbb-2024-0111","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This note considers human rights review of resolution decisions and processes – a context in which property rights can be limited or suspended given the operation of resolution decisions, including bail-in and sale decisions – in the context of the UK resolution regime and the relevance of the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (the Charter) following the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. It outlines the UK framework, considers the current approach to rights review, and closes with the implications of the UK withdrawal from the EU on rights review, ex ante and ex post, against the Convention and Charter.","PeriodicalId":509014,"journal":{"name":"Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft","volume":"85 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139834911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article summarises and puts into context the limited but important case law of the European Court of Human Rights concerning bank resolution procedures, in particular under Article 6 (the right to a fair trial before an independent and impartial tribunal established by law) and Article 1 of the First Protocol (the right of property), as well as the important issue of who has standing under Article 34 to bring proceedings in the name or on behalf of an affected affected bank, its (former) management, share holders, bond holders, creditors or others affected.
{"title":"Bank Resolution and Fundamental Rights – A view from Strasbourg","authors":"T. Eicke","doi":"10.15375/zbb-2024-0110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15375/zbb-2024-0110","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article summarises and puts into context the limited but important case law of the European Court of Human Rights concerning bank resolution procedures, in particular under Article 6 (the right to a fair trial before an independent and impartial tribunal established by law) and Article 1 of the First Protocol (the right of property), as well as the important issue of who has standing under Article 34 to bring proceedings in the name or on behalf of an affected affected bank, its (former) management, share holders, bond holders, creditors or others affected.","PeriodicalId":509014,"journal":{"name":"Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft","volume":"40 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139836137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：