Andy Rupp, Foteini Baldimtsi, Gesine Hinterwälder, C. Paar
We propose a new lightweight cryptographic payment scheme for transit systems, called P4R (Privacy-Preserving Pre-Payments with Refunds), which is suitable for low-cost user devices with limited capabilities. Using P4R, users deposit money to obtain one-show credentials, where each credential allows the user to make an arbitrary ride on the system. The trip fare is determined on-the-fly at the end of the trip. If the deposit for the credential exceeds this fare, the user obtains a refund. Refund values collected over several trips are aggregated in a single token, thereby saving memory and increasing privacy. Our solution builds on Brands’s e-cash scheme to realize the prepayment system and on Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) signatures to implement the refund capabilities. Compared to a Brands-only solution for transportation payment systems, P4R allows us to minimize the number of coins a user needs to pay for his rides and thus minimizes the number of expensive withdrawal transactions, as well as storage requirements for the fairly large coins. Moreover, P4R enables flexible pricing because it allows for exact payments of arbitrary amounts (within a certain range) using a single fast paying (and refund) transaction. Fortunately, the mechanisms enabling these features require very little computational overhead. Choosing contemporary security parameters, we implemented P4R on a prototyping payment device and show its suitability for future transit payment systems. Estimation results demonstrate that the data required for 20 rides consume less than 10KB of memory, and the payment and refund transactions during a ride take less than half a second. We show that malicious users are not able to cheat the system by receiving a refund that exceeds the overall deposit minus the overall fare and can be identified during double-spending checks. At the same time, the system protects the privacy of honest users in that transactions are anonymous (except for deposits) and trips are unlinkable.
我们为交通系统提出了一种新的轻量级加密支付方案，称为P4R (Privacy-Preserving prepayments with re退款)，它适用于功能有限的低成本用户设备。使用P4R，用户可以存入资金来获得一次显示凭证，其中每个凭证都允许用户在系统上任意使用。旅行费用在旅行结束时当场确定。如果凭据的押金超过这个费用，用户将获得退款。在几次旅行中收集的退款值汇总在一个令牌中，从而节省内存并增加隐私。我们的解决方案基于Brands的电子现金方案来实现预付款系统，并基于Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS)签名来实现退款功能。与运输支付系统的纯品牌解决方案相比，P4R允许我们最大限度地减少用户需要支付的硬币数量，从而最大限度地减少昂贵的提款交易数量，以及对相当大的硬币的存储要求。此外，P4R支持灵活的定价，因为它允许使用单个快速支付(和退款)交易来精确支付任意金额(在一定范围内)。幸运的是，启用这些特性的机制只需要很少的计算开销。选择当代安全参数，我们在原型支付设备上实现了P4R，并展示了其对未来过境支付系统的适用性。估计结果表明，20次骑行所需的数据消耗的内存不到10KB，骑行期间的支付和退款事务花费的时间不到半秒。我们表明，恶意用户无法通过收到超过总押金减去总票价的退款来欺骗系统，并且可以在双重支出检查中识别。同时，该系统保护了诚实用户的隐私，因为交易是匿名的(存款除外)，旅行是不可链接的。
{"title":"Cryptographic Theory Meets Practice: Efficient and Privacy-Preserving Payments for Public Transport","authors":"Andy Rupp, Foteini Baldimtsi, Gesine Hinterwälder, C. Paar","doi":"10.1145/2699904","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699904","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a new lightweight cryptographic payment scheme for transit systems, called P4R (Privacy-Preserving Pre-Payments with Refunds), which is suitable for low-cost user devices with limited capabilities. Using P4R, users deposit money to obtain one-show credentials, where each credential allows the user to make an arbitrary ride on the system. The trip fare is determined on-the-fly at the end of the trip. If the deposit for the credential exceeds this fare, the user obtains a refund. Refund values collected over several trips are aggregated in a single token, thereby saving memory and increasing privacy. Our solution builds on Brands’s e-cash scheme to realize the prepayment system and on Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) signatures to implement the refund capabilities. Compared to a Brands-only solution for transportation payment systems, P4R allows us to minimize the number of coins a user needs to pay for his rides and thus minimizes the number of expensive withdrawal transactions, as well as storage requirements for the fairly large coins. Moreover, P4R enables flexible pricing because it allows for exact payments of arbitrary amounts (within a certain range) using a single fast paying (and refund) transaction. Fortunately, the mechanisms enabling these features require very little computational overhead. Choosing contemporary security parameters, we implemented P4R on a prototyping payment device and show its suitability for future transit payment systems. Estimation results demonstrate that the data required for 20 rides consume less than 10KB of memory, and the payment and refund transactions during a ride take less than half a second. We show that malicious users are not able to cheat the system by receiving a refund that exceeds the overall deposit minus the overall fare and can be identified during double-spending checks. At the same time, the system protects the privacy of honest users in that transactions are anonymous (except for deposits) and trips are unlinkable.","PeriodicalId":50912,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Information and System Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1145/2699904","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72525601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article presents StopWatch, a system that defends against timing-based side-channel attacks that arise from coresidency of victims and attackers in infrastructure-as-a-service clouds. StopWatch triplicates each cloud-resident guest virtual machine (VM) and places replicas so that the three replicas of a guest VM are coresident with nonoverlapping sets of (replicas of) other VMs. StopWatch uses the timing of I/O events at a VM’s replicas collectively to determine the timings observed by each one or by an external observer, so that observable timing behaviors are similarly likely in the absence of any other individual, coresident VMs. We detail the design and implementation of StopWatch in Xen, evaluate the factors that influence its performance, demonstrate its advantages relative to alternative defenses against timing side channels with commodity hardware, and address the problem of placing VM replicas in a cloud under the constraints of StopWatch so as to still enable adequate cloud utilization.
{"title":"StopWatch: A Cloud Architecture for Timing Channel Mitigation","authors":"Peng Li, Debin Gao, M. Reiter","doi":"10.1145/2670940","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2670940","url":null,"abstract":"This article presents StopWatch, a system that defends against timing-based side-channel attacks that arise from coresidency of victims and attackers in infrastructure-as-a-service clouds. StopWatch triplicates each cloud-resident guest virtual machine (VM) and places replicas so that the three replicas of a guest VM are coresident with nonoverlapping sets of (replicas of) other VMs. StopWatch uses the timing of I/O events at a VM’s replicas collectively to determine the timings observed by each one or by an external observer, so that observable timing behaviors are similarly likely in the absence of any other individual, coresident VMs. We detail the design and implementation of StopWatch in Xen, evaluate the factors that influence its performance, demonstrate its advantages relative to alternative defenses against timing side channels with commodity hardware, and address the problem of placing VM replicas in a cloud under the constraints of StopWatch so as to still enable adequate cloud utilization.","PeriodicalId":50912,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Information and System Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75539450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The weakest link in software-based full disk encryption is the authentication procedure. Since the master boot record must be present unencrypted in order to launch the decryption of remaining system parts, it can easily be manipulated and infiltrated by bootkits that perform keystroke logging; consequently, password-based authentication schemes become attackable. The current technological response, as enforced by BitLocker, verifies the integrity of the boot process by use of the trusted platform module. But, as we show, this countermeasure is insufficient in practice. We present STARK, the first tamperproof authentication scheme that mutually authenticates the computer and the user in order to resist keylogging during boot. To achieve this, STARK implements trust bootstrapping from a secure token to the whole PC. The secure token is an active USB drive that verifies the integrity of the PC and indicates the verification status by an LED to the user. This way, users can ensure the authenticity of the PC before entering their passwords.
{"title":"Mutual Authentication and Trust Bootstrapping towards Secure Disk Encryption","authors":"J. Götzfried, Tilo Müller","doi":"10.1145/2663348","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2663348","url":null,"abstract":"The weakest link in software-based full disk encryption is the authentication procedure. Since the master boot record must be present unencrypted in order to launch the decryption of remaining system parts, it can easily be manipulated and infiltrated by bootkits that perform keystroke logging; consequently, password-based authentication schemes become attackable. The current technological response, as enforced by BitLocker, verifies the integrity of the boot process by use of the trusted platform module. But, as we show, this countermeasure is insufficient in practice. We present STARK, the first tamperproof authentication scheme that mutually authenticates the computer and the user in order to resist keylogging during boot. To achieve this, STARK implements trust bootstrapping from a secure token to the whole PC. The secure token is an active USB drive that verifies the integrity of the PC and indicates the verification status by an LED to the user. This way, users can ensure the authenticity of the PC before entering their passwords.","PeriodicalId":50912,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Information and System Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75626301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We describe SpartanRPC, a secure middleware technology that supports cooperation between distinct security domains in wireless sensor networks. SpartanRPC extends nesC to provide a link-layer remote procedure call (RPC) mechanism, along with an enhancement of configuration wirings that allow specification of remote, dynamic endpoints. RPC invocation is secured via an authorization logic that enables servers to specify access policies and requires clients to prove authorization. This mechanism is implemented using a combination of symmetric and public key cryptography. We report on benchmark testing of a prototype implementation and on an application of the framework that supports secure collaborative use and administration of an existing WSN data-gathering system.
{"title":"SpartanRPC: Remote Procedure Call Authorization in Wireless Sensor Networks","authors":"Peter C. Chapin, C. Skalka","doi":"10.1145/2644809","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2644809","url":null,"abstract":"We describe SpartanRPC, a secure middleware technology that supports cooperation between distinct security domains in wireless sensor networks. SpartanRPC extends nesC to provide a link-layer remote procedure call (RPC) mechanism, along with an enhancement of configuration wirings that allow specification of remote, dynamic endpoints. RPC invocation is secured via an authorization logic that enables servers to specify access policies and requires clients to prove authorization. This mechanism is implemented using a combination of symmetric and public key cryptography. We report on benchmark testing of a prototype implementation and on an application of the framework that supports secure collaborative use and administration of an existing WSN data-gathering system.","PeriodicalId":50912,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Information and System Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76457038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We present a symbolic framework, based on a modular operational semantics, for formalizing different notions of compromise relevant for the design and analysis of cryptographic protocols. The framework’s rules can be combined to specify different adversary capabilities, capturing different practically-relevant notions of key and state compromise. The resulting adversary models generalize the models currently used in different domains, such as security models for authenticated key exchange. We extend an existing security-protocol analysis tool, Scyther, with our adversary models. This extension systematically supports notions such as weak perfect forward secrecy, key compromise impersonation, and adversaries capable of state-reveal queries. Furthermore, we introduce the concept of a protocol-security hierarchy, which classifies the relative strength of protocols against different adversaries. In case studies, we use Scyther to analyse protocols and automatically construct protocol-security hierarchies in the context of our adversary models. Our analysis confirms known results and uncovers new attacks. Additionally, our hierarchies refine and correct relationships between protocols previously reported in the cryptographic literature.
{"title":"Know Your Enemy: Compromising Adversaries in Protocol Analysis","authors":"D. Basin, C. Cremers","doi":"10.1145/2658996","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2658996","url":null,"abstract":"We present a symbolic framework, based on a modular operational semantics, for formalizing different notions of compromise relevant for the design and analysis of cryptographic protocols. The framework’s rules can be combined to specify different adversary capabilities, capturing different practically-relevant notions of key and state compromise. The resulting adversary models generalize the models currently used in different domains, such as security models for authenticated key exchange. We extend an existing security-protocol analysis tool, Scyther, with our adversary models. This extension systematically supports notions such as weak perfect forward secrecy, key compromise impersonation, and adversaries capable of state-reveal queries. Furthermore, we introduce the concept of a protocol-security hierarchy, which classifies the relative strength of protocols against different adversaries.\u0000 In case studies, we use Scyther to analyse protocols and automatically construct protocol-security hierarchies in the context of our adversary models. Our analysis confirms known results and uncovers new attacks. Additionally, our hierarchies refine and correct relationships between protocols previously reported in the cryptographic literature.","PeriodicalId":50912,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Information and System Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89775319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We demonstrate, by a number of examples, that information flow security properties can be proved from abstract architectural descriptions, which describe only the causal structure of a system and local properties of trusted components. We specify these architectural descriptions of systems by generalizing intransitive noninterference policies to admit the ability to filter information passed between communicating domains. A notion of refinement of such system architectures is developed that supports top-down development of architectural specifications and proofs by abstraction of information security properties. We also show that, in a concrete setting where the causal structure is enforced by access control, a static check of the access control setting plus local verification of the trusted components is sufficient to prove that a generalized intransitive noninterference policy is satisfied.
{"title":"Using Architecture to Reason about Information Security","authors":"Stephen Chong, R. V. D. Meyden","doi":"10.1145/2829949","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2829949","url":null,"abstract":"We demonstrate, by a number of examples, that information flow security properties can be proved from abstract architectural descriptions, which describe only the causal structure of a system and local properties of trusted components. We specify these architectural descriptions of systems by generalizing intransitive noninterference policies to admit the ability to filter information passed between communicating domains. A notion of refinement of such system architectures is developed that supports top-down development of architectural specifications and proofs by abstraction of information security properties. We also show that, in a concrete setting where the causal structure is enforced by access control, a static check of the access control setting plus local verification of the trusted components is sufficient to prove that a generalized intransitive noninterference policy is satisfied.","PeriodicalId":50912,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Information and System Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79273538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ewa Syta, Henry Corrigan-Gibbs, Shu-Chun Weng, D. Wolinsky, B. Ford, Aaron Johnson
Users often wish to communicate anonymously on the Internet, for example, in group discussion or instant messaging forums. Existing solutions are vulnerable to misbehaving users, however, who may abuse their anonymity to disrupt communication. Dining Cryptographers Networks (DC-nets) leave groups vulnerable to denial-of-service and Sybil attacks; mix networks are difficult to protect against traffic analysis; and accountable voting schemes are unsuited to general anonymous messaging. dissent is the first general protocol offering provable anonymity and accountability for moderate-size groups, while efficiently handling unbalanced communication demands among users. We present an improved and hardened dissent protocol, define its precise security properties, and offer rigorous proofs of these properties. The improved protocol systematically addresses the delicate balance between provably hiding the identities of well-behaved users, while provably revealing the identities of disruptive users, a challenging task because many forms of misbehavior are inherently undetectable. The new protocol also addresses several nontrivial attacks on the original dissent protocol stemming from subtle design flaws.
{"title":"Security Analysis of Accountable Anonymity in Dissent","authors":"Ewa Syta, Henry Corrigan-Gibbs, Shu-Chun Weng, D. Wolinsky, B. Ford, Aaron Johnson","doi":"10.1145/2629621","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2629621","url":null,"abstract":"Users often wish to communicate anonymously on the Internet, for example, in group discussion or instant messaging forums. Existing solutions are vulnerable to misbehaving users, however, who may abuse their anonymity to disrupt communication. Dining Cryptographers Networks (DC-nets) leave groups vulnerable to denial-of-service and Sybil attacks; mix networks are difficult to protect against traffic analysis; and accountable voting schemes are unsuited to general anonymous messaging.\u0000 dissent is the first general protocol offering provable anonymity and accountability for moderate-size groups, while efficiently handling unbalanced communication demands among users. We present an improved and hardened dissent protocol, define its precise security properties, and offer rigorous proofs of these properties. The improved protocol systematically addresses the delicate balance between provably hiding the identities of well-behaved users, while provably revealing the identities of disruptive users, a challenging task because many forms of misbehavior are inherently undetectable. The new protocol also addresses several nontrivial attacks on the original dissent protocol stemming from subtle design flaws.","PeriodicalId":50912,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Information and System Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80096999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Access control policies define what resources can be accessed by which subjects and under which conditions. It is, however, often not possible to anticipate all subjects that should be permitted access and the conditions under which they should be permitted. For example, predicting and correctly encoding all emergency and exceptional situations is impractical. Traditional access control models simply deny all requests that are not permitted, and in doing so may cause unpredictable and unacceptable consequences. To overcome this issue, break-glass access control models permit a subject to override an access control denial if he accepts a set of obligatory actions and certain override conditions are met. Existing break-glass models are limited in how the override decision is specified. They either grant overrides for a predefined set of exceptional situations, or they grant unlimited overrides to selected subjects, and as such, they suffer from the difficulty of correctly encoding and predicting all override situations and permissions. To address this, we develop Rumpole, a novel break-glass language that explicitly represents and infers knowledge gaps and knowledge conflicts about the subject's attributes and the contextual conditions, such as emergencies. For example, a Rumpole policy can distinguish whether or not it is known that an emergency holds. This leads to a more informed decision for an override request, whereas current break-glass languages simply assume that there is no emergency if the evidence for it is missing. To formally define Rumpole, we construct a novel many-valued logic programming language called Beagle. It has a simple syntax similar to that of Datalog, and its semantics is an extension of Fitting's bilattice-based semantics for logic programs. Beagle is a knowledge non-monotonic langauge, and as such, is strictly more expressive than current many-valued logic programming languages.
{"title":"Rumpole: An Introspective Break-Glass Access Control Language","authors":"Srdjan Marinovic, Naranker Dulay, M. Sloman","doi":"10.1145/2629502","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2629502","url":null,"abstract":"Access control policies define what resources can be accessed by which subjects and under which conditions. It is, however, often not possible to anticipate all subjects that should be permitted access and the conditions under which they should be permitted. For example, predicting and correctly encoding all emergency and exceptional situations is impractical. Traditional access control models simply deny all requests that are not permitted, and in doing so may cause unpredictable and unacceptable consequences. To overcome this issue, break-glass access control models permit a subject to override an access control denial if he accepts a set of obligatory actions and certain override conditions are met. Existing break-glass models are limited in how the override decision is specified. They either grant overrides for a predefined set of exceptional situations, or they grant unlimited overrides to selected subjects, and as such, they suffer from the difficulty of correctly encoding and predicting all override situations and permissions. To address this, we develop Rumpole, a novel break-glass language that explicitly represents and infers knowledge gaps and knowledge conflicts about the subject's attributes and the contextual conditions, such as emergencies. For example, a Rumpole policy can distinguish whether or not it is known that an emergency holds. This leads to a more informed decision for an override request, whereas current break-glass languages simply assume that there is no emergency if the evidence for it is missing. To formally define Rumpole, we construct a novel many-valued logic programming language called Beagle. It has a simple syntax similar to that of Datalog, and its semantics is an extension of Fitting's bilattice-based semantics for logic programs. Beagle is a knowledge non-monotonic langauge, and as such, is strictly more expressive than current many-valued logic programming languages.","PeriodicalId":50912,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Information and System Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84677050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mohammad Jafari, R. Safavi-Naini, Philip W. L. Fong, K. Barker
Purpose is a key concept in privacy policies. Although some models have been proposed for enforcing purpose-based privacy policies, little has been done in defining formal semantics for purpose, and therefore an effective enforcement mechanism for such policies has remained a challenge. We have developed a framework for expressing and enforcing such policies by giving a formal definition of purpose and proposing a modal-logic language for formally expressing purpose constraints. The semantics of this language are defined over an abstract model of workflows. Based on this formal framework, we discuss some properties of purpose, show how common forms of purpose constraints can be formalized, how purpose-based constraints can be connected to more general access control policies, and how they can be enforced in a workflow-based information system by extending common access control technologies.
{"title":"A Framework for Expressing and Enforcing Purpose-Based Privacy Policies","authors":"Mohammad Jafari, R. Safavi-Naini, Philip W. L. Fong, K. Barker","doi":"10.1145/2629689","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2629689","url":null,"abstract":"Purpose is a key concept in privacy policies. Although some models have been proposed for enforcing purpose-based privacy policies, little has been done in defining formal semantics for purpose, and therefore an effective enforcement mechanism for such policies has remained a challenge. We have developed a framework for expressing and enforcing such policies by giving a formal definition of purpose and proposing a modal-logic language for formally expressing purpose constraints. The semantics of this language are defined over an abstract model of workflows. Based on this formal framework, we discuss some properties of purpose, show how common forms of purpose constraints can be formalized, how purpose-based constraints can be connected to more general access control policies, and how they can be enforced in a workflow-based information system by extending common access control technologies.","PeriodicalId":50912,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Information and System Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77950809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
C. Culnane, P. Ryan, Steve A. Schneider, Vanessa Teague
The Prêt à Voter cryptographic voting system was designed to be flexible and to offer voters a familiar and easy voting experience. In this article, we present our development of the Prêt à Voter design to a practical implementation used in a real state election in November 2014, called vVote. As well as solving practical engineering challenges, we have also had to tailor the system to the idiosyncrasies of elections in the Australian state of Victoria and the requirements of the Victorian Electoral Commission. This article includes general background, user experience, and details of the cryptographic protocols and human processes. We explain the problems, present solutions, then analyze their security properties and explain how they tie in to other design decisions.
{"title":"vVote: A Verifiable Voting System","authors":"C. Culnane, P. Ryan, Steve A. Schneider, Vanessa Teague","doi":"10.1145/2746338","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2746338","url":null,"abstract":"The Prêt à Voter cryptographic voting system was designed to be flexible and to offer voters a familiar and easy voting experience. In this article, we present our development of the Prêt à Voter design to a practical implementation used in a real state election in November 2014, called vVote. As well as solving practical engineering challenges, we have also had to tailor the system to the idiosyncrasies of elections in the Australian state of Victoria and the requirements of the Victorian Electoral Commission. This article includes general background, user experience, and details of the cryptographic protocols and human processes. We explain the problems, present solutions, then analyze their security properties and explain how they tie in to other design decisions.","PeriodicalId":50912,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Information and System Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73776237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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