Pub Date : 2024-07-24DOI: 10.1515/apeiron-2023-0098
Edoardo Benati
This paper studies an argument in the prologue of the Charmides which defends the view that it is impossible to cure the body independently of the soul. I argue that Socrates is committed to an account of the psychē as an embodied soul, causally responsible for the biological condition of the body. Furthermore, the prescription of kaloi logoi as a treatment for the soul’s biological failures suggests that Socrates appears to initially regard the ethical and biological dimensions of the soul as intimately connected. But I also show that Socrates is unable to maintain this position consistently throughout the passage. A similar conflation of functions can be traced in R. X.608d–611a.
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Pub Date : 2024-07-24DOI: 10.1515/apeiron-2023-0110
Radim Kočandrle
Aristotle presented an influential conception of the universe consisting of a sphere of fixed stars with a spherical Earth at its centre. A spherical conception of heaven and Earth appears also in Plato’s writings. In presocratic cosmology, the idea of a spherical universe appears provably first in the thoughts of the Pythagoreans and Parmenides. But while there is no surviving evidence for the cosmology of early Pythagoreans, various sources mention in relation to Parmenides a solid surrounding part and a spherical Earth at the centre of the universe. Being, which Parmenides had likened to a sphere, may have moreover in a cosmological sense referred to ‘heaven’. Furthermore, we can observe in presocratic cosmologies a development which shows that the cosmology of heavenly sphere appeared in the fifth century BCE. Although Parmenides is commonly thought to have influenced especially ontology, one can argue that it was he who introduced the concept of a heavenly sphere to cosmology, a notion which in Aristotle’s thought evolved into the notion of a sphere of fixed stars forming the boundary of the world.
{"title":"Parmenides and the Origins of the Heavenly Sphere in Ancient Greek Cosmology","authors":"Radim Kočandrle","doi":"10.1515/apeiron-2023-0110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/apeiron-2023-0110","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Aristotle presented an influential conception of the universe consisting of a sphere of fixed stars with a spherical Earth at its centre. A spherical conception of heaven and Earth appears also in Plato’s writings. In presocratic cosmology, the idea of a spherical universe appears provably first in the thoughts of the Pythagoreans and Parmenides. But while there is no surviving evidence for the cosmology of early Pythagoreans, various sources mention in relation to Parmenides a solid surrounding part and a spherical Earth at the centre of the universe. Being, which Parmenides had likened to a sphere, may have moreover in a cosmological sense referred to ‘heaven’. Furthermore, we can observe in presocratic cosmologies a development which shows that the cosmology of heavenly sphere appeared in the fifth century BCE. Although Parmenides is commonly thought to have influenced especially ontology, one can argue that it was he who introduced the concept of a heavenly sphere to cosmology, a notion which in Aristotle’s thought evolved into the notion of a sphere of fixed stars forming the boundary of the world.","PeriodicalId":517049,"journal":{"name":"Apeiron","volume":"50 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141808862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-05DOI: 10.1515/apeiron-2023-0024
Wei Cheng
Abstract This study aims to provide a coherent new interpretation of the notorious anti-hedonism of Speusippus, Plato’s nephew and the second scholarch of the Academy, by reconsidering all the relevant sources concerning his attitude to pleasure, sources that seem to be in tension or even incompatible with each other. By reassessing Speusippus’ anti-hedonism and Aristotle’s response, it also sheds new light on the Academic debate over pleasure in which he and Aristotle participated. This debate is not merely concerned with the truth and credibility of the arguments for or against hedonism, there are also notable differences among the participants in their understanding of the practical significance of evaluating hedonic experiences. This new picture allows us to better understand Aristotle’s selective representation of the intra-school debate and some neglected features of his responses to different interlocutors.
{"title":"Between Saying and Doing: Aristotle and Speusippus on the Evaluation of Pleasure","authors":"Wei Cheng","doi":"10.1515/apeiron-2023-0024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/apeiron-2023-0024","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This study aims to provide a coherent new interpretation of the notorious anti-hedonism of Speusippus, Plato’s nephew and the second scholarch of the Academy, by reconsidering all the relevant sources concerning his attitude to pleasure, sources that seem to be in tension or even incompatible with each other. By reassessing Speusippus’ anti-hedonism and Aristotle’s response, it also sheds new light on the Academic debate over pleasure in which he and Aristotle participated. This debate is not merely concerned with the truth and credibility of the arguments for or against hedonism, there are also notable differences among the participants in their understanding of the practical significance of evaluating hedonic experiences. This new picture allows us to better understand Aristotle’s selective representation of the intra-school debate and some neglected features of his responses to different interlocutors.","PeriodicalId":517049,"journal":{"name":"Apeiron","volume":" 23","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141675472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-18DOI: 10.1515/apeiron-2022-0116
Robert Roreitner
Abstract This paper presents a detailed reconstruction of Theophrastus’ account of human ontogeny, which is built around Aristotle’s notoriously difficult claim in Generation of Animals II 3 that “νοῦς alone enters from without”. I argue that this account (which is known to us via quotes from Theophrastus’ de Anima II and On Motion I) provides a viable alternative to the traditional trilemma between naturalist traducianism, creationism, and pre-existence, as well as offering an attractive but so far unappreciated interpretation of Aristotle’s account of human ontogeny. More specifically, I argue that the extant evidence poses a challenge to the two dominant interpretations of “νοῦς from without” in the last decades: a dialectical one, according to which Aristotle ultimately rejects this claim, and a naturalizing one (often inspired by Alexander of Aphrodisias) that obliterates the essential difference between νοῦς and the other parts of the soul.
{"title":"Human Ontogeny in Aristotle and Theophrastus","authors":"Robert Roreitner","doi":"10.1515/apeiron-2022-0116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/apeiron-2022-0116","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper presents a detailed reconstruction of Theophrastus’ account of human ontogeny, which is built around Aristotle’s notoriously difficult claim in Generation of Animals II 3 that “νοῦς alone enters from without”. I argue that this account (which is known to us via quotes from Theophrastus’ de Anima II and On Motion I) provides a viable alternative to the traditional trilemma between naturalist traducianism, creationism, and pre-existence, as well as offering an attractive but so far unappreciated interpretation of Aristotle’s account of human ontogeny. More specifically, I argue that the extant evidence poses a challenge to the two dominant interpretations of “νοῦς from without” in the last decades: a dialectical one, according to which Aristotle ultimately rejects this claim, and a naturalizing one (often inspired by Alexander of Aphrodisias) that obliterates the essential difference between νοῦς and the other parts of the soul.","PeriodicalId":517049,"journal":{"name":"Apeiron","volume":"42 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141334843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-17DOI: 10.1515/apeiron-2024-0012
Lorenzo Zemolin
According to most interpreters, Aristotle explains death as the result of material processes of the body going against the nature of the living being. Yet, this description is incomplete, for it does not clarify the relationship between the process of decay and the teleological system in which it occurs: this makes it impossible to distinguish between natural and violent death. In this paper, I try to fill this gap by looking at his so-called ‘biological works’ and mainly at the De Juventute. I first introduce the specific concept of life at play in this treatise and prove its complementarity with the framework of the De Anima. Then, I illustrate in detail the process of dying and the reasons why a merely material description is insufficient to account for the distinction between natural and violent death. Finally, I show that for Aristotle natural death is a by-product of teleologically directed life activities: only against the background of this teleological structure is natural death fully explained in terms of essence and causes. To support this claim, I compare death to two analogous cases in Aristotle’s biology, namely dreams and the features of GA V.
根据大多数解释者的观点，亚里士多德将死亡解释为身体的物质过程违背生命本质的结果。然而，这种描述并不完整，因为它没有阐明衰变过程与发生衰变的目的论体系之间的关系：这使得我们无法区分自然死亡和暴力死亡。在本文中，我试图通过研究他的所谓 "生物学著作"，主要是《德-尤文图特》，来填补这一空白。我首先介绍了这篇论文中具体的生命概念，并证明了它与《生命论》框架的互补性。然后，我详细说明了死亡的过程，以及仅仅用物质描述不足以解释自然死亡和暴力死亡之间区别的原因。最后，我表明，对亚里士多德来说，自然死亡是目的论指导的生命活动的副产品：只有在这种目的论结构的背景下，自然死亡才能从本质和原因的角度得到充分的解释。为了支持这一主张，我将死亡与亚里士多德生物学中的两个类似情况进行了比较，即梦境和 GA V 的特征。
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Pub Date : 2024-04-17DOI: 10.1515/apeiron-2023-0065
Matthew Shelton
Critics often suggest that Socrates’ portrait of the philosopher’s inspired madness in his second speech in Plato’s Phaedrus is incompatible with the other types of divine madness outlined in the same speech, namely poetic, prophetic, and purificatory madness. This incompatibility is frequently taken to show that Socrates’ characterisation of philosophers as mad is disingenuous or misleading in some way. While philosophical madness and the other types of divine madness are distinguished by the non-philosophical crowd’s different interpretations of them, I aim to show that they are not, in fact, presented as incompatible. Socrates’ pair of speeches demonstrates that madness can be divided into harmful and beneficial kinds, and in Socrates’ key discussion of philosophical madness (249c4-e4), I argue that the crowd correctly recognises that the philosopher is mad on the basis of his eccentricity, but wrongly assumes that the philosopher’s madness is of the harmful type because it fails to realise that the philosopher is enthused. Socrates’ second speech provides information about human souls and gods which shows that philosophical madness belongs to the beneficial type and so falls under the heading of divine enthusiasm after all. Importantly, human souls and gods are shown in the speech to be roughly isomorphic. Both philosophical and other kinds of divine madness involve having something divine inside a human body (entheos): in the former a human soul has become godlike; in the latter a human soul has been displaced by a god. Because of this, I propose that philosophy is presented as a genuine form of divine madness alongside the other more conventional examples.
{"title":"Divine Madness in Plato’s Phaedrus","authors":"Matthew Shelton","doi":"10.1515/apeiron-2023-0065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/apeiron-2023-0065","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Critics often suggest that Socrates’ portrait of the philosopher’s inspired madness in his second speech in Plato’s Phaedrus is incompatible with the other types of divine madness outlined in the same speech, namely poetic, prophetic, and purificatory madness. This incompatibility is frequently taken to show that Socrates’ characterisation of philosophers as mad is disingenuous or misleading in some way. While philosophical madness and the other types of divine madness are distinguished by the non-philosophical crowd’s different interpretations of them, I aim to show that they are not, in fact, presented as incompatible. Socrates’ pair of speeches demonstrates that madness can be divided into harmful and beneficial kinds, and in Socrates’ key discussion of philosophical madness (249c4-e4), I argue that the crowd correctly recognises that the philosopher is mad on the basis of his eccentricity, but wrongly assumes that the philosopher’s madness is of the harmful type because it fails to realise that the philosopher is enthused. Socrates’ second speech provides information about human souls and gods which shows that philosophical madness belongs to the beneficial type and so falls under the heading of divine enthusiasm after all. Importantly, human souls and gods are shown in the speech to be roughly isomorphic. Both philosophical and other kinds of divine madness involve having something divine inside a human body (entheos): in the former a human soul has become godlike; in the latter a human soul has been displaced by a god. Because of this, I propose that philosophy is presented as a genuine form of divine madness alongside the other more conventional examples.","PeriodicalId":517049,"journal":{"name":"Apeiron","volume":"105 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140694340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-16DOI: 10.1515/apeiron-2023-0078
Luca Torrente
In this article, I claim that the treatise known as περὶ πνεύματος/De spiritu (481a-486b Bekker) was written by Theophrastus. My overall argument unfolds in three stages: first, I briefly summarize the arguments against De spiritu’s authenticity in Aristotle’s corpus. This summary will lead to my first argument which uses the very same reasons that prove the non-Aristotelian authorship to claim the Theophrastean one, in particular linguistic aspects of the text (§2). Next, I will focus on chronology, by discussing the mention of one Aristogenes to show that Aristotle could not have known this individual (§3). Third and last, I will examine various aspects of the work that demonstrate stylistic and argumentative connections (§4), as well as doctrinal affinities with the works of Theophrastus, although some have attributed it to Strato (§5). On the basis of these arguments, I conclude that the weight of the evidence makes On Breath a work by Theophrastus (or his circle) rather than one composed by Aristotle.
在这篇文章中，我声称《περὶ πνεύματος/De spiritu》（481a-486b Bekker）是提奥弗拉斯特所著。我的总体论证分为三个阶段：首先，我简要总结了亚里士多德文献中反对 De spiritu 真实性的论据。这一总结将引出我的第一个论点，即利用证明非亚里士多德作者的相同理由，特别是文本的语言方面（§2），来主张狄奥弗拉斯特的作者。接下来，我将重点讨论年代学，通过讨论提到的一位亚里士多德来证明亚里士多德不可能认识这个人（§3）。第三也是最后一点，我将研究这部作品的各个方面，以证明其在文体和论证方面的联系（§4），以及与提奥弗拉斯图斯作品在学说上的亲缘关系，尽管有些人将其归功于斯特拉托（§5）。根据这些论据，我的结论是，从证据的份量来看，《论呼吸》是提奥弗拉斯图（或他的圈子）的作品，而不是亚里士多德的作品。
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Pub Date : 2024-04-03DOI: 10.1515/apeiron-2023-0113
Duane Long
In the ethical texts, Aristotle claims that all instances of choice (prohairesis) must be preceded by deliberation, but it is not clear why he believes this. This paper offers an explanation of that commitment, drawing heavily from the De Anima and showing that the account emerging from there complements that of the ethical texts. The view is that the deliberative faculty has the capacity to manipulate reasons combinatorially, while the perceptual/desiderative faculty does not, and choice requires the combinatorial manipulation of reasons.
{"title":"Why is Deliberation Necessary for Choice?","authors":"Duane Long","doi":"10.1515/apeiron-2023-0113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/apeiron-2023-0113","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In the ethical texts, Aristotle claims that all instances of choice (prohairesis) must be preceded by deliberation, but it is not clear why he believes this. This paper offers an explanation of that commitment, drawing heavily from the De Anima and showing that the account emerging from there complements that of the ethical texts. The view is that the deliberative faculty has the capacity to manipulate reasons combinatorially, while the perceptual/desiderative faculty does not, and choice requires the combinatorial manipulation of reasons.","PeriodicalId":517049,"journal":{"name":"Apeiron","volume":"101 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140748224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-29DOI: 10.1515/apeiron-2023-0104
Cara Rei Cummings-Coughlin
In Aristotle’s account of change, lacking a form is called privation (Physics I.7 191a14). For example, someone takes on the form of being musical only from previously having the privation of being unmusical. However, he also states that “shape and nature are spoken of in two ways, for the privation too is in a way form” (Physics II.1 193b19). I will demonstrate that these seemingly contradictory statements are not actually in tension. Since all perceptible matter must be enformed, we would have trouble discussing things that have yet to undergo generation, like menstrual fluid, and things that have undergone corruption, like corpses, if we did not cite the privation as a sort of form. I will argue that, given his commitment to hylomorphism, Aristotle is committed to privation being a form in a qualified sense. It cannot be a form in an unqualified sense because privation often spoils the matter such that it can no longer be reformed. The fact of the matter is we cannot draw a bright line between privation and form because the two are contraries and can be said to hold to different degrees at different points on a spectrum.
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Pub Date : 2024-02-01DOI: 10.1515/apeiron-2023-0100
Mariana Beatriz Noé
I argue that, in Plato’s Laws, demotic virtues (δημόσιαι ἀρεταί, 968a2) are the virtues that non-divine beings can attain. I consider two related questions: what demotic virtues are and how they relate to divine virtue. According to my interpretation, demotic virtues are an attainable – but unreliable – type of virtue that non-divine beings can improve through knowledge. These virtues are not perfect; only divine beings possess perfect virtue. However, this does not mean that perfect virtue plays no part in the ethical lives of non-divine beings. It serves as a “regulative ideal” for everyone who is not a god.
{"title":"Demotic Virtues in Plato’s Laws","authors":"Mariana Beatriz Noé","doi":"10.1515/apeiron-2023-0100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/apeiron-2023-0100","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I argue that, in Plato’s Laws, demotic virtues (δημόσιαι ἀρεταί, 968a2) are the virtues that non-divine beings can attain. I consider two related questions: what demotic virtues are and how they relate to divine virtue. According to my interpretation, demotic virtues are an attainable – but unreliable – type of virtue that non-divine beings can improve through knowledge. These virtues are not perfect; only divine beings possess perfect virtue. However, this does not mean that perfect virtue plays no part in the ethical lives of non-divine beings. It serves as a “regulative ideal” for everyone who is not a god.","PeriodicalId":517049,"journal":{"name":"Apeiron","volume":"20 8","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139897641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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