Congressional requests for administrative agency information could be handled in a less confrontational manner by negotiation. Instead of negotiations occurring ad hoc as they currently do, Congress and the executive branch could have a written agreement to structure negotiations regarding inter branch sharing of sensitive information. Analyses of this issue tend to argue that Congress's right to information varies with executive and independent agencies, but Supreme Court decisions show that the division of agencies into these two categories has no basis in the Constitution.
{"title":"Negotiating for Knowledge: Administrative Responses to Congressional Demands for Information","authors":"P. Shane","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/gysdw","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/gysdw","url":null,"abstract":"Congressional requests for administrative agency information could be handled in a less confrontational manner by negotiation. Instead of negotiations occurring ad hoc as they currently do, Congress and the executive branch could have a written agreement to structure negotiations regarding inter branch sharing of sensitive information. Analyses of this issue tend to argue that Congress's right to information varies with executive and independent agencies, but Supreme Court decisions show that the division of agencies into these two categories has no basis in the Constitution.","PeriodicalId":51730,"journal":{"name":"Administrative Law Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48972071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"法学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-06-14DOI: 10.4324/9781315183770-11
S. Halliday
{"title":"The Influence of Judicial Review on Bureaucratic Decision-Making","authors":"S. Halliday","doi":"10.4324/9781315183770-11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315183770-11","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51730,"journal":{"name":"Administrative Law Review","volume":"135 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84935001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"法学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-06-14DOI: 10.4324/9781315183770-16
M. Freedland
{"title":"Public Law and Private Finance—Placing the Private Finance Initiative in a Public Law Frame","authors":"M. Freedland","doi":"10.4324/9781315183770-16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315183770-16","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51730,"journal":{"name":"Administrative Law Review","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88325586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"法学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-06-14DOI: 10.4324/9781315183770-22
Peter Cane
{"title":"Damages in Public Law","authors":"Peter Cane","doi":"10.4324/9781315183770-22","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315183770-22","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51730,"journal":{"name":"Administrative Law Review","volume":"53 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86148434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"法学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-06-14DOI: 10.4324/9781315183770-10
G. Richardson, M. Sunkin
{"title":"Judicial Review: Questions of Impact","authors":"G. Richardson, M. Sunkin","doi":"10.4324/9781315183770-10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315183770-10","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51730,"journal":{"name":"Administrative Law Review","volume":"160 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73799454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"法学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-06-14DOI: 10.4324/9781315183770-12
R. O’Leary
{"title":"The Impact of Federal Court Decisions on the Policies and Administration of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency","authors":"R. O’Leary","doi":"10.4324/9781315183770-12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315183770-12","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51730,"journal":{"name":"Administrative Law Review","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73636852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"法学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-06-14DOI: 10.4324/9781315183770-14
F. Cross
{"title":"The Judiciary and Public Choice","authors":"F. Cross","doi":"10.4324/9781315183770-14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315183770-14","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51730,"journal":{"name":"Administrative Law Review","volume":"161 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76626992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"法学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
article reports on an empirical study of some broad trends in federal administrative law that was recently concluded. Although the complete study is published elsewhere,1 we also report our findings here for two reasons. First, we hope to broaden the audience for this research, especially among practicing administrative lawyers. We believe that the study provides some important and intriguing new perspectives on a number of issues: the changing style of appellate decisions in administrative law; the evolution of administrative law since the mid1 960s; the patterns of remands to administrative agencies; and the effects of the Supreme Court's Chevron decision. Second, we wish to call particular attention to the methodology of our study in the hope that other researchers will use it to probe additional questions of interest to administrative lawyers and scholars.2
{"title":"Studying Administrative Law: A Methodology for, and Report on, New Empirical Research","authors":"E. Elliott, P. Schuck","doi":"10.4324/9781315183770-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315183770-9","url":null,"abstract":"article reports on an empirical study of some broad trends in federal administrative law that was recently concluded. Although the complete study is published elsewhere,1 we also report our findings here for two reasons. First, we hope to broaden the audience for this research, especially among practicing administrative lawyers. We believe that the study provides some important and intriguing new perspectives on a number of issues: the changing style of appellate decisions in administrative law; the evolution of administrative law since the mid1 960s; the patterns of remands to administrative agencies; and the effects of the Supreme Court's Chevron decision. Second, we wish to call particular attention to the methodology of our study in the hope that other researchers will use it to probe additional questions of interest to administrative lawyers and scholars.2","PeriodicalId":51730,"journal":{"name":"Administrative Law Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79807942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"法学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
F rom the early 1930s to the present day, those studying the growth of the administrative state have sounded two conflicting themes. The first is that of "the need for regulation." Complex modern social, economic and technical problems require governmental intervention, particularly into the private marketplace. Intervention means regulation by administrators acting under generally worded congressional delegations of broad policymaking authority. The second theme is that of "the need for checks and controls." These same necessary administrators must be checked in the exercise of their broad powers lest their shortsightedness or overzealous ness lead to unwise policies or unfair or oppressive behavior. Congressional action in the late 1960s and early 1970s reflected the first of these themes. Congress created many new agencies charged with problems of health, safety and environmental protection.' Perhaps in reaction to the sudden, large growth in federal regulatory activity, however, public debate during the past decade has focused on the second theme: How can government guarantee wiser or fairer regulatory policies? How can it regulate the regulators? One can find several general topical answers to these latter questions. One kind of answer focuses upon the substance of particular regulatory programs and advocates dramatic individual substantive changes such as economic deregulation of airlines,2 trucking,' or financial insti-
{"title":"Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy","authors":"S. Breyer","doi":"10.4324/9781315183770-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315183770-3","url":null,"abstract":"F rom the early 1930s to the present day, those studying the growth of the administrative state have sounded two conflicting themes. The first is that of \"the need for regulation.\" Complex modern social, economic and technical problems require governmental intervention, particularly into the private marketplace. Intervention means regulation by administrators acting under generally worded congressional delegations of broad policymaking authority. The second theme is that of \"the need for checks and controls.\" These same necessary administrators must be checked in the exercise of their broad powers lest their shortsightedness or overzealous ness lead to unwise policies or unfair or oppressive behavior. Congressional action in the late 1960s and early 1970s reflected the first of these themes. Congress created many new agencies charged with problems of health, safety and environmental protection.' Perhaps in reaction to the sudden, large growth in federal regulatory activity, however, public debate during the past decade has focused on the second theme: How can government guarantee wiser or fairer regulatory policies? How can it regulate the regulators? One can find several general topical answers to these latter questions. One kind of answer focuses upon the substance of particular regulatory programs and advocates dramatic individual substantive changes such as economic deregulation of airlines,2 trucking,' or financial insti-","PeriodicalId":51730,"journal":{"name":"Administrative Law Review","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76552309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"法学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}