Pub Date : 2023-07-24DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20030005
Matthew Wray Perry
{"title":"Saving Animals, Saving Ourselves: Why Animals Matter for Pandemics, Climate Change, and other Catastrophes, written by Jeff Sebo","authors":"Matthew Wray Perry","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20030005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20030005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46274828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-24DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20030009
Steven Montgomery
{"title":"Why Should We Obey the Law?, written by George Klosko","authors":"Steven Montgomery","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20030009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20030009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45581604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-24DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20030011
J. Carroll
{"title":"On Justice: Philosophy, History, Foundations, written by Mathias Risse","authors":"J. Carroll","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20030011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20030011","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43465979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-24DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20030008
T. Hedberg
{"title":"The Virtues of Sustainability, edited by Jason Kawall","authors":"T. Hedberg","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20030008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20030008","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49543882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-24DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20030014
Matthew Palynchuk
{"title":"The Disabled Contract: Severe Intellectual Disability, Justice, and Morality, written by Jonas-Sébastien Beaudry","authors":"Matthew Palynchuk","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20030014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20030014","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44330066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-24DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20030010
Tom A. Doyle
{"title":"Quality of Life: A Post-Pandemic Philosophy of Medicine, written by Robin Downie","authors":"Tom A. Doyle","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20030010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20030010","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44359083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-11DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20233763
Yuval Eylon
It is commonly accepted that non-hypocrisy is a condition of blaming, and that it is a moral condition. This paper proposes an alternative, epistemic, view of blaming: knowledge is necessary for blaming, and with the added condition that knowledge provides a (motivating) reason for action – sufficient. First it is argued that knowing that the action of a blamee is wrong is necessary for blaming. Second, it is shown that the phenomenon of hypocritical blaming extends to circumstances not involving moral judgment (such as sports). Third, it is claimed that expressions of intentions such as (1) “A is wrong and I intend to do it” are infelicitous as they stand. The similarities between such expressions and hypocritical blaming recommend a unified account of their infelicity. Finally, it is argued that only the epistemic view of blaming provides accounts for both moral and non-moral blaming, and for the related phenomena.
{"title":"Hypocrisy, Knowledge, and the Rule of Blaming","authors":"Yuval Eylon","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20233763","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20233763","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000It is commonly accepted that non-hypocrisy is a condition of blaming, and that it is a moral condition. This paper proposes an alternative, epistemic, view of blaming: knowledge is necessary for blaming, and with the added condition that knowledge provides a (motivating) reason for action – sufficient.\u0000First it is argued that knowing that the action of a blamee is wrong is necessary for blaming. Second, it is shown that the phenomenon of hypocritical blaming extends to circumstances not involving moral judgment (such as sports). Third, it is claimed that expressions of intentions such as (1) “A is wrong and I intend to do it” are infelicitous as they stand. The similarities between such expressions and hypocritical blaming recommend a unified account of their infelicity. Finally, it is argued that only the epistemic view of blaming provides accounts for both moral and non-moral blaming, and for the related phenomena.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42422511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-10DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20234236
J. Quong
This article offers a brief synopsis of some of the main claims from The Morality of Defensive Force, and replies to the symposium contributions of Lars Christie, Lisa Hecht, and Jonathan Parry.
{"title":"The Morality of Defensive Force: Replies to Christie, Hecht, and Parry","authors":"J. Quong","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20234236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20234236","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This article offers a brief synopsis of some of the main claims from The Morality of Defensive Force, and replies to the symposium contributions of Lars Christie, Lisa Hecht, and Jonathan Parry.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64617505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-28DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20234097
L. Eggert
This paper defends the possibility of dirty hands against the longstanding skepticism that an action cannot be simultaneously right and wrong and that dirty hands cases are therefore impossible. While skeptics are right to recognize that prima facie reasons against violating moral duties may be overridden, they are wrong to deny that actions required by necessity may nevertheless remain wrong. Dirty hands cases capture the simultaneous necessity of disregarding moral duties in certain circumstances and the reprehensibility of wronging people even in cases in which this is all-things-considered permissible. Rather than indicating any deficiency in our moral reasoning, the capacity to accommodate the possibility of dirty hands, along with the reality of moral conflict, is a strength of a moral theory.
{"title":"Dirty Hands Defended","authors":"L. Eggert","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20234097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20234097","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This paper defends the possibility of dirty hands against the longstanding skepticism that an action cannot be simultaneously right and wrong and that dirty hands cases are therefore impossible. While skeptics are right to recognize that prima facie reasons against violating moral duties may be overridden, they are wrong to deny that actions required by necessity may nevertheless remain wrong. Dirty hands cases capture the simultaneous necessity of disregarding moral duties in certain circumstances and the reprehensibility of wronging people even in cases in which this is all-things-considered permissible. Rather than indicating any deficiency in our moral reasoning, the capacity to accommodate the possibility of dirty hands, along with the reality of moral conflict, is a strength of a moral theory.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48050001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-08DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20233756
Eszter Kollar, Ayelet Banai
The immigration debate in political theory has produced a series of accounts that justify the state’s right to exclude potential immigrants, where the right of self-determination figures prominently. We challenge two prominent accounts of the self-determination-based right to exclude and defend a circumscribed right to exclude and a corollary duty to admit immigrants, based on our ‘people relationship goods’ account of self-determination. Our conception reconciles the moral claims of global opportunity migrants with the well-being and non-alienation interests of the locals. It therefore provides a principled answer to the philosophical question underlying pressing political conflicts today, namely what is the permissible scope of exclusion by self-determining political communities, in light of weighty global moral demands of inclusion.
{"title":"The Right to Exclude and the Duty to Include: Self-determination, Equal Opportunity, and Immigration","authors":"Eszter Kollar, Ayelet Banai","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20233756","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20233756","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The immigration debate in political theory has produced a series of accounts that justify the state’s right to exclude potential immigrants, where the right of self-determination figures prominently. We challenge two prominent accounts of the self-determination-based right to exclude and defend a circumscribed right to exclude and a corollary duty to admit immigrants, based on our ‘people relationship goods’ account of self-determination. Our conception reconciles the moral claims of global opportunity migrants with the well-being and non-alienation interests of the locals. It therefore provides a principled answer to the philosophical question underlying pressing political conflicts today, namely what is the permissible scope of exclusion by self-determining political communities, in light of weighty global moral demands of inclusion.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44506255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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