Pub Date : 2024-06-07DOI: 10.1163/15685284-bja10092
Santiago Chame
Bryson of Heraclea and Polyxenus have received little attention from scholars. Sources on these philosophers are few and difficult to interpret. However, they present interesting dialectical arguments that concern some of Plato’s and Aristotle’s most important theoretical elaborations: Bryson’s arguments on the issue of semantic ambiguity were explicitly discussed by Aristotle, and Polyxenus is credited with a particular version of the Third Man argument. My purpose in this paper is to reconstruct the historical background of these two philosophers and to analyze the philosophical implications of the arguments that the ancient tradition ascribes to them.
{"title":"Bryson of Heraclea and Polyxenus, Megarian Philosophers","authors":"Santiago Chame","doi":"10.1163/15685284-bja10092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15685284-bja10092","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Bryson of Heraclea and Polyxenus have received little attention from scholars. Sources on these philosophers are few and difficult to interpret. However, they present interesting dialectical arguments that concern some of Plato’s and Aristotle’s most important theoretical elaborations: Bryson’s arguments on the issue of semantic ambiguity were explicitly discussed by Aristotle, and Polyxenus is credited with a particular version of the Third Man argument. My purpose in this paper is to reconstruct the historical background of these two philosophers and to analyze the philosophical implications of the arguments that the ancient tradition ascribes to them.","PeriodicalId":518820,"journal":{"name":"Phronesis","volume":" 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141375037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-22DOI: 10.1163/15685284-bja10090
Michele Pecorari
At Outlines of Pyrrhonism (PH) 2.227–8, Sextus Empiricus argues that certain entities which his adversaries hold to be one and the same for different individuals are in fact not. This he does by, among other things, considering the truth-value of sentences of which the subject is a common noun, thereby drawing an interesting connection between metaphysics and semantics. In this article, I provide a careful analysis of Sextus’ arguments at PH 2.227–8 and explore the origins and limits of such a connection. In particular, I argue that Sextus’ argument at PH 2.227 probably reflects a Stoic argument against Aristotelian essences, thereby relying on specifically Stoic doctrines about universals and common nouns, whereas his next argument at PH 2.228 targets accidents. If this is true, it follows that the overall structure of PH 2.227–8 fits well with the typically Aristotelian distinction between essence and accident.
{"title":"A Linguistic Muddle. Sextus’ Arguments against Universals at PH 2.227–8","authors":"Michele Pecorari","doi":"10.1163/15685284-bja10090","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15685284-bja10090","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000At Outlines of Pyrrhonism (PH) 2.227–8, Sextus Empiricus argues that certain entities which his adversaries hold to be one and the same for different individuals are in fact not. This he does by, among other things, considering the truth-value of sentences of which the subject is a common noun, thereby drawing an interesting connection between metaphysics and semantics. In this article, I provide a careful analysis of Sextus’ arguments at PH 2.227–8 and explore the origins and limits of such a connection. In particular, I argue that Sextus’ argument at PH 2.227 probably reflects a Stoic argument against Aristotelian essences, thereby relying on specifically Stoic doctrines about universals and common nouns, whereas his next argument at PH 2.228 targets accidents. If this is true, it follows that the overall structure of PH 2.227–8 fits well with the typically Aristotelian distinction between essence and accident.","PeriodicalId":518820,"journal":{"name":"Phronesis","volume":"47 12","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141109362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-23DOI: 10.1163/15685284-bja10082
Patricia Marechal
In Nicomachean Ethics 7.7 (= Eudemian Ethics 6.7), Aristotle distinguishes softness (malakia) from lack of self-control (akrasia) and endurance (karteria) from self-control (enkrateia). This paper argues that unqualified softness consists of a disposition to give up acting to avoid the painful toil (ponos) required to execute practical resolutions, and (coincidentally) to enjoy the pleasures of rest and relaxation. The enduring person, in contrast, persists in her commitments despite the painful effort required to enact them. Along the way, I argue that this interpretation qualifies our understanding of the pleasures and pains with which temperance and intemperance are concerned.
{"title":"Aristotle on Softness and Endurance: Nicomachean Ethics 7.7, 1150a9–b19","authors":"Patricia Marechal","doi":"10.1163/15685284-bja10082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15685284-bja10082","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In Nicomachean Ethics 7.7 (= Eudemian Ethics 6.7), Aristotle distinguishes softness (malakia) from lack of self-control (akrasia) and endurance (karteria) from self-control (enkrateia). This paper argues that unqualified softness consists of a disposition to give up acting to avoid the painful toil (ponos) required to execute practical resolutions, and (coincidentally) to enjoy the pleasures of rest and relaxation. The enduring person, in contrast, persists in her commitments despite the painful effort required to enact them. Along the way, I argue that this interpretation qualifies our understanding of the pleasures and pains with which temperance and intemperance are concerned.","PeriodicalId":518820,"journal":{"name":"Phronesis","volume":"8 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140530798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-23DOI: 10.1163/15685284-bja10080
Sean Driscoll
The question of ontological commitment in Plato’s Hippias Major has been important in disputes over the dialogue’s place in the corpus, its meaning, and its authenticity. But this question seems to have been settled—the Hippias Major is not committed to the ‘forms.’ Such an ontological conclusion has been vigorously defended, but its defenses rest on a problematic meta-ontological framework. This paper suggests a more adequate framework and brings more evidence to the evaluation of the question of ontological commitment in the Hippias Major. It concludes that the dialogue is indeed committed to some kind of form.
{"title":"Socratic Heterodoxy? Ontological Commitment in the Hippias Major","authors":"Sean Driscoll","doi":"10.1163/15685284-bja10080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15685284-bja10080","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The question of ontological commitment in Plato’s Hippias Major has been important in disputes over the dialogue’s place in the corpus, its meaning, and its authenticity. But this question seems to have been settled—the Hippias Major is not committed to the ‘forms.’ Such an ontological conclusion has been vigorously defended, but its defenses rest on a problematic meta-ontological framework. This paper suggests a more adequate framework and brings more evidence to the evaluation of the question of ontological commitment in the Hippias Major. It concludes that the dialogue is indeed committed to some kind of form.","PeriodicalId":518820,"journal":{"name":"Phronesis","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140530619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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