{"title":"Facebook: From Data Privacy to a Concept of Abuse by Restriction of Choice","authors":"Rachel Scheele","doi":"10.1093/JECLAP/LPAA101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JECLAP/LPAA101","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Competition Law & Practice","volume":"12 1","pages":"34-37"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41894486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tech giants are commonly referred to as ‘platforms’ in our everyday language and academic circles. Some refer to ‘the platform economy’, or the ‘platformization of the Web’. But our legal language requires more nuance as putting all these companies in the same basket has significant drawbacks. With this article, I want to emphasize the importance of distinguishing between platforms and aggregators for antitrust law.
{"title":"Platforms or Aggregators: Implications for Digital Antitrust Law","authors":"Thibault Schrepel","doi":"10.1093/JECLAP/LPAA100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JECLAP/LPAA100","url":null,"abstract":"Tech giants are commonly referred to as ‘platforms’ in our everyday language and academic circles. Some refer to ‘the platform economy’, or the ‘platformization of the Web’. But our legal language requires more nuance as putting all these companies in the same basket has significant drawbacks. With this article, I want to emphasize the importance of distinguishing between platforms and aggregators for antitrust law.","PeriodicalId":51907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Competition Law & Practice","volume":"12 1","pages":"1-3"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JECLAP/LPAA100","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42202272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The European Union (EU) Antitrust Damages Directive (Directive) was enacted in December 2014 after nearly a decade of consultations—its implementation was due by 27 December 2016.1 The Directive entails a number of requirements reforming the Member States’ substantive and procedural law, thereby specifying the European damages regime. It seeks to boost private enforcement and, in particular, to enable each purchaser that suffers damage due to infringements of competition law to claim compensation. The main objective of the Directive is the attainment of ‘full compensation’, with ‘deterrence’ being stipulated as an important secondary goal.2 This paper brings into focus the harm borne by final consumers. Any infringement which raises prices to final consumers, either directly or indirectly through the supply chain, may harm such consumers in two different ways. First, final consumers who made some purchases during the infringement period (e.g. at the time a cartel was in place) may have done so at inflated prices. We refer to this as the ‘overcharge effect’. Second, final consumers who refrained from purchasing (or reduced
{"title":"Antitrust Damages, Consumer Harm, and Consumer Collective Redress","authors":"Germain Gaudin, Franziska Weber","doi":"10.1093/JECLAP/LPAA097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JECLAP/LPAA097","url":null,"abstract":"The European Union (EU) Antitrust Damages Directive (Directive) was enacted in December 2014 after nearly a decade of consultations—its implementation was due by 27 December 2016.1 The Directive entails a number of requirements reforming the Member States’ substantive and procedural law, thereby specifying the European damages regime. It seeks to boost private enforcement and, in particular, to enable each purchaser that suffers damage due to infringements of competition law to claim compensation. The main objective of the Directive is the attainment of ‘full compensation’, with ‘deterrence’ being stipulated as an important secondary goal.2 This paper brings into focus the harm borne by final consumers. Any infringement which raises prices to final consumers, either directly or indirectly through the supply chain, may harm such consumers in two different ways. First, final consumers who made some purchases during the infringement period (e.g. at the time a cartel was in place) may have done so at inflated prices. We refer to this as the ‘overcharge effect’. Second, final consumers who refrained from purchasing (or reduced","PeriodicalId":51907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Competition Law & Practice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JECLAP/LPAA097","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43235086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Economic Activity, Market Failure and Services of General Economic Interest: It Takes Two to Tango","authors":"A. Collins, Martín Martínez Navarro","doi":"10.1093/JECLAP/LPAA098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JECLAP/LPAA098","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Competition Law & Practice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49391679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/jeclap/lpab071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpab071","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Competition Law & Practice","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61194309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Ecn+ Directive and the Next Steps for Independence in Competition Law Enforcement","authors":"Rubén Perea Molleda","doi":"10.1093/jeclap/lpaa095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpaa095","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Competition Law & Practice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43638650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Google Shopping for the Empress’s New Clothes –When a Remedy Isn’t a Remedy (and How to Fix it)","authors":"Philip Marsden","doi":"10.1093/jeclap/lpaa050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpaa050","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Competition Law & Practice","volume":"105 9-10","pages":"553-560"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/jeclap/lpaa050","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41287069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do We Need to Regulate Equal Treatment? The Google Shopping Case and the Implications of its Equal Treatment Principle for New Legislative Initiatives","authors":"Thomas Graf, H. Mostyn","doi":"10.1093/jeclap/lpaa053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpaa053","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Competition Law & Practice","volume":"11 1","pages":"561-574"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/jeclap/lpaa053","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43885727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The concept of FRAND licensing has been widely debated for years. It is not an exaggeration to call the stream of scholarly papers a flood. And since 2015, the Court of Justice of the European Union and many national courts have weighed in as well. Yet notwithstanding the apparent abundance of scholarly analyses and judicial precedent, both the theory and practice of SEP licensing remain a black box. This is due mainly to the fact that ‘economics’ and ‘law’ coexist in different universes. Economic analyses often focus on specific issues, mostly in technical and formal terms. Lawyers, however, often lack access to the closed world of economic models and econo-technical jargon. The courts literally crave a set of accessible and practical guidelines for resolving FRAND disputes. This paper provides an overview of the most pressing practical issues of SEP licensing and offers a roadmap for the practical implementation of economic wisdom. Unlike most of the economic literature, it seeks to provide a more comprehensive and structured (and, hence, more workable) guide to the resolution of practical disputes.
{"title":"Standard-Essential Patents and FRAND Licensing—At the Crossroads of Economic Theory and Legal Practice","authors":"Tim W. Dornis","doi":"10.1093/jeclap/lpaa047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpaa047","url":null,"abstract":"The concept of FRAND licensing has been widely debated for years. It is not an exaggeration to call the stream of scholarly papers a flood. And since 2015, the Court of Justice of the European Union and many national courts have weighed in as well. Yet notwithstanding the apparent abundance of scholarly analyses and judicial precedent, both the theory and practice of SEP licensing remain a black box. This is due mainly to the fact that ‘economics’ and ‘law’ coexist in different universes. Economic analyses often focus on specific issues, mostly in technical and formal terms. Lawyers, however, often lack access to the closed world of economic models and econo-technical jargon. The courts literally crave a set of accessible and practical guidelines for resolving FRAND disputes. This paper provides an overview of the most pressing practical issues of SEP licensing and offers a roadmap for the practical implementation of economic wisdom. Unlike most of the economic literature, it seeks to provide a more comprehensive and structured (and, hence, more workable) guide to the resolution of practical disputes.","PeriodicalId":51907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Competition Law & Practice","volume":"11 1","pages":"575-591"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/jeclap/lpaa047","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43520029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
F. Carloni, Alessandro Di Mario, Michal Kocon, Nicolas Hipp
{"title":"Vertical Agreements in the Luxury Sector","authors":"F. Carloni, Alessandro Di Mario, Michal Kocon, Nicolas Hipp","doi":"10.1093/jeclap/lpaa092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpaa092","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Competition Law & Practice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49344925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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