Pub Date : 2025-03-28DOI: 10.1134/S1064562424702387
A. A. Kovalchuk
The phenomenon of intransitivity of trading strategies with constant levels in the stock market is studied. By using Doob’s stopping theorem and basic concepts from probability theory, accurate estimates for the strength of intransitivity are derived for the case of strategies with constant levels.
{"title":"Intransitive Sets of Financial Strategies with Constant Levels","authors":"A. A. Kovalchuk","doi":"10.1134/S1064562424702387","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562424702387","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The phenomenon of intransitivity of trading strategies with constant levels in the stock market is studied. By using Doob’s stopping theorem and basic concepts from probability theory, accurate estimates for the strength of intransitivity are derived for the case of strategies with constant levels.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"110 2 supplement","pages":"S367 - S375"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143716730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-03-28DOI: 10.1134/S1064562424602609
A. A. Vasin, N. I. Tsyganov
The problem of optimal organization of state inspection with an honest head and rational auditors is considered. Audit schemes are investigated in which the honest behavior of taxpayers and auditors turns out to be resistant to coalition deviations. In addition to hierarchical structures, a three-stage scheme with cross-checking is considered. It is proved that cross-checking is never optimal. The minimum audit costs for two- and three-level structures are determined. The best option is specified depending on the model parameters.
{"title":"Models of Optimal Organization of Tax Inspection","authors":"A. A. Vasin, N. I. Tsyganov","doi":"10.1134/S1064562424602609","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562424602609","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The problem of optimal organization of state inspection with an honest head and rational auditors is considered. Audit schemes are investigated in which the honest behavior of taxpayers and auditors turns out to be resistant to coalition deviations. In addition to hierarchical structures, a three-stage scheme with cross-checking is considered. It is proved that cross-checking is never optimal. The minimum audit costs for two- and three-level structures are determined. The best option is specified depending on the model parameters.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"110 2 supplement","pages":"S468 - S472"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143716738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-03-28DOI: 10.1134/S1064562424602592
D. V. Kuzyutin, N. V. Smirnova, I. R. Tantlevskij
The paper examines an infinite-horizon multistage game of renewable resource extraction with two types of players differing in the discount rates of future payoffs. Using the dynamic programming method, we construct a noncooperative solution—a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in stationary feedback strategies—and a cooperative (Pareto optimal) solution for the case of complete cooperation of all players. The resulting solutions are analyzed for sensitivity to variations in model parameters. In particular, the range of the coefficient of natural resource renewal is found in which a noncooperative solution leads to complete depletion of the resource, while a cooperative scheme allows the players to avoid this negative scenario. A numerical example is given to demonstrate the theoretical results obtained.
{"title":"Multistage Model for Renewable Resource Extraction by Players of Two Types","authors":"D. V. Kuzyutin, N. V. Smirnova, I. R. Tantlevskij","doi":"10.1134/S1064562424602592","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562424602592","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The paper examines an infinite-horizon multistage game of renewable resource extraction with two types of players differing in the discount rates of future payoffs. Using the dynamic programming method, we construct a noncooperative solution—a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in stationary feedback strategies—and a cooperative (Pareto optimal) solution for the case of complete cooperation of all players. The resulting solutions are analyzed for sensitivity to variations in model parameters. In particular, the range of the coefficient of natural resource renewal is found in which a noncooperative solution leads to complete depletion of the resource, while a cooperative scheme allows the players to avoid this negative scenario. A numerical example is given to demonstrate the theoretical results obtained.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"110 2 supplement","pages":"S445 - S451"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143716734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-03-28DOI: 10.1134/S1064562425700012
S. V. Lebed, D. E. Namiot, E. V. Zubareva, P. V. Khenkin, A. A. Vorobeva, D. A. Svichkar
The article provides an overview of the practice of using large language models (LLMs) in cyberattacks. Artificial intelligence models (machine learning and deep learning) are applied across various fields, with cybersecurity being no exception. One aspect of this usage is offensive artificial intelligence, specifically in relation to LLMs. Generative models, including LLMs, have been utilized in cybersecurity for some time, primarily for generating adversarial attacks on machine learning models. The analysis focuses on how LLMs, such as ChatGPT, can be exploited by malicious actors to automate the creation of phishing emails and malware, significantly simplifying and accelerating the process of conducting cyberattacks. Key aspects of LLM usage are examined, including text generation for social engineering attacks and the creation of malicious code. The article is aimed at cybersecurity professionals, researchers, and LLM developers, providing them with insights into the risks associated with the malicious use of these technologies and recommendations for preventing their exploitation as cyber weapons. The research emphasizes the importance of recognizing potential threats and the need for active countermeasures against automated cyberattacks.
{"title":"Large Language Models in Cyberattacks","authors":"S. V. Lebed, D. E. Namiot, E. V. Zubareva, P. V. Khenkin, A. A. Vorobeva, D. A. Svichkar","doi":"10.1134/S1064562425700012","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562425700012","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The article provides an overview of the practice of using large language models (LLMs) in cyberattacks. Artificial intelligence models (machine learning and deep learning) are applied across various fields, with cybersecurity being no exception. One aspect of this usage is offensive artificial intelligence, specifically in relation to LLMs. Generative models, including LLMs, have been utilized in cybersecurity for some time, primarily for generating adversarial attacks on machine learning models. The analysis focuses on how LLMs, such as ChatGPT, can be exploited by malicious actors to automate the creation of phishing emails and malware, significantly simplifying and accelerating the process of conducting cyberattacks. Key aspects of LLM usage are examined, including text generation for social engineering attacks and the creation of malicious code. The article is aimed at cybersecurity professionals, researchers, and LLM developers, providing them with insights into the risks associated with the malicious use of these technologies and recommendations for preventing their exploitation as cyber weapons. The research emphasizes the importance of recognizing potential threats and the need for active countermeasures against automated cyberattacks.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"110 2 supplement","pages":"S510 - S520"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143716737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-03-28DOI: 10.1134/S1064562424702417
A. Poddiakov
Chess players’ positions in intransitive (rock-paper-scissors) relations are considered. Intransitivity of chess players’ positions means that: position A of White is preferable (it should be chosen if choice is possible) to position B of Black, if A and B are on a chessboard; position B of Black is preferable to position C of White, if B and C are on the chessboard; position C of White is preferable to position D of Black, if C and D are on the chessboard; but position D of Black is preferable to position A of White, if A and D are on the chessboard. Intransitivity of winningness of chess players’ positions is considered to be a consequence of complexity of the chess environment—in contrast with simpler games with transitive positions only. The space of relations between winningness of chess players’ positions is non-Euclidean. The Zermelo-von Neumann theorem is complemented by statements about possibility vs. impossibility of building pure winning strategies based on the assumption of transitivity of players’ positions. Questions about the possibility of intransitive players’ positions in other positional games are raised.
{"title":"Intransitively Winning Chess Players’ Positions","authors":"A. Poddiakov","doi":"10.1134/S1064562424702417","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562424702417","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Chess players’ positions in intransitive (rock-paper-scissors) relations are considered. Intransitivity of chess players’ positions means that: position A of White is preferable (it should be chosen if choice is possible) to position B of Black, if A and B are on a chessboard; position B of Black is preferable to position C of White, if B and C are on the chessboard; position C of White is preferable to position D of Black, if C and D are on the chessboard; but position D of Black is preferable to position A of White, if A and D are on the chessboard. Intransitivity of winningness of chess players’ positions is considered to be a consequence of complexity of the chess environment—in contrast with simpler games with transitive positions only. The space of relations between winningness of chess players’ positions is non-Euclidean. The Zermelo-von Neumann theorem is complemented by statements about possibility <i>vs</i>. impossibility of building pure winning strategies based on the assumption of transitivity of players’ positions. Questions about the possibility of intransitive players’ positions in other positional games are raised.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"110 2 supplement","pages":"S391 - S398"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143716670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-03-28DOI: 10.1134/S1064562424602725
M. A. Khodiakova
In 1984, Kaminsky, Luks, and Nelson formulated the gladiator game model of two teams with given strengths. Suppose that a team wants to maximize its expected strength at the end of a battle. We consider an optimization problem: how to distribute the team’s strength among its gladiators. In the above we suppose that the teams distribute their strengths at the beginning of a battle. We also consider Nash equilibria when the teams may change gladiators’ strengths before every fight. We consider two cases. In both, the first team wants to maximize its strength. The second team wants to maximize its strength too in the first case or wants to minimize the first team’s strength in the second case.
{"title":"How to Maximize the Total Strength of Survivors in a Battle and Tournament in Gladiator Game Models","authors":"M. A. Khodiakova","doi":"10.1134/S1064562424602725","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562424602725","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In 1984, Kaminsky, Luks, and Nelson formulated the gladiator game model of two teams with given strengths. Suppose that a team wants to maximize its expected strength at the end of a battle. We consider an optimization problem: how to distribute the team’s strength among its gladiators. In the above we suppose that the teams distribute their strengths at the beginning of a battle. We also consider Nash equilibria when the teams may change gladiators’ strengths before every fight. We consider two cases. In both, the first team wants to maximize its strength. The second team wants to maximize its strength too in the first case or wants to minimize the first team’s strength in the second case.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"110 2 supplement","pages":"S452 - S462"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143716736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-03-28DOI: 10.1134/S1064562424602610
P. D. Demchuk, A. V. Korolev, G. A. Ugolnitsky
The basic model of the Cournot oligopoly taking into account competition-cooperation and environmental pollution as a differential game in a normal form is described. The numerical analysis for independent and cooperative behavior is carried out for an example used in the future. Games in the form of the characteristic von Neumann–Morgenstern, Petrosyan–Zaccour, and Gromova–Petrosyan functions are constructed, and the Shapley values are calculated. Hierarchical games with information regulations for direct and reverse Stackelberg games are analyzed, payoffs’ comparative analysis for all methods of organization is provided. All the results are presented for the dynamic game with three players.
{"title":"Dynamic Models of Competition and Cooperation in Cournot Oligopoly Taking into Account the Environmental Impact","authors":"P. D. Demchuk, A. V. Korolev, G. A. Ugolnitsky","doi":"10.1134/S1064562424602610","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562424602610","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The basic model of the Cournot oligopoly taking into account competition-cooperation and environmental pollution as a differential game in a normal form is described. The numerical analysis for independent and cooperative behavior is carried out for an example used in the future. Games in the form of the characteristic von Neumann–Morgenstern, Petrosyan–Zaccour, and Gromova–Petrosyan functions are constructed, and the Shapley values are calculated. Hierarchical games with information regulations for direct and reverse Stackelberg games are analyzed, payoffs’ comparative analysis for all methods of organization is provided. All the results are presented for the dynamic game with three players.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"110 2 supplement","pages":"S473 - S486"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143716740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-03-28DOI: 10.1134/S1064562424702375
V. A. Kochevadov, A. A. Sedakov
The paper examines discrete-time network models of competition with a finite planning horizon. Firms produce a homogeneous product in constant quantities and sell it in a common market. In a nonterminal period, the behavior of each firm is characterized by a multicomponent profile that includes, among other things, the amount of investment and the structure of bilateral links with partner firms. The latter affects the technological state of the firm and allows it to reduce its current costs. The endogenous structure of partner firms is described by a network. For the models under study, an open-loop Nash equilibrium is characterized.
{"title":"Dynamic Models of Competition with Endogenous Network Formation: The Case of Constant Output","authors":"V. A. Kochevadov, A. A. Sedakov","doi":"10.1134/S1064562424702375","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562424702375","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The paper examines discrete-time network models of competition with a finite planning horizon. Firms produce a homogeneous product in constant quantities and sell it in a common market. In a nonterminal period, the behavior of each firm is characterized by a multicomponent profile that includes, among other things, the amount of investment and the structure of bilateral links with partner firms. The latter affects the technological state of the firm and allows it to reduce its current costs. The endogenous structure of partner firms is described by a network. For the models under study, an open-loop Nash equilibrium is characterized.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"110 2 supplement","pages":"S357 - S366"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143716947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-03-22DOI: 10.1134/S1064562424602336
A. S. Veprikov, E. D. Petrov, G. V. Evseev, A. N. Beznosikov
In this paper we consider a distributed optimization problem in the black-box formulation. This means that the target function f is decomposed into the sum of (n) functions ({{f}_{i}}), where (n) is the number of workers, it is assumed that each worker has access only to the zero-order noisy oracle, i.e., only to the values of ({{f}_{i}}(x)) with added noise. In this paper, we propose a new method ZO-MARINA based on the state-of-the-art distributed optimization algorithm MARINA. In particular, the following modifications are made to solve the problem in the black-box formulation: (i) we use approximations of the gradient instead of the true value, (ii) the difference of two approximated gradients at some coordinates is used instead of the compression operator. In this paper, a theoretical convergence analysis is provided for non-convex functions and functions satisfying the PL condition. The convergence rate of the proposed algorithm is correlated with the results for the algorithm that uses the first-order oracle. The theoretical results are validated in computational experiments to find optimal hyperparameters for the Resnet-18 neural network, that is trained on the CIFAR-10 dataset and the SVM model on the LibSVM library dataset and on the Mnist-784 dataset.
{"title":"Zero Order Algorithm for Decentralized Optimization Problems","authors":"A. S. Veprikov, E. D. Petrov, G. V. Evseev, A. N. Beznosikov","doi":"10.1134/S1064562424602336","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562424602336","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper we consider a distributed optimization problem in the black-box formulation. This means that the target function <i>f</i> is decomposed into the sum of <span>(n)</span> functions <span>({{f}_{i}})</span>, where <span>(n)</span> is the number of workers, it is assumed that each worker has access only to the zero-order noisy oracle, i.e., only to the values of <span>({{f}_{i}}(x))</span> with added noise. In this paper, we propose a new method <span>ZO-MARINA</span> based on the state-of-the-art distributed optimization algorithm <i><span>MARINA</span></i>. In particular, the following modifications are made to solve the problem in the black-box formulation: (i) we use approximations of the gradient instead of the true value, (ii) the difference of two approximated gradients at some coordinates is used instead of the compression operator. In this paper, a theoretical convergence analysis is provided for non-convex functions and functions satisfying the PL condition. The convergence rate of the proposed algorithm is correlated with the results for the algorithm that uses the first-order oracle. The theoretical results are validated in computational experiments to find optimal hyperparameters for the Resnet-18 neural network, that is trained on the CIFAR-10 dataset and the SVM model on the LibSVM library dataset and on the Mnist-784 dataset.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"110 1 supplement","pages":"S261 - S277"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1134/S1064562424602336.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143676487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-03-22DOI: 10.1134/S106456242460221X
A. Allahverdyan, A. Zhadan, I. Kondratov, O. Petrosian, A. Romanovskii, V. Kharin, Yin Li
In heterogeneous computing environments, efficiently scheduling tasks, especially those forming Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs), is critical. This is particularly true for various Cloud and Edge computing tasks, as well as training Large Language Models (LLMs). This paper introduces a new scheduling approach using an Adaptive Neural Hyper-heuristic. By integrating a neural network trained with genetic algorithms, our method aims to minimize makespan. The approach uses a two-level algorithm: the first level prioritizes tasks using adaptive heuristic and the second level assigns resources based on the Earliest Finish Time (EFT) algorithm. Our tests show that this method significantly improves over traditional scheduling heuristics and other machine learning-based approaches. It reduces the makespan by 6.7% for small-scale DAGs and 28.49% for large-scale DAGs compared to the leading DONF algorithm. Additionally, it achieves a proximity of 84.08% to 96.43% to the optimal solutions found using Mixed-Integer Linear Programming (MILP), demonstrating its effectiveness in diverse computational settings.
在异构计算环境中,高效调度任务,尤其是那些形成有向无环图(DAG)的任务,至关重要。对于各种云计算和边缘计算任务以及大型语言模型(LLM)的训练而言,尤其如此。本文介绍了一种使用自适应神经超启发式的新调度方法。通过将经过遗传算法训练的神经网络整合在一起,我们的方法旨在最大限度地减少时间跨度。该方法使用两级算法:第一级使用自适应启发式确定任务的优先级,第二级根据最早完成时间(EFT)算法分配资源。我们的测试表明,与传统的调度启发式方法和其他基于机器学习的方法相比,这种方法有明显改善。与领先的 DONF 算法相比,小规模 DAG 的 makepan 降低了 6.7%,大规模 DAG 的 makespan 降低了 28.49%。此外,它还实现了 84.08% 至 96.43% 的接近度,接近于使用混合整数线性规划(MILP)找到的最优解,证明了它在各种计算环境中的有效性。
{"title":"Heterogeneous Computational Scheduling Using Adaptive Neural Hyper-Heuristic","authors":"A. Allahverdyan, A. Zhadan, I. Kondratov, O. Petrosian, A. Romanovskii, V. Kharin, Yin Li","doi":"10.1134/S106456242460221X","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S106456242460221X","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In heterogeneous computing environments, efficiently scheduling tasks, especially those forming Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs), is critical. This is particularly true for various Cloud and Edge computing tasks, as well as training Large Language Models (LLMs). This paper introduces a new scheduling approach using an Adaptive Neural Hyper-heuristic. By integrating a neural network trained with genetic algorithms, our method aims to minimize makespan. The approach uses a two-level algorithm: the first level prioritizes tasks using adaptive heuristic and the second level assigns resources based on the Earliest Finish Time (EFT) algorithm. Our tests show that this method significantly improves over traditional scheduling heuristics and other machine learning-based approaches. It reduces the makespan by 6.7% for small-scale DAGs and 28.49% for large-scale DAGs compared to the leading DONF algorithm. Additionally, it achieves a proximity of 84.08% to 96.43% to the optimal solutions found using Mixed-Integer Linear Programming (MILP), demonstrating its effectiveness in diverse computational settings.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"110 1 supplement","pages":"S151 - S161"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1134/S106456242460221X.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143676271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}