Shoplifting is a major issue in Canada, with 87 percent of small and medium sized stores victimized each year. As a result, shopkeepers face a difficult decision between allowing this loss of product, or detaining the individual and facing tortious liability for an unlawful arrest. The legal debate regarding allowing a shopkeeper’s privilege to detain an individual, when they have reasonable suspicion of theft, attempts to balance competing values of personal liberty and the protection of property. Due to the changing context surrounding this issue, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice recently endorsed the shopkeeper’s privilege in Mann v. Canadian Tire Corporation Ltd. In Mann, Justice Akhtar drew on existing Canadian, American, and United Kingdom jurisprudence to articulate a new test for shopkeeper’s privilege in Canada.
{"title":"The Shopkeeper’s Privilege and Canadian Tort Law","authors":"M. Mcinnes, A. Simpson","doi":"10.29173/ALR2496","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29173/ALR2496","url":null,"abstract":"Shoplifting is a major issue in Canada, with 87 percent of small and medium sized stores victimized each year. As a result, shopkeepers face a difficult decision between allowing this loss of product, or detaining the individual and facing tortious liability for an unlawful arrest. The legal debate regarding allowing a shopkeeper’s privilege to detain an individual, when they have reasonable suspicion of theft, attempts to balance competing values of personal liberty and the protection of property. Due to the changing context surrounding this issue, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice recently endorsed the shopkeeper’s privilege in Mann v. Canadian Tire Corporation Ltd. In Mann, Justice Akhtar drew on existing Canadian, American, and United Kingdom jurisprudence to articulate a new test for shopkeeper’s privilege in Canada.","PeriodicalId":54047,"journal":{"name":"ALBERTA LAW REVIEW","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2018-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41954267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article considers sources of opposition to allowing access to medical assistance in dying for individuals with mental illness. It originated with an observation by members of the University of Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics that in mainstream Canadian culture — as well as in political, academic, and professional circles — such opposition remains widespread (and often reflexive). This opposition exists even in light of broad support for access to assisted dying for individuals with illness manifesting in physical suffering. Most Canadians treat the prospect of assisted dying for those with mental illness with suspicion, and it is worth exploring why this opposition persists, what arguments can be leveled to support it, and whether those arguments can be sustained. To that end, I identify five objections to assisted dying for the mentally ill that seem to characterize the public debate, and argue that none are sustainable. They either rely on false premises or otherwise fail to secure the conclusion that assisted dying should be off limits to people suffering from mental illness, even when such mental illness is their sole underlying condition.
{"title":"An Ethical-Legal Analysis of Medical Assistance in Dying for Those with Mental Illness","authors":"R. Tanner","doi":"10.29173/ALR2500","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29173/ALR2500","url":null,"abstract":"This article considers sources of opposition to allowing access to medical assistance in dying for individuals with mental illness. It originated with an observation by members of the University of Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics that in mainstream Canadian culture — as well as in political, academic, and professional circles — such opposition remains widespread (and often reflexive). This opposition exists even in light of broad support for access to assisted dying for individuals with illness manifesting in physical suffering. Most Canadians treat the prospect of assisted dying for those with mental illness with suspicion, and it is worth exploring why this opposition persists, what arguments can be leveled to support it, and whether those arguments can be sustained. To that end, I identify five objections to assisted dying for the mentally ill that seem to characterize the public debate, and argue that none are sustainable. They either rely on false premises or otherwise fail to secure the conclusion that assisted dying should be off limits to people suffering from mental illness, even when such mental illness is their sole underlying condition.","PeriodicalId":54047,"journal":{"name":"ALBERTA LAW REVIEW","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2018-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41792576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In R. v. Marakah, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada decided that senders of electronic text communications maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy over their messages even after they are copied to recipients’ devices. The dissenters argued, in contrast, that any such expectation is objectively unreasonable given senders’ inability to control the messages after delivery. The Supreme Court did not settle the question, however, of whether this expectation can be defeated by a recipient’s voluntary decision to allow police to search his or her own device. Indeed, each side intimated that such a consent would be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.This article argues, nonetheless, that courts can and should use consent doctrine to avoid the “zero-sum” model of section 8 adjudication that characterizes the majority and dissenting reasons in Marakah. Properly interpreted, that doctrine preserves Marakah’s core holding — that senders do not reasonably expect unfettered state access to their received text communications — while also giving effect to recipients’ autonomous decisions to assist police.However, as with oral communications, a recipient’s consent to disclose a sender’s text communications to police should only defeat the sender’s expectation of privacy over preexisting messages. Contrary to several lower court decisions, this article argues that the acquisition of future, incoming communications from recipients’ devices (with or without consent) invades senders’ reasonable expectations of privacy under section 8 of the Charter and constitutes an “interception” requiring judicial authorization under section 184.2 of the Criminal Code.
在R. v. Marakah一案中，加拿大最高法院的多数法官裁定，电子文本通信的发送者即使在信息被复制到接收方的设备上后，仍对其信息的隐私保持合理的期望。相反，反对者认为，鉴于发送者在发送后无法控制信息，任何这样的期望在客观上都是不合理的。然而，最高法院并没有解决这个问题，即这种期望是否可以被接受者自愿决定允许警察搜查他或她自己的设备所击败。事实上，双方都暗示，要获得这样的同意即使不是不可能，也是很困难的。尽管如此，本文认为，法院可以而且应该使用同意原则来避免第8条裁决的“零和”模式，这种模式是Marakah案中多数和反对理由的特征。正确地解释，这一原则保留了Marakah的核心主张——发送者不合理地期望政府不受约束地访问他们收到的短信——同时也使接收者自主决定协助警方。然而，与口头交流一样，接收方同意向警方披露发送方的文本通信内容，只会破坏发送方对先前存在的信息的隐私期望。与几项下级法院的判决相反，本文认为，根据《宪章》第8条，从接收方的设备(无论是否同意)获取未来的传入通信侵犯了发送方对隐私的合理期望，并构成了根据《刑法》第184.2条需要司法授权的“拦截”。
{"title":"Consent Searches for Electronic Text Communications: Escaping the Zero-Sum Trap","authors":"S. Penney","doi":"10.29173/ALR2494","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29173/ALR2494","url":null,"abstract":"In R. v. Marakah, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada decided that senders of electronic text communications maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy over their messages even after they are copied to recipients’ devices. The dissenters argued, in contrast, that any such expectation is objectively unreasonable given senders’ inability to control the messages after delivery. The Supreme Court did not settle the question, however, of whether this expectation can be defeated by a recipient’s voluntary decision to allow police to search his or her own device. Indeed, each side intimated that such a consent would be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.This article argues, nonetheless, that courts can and should use consent doctrine to avoid the “zero-sum” model of section 8 adjudication that characterizes the majority and dissenting reasons in Marakah. Properly interpreted, that doctrine preserves Marakah’s core holding — that senders do not reasonably expect unfettered state access to their received text communications — while also giving effect to recipients’ autonomous decisions to assist police.However, as with oral communications, a recipient’s consent to disclose a sender’s text communications to police should only defeat the sender’s expectation of privacy over preexisting messages. Contrary to several lower court decisions, this article argues that the acquisition of future, incoming communications from recipients’ devices (with or without consent) invades senders’ reasonable expectations of privacy under section 8 of the Charter and constitutes an “interception” requiring judicial authorization under section 184.2 of the Criminal Code.","PeriodicalId":54047,"journal":{"name":"ALBERTA LAW REVIEW","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2018-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41626366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, Gillian Calder, P. Cochran, Maneesha Deckha, Freya Kodar, H. Lessard, P. Parmar, K. Plyley, Mark N. Zion
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{"title":"Claire L’Heureux-Dubé: A Life, Constance Backhouse (Vancouver: UBC Press for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2017)","authors":"Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, Gillian Calder, P. Cochran, Maneesha Deckha, Freya Kodar, H. Lessard, P. Parmar, K. Plyley, Mark N. Zion","doi":"10.29173/ALR2504","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29173/ALR2504","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p>None.</jats:p>","PeriodicalId":54047,"journal":{"name":"ALBERTA LAW REVIEW","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2018-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42675834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Indian Mining Regulations were adopted in 1954, revised in 1961, and amended in 1968 and 1978 as a means to promote mineral resource development on First Nation reserves, where First Nations hold title to the mineral resource. In this article, the Indian Mining Regulations, as part of a suite of regulations associated with the Indian Act, are outlined in relationship to Saskatchewan mining law. First is a general survey of First Nations’ mineral titles across Canada where the Indian Mining Regulations apply. This article then discusses the application of these Regulations; compliance with provincial law; the disposition of minerals; permits; leases; and, finally, the assignment of royalties. It is recommended that a critical review of mineral resource potentials, exploration, mine permitting, and standards for environmental monitoring and reclamation be established prior to any assignment of the existing Indian Mining Regulations against any mineral resource development that occurs on First Nation lands or reserves.
{"title":"A Systematic Review of the Indian Mining Regulations in Comparison to Saskatchewan Mining Law Where the First Nations Holds Mineral Title","authors":"P. Mills","doi":"10.29173/ALR2503","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29173/ALR2503","url":null,"abstract":"The Indian Mining Regulations were adopted in 1954, revised in 1961, and amended in 1968 and 1978 as a means to promote mineral resource development on First Nation reserves, where First Nations hold title to the mineral resource. In this article, the Indian Mining Regulations, as part of a suite of regulations associated with the Indian Act, are outlined in relationship to Saskatchewan mining law. First is a general survey of First Nations’ mineral titles across Canada where the Indian Mining Regulations apply. This article then discusses the application of these Regulations; compliance with provincial law; the disposition of minerals; permits; leases; and, finally, the assignment of royalties. It is recommended that a critical review of mineral resource potentials, exploration, mine permitting, and standards for environmental monitoring and reclamation be established prior to any assignment of the existing Indian Mining Regulations against any mineral resource development that occurs on First Nation lands or reserves.","PeriodicalId":54047,"journal":{"name":"ALBERTA LAW REVIEW","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2018-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48027565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For infant plaintiffs, personal injury litigation damage awards for loss of earning capacity are highly speculative. To quantify damages, courts rely on general population statistics and often consider the gender of the plaintiff. This article examines ways in which courts have discounted damages to minor female plaintiffs. The author notes that this discounting broadly occurs in two ways, through the use of gendered statistics and through the application of female specific contingencies. While the courts have justified gender specific damages on the basis that tort law aims to be corrective, the author argues that these practices are no more appropriate than reducing damage awards based on factors such as race or ethnicity. The author concludes that tort law is capable of evolution and it is time that the practice of gender based damages be retired.
{"title":"Apples to Oranges? Gendered Damages in Personal Injury Litigation: A Focus on Infant Claims","authors":"Kathleen Renaud","doi":"10.29173/ALR2502","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29173/ALR2502","url":null,"abstract":"For infant plaintiffs, personal injury litigation damage awards for loss of earning capacity are highly speculative. To quantify damages, courts rely on general population statistics and often consider the gender of the plaintiff. This article examines ways in which courts have discounted damages to minor female plaintiffs. The author notes that this discounting broadly occurs in two ways, through the use of gendered statistics and through the application of female specific contingencies. While the courts have justified gender specific damages on the basis that tort law aims to be corrective, the author argues that these practices are no more appropriate than reducing damage awards based on factors such as race or ethnicity. The author concludes that tort law is capable of evolution and it is time that the practice of gender based damages be retired.","PeriodicalId":54047,"journal":{"name":"ALBERTA LAW REVIEW","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2018-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45404835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article argues that Canadian law plays a central role in creating and ameliorating conditions of disaster vulnerability. Using the circumstances surrounding the 2016 Fort McMurray wildfire for context, the article identifies and assesses the shared, structural features of Canada’s emergency management laws and their application to “natural” disasters. This article argues that these laws lag behind foundational social science research on disasters. It argues that Canadian emergency management laws fail to incorporate a multi-faceted vulnerability perspective, which leaves communities unnecessarily susceptible to disaster harm. This article offers some preliminary suggestions on how Canadian disaster law can begin to integrate a vulnerability perspective to rectify existing gaps and flaws at all stages of the disaster cycle.
{"title":"Vulnerability, Canadian Disaster Law, and The Beast","authors":"Jocelyn Stacey","doi":"10.29173/ALR2480","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29173/ALR2480","url":null,"abstract":"This article argues that Canadian law plays a central role in creating and ameliorating conditions of disaster vulnerability. Using the circumstances surrounding the 2016 Fort McMurray wildfire for context, the article identifies and assesses the shared, structural features of Canada’s emergency management laws and their application to “natural” disasters. This article argues that these laws lag behind foundational social science research on disasters. It argues that Canadian emergency management laws fail to incorporate a multi-faceted vulnerability perspective, which leaves communities unnecessarily susceptible to disaster harm. This article offers some preliminary suggestions on how Canadian disaster law can begin to integrate a vulnerability perspective to rectify existing gaps and flaws at all stages of the disaster cycle.","PeriodicalId":54047,"journal":{"name":"ALBERTA LAW REVIEW","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2018-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46971200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Canadian courts interpret statutes flexibly, as they remain unbridled by strict interpretive rules or principles. Consequently, ambiguity in statutory interpretation has emerged, particularly regarding the temporal application of statutory amendments. In this article, the author suggests that clearer rules should be established to remedy such uncertainty, focusing predominantly on clarifying the presumption against interference with vested rights. The article first proposes a step-by-step approach to the vested rights analysis, explaining how it operates and interacts with other temporal application presumptions. Next, the article traces the history and jurisprudence of the presumption against interference with vested rights, and attempts to resolve outstanding issues relating to the presumption. Finally, it applies this background to the proposed step-by-step approach, ultimately synthesizing the law and theory underpinning the discussed presumptions.
{"title":"The Presumption Against Interference with Vested Rights: Creating Structure out of the Confusion","authors":"Michael Custer","doi":"10.29173/ALR2486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29173/ALR2486","url":null,"abstract":"Canadian courts interpret statutes flexibly, as they remain unbridled by strict interpretive rules or principles. Consequently, ambiguity in statutory interpretation has emerged, particularly regarding the temporal application of statutory amendments. In this article, the author suggests that clearer rules should be established to remedy such uncertainty, focusing predominantly on clarifying the presumption against interference with vested rights. The article first proposes a step-by-step approach to the vested rights analysis, explaining how it operates and interacts with other temporal application presumptions. Next, the article traces the history and jurisprudence of the presumption against interference with vested rights, and attempts to resolve outstanding issues relating to the presumption. Finally, it applies this background to the proposed step-by-step approach, ultimately synthesizing the law and theory underpinning the discussed presumptions.","PeriodicalId":54047,"journal":{"name":"ALBERTA LAW REVIEW","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2018-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48717850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines the operation of “reasonable steps” as a statutory standard for analysis of the availability of the defence of belief in consent in sexual assault cases and concludes that application of section 273.2(b) of the Criminal Code, as presently worded, often undermines the legal validity and correctness of decisions about whether the accused acted with mens rea, a guilty, blameworthy state of mind. When the conduct of an accused who is alleged to have made a mistake about whether a complainant communicated consent is assessed by the hybrid subjective-objective reasonableness standard prescribed by section 273.2, many decision-makers rely on extra-legal criteria and assumptions grounded in their personal experience and opinion about what is reasonable. In the midst of debate over what the accused knew and what steps were “reasonable,” given what the accused knew, the legal definition of consent in section 273.1 is easily overlooked and decision-makers focus on facts that are legally irrelevant and prejudice rational deliberation. The result is failure to enforce the law. The author proposes: (1) that section 273.2 be amended to reflect the significant developments achieved in sexual consent jurisprudence since enactment of the provision in 1992; and (2) that, in the interim, the judiciary act with resolve to make full and proper use of the statutory and common law tools that are presently available to determine whether the accused acted with mens rea in relation to the absence of sexual consent.
{"title":"The Prejudicial Effects of \"Reasonable Steps\" in Analysis of Mens Rea and Sexual Consent: Two Solutions","authors":"Lucinda Vandervort","doi":"10.29173/ALR2482","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29173/ALR2482","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the operation of “reasonable steps” as a statutory standard for analysis of the availability of the defence of belief in consent in sexual assault cases and concludes that application of section 273.2(b) of the Criminal Code, as presently worded, often undermines the legal validity and correctness of decisions about whether the accused acted with mens rea, a guilty, blameworthy state of mind. When the conduct of an accused who is alleged to have made a mistake about whether a complainant communicated consent is assessed by the hybrid subjective-objective reasonableness standard prescribed by section 273.2, many decision-makers rely on extra-legal criteria and assumptions grounded in their personal experience and opinion about what is reasonable. In the midst of debate over what the accused knew and what steps were “reasonable,” given what the accused knew, the legal definition of consent in section 273.1 is easily overlooked and decision-makers focus on facts that are legally irrelevant and prejudice rational deliberation. The result is failure to enforce the law. The author proposes: (1) that section 273.2 be amended to reflect the significant developments achieved in sexual consent jurisprudence since enactment of the provision in 1992; and (2) that, in the interim, the judiciary act with resolve to make full and proper use of the statutory and common law tools that are presently available to determine whether the accused acted with mens rea in relation to the absence of sexual consent.","PeriodicalId":54047,"journal":{"name":"ALBERTA LAW REVIEW","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2018-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47253356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since 2015, new provisions have been added to Alberta’s Municipal Government Act (MGA) that arguably authorize municipalities to manage components of the environment, such as surface water resources and air quality at the local and regional geopolitical landscape scales. Since 2013, Part 17.1 enabled voluntary formation of “growth management boards” (GMBs) by two or more participating municipalities, and once appointed by the Minister, GMBs are empowered to create “growth plans” to govern growth-related land use decision-making processes within the boundaries of the participating municipalities. Part 17.1 was amended in 2016 and new regulations followed in 2017. City Charter provisions enacted in 2015 give broad governance powers to cities. MGA provisions that create both these new institutional arrangements do not preclude GMBs or cities from developing municipal environmental management objectives. Recent additional MGA amendments enacted as the Modernized Municipal Government Act (MMGA) in December 2016, and further amendments in the spring of 2017 added a preamble, defined “body of water” for the purposes of the MGA, provided for intermunicipal collaborative governance of land use, and amended the environmental reserve provisions and other regulatory aspects of Part 17: Planning and Development. Two new purposes of municipal government were added: “to work collaboratively with neighbouring municipalities to plan, deliver and fund intermunicipal services,” and “to foster the well-being of the environment.” In this article, amendments to the MGA since 2015 are examined and analyzed in light of Alberta’s regional watershed scale land use policy, legislation, and regulations to determine if Alberta municipalities are now authorized to manage the environment, specifically surface water resources and water quality.
{"title":"Do Recent Amendments to Alberta's Municipal Government Act Enable Management of Surface Water Resources and Air Quality?","authors":"J. Stewart","doi":"10.29173/alr2484","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29173/alr2484","url":null,"abstract":"Since 2015, new provisions have been added to Alberta’s Municipal Government Act (MGA) that arguably authorize municipalities to manage components of the environment, such as surface water resources and air quality at the local and regional geopolitical landscape scales. Since 2013, Part 17.1 enabled voluntary formation of “growth management boards” (GMBs) by two or more participating municipalities, and once appointed by the Minister, GMBs are empowered to create “growth plans” to govern growth-related land use decision-making processes within the boundaries of the participating municipalities. Part 17.1 was amended in 2016 and new regulations followed in 2017. City Charter provisions enacted in 2015 give broad governance powers to cities. MGA provisions that create both these new institutional arrangements do not preclude GMBs or cities from developing municipal environmental management objectives. Recent additional MGA amendments enacted as the Modernized Municipal Government Act (MMGA) in December 2016, and further amendments in the spring of 2017 added a preamble, defined “body of water” for the purposes of the MGA, provided for intermunicipal collaborative governance of land use, and amended the environmental reserve provisions and other regulatory aspects of Part 17: Planning and Development. Two new purposes of municipal government were added: “to work collaboratively with neighbouring municipalities to plan, deliver and fund intermunicipal services,” and “to foster the well-being of the environment.” In this article, amendments to the MGA since 2015 are examined and analyzed in light of Alberta’s regional watershed scale land use policy, legislation, and regulations to determine if Alberta municipalities are now authorized to manage the environment, specifically surface water resources and water quality.","PeriodicalId":54047,"journal":{"name":"ALBERTA LAW REVIEW","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2018-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43385670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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