HEYTHROP JOURNAL最新文献

This article aims to elucidate Conciliar Trinitarianism, the teaching that, in the Trinity, there exists one God, the Father, and two relationally distinct divine persons: the Son and the Spirit, who are homoousios with (i.e. of same substance as) the Father, through the novel metaphysical framework (or model) of Conciliar Aspectivalism. By integrating complex concepts from contemporary metaphysics, Conciliar Aspectivalism provides a coherent and philosophically robust framework for expressing the central tenets of Conciliar Trinitarianism in a way, however, that preserves fundamentality of the one God, the Father, and the absolute unity and singularity of the divine substance that is equally shared by the Trinitarian persons. Hence, through this elucidation, Conciliar Aspectivalism offers a unique perspective for understanding and articulating the core teaching of the Trinitarianism that is expressed by the Seven Ecumenical Councils within a metaphysically coherent framework.

This article examines the attitude of worship by drawing on insights from the contemporary debate about the attitude of love. This seems justified because a certain kind of love appears to be an integral part of worship. Furthermore, the debate about love is much more developed and nuanced than the debate about worship. However, not every aspect we ascribe to love can equally be ascribed to worship. In fact, love is a very diverse phenomenon. The challenge is to focus on a form of love that, like worship, can plausibly be directed towards God. Contrary to previous attempts, it is argued that a merely passive form of love is not a suitable candidate for understanding the kind of love at play in worship. Based on considerations about love, it will be claimed that worship is an active form of value appraisal that involves reverence, awe, praise, and admiration. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of this line of interpretation for metatheological considerations.

This article argues that John Duns Scotus's claim that Christ's passion was formally finite is motivated by his concern to formulate the theology of the atonement in conformity with the teaching of Chalcedon on the two natures of Christ, especially the claim that they are ‘unconfused’. Contemporary theologians sometimes object to Scotus's account because of a putative latent Nestorianism. In reply, the article builds on recent scholarship that has argued that Scotus is not a Nestorian, advancing the basis for that judgement. First, the article focuses on Scotus's account of the finite power of Christ's passion in Lectura III, d. 19, and shows why his argument is motivated by trinitarian and Christological considerations. Second, it assesses Scotus's arguments and demonstrates that Scotus makes a distinction between person and agency in Christ. Far from being Nestorian, Scotus shows us the importance of the distinction between the hypostatic union and the human and divine operations in Christ and presents an opportunity to reflect on how these two doctrinal points ought to be related. Third, the article evaluates Scotus's position, responding to an objection that we should not divide personhood from agency in Christ, as Scotus does.

René Girard's mimetic theory suggests that humans imitate not just behaviour but desire. Girard highlighted this mechanism's negative effects, such as conflict, violence, and scapegoating, but acknowledged that it can also lead to reconciliation and love. This less-explored positive potential has inspired several researchers, including Rebecca Adams, who introduced the concept of loving mimesis. Adams's work builds on Girard's theory, proposing that love can emerge when the model directs its desire towards the subjectivity of the imitating subject rather than objectifying them and starting a conflict with them. This paper critically examines Adams's interpretation, questioning her assumption that the model can entirely give up objectification and affirm the imitating subject's identity. The paper explores whether the model can fully bear the responsibility for the imitating subject's desire for subjectivity and argues that such a dynamic is only possible within Christianity. The analysis will compare Girard's mimetic theory with Adams's concept of loving mimesis and propose extending Adams's theory through the theology of imago Dei, where participants in the mimetic process are seen as subjects in mutual relationships, ultimately relating to God as the proto-subject.