Nebraska Symposium on Motivation最新文献

In summary, there are remarkably few studies focused on the genetic contributions to alcohol's reinforcing values. Almost all such studies examine the two-bottle preference test. Despite the deficiencies I have raised in its interpretation, a rodent genotype's willingness to drink ethanol when water is freely available offers a reasonable aggregate estimate of alcohol's reinforcing value relative to other genotypes (Green and Grahame 2008). As indicated above, however, preference drinking studies will likely never avoid the confounding role of taste preferences and most often yield intake levels not sufficient to yield a pharmacologically significant BAL. Thus, the quest for improved measures of reinforcing value continues. Of the potential motivational factors considered by McClearn in his seminal review in this series, we can safely conclude that rodent alcohol drinking is not primarily directed at obtaining calories. The role of taste (and odor) remains a challenge. McClearn appears to have been correct that especially those genotypes that avoid alcohol are probably doing so based on preingestive sensory cues; however, postingestive consequences are also important. Cunningham's intragastric model shows the role of both preingestional and postingestional modulating factors for the best known examples, the usually nearly absolutely alcohol-avoiding DBA/2J and HAP-2 mice. Much subsequent data reinforce McClearn's earlier conclusion that C57BL/6J mice, at least, do not regulate their intake around a given self-administered dose of alcohol by adjusting their intake. This leaves us with the puzzle of why nearly all genotypes, even those directionally selectively bred for high voluntary intake for many generations, fail to self-administer intoxicating amounts of alcohol. Since McClearn's review, many ingenious assays to index alcohol's motivational effects have been used extensively, and new methods for inducing dependence have supplanted the older ones prevalent in 1968. I have tried to identify promising areas where the power of genetics could be fruitfully harvested and generally feel that we have a much more clear idea now about some important experiments remaining to be performed.

Human beings have a sophisticated ability to reason about the minds of others, often referred to as using one's theory of mind or mentalizing. Just like any other cognitive ability, people engage in reasoning about other minds when it seems useful for achieving particular goals, but this ability remains disengaged otherwise. We suggest that understanding the factors that engage our ability to reason about the minds of others helps to explain anthropomorphism: cases in which people attribute minds to a wide range of nonhuman agents, including animals, mechanical and technological objects, and supernatural entities such as God. We suggest that engagement is guided by two basic motivations: (1) the motivation to explain and predict others' actions, and (2) the motivation to connect socially with others. When present, these motivational forces can lead people to attribute minds to almost any agent. When absent, the likelihood of attributing a mind to others, even other human beings, decreases. We suggest that understanding the factors that engage our theory of mind can help to explain the inverse process of dehumanization, and also why people might be indifferent to other people even when connecting to them would improve their momentary wellbeing.

In this chapter, I have called for greater attention to targets' experiences in theory and research on dehumanization. I have also argued that what we know from theory and research on targets' experiences of stigma and discrimination can inform how we pursue the understanding of targets' experiences of dehumanization. To this end, I have emphasized the utility of attention to the intersectionality of minority statuses in shaping discrimination experiences. I have also described theoretical frameworks grounded in different populations' experiences--including theories of discrimination as stressful life events or daily hassles, minority stress frameworks, and objectification theory--and offered examples of integrating these frameworks as a way to attend to intersectionality. As well, I have noted parallels between the areas of convergence across discrimination theories and emerging findings regarding the consequences of dehumanization for targets. Finally, I have described the broad outlines of a pantheoretical framework that reflects areas of convergence and complementary integration across the discrimination and dehumanization literatures. My hope is that this framework will encourage further attention to the potential distinctions between internalization and cognizance of discrimination, exploration of their potentially distinctive intermediary consequences, and consideration of a broader range of outcomes beyond individual health and well-being indicators, and including individual and collective social activism. I also hope that readers will contribute to the critical evaluation and refinement of this pantheoretical framework with continued attention to the intersectionality that characterizes people's identities and experiences of discrimination.

Recognizing or denying another's humanity varies predictably along apparently universal dimensions of the other's perceived warmth (trustworthiness) and competence. New data reveal distinct neural and behavioral signatures of (de)humanizing responses to distinct kinds of ingroups and outgroups on these dimensions. The most dehumanized outgroups (low on both warmth and competence) elicit disgust and avoidance, devalued as literally worth-less. In contrast, groups disliked for seeming cold but respected for competence elicit envy and Schadenfreude. Reactions to pitied outgroups--disrespected for seeming incompetent, but apparently likable enough for seeming trustworthy and warm--focus on prescriptions for their behavior. The humanization of ingroup members, who are both liked and respected, reflects individuating processes in impression formation, not necessarily accurate but at least three-dimensionally human.

Philosophical theorizing, research on self-objectification, and the newest empirical research on the objectification of others converge to support the notion that the objectification of women entails rendering women, quite literally, as objects. This chapter begins with a review of this literature and then moves onto the question of why women are viewed as objects. The answer offered is informed by terror management theory, and suggests that the need to manage a fear of death creates a fundamental problem with the physical body, and such difficulties resonate especially in reaction to women's--menstruating, lactating, childbearing--bodies, and men's attraction to them. Evidence is presented to support this, and for the position that this situation plays a role in, not just expectations for women to be beautiful, but in the literal transformation of women into inanimate--immortal--objects.

This chapter explores the ways in which the concept of "humanness" illuminates a wide and fascinating variety of psychological phenomena. After introducing the concept--everyday understandings of what it is to be human--we present a model of the diverse ways in which humanness can be denied to people. According to this model people may be perceived as lacking uniquely human characteristics, and thus likened to animals, or as lacking human nature, and thus likened to inanimate objects. Both of these forms of dehumanization occur with varying degrees of subtlety, from the explicit uses of derogatory animal metaphors, to stereotypes that ascribe lesser humanness or simpler minds to particular groups, to nonconscious associations between certain humans and nonhumans. After reviewing research on dehumanization through the lens of our model we examine additional topics that the psychology of humanness clarifies, notably the perception of nonhuman animals and the objectification of women. Humanness emerges as a concept that runs an integrating thread through a variety of research literatures.

Integrating objectification and system justification perspectives, this chapter offers a conception of self-objectification as a dominant cultural lens through which women come to view themselves that garners their compliance in the sexist status quo. This chapter begins with an overview of objectification theory (Fredrickson and Roberts 1997) and system justification theory (Jost and Banaji, 1994). Then, an integration of the two perspectives is presented that situates self-objectification in a system justification context, extending the scope of impact of self-objectification beyond the domains of body image and mental health. Empirical evidence is reviewed to demonstrate the direct and indirect ways that self-objectification works as a system-justifying device for many women. For example, as a self-perspective that increases in response to benevolently sexist ideology or as a potential obstacle to taking collective action on behalf of women, self-objectification functions as a motivational and ideological force that rationalizes and legitimizes a gender role hierarchy. This developing program of research attempts to deepen our understanding of self-objectification and the broader system-level implications of this self-perspective. The chapter concludes with a discussion of potential next steps and a call for continued scientific inquiry into the broader functions of self-objectification.