Pub Date : 2018-07-19DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190690649.003.0006
Anouk Barberousse
How should we think of the dynamics of science? What are the relationships between an earlier theory and the theory that has superseded it? This chapter introduces the heated debates on the nature of scientific change, at the intersection of philosophy of science and history of science, and their bearing on the more general question of the rationality of the scientific enterprise. It focuses on the issue of the continuity or discontinuity of scientific change and the various versions of the incommensurability thesis one may uphold. Historicist views are balanced against nagging questions regarding scientific progress (Is there such a thing? If so, how should it be defined?), the causes of scientific change (Are they to be found within scientific method itself?), and its necessity (Is the history of scientific developments an argument in favor of realism, or could we have had entirely different sciences?).
{"title":"Scientific Change","authors":"Anouk Barberousse","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190690649.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190690649.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"How should we think of the dynamics of science? What are the relationships between an earlier theory and the theory that has superseded it? This chapter introduces the heated debates on the nature of scientific change, at the intersection of philosophy of science and history of science, and their bearing on the more general question of the rationality of the scientific enterprise. It focuses on the issue of the continuity or discontinuity of scientific change and the various versions of the incommensurability thesis one may uphold. Historicist views are balanced against nagging questions regarding scientific progress (Is there such a thing? If so, how should it be defined?), the causes of scientific change (Are they to be found within scientific method itself?), and its necessity (Is the history of scientific developments an argument in favor of realism, or could we have had entirely different sciences?).","PeriodicalId":55327,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the Philosophy of Science","volume":"77 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2018-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86414359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-19DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780190690649.003.0017
P. Égré
This chapter is an enquiry into the goals and methods of linguistics, with the aim of understanding both the specifics of the discipline and the relationships between linguists’ take on the methodology of their field and general principles of philosophy of science. The first part highlights linguistics as an inquiry into language, as opposed to languages. The second part describes the shift from structural linguistics to generative grammar as a paradigm shift, involving major changes in both what is studied and how it is studied. The next section focuses on the empirical import of contemporary linguistics, discussing standards of explanation and prediction, as well as confirmation and refutation of linguistic hypotheses. The last part introduces linguistic universals, what they are and how they may be identified and explained, thus making explicit the connection with the goal of understanding not only the variety of languages but the faculty of language.
{"title":"Philosophy of Linguistics","authors":"P. Égré","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190690649.003.0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190690649.003.0017","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter is an enquiry into the goals and methods of linguistics, with the aim of understanding both the specifics of the discipline and the relationships between linguists’ take on the methodology of their field and general principles of philosophy of science. The first part highlights linguistics as an inquiry into language, as opposed to languages. The second part describes the shift from structural linguistics to generative grammar as a paradigm shift, involving major changes in both what is studied and how it is studied. The next section focuses on the empirical import of contemporary linguistics, discussing standards of explanation and prediction, as well as confirmation and refutation of linguistic hypotheses. The last part introduces linguistic universals, what they are and how they may be identified and explained, thus making explicit the connection with the goal of understanding not only the variety of languages but the faculty of language.","PeriodicalId":55327,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the Philosophy of Science","volume":"55 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2018-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73578219","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-19DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190690649.003.0015
M. Cozic
Although there are no doubts regarding the impact of economics in society and politics, doubts regarding its epistemological status endure. Does economics provide us with bona fide empirical theories? Are its mathematical models on a par with those of the hard sciences, or is its scientific character exaggerated? This chapter focuses on the key problem of the philosophy of economics: the reconciliation of its claim to empirical significance with what often appears as a non-empirical methodology, favoring deduction from a priori principles and showing little sensitivity to refutation by observation and experiment. Several attempts at answering this problem are considered, both in the Millian tradition and following neo-positivist approaches. Finally, the empirical status of the discipline is put in perspective with its recent extension to new fields of inquiry, such as behavioral economics and neuroeconomics, where experiments seem to be part of the core methodology.
{"title":"Philosophy of Economics","authors":"M. Cozic","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190690649.003.0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190690649.003.0015","url":null,"abstract":"Although there are no doubts regarding the impact of economics in society and politics, doubts regarding its epistemological status endure. Does economics provide us with bona fide empirical theories? Are its mathematical models on a par with those of the hard sciences, or is its scientific character exaggerated? This chapter focuses on the key problem of the philosophy of economics: the reconciliation of its claim to empirical significance with what often appears as a non-empirical methodology, favoring deduction from a priori principles and showing little sensitivity to refutation by observation and experiment. Several attempts at answering this problem are considered, both in the Millian tradition and following neo-positivist approaches. Finally, the empirical status of the discipline is put in perspective with its recent extension to new fields of inquiry, such as behavioral economics and neuroeconomics, where experiments seem to be part of the core methodology.","PeriodicalId":55327,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the Philosophy of Science","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2018-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74761652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-19DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780190690649.003.0014
J. Elster
This chapter addresses problems and themes in the social sciences. Social sciences are understood specifically as sciences that have (or should have) the following minimal characteristics: their object of study is human behavior and they follow a certain number of methodological principles, including a marked effort towards analytical clarity; the investigation of causal explanations through the formulation of causal laws or at least causal mechanisms; and a subscription to a form of methodological individualism, if an amended one, which puts at the heart of social science the notion of choice. We discuss three principal themes. The first raises the question of the status of laws in the social sciences and, in particular, that of “consequence laws,” otherwise known as functionalist explanations. The second theme takes up methodological individualism, as compared to holistic approaches. The last theme concerns hypotheses of rationality and self-interested motivations, which increasingly figure in social scientific explanations.
{"title":"Philosophy of Social Sciences","authors":"J. Elster","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190690649.003.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190690649.003.0014","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter addresses problems and themes in the social sciences. Social sciences are understood specifically as sciences that have (or should have) the following minimal characteristics: their object of study is human behavior and they follow a certain number of methodological principles, including a marked effort towards analytical clarity; the investigation of causal explanations through the formulation of causal laws or at least causal mechanisms; and a subscription to a form of methodological individualism, if an amended one, which puts at the heart of social science the notion of choice. We discuss three principal themes. The first raises the question of the status of laws in the social sciences and, in particular, that of “consequence laws,” otherwise known as functionalist explanations. The second theme takes up methodological individualism, as compared to holistic approaches. The last theme concerns hypotheses of rationality and self-interested motivations, which increasingly figure in social scientific explanations.","PeriodicalId":55327,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the Philosophy of Science","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2018-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84358641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-19DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780190690649.003.0007
Anouk Barberousse
Science studies have proposed a novel and integrated outlook on scientific activity, to be described in a quasi-anthropological way and without the supposed normative prejudice of most philosophers of science. This chapter examines the stiff competition between philosophy of science and science studies in accounting for what science really is about. This competition is best framed at a methodological level, in particular in terms of the relationship between the study of science and its history. Should one strive for ahistorical generalizations or focus on the irremediably singular low-level interactions that constitute the day-to-day business of scientific life? Should one accept to practice “judged history,” and put past theories in perspective with what we learned to be right and wrong about them, or should one refrain from any such overseeing perspective? The chapter concludes with prospects for accounting from within philosophy of science for the important phenomena that science studies have contributed.
{"title":"Philosophy of Science and Science Studies","authors":"Anouk Barberousse","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190690649.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190690649.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"Science studies have proposed a novel and integrated outlook on scientific activity, to be described in a quasi-anthropological way and without the supposed normative prejudice of most philosophers of science. This chapter examines the stiff competition between philosophy of science and science studies in accounting for what science really is about. This competition is best framed at a methodological level, in particular in terms of the relationship between the study of science and its history. Should one strive for ahistorical generalizations or focus on the irremediably singular low-level interactions that constitute the day-to-day business of scientific life? Should one accept to practice “judged history,” and put past theories in perspective with what we learned to be right and wrong about them, or should one refrain from any such overseeing perspective? The chapter concludes with prospects for accounting from within philosophy of science for the important phenomena that science studies have contributed.","PeriodicalId":55327,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the Philosophy of Science","volume":"95 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2018-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86283315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-19DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780190690649.003.0008
Pascal Ludwig
How are our scientific theories related to each other? Do they draw, together, a unified picture of the world, or should we infer from their disunity that reality is ontologically plural in some way? This chapter addresses the question of whether ontological pluralism is a defendable metaphysical thesis and whether philosophy of science has anything to say about it. It examines whether psychological phenomena possess an irreducible nature of their own that would be distinct from the nature of the phenomena studied by neuroscience. If, on the contrary, the explanatory gap between physics and special sciences is to be filled, the question is raised as to how it has to be done. Is conceptual analysis enough? Or should the explanatory gap be simply dismissed as being badly formulated? The chapter proposes a discussion of the current reductionist strategies.
{"title":"Reduction and Emergence","authors":"Pascal Ludwig","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190690649.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190690649.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"How are our scientific theories related to each other? Do they draw, together, a unified picture of the world, or should we infer from their disunity that reality is ontologically plural in some way? This chapter addresses the question of whether ontological pluralism is a defendable metaphysical thesis and whether philosophy of science has anything to say about it. It examines whether psychological phenomena possess an irreducible nature of their own that would be distinct from the nature of the phenomena studied by neuroscience. If, on the contrary, the explanatory gap between physics and special sciences is to be filled, the question is raised as to how it has to be done. Is conceptual analysis enough? Or should the explanatory gap be simply dismissed as being badly formulated? The chapter proposes a discussion of the current reductionist strategies.","PeriodicalId":55327,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the Philosophy of Science","volume":"97 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2018-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77196039","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-19DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190690649.003.0004
M. Esfeld
This chapter outlines a metaphysics of science in the sense of a naturalized metaphysics. It considers in the first place the interplay of physics and metaphysics in Newtonian mechanics, then goes into the issues for the metaphysics of time that relativity physics raises, shows that what one considers as the referent of quantum theory depends on metaphysical considerations, and finally explains how the stance that one takes with respect to objective modality and laws of nature shapes the options that are available for an ontology of quantum physics. In that way, this chapter seeks to make a case for a natural philosophy that treats physics and metaphysics as inseparable in the enquiry into the constitution of the world, there being neither a neo-positivist way of deducing metaphysics from the formalisms of physical theories, nor a neo-rationalist realm of investigation for metaphysics that is independent of physics.
{"title":"Metaphysics of Science as Naturalized Metaphysics","authors":"M. Esfeld","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190690649.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190690649.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter outlines a metaphysics of science in the sense of a naturalized metaphysics. It considers in the first place the interplay of physics and metaphysics in Newtonian mechanics, then goes into the issues for the metaphysics of time that relativity physics raises, shows that what one considers as the referent of quantum theory depends on metaphysical considerations, and finally explains how the stance that one takes with respect to objective modality and laws of nature shapes the options that are available for an ontology of quantum physics. In that way, this chapter seeks to make a case for a natural philosophy that treats physics and metaphysics as inseparable in the enquiry into the constitution of the world, there being neither a neo-positivist way of deducing metaphysics from the formalisms of physical theories, nor a neo-rationalist realm of investigation for metaphysics that is independent of physics.","PeriodicalId":55327,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the Philosophy of Science","volume":"55 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2018-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84761531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-19DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190690649.003.0011
Anouk Barberousse
Philosophical reflections on physics and its theories have been shaping the agenda of general philosophy of science, including issues such as the nature of scientific theories, the meaning of scientific terms, and scientific modeling. But physics is also well worth being considered a special science of its own, whose methods and tools raised specific questions for philosophers of science: this is the approach followed in this chapter, which has as its main thread the role of mathematics in physical theories. It tackles classical issues concerning measurement and determinism and long-standing controversies in the philosophy of statistical mechanics (how may the reversible laws of mechanics account for the irreversible principles of thermodynamics?) and in the philosophy of quantum physics (does quantum mechanics provide us a with a complete description of quantum phenomena?). It also addresses emerging issues in the field, such as computer simulations and their role between theory and observation.
{"title":"Philosophy of Physics","authors":"Anouk Barberousse","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190690649.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190690649.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophical reflections on physics and its theories have been shaping the agenda of general philosophy of science, including issues such as the nature of scientific theories, the meaning of scientific terms, and scientific modeling. But physics is also well worth being considered a special science of its own, whose methods and tools raised specific questions for philosophers of science: this is the approach followed in this chapter, which has as its main thread the role of mathematics in physical theories. It tackles classical issues concerning measurement and determinism and long-standing controversies in the philosophy of statistical mechanics (how may the reversible laws of mechanics account for the irreversible principles of thermodynamics?) and in the philosophy of quantum physics (does quantum mechanics provide us a with a complete description of quantum phenomena?). It also addresses emerging issues in the field, such as computer simulations and their role between theory and observation.","PeriodicalId":55327,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the Philosophy of Science","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2018-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82232910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-19DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780190690649.003.0009
P. Rouilhan
Logic may be characterized as the science aiming at revealing the deep logical structure of statements and, correlatively, at evaluating the arguments involving such statements. This chapter focuses on the content of different categories of expression of ordinary language, a question that arises typically in the analysis of singular terms and propositional attitudes. It starts from the paradoxes of the “indiscernibility of identicals” and goes through two main solutions to these paradoxes: a “logic of sense and denotation” (à la Frege) and a “logic of meaning” (à la Russell). A logic halfway between the two is also discussed. In the closing section, a comparative appraisal of these solutions is proposed.
逻辑可以被描述为旨在揭示陈述的深层逻辑结构，并相应地评估涉及这些陈述的论证的科学。这一章的重点是日常语言的不同表达范畴的内容，这是一个在分析单数术语和命题态度时典型出现的问题。它从“同一性的不可区分性”的悖论出发，并经历了对这些悖论的两种主要解决方案:“意义与外延的逻辑”( la Frege)和“意义的逻辑”( la Russell)。本文还讨论了介于两者之间的一种逻辑。在最后一节，对这些解决方案进行了比较评价。
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Pub Date : 2018-07-19DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190690649.003.0010
Denis Bonnay
Philosophy of mathematics deals both with ontological issues (what is it that mathematics studies?) and epistemological issues (how is mathematical knowledge possible?). This chapter reviews the main answers given to these two sets of issues, stressing how interrelated they are. It starts from the classical opposition between empiricist, rational, and critical approaches to set the sage and poses the question of mathematics’ relationship with experience as well as the one of the respective roles of intuition and logical principles. A detailed account of two anti-realist programs (finitism and intuitionism) is provided. Arguments in favor of realism are presented, and distinct realist views are distinguished. Having confronted the epistemological difficulties of various realist views, the last part of the chapter deals with naturalist perspectives and mathematical structuralism.
{"title":"Philosophy of Mathematics","authors":"Denis Bonnay","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190690649.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190690649.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophy of mathematics deals both with ontological issues (what is it that mathematics studies?) and epistemological issues (how is mathematical knowledge possible?). This chapter reviews the main answers given to these two sets of issues, stressing how interrelated they are. It starts from the classical opposition between empiricist, rational, and critical approaches to set the sage and poses the question of mathematics’ relationship with experience as well as the one of the respective roles of intuition and logical principles. A detailed account of two anti-realist programs (finitism and intuitionism) is provided. Arguments in favor of realism are presented, and distinct realist views are distinguished. Having confronted the epistemological difficulties of various realist views, the last part of the chapter deals with naturalist perspectives and mathematical structuralism.","PeriodicalId":55327,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the Philosophy of Science","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2018-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78955882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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