Pub Date : 2005-05-08DOI: 10.1504/IJSN.2009.023425
Jonathan M. McCune, A. Perrig, M. Reiter
Current mechanisms for authenticating communication between devices that share no prior context are inconvenient for ordinary users, without the assistance of a trusted authority. We present and analyze seeing-is-believing, a system that utilizes 2D barcodes and camera-telephones to implement a visual channel for authentication and demonstrative identification of devices. We apply this visual channel to several problems in computer security, including authenticated key exchange between devices that share no prior context, establishment of a trusted path for configuration of a TCG-compliant computing platform, and secure device configuration in the context of a smart home.
{"title":"Seeing-is-believing: using camera phones for human-verifiable authentication","authors":"Jonathan M. McCune, A. Perrig, M. Reiter","doi":"10.1504/IJSN.2009.023425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJSN.2009.023425","url":null,"abstract":"Current mechanisms for authenticating communication between devices that share no prior context are inconvenient for ordinary users, without the assistance of a trusted authority. We present and analyze seeing-is-believing, a system that utilizes 2D barcodes and camera-telephones to implement a visual channel for authentication and demonstrative identification of devices. We apply this visual channel to several problems in computer security, including authenticated key exchange between devices that share no prior context, establishment of a trusted path for configuration of a TCG-compliant computing platform, and secure device configuration in the context of a smart home.","PeriodicalId":6366,"journal":{"name":"2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05)","volume":"20 1","pages":"110-124"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73416770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yinglian Xie, V. Sekar, D. Maltz, M. Reiter, Hui Zhang
We propose a novel technique that can determine both the host responsible for originating a propagating worm attack and the set of attack flows that make up the initial stages of the attack tree via which the worm infected successive generations of victims. We argue that knowledge of both is important for combating worms: knowledge of the origin supports law enforcement, and knowledge of the causal flows that advance the attack supports diagnosis of how network defenses were breached. Our technique exploits the "wide tree" shape of a worm propagation emanating from the source by performing random "moonwalks" backward in time along paths of flows. Correlating the repeated walks reveals the initial causal flows, thereby aiding in identifying the source. Using analysis, simulation, and experiments with real world traces, we show how the technique works against both today's fast propagating worms and stealthy worms that attempt to hide their attack flows among background traffic.
{"title":"Worm origin identification using random moonwalks","authors":"Yinglian Xie, V. Sekar, D. Maltz, M. Reiter, Hui Zhang","doi":"10.1109/SP.2005.23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2005.23","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a novel technique that can determine both the host responsible for originating a propagating worm attack and the set of attack flows that make up the initial stages of the attack tree via which the worm infected successive generations of victims. We argue that knowledge of both is important for combating worms: knowledge of the origin supports law enforcement, and knowledge of the causal flows that advance the attack supports diagnosis of how network defenses were breached. Our technique exploits the \"wide tree\" shape of a worm propagation emanating from the source by performing random \"moonwalks\" backward in time along paths of flows. Correlating the repeated walks reveals the initial causal flows, thereby aiding in identifying the source. Using analysis, simulation, and experiments with real world traces, we show how the technique works against both today's fast propagating worms and stealthy worms that attempt to hide their attack flows among background traffic.","PeriodicalId":6366,"journal":{"name":"2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05)","volume":"28 1","pages":"242-256"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84420146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we propose BIND (binding instructions and data), a fine-grained attestation service for securing distributed systems. Code attestation has recently received considerable attention in trusted computing. However, current code attestation technology is relatively immature. First, due to the great variability in software versions and configurations, verification of the hash is difficult. Second, the time-of-use and time-of-attestation discrepancy remains to be addressed, since the code may be correct at the time of the attestation, but it may be compromised by the time of use. The goal of BIND is to address these issues and make code attestation more usable in securing distributed systems. BIND offers the following properties: (1) BIND performs fine-grained attestation. Instead of attesting to the entire memory content, BIND attests only to the piece of code we are concerned about. This greatly simplifies verification. (2) BIND narrows the gap between time-of-attestation and time-of-use. BIND measures a piece of code immediately before it is executed and uses a sandboxing mechanism to protect the execution of the attested code. (3) BIND ties the code attestation with the data that the code produces, such that we can pinpoint what code has been run to generate that data. In addition, by incorporating the verification of input data integrity into the attestation, BIND offers transitive integrity verification, i.e., through one signature, we can vouch for the entire chain of processes that have performed transformations over a piece of data. BIND offers a general solution toward establishing a trusted environment for distributed system designers.
{"title":"BIND: a fine-grained attestation service for secure distributed systems","authors":"E. Shi, A. Perrig, L. V. Doorn","doi":"10.1109/SP.2005.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2005.4","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we propose BIND (binding instructions and data), a fine-grained attestation service for securing distributed systems. Code attestation has recently received considerable attention in trusted computing. However, current code attestation technology is relatively immature. First, due to the great variability in software versions and configurations, verification of the hash is difficult. Second, the time-of-use and time-of-attestation discrepancy remains to be addressed, since the code may be correct at the time of the attestation, but it may be compromised by the time of use. The goal of BIND is to address these issues and make code attestation more usable in securing distributed systems. BIND offers the following properties: (1) BIND performs fine-grained attestation. Instead of attesting to the entire memory content, BIND attests only to the piece of code we are concerned about. This greatly simplifies verification. (2) BIND narrows the gap between time-of-attestation and time-of-use. BIND measures a piece of code immediately before it is executed and uses a sandboxing mechanism to protect the execution of the attested code. (3) BIND ties the code attestation with the data that the code produces, such that we can pinpoint what code has been run to generate that data. In addition, by incorporating the verification of input data integrity into the attestation, BIND offers transitive integrity verification, i.e., through one signature, we can vouch for the entire chain of processes that have performed transformations over a piece of data. BIND offers a general solution toward establishing a trusted environment for distributed system designers.","PeriodicalId":6366,"journal":{"name":"2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05)","volume":"39 1","pages":"154-168"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76145772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Host-based intrusion detection systems attempt to identify attacks by discovering program behaviors that deviate from expected patterns. While the idea of performing behavior validation on-the-fly and terminating errant tasks as soon as a violation is detected is appealing, existing systems exhibit serious shortcomings in terms of accuracy and/or efficiency. To gain acceptance, a number of technical advances are needed. In this paper we focus on automated, conservative, intrusion detection techniques, i.e. techniques which do not require human intervention and do not suffer from false positives. We present a static analysis algorithm for constructing a flow- and context-sensitive model of a program that allows for efficient online validation. Context-sensitivity is essential to reduce the number of impossible control-flow paths accepted by the intrusion detection system because such paths provide opportunities for attackers to evade detection. An important consideration for on-the-fly intrusion detection is to reduce the performance overhead caused by monitoring. Compared to the existing approaches, our inlined automaton model (IAM) presents a good tradeoff between accuracy and performance. On a 32K line program, the monitoring overhead is negligible. While the space requirements of a naive IAM implementation can be quite high, compaction techniques can be employed to substantially reduce that footprint.
{"title":"Efficient intrusion detection using automaton inlining","authors":"R. Gopalakrishna, E. Spafford, J. Vitek","doi":"10.1109/SP.2005.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2005.1","url":null,"abstract":"Host-based intrusion detection systems attempt to identify attacks by discovering program behaviors that deviate from expected patterns. While the idea of performing behavior validation on-the-fly and terminating errant tasks as soon as a violation is detected is appealing, existing systems exhibit serious shortcomings in terms of accuracy and/or efficiency. To gain acceptance, a number of technical advances are needed. In this paper we focus on automated, conservative, intrusion detection techniques, i.e. techniques which do not require human intervention and do not suffer from false positives. We present a static analysis algorithm for constructing a flow- and context-sensitive model of a program that allows for efficient online validation. Context-sensitivity is essential to reduce the number of impossible control-flow paths accepted by the intrusion detection system because such paths provide opportunities for attackers to evade detection. An important consideration for on-the-fly intrusion detection is to reduce the performance overhead caused by monitoring. Compared to the existing approaches, our inlined automaton model (IAM) presents a good tradeoff between accuracy and performance. On a 32K line program, the monitoring overhead is negligible. While the space requirements of a naive IAM implementation can be quite high, compaction techniques can be employed to substantially reduce that footprint.","PeriodicalId":6366,"journal":{"name":"2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05)","volume":"97 1","pages":"18-31"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81363945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We present an adaptive tree-log scheme to improve the performance of checking the integrity of arbitrarily large untrusted data, when using only a small fixed-sized trusted state. Currently, hash trees are used to check the data. In many systems that use hash trees, programs perform many data operations before performing a critical operation that exports a result outside of the program's execution environment. The adaptive tree-log scheme we present uses this observation to harness the power of the constant runtime bandwidth overhead of a log-based scheme. For all programs, the adaptive tree-log scheme's bandwidth overhead is guaranteed to never be worse than a parameterizable worst case bound. Furthermore, for all programs, as the average number of times the program accesses data between critical operations increases, the adaptive tree-log scheme's bandwidth overhead moves from a logarithmic to a constant bandwidth overhead.
{"title":"Towards constant bandwidth overhead integrity checking of untrusted data","authors":"Dwaine E. Clarke","doi":"10.1109/SP.2005.24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2005.24","url":null,"abstract":"We present an adaptive tree-log scheme to improve the performance of checking the integrity of arbitrarily large untrusted data, when using only a small fixed-sized trusted state. Currently, hash trees are used to check the data. In many systems that use hash trees, programs perform many data operations before performing a critical operation that exports a result outside of the program's execution environment. The adaptive tree-log scheme we present uses this observation to harness the power of the constant runtime bandwidth overhead of a log-based scheme. For all programs, the adaptive tree-log scheme's bandwidth overhead is guaranteed to never be worse than a parameterizable worst case bound. Furthermore, for all programs, as the average number of times the program accesses data between critical operations increases, the adaptive tree-log scheme's bandwidth overhead moves from a logarithmic to a constant bandwidth overhead.","PeriodicalId":6366,"journal":{"name":"2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05)","volume":"21 1","pages":"139-153"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90667799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
An apparently prevailing myth is that safety is undecidable in discretionary access control (DAC); therefore, one needs to invent new DAC schemes in which safety analysis is decidable. In this paper we dispel this myth. We argue that DAC should not be equated with the Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman (1976) access matrix scheme, in which safety is undecidable. We present an efficient (running time cubic in its input size) algorithm for deciding safety in the Graham-Denning (1972) DAC scheme, which subsumes the DAC schemes used in the literature on comparing DAC with other access control models. We also counter several claims made in recent work by Solworth and Sloan (2004), in which the authors present a new access control scheme based on labels and relabelling and assert that it can implement the full range of DAC models. We present a precise characterization of their access control scheme and show that it does not adequately capture a relatively simple DAC scheme.
{"title":"On safety in discretionary access control","authors":"Ninghui Li, Mahesh V. Tripunitara","doi":"10.1109/SP.2005.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2005.14","url":null,"abstract":"An apparently prevailing myth is that safety is undecidable in discretionary access control (DAC); therefore, one needs to invent new DAC schemes in which safety analysis is decidable. In this paper we dispel this myth. We argue that DAC should not be equated with the Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman (1976) access matrix scheme, in which safety is undecidable. We present an efficient (running time cubic in its input size) algorithm for deciding safety in the Graham-Denning (1972) DAC scheme, which subsumes the DAC schemes used in the literature on comparing DAC with other access control models. We also counter several claims made in recent work by Solworth and Sloan (2004), in which the authors present a new access control scheme based on labels and relabelling and assert that it can implement the full range of DAC models. We present a precise characterization of their access control scheme and show that it does not adequately capture a relatively simple DAC scheme.","PeriodicalId":6366,"journal":{"name":"2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05)","volume":"1 1","pages":"96-109"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76209831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We present a methodology to automatically construct robust signatures whose accuracy is based on formal reasoning so it can be systematically evaluated. Our methodology is based on two formal languages that describe different properties of a given attack. The first language, called a session signature, describes temporal relations between the attack events. The second, called an attack invariant, describes semantic properties that hold in any instance of the attack. For example, an invariant may state that a given FTP attack must include a successful FTP login and can be launched only after the FTP representation mode has been set to ASCII. We iteratively eliminate false positives and negatives from an initial session signature by comparing the signature language to the language of the invariant. We developed GARD, a tool for session-signature construction, and used it to construct session signatures for multi-step attacks. We show that a session signature is more accurate than existing signatures.
{"title":"Language-based generation and evaluation of NIDS signatures","authors":"Shai Rubin, S. Jha, B. Miller","doi":"10.1109/SP.2005.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2005.10","url":null,"abstract":"We present a methodology to automatically construct robust signatures whose accuracy is based on formal reasoning so it can be systematically evaluated. Our methodology is based on two formal languages that describe different properties of a given attack. The first language, called a session signature, describes temporal relations between the attack events. The second, called an attack invariant, describes semantic properties that hold in any instance of the attack. For example, an invariant may state that a given FTP attack must include a successful FTP login and can be launched only after the FTP representation mode has been set to ASCII. We iteratively eliminate false positives and negatives from an initial session signature by comparing the signature language to the language of the invariant. We developed GARD, a tool for session-signature construction, and used it to construct session signatures for multi-step attacks. We show that a session signature is more accurate than existing signatures.","PeriodicalId":6366,"journal":{"name":"2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05)","volume":"86 1","pages":"3-17"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77995127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
So far sensor network broadcast protocols assume a trustworthy environment. However in safety and mission-critical sensor networks this assumption may not be valid and some sensor nodes might be adversarial. In these environments, malicious sensor nodes can deprive other nodes from receiving a broadcast message. We call this attack a denial-of-message attack (DoM). In this paper we model and analyze this attack, and present countermeasures. We present SIS, a secure implicit sampling scheme that permits a broadcasting base station to probabilistically detect the failure of nodes to receive its broadcast, even if these failures result from an attacker motivated to induce these failures undetectably. SIS works by eliciting authenticated acknowledgments from a subset of nodes per broadcast, where the subset is unpredictable to the attacker and tunable so as to mitigate acknowledgment implosion on the base station. We use a game-theoretic approach to evaluate this scheme in the face of an optimal attacker that attempts to maximize the number of nodes it denies the broadcast while remaining undetected by the base station, and show that SIS significantly constrains such an attacker even in sensor networks exhibiting high intrinsic loss rates. We also discuss extensions that permit more targeted detection capabilities.
{"title":"Detection of denial-of-message attacks on sensor network broadcasts","authors":"Jonathan M. McCune, E. Shi, A. Perrig, M. Reiter","doi":"10.1109/SP.2005.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2005.7","url":null,"abstract":"So far sensor network broadcast protocols assume a trustworthy environment. However in safety and mission-critical sensor networks this assumption may not be valid and some sensor nodes might be adversarial. In these environments, malicious sensor nodes can deprive other nodes from receiving a broadcast message. We call this attack a denial-of-message attack (DoM). In this paper we model and analyze this attack, and present countermeasures. We present SIS, a secure implicit sampling scheme that permits a broadcasting base station to probabilistically detect the failure of nodes to receive its broadcast, even if these failures result from an attacker motivated to induce these failures undetectably. SIS works by eliciting authenticated acknowledgments from a subset of nodes per broadcast, where the subset is unpredictable to the attacker and tunable so as to mitigate acknowledgment implosion on the base station. We use a game-theoretic approach to evaluate this scheme in the face of an optimal attacker that attempts to maximize the number of nodes it denies the broadcast while remaining undetected by the base station, and show that SIS significantly constrains such an attacker even in sensor networks exhibiting high intrinsic loss rates. We also discuss extensions that permit more targeted detection capabilities.","PeriodicalId":6366,"journal":{"name":"2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05)","volume":"69 1","pages":"64-78"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83234979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We present two new approaches to improving the integrity of network broadcasts and multicasts with low storage and computation overhead. The first approach is a leapfrog linking protocol for securing the integrity of packets as they traverse a network during a broadcast, such as in the setup phase for link-state routing. This technique allows each router to gain confidence about the integrity of a packet before passing it on to the next router; hence, allows many integrity violations to be stopped immediately in their tracks. The second approach is a novel key predistribution scheme that we use in conjunction with a small number of hashed message authentication codes (HMAC), which allows end-to-end integrity checking as well as improved hop-by-hop integrity checking. Our schemes are suited to environments, such as in ad hoc and overlay networks, where routers can share only a small number of symmetric keys. Moreover, our protocols do not use encryption (which, of course, can be added as an optional security enhancement). Instead, security is based strictly on the use of one-way hash functions; hence, our algorithms are considerably faster than those based on traditional public-key signature schemes. This improvement in speed comes with only modest reductions in the security for broadcasting, as our schemes can tolerate small numbers of malicious routers, provided they do not form significant cooperating coalitions.
{"title":"Leap-frog packet linking and diverse key distributions for improved integrity in network broadcasts","authors":"M. Goodrich","doi":"10.1109/SP.2005.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2005.11","url":null,"abstract":"We present two new approaches to improving the integrity of network broadcasts and multicasts with low storage and computation overhead. The first approach is a leapfrog linking protocol for securing the integrity of packets as they traverse a network during a broadcast, such as in the setup phase for link-state routing. This technique allows each router to gain confidence about the integrity of a packet before passing it on to the next router; hence, allows many integrity violations to be stopped immediately in their tracks. The second approach is a novel key predistribution scheme that we use in conjunction with a small number of hashed message authentication codes (HMAC), which allows end-to-end integrity checking as well as improved hop-by-hop integrity checking. Our schemes are suited to environments, such as in ad hoc and overlay networks, where routers can share only a small number of symmetric keys. Moreover, our protocols do not use encryption (which, of course, can be added as an optional security enhancement). Instead, security is based strictly on the use of one-way hash functions; hence, our algorithms are considerably faster than those based on traditional public-key signature schemes. This improvement in speed comes with only modest reductions in the security for broadcasting, as our schemes can tolerate small numbers of malicious routers, provided they do not form significant cooperating coalitions.","PeriodicalId":6366,"journal":{"name":"2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05)","volume":"118 1","pages":"196-207"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89121522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tor is the second generation onion router supporting the anonymous transport of TCP streams over the Internet. Its low latency makes it very suitable for common tasks, such as Web browsing, but insecure against traffic-analysis attacks by a global passive adversary. We present new traffic-analysis techniques that allow adversaries with only a partial view of the network to infer which nodes are being used to relay the anonymous streams and therefore greatly reduce the anonymity provided by Tor. Furthermore, we show that otherwise unrelated streams can be linked back to the same initiator Our attack is feasible for the adversary anticipated by the Tor designers. Our theoretical attacks are backed up by experiments performed on the deployed, albeit experimental, Tor network. Our techniques should also be applicable to any low latency anonymous network. These attacks highlight the relationship between the field of traffic-analysis and more traditional computer security issues, such as covert channel analysis. Our research also highlights that the inability to directly observe network links does not prevent an attacker from performing traffic-analysis: the adversary can use the anonymising network as an oracle to infer the traffic load on remote nodes in order to perform traffic-analysis.
{"title":"Low-cost traffic analysis of Tor","authors":"S. Murdoch, G. Danezis","doi":"10.1109/SP.2005.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2005.12","url":null,"abstract":"Tor is the second generation onion router supporting the anonymous transport of TCP streams over the Internet. Its low latency makes it very suitable for common tasks, such as Web browsing, but insecure against traffic-analysis attacks by a global passive adversary. We present new traffic-analysis techniques that allow adversaries with only a partial view of the network to infer which nodes are being used to relay the anonymous streams and therefore greatly reduce the anonymity provided by Tor. Furthermore, we show that otherwise unrelated streams can be linked back to the same initiator Our attack is feasible for the adversary anticipated by the Tor designers. Our theoretical attacks are backed up by experiments performed on the deployed, albeit experimental, Tor network. Our techniques should also be applicable to any low latency anonymous network. These attacks highlight the relationship between the field of traffic-analysis and more traditional computer security issues, such as covert channel analysis. Our research also highlights that the inability to directly observe network links does not prevent an attacker from performing traffic-analysis: the adversary can use the anonymising network as an oracle to infer the traffic load on remote nodes in order to perform traffic-analysis.","PeriodicalId":6366,"journal":{"name":"2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05)","volume":"1 1","pages":"183-195"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89273800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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