International journal of health care finance and economics最新文献

Efficient contracting of health care requires effective consumer channeling. Little is known about the effectiveness of channeling strategies. We study channeling incentives on pharmacy choice using a large scale discrete choice experiment. Financial incentives prove to be effective. Positive financial incentives are less effective than negative financial incentives. Channeling through qualitative incentives also leads to a significant impact on provider choice. While incentives help to channel, a strong status quo bias needs to be overcome before consumers change pharmacies. Focusing on consumers who are forced to choose a new pharmacy seems to be the most effective strategy.

Basic economic theory suggests that health insurance coverage may cause a reduction in prevention activities, but empirical studies have yet to provide much evidence to support this prediction. However, in other insurance contexts that involve adverse health events, evidence of ex ante moral hazard is more consistent. In this paper, we extend the analysis of the effect of health insurance on health behaviors by allowing for the possibility that health insurance has a direct (ex ante moral hazard) and indirect effect on health behaviors. The indirect effect works through changes in health promotion information and the probability of illness that may be a byproduct of insurance-induced greater contact with medical professionals. We identify these two effects and in doing so identify the pure ex ante moral hazard effect. This study exploits the plausibly exogenous variation in health insurance as a result of obtaining Medicare coverage at age 65. We find evidence that obtaining health insurance reduces prevention and increases unhealthy behaviors among elderly men. We also find evidence that physician counseling is successful in changing health behaviors.

This paper aims to incorporate option values into the economic evaluation of positron emission tomography (PET). The installation of this equipment requires a substantial capital outlay, while uncertainty, especially regarding the possibility of new applications, is relevant, because the evidence available is still insufficient. Treating the number of examinations to provide as a stochastic variable, the cost-effectiveness analysis is extended to include the value of flexibility both with respect to the timing of investment and to the size of the project. The threshold values of the stochastic variable that ensure the cost-effectiveness of a PET scan according to this approach are obtained as a function of the value of the incremental effectiveness.

Prospective payment schemes in health care often include supply-side insurance for cost outliers. In hospital reimbursement, prospective payments for patient discharges, based on their classification into diagnosis related group (DRGs), are complemented by outlier payments for long stay patients. The outlier scheme fixes the length of stay (LOS) threshold, constraining the profit risk of the hospitals. In most DRG systems, this threshold increases with the standard deviation of the LOS distribution. The present paper addresses the adequacy of this DRG outlier threshold rule for risk-averse hospitals with preferences depending on the expected value and the variance of profits. It first shows that the optimal threshold solves the hospital's tradeoff between higher profit risk and lower premium loading payments. It then demonstrates for normally distributed truncated LOS that the optimal outlier threshold indeed decreases with an increase in the standard deviation.

The aim of this study was to examine the effects of an incentive-based remuneration system on number of individuals under supervision and on quality of public dental services in Norway. The basis for the study was a natural experiment in which all public dental officers in one county were given the opportunity to renegotiate their contract from a fixed salary contract to a combined per capita and fixed salary contract. Comprehensive data were collected before and after the change. A main finding is that the transition to an incentive-based remuneration system led to an increase in the number of individuals under supervision without either a fall in quality or a patient selection effect.

This study applies the theory and the conceptual framework of the soft budget constraint (SBC) to the hospital sector. The first part deals solely with hospitals in state ownership, but the study moves later onto the problems of ownership relations as well. The question posed is why the SBC phenomenon is so general in the hospital sector (including specialist outpatient clinics and diagnostic or nursing establishments that operate as separate units). The study contains several references to Hungarian experience, but the subject is of a more general nature. The SBC phenomenon is not confined to the Hungarian hospital sector, nor to the socialist system, nor as a vestige of socialism during post-socialist transformation. Soft budget constraints inevitably develop in the hospital sector, even in capitalist market economies.

Using data from 276 general acute hospitals in the Pearl River Delta region of Guangdong Province from 2002 and 2004, we construct a preliminary metric of budget constraint softness. We find that, controlling for hospital size, ownership, and other factors, a Chinese hospital's probability of receiving government financial support is inversely associated with the hospital's previous net revenue, an association consistent with soft budget constraints.

This article seeks to assess whether physician payment reforms in the United States and Switzerland were likely to attain their objectives. We first introduce basic contract theory, with the organizing principle being the degree of information asymmetry between the patient and the health care provider. Depending on the degree of information asymmetry, different forms of payment induce "appropriate" behavior. These theoretical results are then pitted against the RBRVS of the United States to find that a number of its aspects are not optimal. We then turn to Switzerland's Tarmed and find that it fails to conform with the prescriptions of economic contract theory as well. The article closes with a review of possible reforms that could do away with uniform fee schedules to improve the performance of the health care system.

Given an increasingly complex web of financial pressures on providers, studies have examined how hospitals' overall financial health affects different aspects of hospital operations. In our study, we develop an empirical proxy for the concept of soft budget constraint (SBC, Kornai, Kyklos 39:3-30, 1986) as an alternative financial measure of a hospital's overall financial health and offer an initial estimate of the effect of SBCs on hospital access and quality. An organization has a SBC if it can expect to be bailed out rather than shut down. Our conceptual model predicts that hospitals facing softer budget constraints will be associated with less aggressive cost control, and their quality may be better or worse, depending on the scope for damage to quality from noncontractible aspects of cost control. We find that hospitals with softer budget constraints are less likely to shut down safety net services. In addition, hospitals with softer budget constraints appear to have better mortality outcomes for elderly heart attack patients.