Mobile smart devices are changing our lives and are the emerging dominant computing platform for end-users. Mobile applications (apps) provide flexible access to critical services such as online banking, health records, enterprise applications, or social networks. The increasing computing and storage capabilities, new interfaces such as near field communication technology (NFC) or integration of hardware-based secure execution environments as well as rich context sensing capabilities have turned these devices to enablers for many useful (and fancy) applications. In particular, we consider two emerging trends with high commercial interest: smart devices as access tokens (e.g., in conjunction with NFC), and smart devices as powerful sensors for context-aware access control to resources. We elaborate on the functional, security, and privacy challenges to realizing these applications in practice. To tackle these challenges (and depending on the underlying use-case) we clearly need security and privacy protecting measures at different system abstraction layers (applications, operating system, and hardware) and we may need them simultaneously. Although mobile operating systems have been designed with security in mind from their infancy, they fail to resist sophisticated attacks as shown recently. We observe diverse attack vectors from application-level privilege escalation attacks and sensory malware to runtime attacks that hijack the execution flow of apps, in particular the recently proposed just-in-time return-oriented programming attack technique which circumvents fine-grained address space layout randomization. Moreover, runtime attacks can be leveraged to compromise the underlying operating system through kernel based attacks (e.g., root exploits) allowing an attacker to get full control over the mobile device. In the recent years, researchers have presented many proposals to enhance the security and privacy at different abstraction layers with the strong focus on the Android operating system for obvious reasons (open-source and popularity). Investigating the large body of literature on Android security we observe that almost all proposals for security extensions to Android constitute mandatory access control (MAC) mechanisms that are tailored to the specific semantics of the addressed problem, for instance, establishing fine-grained access control to the user's private data or protecting the platform integrity. Moreover, these solutions consider protection mechanisms that operate only at a specific system abstraction layer, i.e., either at the middleware (and/or application) layer, or at the kernel-layer. In addition, security and privacy policy management itself would need to be made more context-aware and user-centric. We elaborate on security solutions (including our work) that aim to mitigate attacks at application-level including control flow integrity (CFI) against runtime attacks on mobile devices, and discuss their trade-offs. We then
{"title":"Mobile security and privacy: the quest for the mighty access control","authors":"A. Sadeghi","doi":"10.1145/2462410.2463204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2462410.2463204","url":null,"abstract":"Mobile smart devices are changing our lives and are the emerging dominant computing platform for end-users. Mobile applications (apps) provide flexible access to critical services such as online banking, health records, enterprise applications, or social networks. The increasing computing and storage capabilities, new interfaces such as near field communication technology (NFC) or integration of hardware-based secure execution environments as well as rich context sensing capabilities have turned these devices to enablers for many useful (and fancy) applications. In particular, we consider two emerging trends with high commercial interest: smart devices as access tokens (e.g., in conjunction with NFC), and smart devices as powerful sensors for context-aware access control to resources. We elaborate on the functional, security, and privacy challenges to realizing these applications in practice. To tackle these challenges (and depending on the underlying use-case) we clearly need security and privacy protecting measures at different system abstraction layers (applications, operating system, and hardware) and we may need them simultaneously. Although mobile operating systems have been designed with security in mind from their infancy, they fail to resist sophisticated attacks as shown recently. We observe diverse attack vectors from application-level privilege escalation attacks and sensory malware to runtime attacks that hijack the execution flow of apps, in particular the recently proposed just-in-time return-oriented programming attack technique which circumvents fine-grained address space layout randomization. Moreover, runtime attacks can be leveraged to compromise the underlying operating system through kernel based attacks (e.g., root exploits) allowing an attacker to get full control over the mobile device.\u0000 In the recent years, researchers have presented many proposals to enhance the security and privacy at different abstraction layers with the strong focus on the Android operating system for obvious reasons (open-source and popularity). Investigating the large body of literature on Android security we observe that almost all proposals for security extensions to Android constitute mandatory access control (MAC) mechanisms that are tailored to the specific semantics of the addressed problem, for instance, establishing fine-grained access control to the user's private data or protecting the platform integrity.\u0000 Moreover, these solutions consider protection mechanisms that operate only at a specific system abstraction layer, i.e., either at the middleware (and/or application) layer, or at the kernel-layer. In addition, security and privacy policy management itself would need to be made more context-aware and user-centric.\u0000 We elaborate on security solutions (including our work) that aim to mitigate attacks at application-level including control flow integrity (CFI) against runtime attacks on mobile devices, and discuss their trade-offs. We then","PeriodicalId":74509,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... ACM symposium on access control models and technologies. ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"40 1","pages":"1-2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79535557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mobile applications allow individuals on-the-move access to resources "anytime, anywhere" using hand-held mobile devices. We argue that for critical and sensitive resources this is often times not desirable -- a lost or stolen mobile device can be tampered with to view or alter sensitive information. We need authorization policies that take into account time of access and location of the user in addition to the credentials of the user. Towards this end, we propose a new spatio-temporal role-based access control model. It improves upon existing models by providing features that are useful for mobile applications. Thus, an application using our model can specify different types of spatio-temporal constraints. We discuss how such an application using our spatio-temporal access control model can be verified using the UPPAAL model checker. We also demonstrate how to reduce the state-space explosion problem that is inherent in model checkers.
{"title":"Specification and analysis of access control policies for mobile applications","authors":"Ramadan Abdunabi, I. Ray, R. France","doi":"10.1145/2462410.2463206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2462410.2463206","url":null,"abstract":"Mobile applications allow individuals on-the-move access to resources \"anytime, anywhere\" using hand-held mobile devices. We argue that for critical and sensitive resources this is often times not desirable -- a lost or stolen mobile device can be tampered with to view or alter sensitive information. We need authorization policies that take into account time of access and location of the user in addition to the credentials of the user. Towards this end, we propose a new spatio-temporal role-based access control model. It improves upon existing models by providing features that are useful for mobile applications. Thus, an application using our model can specify different types of spatio-temporal constraints. We discuss how such an application using our spatio-temporal access control model can be verified using the UPPAAL model checker. We also demonstrate how to reduce the state-space explosion problem that is inherent in model checkers.","PeriodicalId":74509,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... ACM symposium on access control models and technologies. ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"39 1","pages":"173-184"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88181864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Francesco Di Cerbo, S. Trabelsi, Thomas Steingruber, Gabriella Dodero, M. Bezzi
Mobile devices consume significant amounts of information, from different sources. Thus they often deal also with sensitive or confidential data, in places or situations that could be not appropriate, or not compliant with a corporate policy: context-aware access/usage control solutions can counter such situations. We propose a prototype, called ProtectMe, that exploits "Sticky Policies" (SP) that are attached to resources and prescribe usage conditions. Since mobile devices cannot foresee usage conditions of collected data, ProtectMe integrates SPs within any information consumable by mobile devices, and dynamically enforces their usage constraints. It assists users in attaching access and usage control conditions stated by resource-specific SPs, and it enforces them by making use of contextual information collected by mobile devices. The aim of the prototype is to show the feasibility of the SP approach, merging security functionalities within a concept for expressing SPs in a user-friendly manner.
{"title":"Sticky policies for mobile devices","authors":"Francesco Di Cerbo, S. Trabelsi, Thomas Steingruber, Gabriella Dodero, M. Bezzi","doi":"10.1145/2462410.2462429","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2462410.2462429","url":null,"abstract":"Mobile devices consume significant amounts of information, from different sources. Thus they often deal also with sensitive or confidential data, in places or situations that could be not appropriate, or not compliant with a corporate policy: context-aware access/usage control solutions can counter such situations. We propose a prototype, called ProtectMe, that exploits \"Sticky Policies\" (SP) that are attached to resources and prescribe usage conditions.\u0000 Since mobile devices cannot foresee usage conditions of collected data, ProtectMe integrates SPs within any information consumable by mobile devices, and dynamically enforces their usage constraints. It assists users in attaching access and usage control conditions stated by resource-specific SPs, and it enforces them by making use of contextual information collected by mobile devices.\u0000 The aim of the prototype is to show the feasibility of the SP approach, merging security functionalities within a concept for expressing SPs in a user-friendly manner.","PeriodicalId":74509,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... ACM symposium on access control models and technologies. ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"38 1","pages":"257-260"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85788745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Chinese Wall security policy states that information from objects that are to be confidential from one another should not flow to a subject. It addresses conflict of interest, and was first articulated in the well-cited work of Brewer and Nash, which proposes also an enforcement mechanism for the policy. Work subsequent to theirs has observed that their enforcement mechanism is overly restrictive -- authorization states in which the policy is not violated may be rendered unreachable. We present two sets of novel results in this context. In one, we present an enforcement mechanism for the policy that is simple and efficient, and least-restrictive -- an authorization state is reachable if and only if it does not violate the policy. In our enforcement mechanism, the actions of a subject can constrain the prospective actions of another, a trade-off that we show every enforcement mechanism that is least-restrictive must incur. Our other set of results is that the enforcement mechanism of Brewer-Nash is even more restrictive than previous work establishes. Specifically, we show: (1) what is called the *-rule is overspecified in that one of its sub-rules implies the other, and, (2) if a subject is authorized to write to an object that contains confidential information, then all objects that contain confidential information must belong to the same conflict of interest class. Our work sheds new light on what is generally considered to be important work in information security.
{"title":"Least-restrictive enforcement of the Chinese wall security policy","authors":"A. Sharifi, Mahesh V. Tripunitara","doi":"10.1145/2462410.2462425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2462410.2462425","url":null,"abstract":"The Chinese Wall security policy states that information from objects that are to be confidential from one another should not flow to a subject. It addresses conflict of interest, and was first articulated in the well-cited work of Brewer and Nash, which proposes also an enforcement mechanism for the policy. Work subsequent to theirs has observed that their enforcement mechanism is overly restrictive -- authorization states in which the policy is not violated may be rendered unreachable. We present two sets of novel results in this context. In one, we present an enforcement mechanism for the policy that is simple and efficient, and least-restrictive -- an authorization state is reachable if and only if it does not violate the policy. In our enforcement mechanism, the actions of a subject can constrain the prospective actions of another, a trade-off that we show every enforcement mechanism that is least-restrictive must incur. Our other set of results is that the enforcement mechanism of Brewer-Nash is even more restrictive than previous work establishes. Specifically, we show: (1) what is called the *-rule is overspecified in that one of its sub-rules implies the other, and, (2) if a subject is authorized to write to an object that contains confidential information, then all objects that contain confidential information must belong to the same conflict of interest class. Our work sheds new light on what is generally considered to be important work in information security.","PeriodicalId":74509,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... ACM symposium on access control models and technologies. ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"55 1","pages":"61-72"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80200421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recently, many location-sharing services (LSSs) have emerged that share data collected using mobile devices. However, research has shown that many users are uncomfortable with LSS operators managing their location histories, and that the ease with which contextual data can be shared with unintended audiences can lead to regrets that sometimes outweigh the benefits of these systems. In an effort to address these issues, we have developed SLS: a secure location sharing system that combines location-limited channels, multi-channel key establishment, and untrusted cloud storage to hide user locations from LSS operators while also limiting unintended audience sharing. In addition to describing the key agreement and location-sharing protocols used by SLS, we discuss an iOS implementation of SLS that enables location sharing at tunable granularity through an intuitive policy interface on the user's mobile device.
{"title":"Combining social authentication and untrusted clouds for private location sharing","authors":"A. Adams, Adam J. Lee","doi":"10.1145/2462410.2462421","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2462410.2462421","url":null,"abstract":"Recently, many location-sharing services (LSSs) have emerged that share data collected using mobile devices. However, research has shown that many users are uncomfortable with LSS operators managing their location histories, and that the ease with which contextual data can be shared with unintended audiences can lead to regrets that sometimes outweigh the benefits of these systems. In an effort to address these issues, we have developed SLS: a secure location sharing system that combines location-limited channels, multi-channel key establishment, and untrusted cloud storage to hide user locations from LSS operators while also limiting unintended audience sharing. In addition to describing the key agreement and location-sharing protocols used by SLS, we discuss an iOS implementation of SLS that enables location sharing at tunable granularity through an intuitive policy interface on the user's mobile device.","PeriodicalId":74509,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... ACM symposium on access control models and technologies. ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"11 1","pages":"15-24"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82525499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Security is still a major inhibitor of cloud computing. When companies are testing cloud applications, e.g. for storage or databases, they use generated data for fear of data loss. Modern encrypted databases where the cryptographic key remains at the client provide a solution to this problem. Recent results in cryptography, such order-preserving encryption, and database systems enable the practical use of these systems. We report on our pre-development efforts of implementing such an encrypted database in an in-memory, column store database. We highlight some unsolved research challenges: such as access control, infrequent queries and security vs. performance query optimization. Challenges to key management in multi-user environments remain largely unsolved. We give an overview of the architecture and performance benchmarks on our prototype which are very encouraging for practical adoption.
{"title":"Searching over encrypted data in cloud systems","authors":"F. Kerschbaum","doi":"10.1145/2462410.2462888","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2462410.2462888","url":null,"abstract":"Security is still a major inhibitor of cloud computing. When companies are testing cloud applications, e.g. for storage or databases, they use generated data for fear of data loss. Modern encrypted databases where the cryptographic key remains at the client provide a solution to this problem. Recent results in cryptography, such order-preserving encryption, and database systems enable the practical use of these systems. We report on our pre-development efforts of implementing such an encrypted database in an in-memory, column store database. We highlight some unsolved research challenges: such as access control, infrequent queries and security vs. performance query optimization. Challenges to key management in multi-user environments remain largely unsolved. We give an overview of the architecture and performance benchmarks on our prototype which are very encouraging for practical adoption.","PeriodicalId":74509,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... ACM symposium on access control models and technologies. ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"18 1","pages":"87-88"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86473586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A. Armando, Matteo Grasso, S. Oudkerk, Silvio Ranise, K. Wrona
The successful operation of NATO missions requires effective and secure sharing of information among coalition partners and external organizations, while avoiding the disclosure of sensitive information to untrusted users. To resolve the conflict between confidentiality and availability, NATO is developing a new information sharing infrastructure, called Content-based Protection and Release. We describe the architecture of access control in NATO operations, which is designed to be easily built on top of available (service-oriented) infrastructures for identity and access control management. We then present a use case scenario drawn from the NATO Passive Missile Defence system for simulating the consequences of intercepting missile attacks. In the system demonstration, we show how maps annotated with the findings of the system are filtered by the access control module to produce appropriate views for users with different clearances and terminals under given release and protection policies.
{"title":"Content-based information protection and release in NATO operations","authors":"A. Armando, Matteo Grasso, S. Oudkerk, Silvio Ranise, K. Wrona","doi":"10.1145/2462410.2462427","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2462410.2462427","url":null,"abstract":"The successful operation of NATO missions requires effective and secure sharing of information among coalition partners and external organizations, while avoiding the disclosure of sensitive information to untrusted users. To resolve the conflict between confidentiality and availability, NATO is developing a new information sharing infrastructure, called Content-based Protection and Release. We describe the architecture of access control in NATO operations, which is designed to be easily built on top of available (service-oriented) infrastructures for identity and access control management. We then present a use case scenario drawn from the NATO Passive Missile Defence system for simulating the consequences of intercepting missile attacks. In the system demonstration, we show how maps annotated with the findings of the system are filtered by the access control module to produce appropriate views for users with different clearances and terminals under given release and protection policies.","PeriodicalId":74509,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... ACM symposium on access control models and technologies. ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"55 1","pages":"261-264"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89956988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper a meta-model for information flow control is defined using the foundation of Barker's access control meta-model. The purposes for defining this meta-model is to achieve a more principled understanding of information flow control, to compare information flow control and access control at an abstract level, and to explore how information flow control and access control might be composed to yield a rich new set of ideas and systems for controlling the dissemination of sensitive information. It is shown that it is possible to define a meta-model for information flow control, that such a model is more complex compared to the access control meta-model, and that the meta-models for information flow control and access control can be composed in a conceptually straightforward way.
{"title":"An information flow control meta-model","authors":"D. Kafura, D. Gračanin","doi":"10.1145/2462410.2462414","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2462410.2462414","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper a meta-model for information flow control is defined using the foundation of Barker's access control meta-model. The purposes for defining this meta-model is to achieve a more principled understanding of information flow control, to compare information flow control and access control at an abstract level, and to explore how information flow control and access control might be composed to yield a rich new set of ideas and systems for controlling the dissemination of sensitive information. It is shown that it is possible to define a meta-model for information flow control, that such a model is more complex compared to the access control meta-model, and that the meta-models for information flow control and access control can be composed in a conceptually straightforward way.","PeriodicalId":74509,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... ACM symposium on access control models and technologies. ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"24 1","pages":"101-112"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75441156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recently, there are many approaches proposed for mining roles using automated technologies. However, it lacks a tool set that can be used to aid the application of role mining approaches and update role states. In this demonstration, we introduce a tool set, RMiner, which is based on the core of WEKA, an open source data mining tool. RMiner implements most of the classic and latest role mining algorithms and provides interactive tools for administrator to update role states. The running examples of RMiner are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the tool set.
{"title":"RMiner: a tool set for role mining","authors":"Ruixuan Li, Huaqing Li, Wei Wang, Xiaopu Ma, X. Gu","doi":"10.1145/2462410.2462431","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2462410.2462431","url":null,"abstract":"Recently, there are many approaches proposed for mining roles using automated technologies. However, it lacks a tool set that can be used to aid the application of role mining approaches and update role states. In this demonstration, we introduce a tool set, RMiner, which is based on the core of WEKA, an open source data mining tool. RMiner implements most of the classic and latest role mining algorithms and provides interactive tools for administrator to update role states. The running examples of RMiner are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the tool set.","PeriodicalId":74509,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... ACM symposium on access control models and technologies. ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"6 1","pages":"193-196"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76262528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The current Idintity and Access Management (IAM) landscape mainly consists of classic Identity Management (IdM) and business-oriented Access Governance. IdM focuses more on providing a single point of administration and provisioning users with the needed access rights. In contrast, Access Governance concentrates on integrating business departments in the assignment and controlling of access rights in the organisation. It therefore provides functions like access request and approval workflows and access certification processes. In addition, the demand to analyse access right structures to cover compliance requirements increases. We therefore use a business intelligence (BI) based approach to complement the current IAM landscape with comprehensive and powerful analysis capabilities. We see the following additional values in providing a separate Access Intelligence system: Using a BI system allows us to convert the access data into a format which allows flexible and fast analytics. We can fulfil the demand of many organisations to separate their operative access control systems and the analytics system. Using the well-known capabilities of a BI system, new analyses are provided. One example is the permission path analysis. It divides complex access structures into single paths and thereby lays the foundation for effective access right analyses. In this paper we present the permission path analysis and describe two evaluations based on it.
{"title":"Permission path analysis based on access intelligence","authors":"D. Sturm, A. Kern","doi":"10.1145/2462410.2462432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2462410.2462432","url":null,"abstract":"The current Idintity and Access Management (IAM) landscape mainly consists of classic Identity Management (IdM) and business-oriented Access Governance. IdM focuses more on providing a single point of administration and provisioning users with the needed access rights. In contrast, Access Governance concentrates on integrating business departments in the assignment and controlling of access rights in the organisation. It therefore provides functions like access request and approval workflows and access certification processes. In addition, the demand to analyse access right structures to cover compliance requirements increases. We therefore use a business intelligence (BI) based approach to complement the current IAM landscape with comprehensive and powerful analysis capabilities. We see the following additional values in providing a separate Access Intelligence system: Using a BI system allows us to convert the access data into a format which allows flexible and fast analytics. We can fulfil the demand of many organisations to separate their operative access control systems and the analytics system.\u0000 Using the well-known capabilities of a BI system, new analyses are provided. One example is the permission path analysis. It divides complex access structures into single paths and thereby lays the foundation for effective access right analyses. In this paper we present the permission path analysis and describe two evaluations based on it.","PeriodicalId":74509,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... ACM symposium on access control models and technologies. ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"24 1","pages":"253-256"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87641766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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