{"title":"EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO's PHILOSOPHY OF FAMILY PRACTICE","authors":"H. Brody","doi":"10.1023/A:1005728614068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005728614068","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":77444,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine","volume":"18 1","pages":"7-20"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1023/A:1005728614068","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"57092994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A DIALOGUE BETWEEN VIRTUE ETHICS AND CARE ETHICS","authors":"P. Benner","doi":"10.1023/A:1005797100864","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005797100864","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":77444,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine","volume":"18 1","pages":"47-61"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1023/A:1005797100864","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"57096395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Marc A. Rodwin. Medicin, Money, and Morals: Physicians' Conflicts of Interest","authors":"K. D. De Ville","doi":"10.1023/A:1005821025660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005821025660","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":77444,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine","volume":"18 1","pages":"303-307"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1023/A:1005821025660","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"57097833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1997-01-01DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-3364-9_12
H. Tristram Engelhardt
{"title":"The crisis of virtue: arming for the cultural wars and Pellegrino at the limes.","authors":"H. Tristram Engelhardt","doi":"10.1007/978-94-017-3364-9_12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3364-9_12","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":77444,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine","volume":"18 1-2 1","pages":"165-72"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"51042732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"“DAMAGED HUMANITY”: THE CALL FOR A PATIENT-CENTERED MEDICAL ETHIC IN THE MANAGED CARE ERA","authors":"L. Churchill","doi":"10.1023/A:1005769723154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005769723154","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":77444,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine","volume":"18 1","pages":"113-126"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1023/A:1005769723154","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"57095299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The purpose of this essay is to argue for the necessity of an ethics of the practice of the specialist-technologist in medicine. In the first part I sketch three stages of medical ethics, each with a particular viewpoint regarding the technology of medicine. I focus on Brody's consideration of the "physician's power" as a example of contemporary medical ethics which explicitly excludes the specialist-technologist as a locus of development of medical ethics. Next, the philosophy of Heidegger is examined to suggest an approach to the problem, and, finally, some of Levinas' contributions regarding the "other" are introduced to suggest a preliminary approach to a medical ethics of the specialist-technologist.
{"title":"The gastroenterologist and his endoscope: the embodiment of technology and the necessity for a medical ethics.","authors":"M W Cooper","doi":"10.1007/BF00489682","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00489682","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The purpose of this essay is to argue for the necessity of an ethics of the practice of the specialist-technologist in medicine. In the first part I sketch three stages of medical ethics, each with a particular viewpoint regarding the technology of medicine. I focus on Brody's consideration of the \"physician's power\" as a example of contemporary medical ethics which explicitly excludes the specialist-technologist as a locus of development of medical ethics. Next, the philosophy of Heidegger is examined to suggest an approach to the problem, and, finally, some of Levinas' contributions regarding the \"other\" are introduced to suggest a preliminary approach to a medical ethics of the specialist-technologist.</p>","PeriodicalId":77444,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine","volume":"17 4","pages":"379-98"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1996-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/BF00489682","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"19962899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the discussion of such social questions as "how should alcoholics be treated by society?" and "what kind of people are responsible in the face of the law?", is "disease" a value-free or value-laden notion, a natural or a normative one? It seems, for example, that by the utterance "alcoholism should be classified as a disease' we mean something like the following: the condition called alcoholism is similar in morally relevant respects to conditions that we uncontroversially label diseases, and therefore we have a moral obligation to consider alcoholism a disease. So there are grounds to think that, in the discussion of social questions, our concept of disease is strongly value-laden. However, it does not follow that the medical concept of disease is likewise value-laden. In this paper I distinguish between the medical and social concepts of disease, arguing that the naturalist-normativist debate is concerned with the former, but not the latter. Therefore, we need not settle the naturalist-normativist debate in order to conclude that the social concept of disease is value-laden.
{"title":"The social concept of disease.","authors":"J Räikkä","doi":"10.1007/BF00489680","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00489680","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In the discussion of such social questions as \"how should alcoholics be treated by society?\" and \"what kind of people are responsible in the face of the law?\", is \"disease\" a value-free or value-laden notion, a natural or a normative one? It seems, for example, that by the utterance \"alcoholism should be classified as a disease' we mean something like the following: the condition called alcoholism is similar in morally relevant respects to conditions that we uncontroversially label diseases, and therefore we have a moral obligation to consider alcoholism a disease. So there are grounds to think that, in the discussion of social questions, our concept of disease is strongly value-laden. However, it does not follow that the medical concept of disease is likewise value-laden. In this paper I distinguish between the medical and social concepts of disease, arguing that the naturalist-normativist debate is concerned with the former, but not the latter. Therefore, we need not settle the naturalist-normativist debate in order to conclude that the social concept of disease is value-laden.</p>","PeriodicalId":77444,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine","volume":"17 4","pages":"353-61"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1996-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/BF00489680","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"19962897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This essay argues that while we have examined clinical ethics quite extensively in the literature, too little attention has been paid to the complex question of how clinical ethics is learned. Competing approaches to ethics pedagogy have relied on outmoded understandings of the way moral learning takes place in ethics. It is argued that the better approach, framed in the work of Aristotle, is the idea of phronesis, which depends on a long-term mentorship in clinical medicine for either medical students or clinical ethics students. Such an approach is articulated and defended.
{"title":"Phronesis in clinical ethics.","authors":"G McGee","doi":"10.1007/BF00489678","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00489678","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This essay argues that while we have examined clinical ethics quite extensively in the literature, too little attention has been paid to the complex question of how clinical ethics is learned. Competing approaches to ethics pedagogy have relied on outmoded understandings of the way moral learning takes place in ethics. It is argued that the better approach, framed in the work of Aristotle, is the idea of phronesis, which depends on a long-term mentorship in clinical medicine for either medical students or clinical ethics students. Such an approach is articulated and defended.</p>","PeriodicalId":77444,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine","volume":"17 4","pages":"317-28"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1996-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/BF00489678","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"19962895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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