A “D-” is not the grade anyone wishes to receive; yet, it is the grade that the Institute for Justice1 (“IJ”) awarded Kansas for its civil asset forfeiture statutes.2 In a national survey of forfeiture approaches, the IJ assigned each jurisdiction an overall system grade based on the jurisdiction’s individual grades in three categories: “the financial incentive for law enforcement to seize, the government’s standard of proof to forfeit, and who bears the burden in innocent owner claims.”3 If Kansas’ low grade does not demonstrate that there are problems with Kansas’ civil forfeiture system, consider the American Civil Liberties Union’s (“ACLU”) determination that the Kansas civil asset forfeiture laws are “among the worst in the nation.”4 Kansas’ civil forfeiture laws are known collectively as the Kansas Standard Asset Seizure and Forfeiture Act (“KSASFA”).5 Kansas’ forfeiture problems begin with its use of a civil forfeiture approach. Civil asset forfeiture is a civil action in which the government pursues forfeiture, of real or personal property, based on the fictional idea that the property itself committed a wrong.6 Civil forfeiture actions proceed
{"title":",,,Kansas Standard Asset Seizure and Forfeiture Act: An Anciet and Failing Approach","authors":"A. Selph","doi":"10.17161/1808.26576","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17161/1808.26576","url":null,"abstract":"A “D-” is not the grade anyone wishes to receive; yet, it is the grade that the Institute for Justice1 (“IJ”) awarded Kansas for its civil asset forfeiture statutes.2 In a national survey of forfeiture approaches, the IJ assigned each jurisdiction an overall system grade based on the jurisdiction’s individual grades in three categories: “the financial incentive for law enforcement to seize, the government’s standard of proof to forfeit, and who bears the burden in innocent owner claims.”3 If Kansas’ low grade does not demonstrate that there are problems with Kansas’ civil forfeiture system, consider the American Civil Liberties Union’s (“ACLU”) determination that the Kansas civil asset forfeiture laws are “among the worst in the nation.”4 Kansas’ civil forfeiture laws are known collectively as the Kansas Standard Asset Seizure and Forfeiture Act (“KSASFA”).5 Kansas’ forfeiture problems begin with its use of a civil forfeiture approach. Civil asset forfeiture is a civil action in which the government pursues forfeiture, of real or personal property, based on the fictional idea that the property itself committed a wrong.6 Civil forfeiture actions proceed","PeriodicalId":83417,"journal":{"name":"University of Kansas law review. University of Kansas. School of Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44263132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Joe, the defendant in this hypothetical case, was charged with aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, theft, and criminal possession of a firearm. These charges stemmed from his involvement in a forcible entry into an apartment. As Joe entered into the apartment, he demanded money from its occupants. While demanding money, Joe was holding what was described as a “skinny weapon” that had a pistol grip in the front and rear. When the police finally arrived on the scene, however, no weapon was found. Nor was any weapon found when Joe was later apprehended. Joe plead guilty to a charge of aggravated burglary and a reduced charge of robbery at his plea hearing. In exchange to pleading these counts, the State agreed to drop the other charges against Joe. Notably, none of the charges Joe pleaded to alleged he used a “deadly weapon” during the commission of those crimes. The district court accepted Joe’s pleas, but also made a finding that a firearm was used in the commission of the crime. If Joe were a resident of a state such as Alaska, he would most likely be sentenced to serve concurrent sentences. These sentences would roughly amount to a little under five years of incarceration. Joe’s sentence would be unaffected by the judge’s finding of Joe being in possession of a firearm because doing so would violate Joe’s Apprendi rights.2
{"title":",,,The Kansas Offender Registration Act: Where's the Constitutional Limit?","authors":"Lindsay Strong","doi":"10.17161/1808.26580","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17161/1808.26580","url":null,"abstract":"Joe, the defendant in this hypothetical case, was charged with aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, theft, and criminal possession of a firearm. These charges stemmed from his involvement in a forcible entry into an apartment. As Joe entered into the apartment, he demanded money from its occupants. While demanding money, Joe was holding what was described as a “skinny weapon” that had a pistol grip in the front and rear. When the police finally arrived on the scene, however, no weapon was found. Nor was any weapon found when Joe was later apprehended. Joe plead guilty to a charge of aggravated burglary and a reduced charge of robbery at his plea hearing. In exchange to pleading these counts, the State agreed to drop the other charges against Joe. Notably, none of the charges Joe pleaded to alleged he used a “deadly weapon” during the commission of those crimes. The district court accepted Joe’s pleas, but also made a finding that a firearm was used in the commission of the crime. If Joe were a resident of a state such as Alaska, he would most likely be sentenced to serve concurrent sentences. These sentences would roughly amount to a little under five years of incarceration. Joe’s sentence would be unaffected by the judge’s finding of Joe being in possession of a firearm because doing so would violate Joe’s Apprendi rights.2","PeriodicalId":83417,"journal":{"name":"University of Kansas law review. University of Kansas. School of Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47422510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The idea of the emergency responder is deeply rooted in American culture.2 As shown in the prevalence of emergency responders in popular culture, the American cultural consciousness of emergency responders runs so deep that it has been called a modern re-cast of a classical archetype, typifying the “American Hero.”3 But what is not well known is that just over 800,000 (70%) of the more than 1.1 million firefighters4 and 49% of the 826,111 credentialed emergency medical responders at the EMT-Basic level are volunteers.5 These volunteers are critical to our communities. However, recent court decisions threaten the stability of the volunteer fire departments that they work for. In Mendel v. City of Gibraltar, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that because volunteer firefighters were paid an
{"title":",,,The Roof is on Fire: Dangers to the Volunteer Emergency Services After Mendel v. City of Gibraltar","authors":"Joe Uhlman","doi":"10.17161/1808.26581","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17161/1808.26581","url":null,"abstract":"The idea of the emergency responder is deeply rooted in American culture.2 As shown in the prevalence of emergency responders in popular culture, the American cultural consciousness of emergency responders runs so deep that it has been called a modern re-cast of a classical archetype, typifying the “American Hero.”3 But what is not well known is that just over 800,000 (70%) of the more than 1.1 million firefighters4 and 49% of the 826,111 credentialed emergency medical responders at the EMT-Basic level are volunteers.5 These volunteers are critical to our communities. However, recent court decisions threaten the stability of the volunteer fire departments that they work for. In Mendel v. City of Gibraltar, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that because volunteer firefighters were paid an","PeriodicalId":83417,"journal":{"name":"University of Kansas law review. University of Kansas. School of Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48617905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 1960, the Journal of the American Medical Association published an article describing a surprisingly simple and remarkably effective lifesaving technique.1 The technique, now known as cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), enabled medical professionals to “restor[e] spontaneous circulation” to patients suffering from cardiac arrest.2 Once administration of CPR became standard procedure, however, medical professionals recognized that it may not always be in a patient’s interest to attempt resuscitation.3 Rather, resuscitating a terminal patient already near death may cause the patient to endure a painful last few days of life. Recognizing this, doctors and nurses looked for a way to curb the unnecessary “suffering inflicted on many terminally ill patients by repeated resuscitation attempts that only prolonged death.”4 Hospital staffs adopted “procedures to delay or deny resuscitation attempts in situations in which they believed CPR would not be beneficial.”5 Doctors designated certain patients for “less-than-full” resuscitation attempts; word of mouth or symbols on a patient’s chart
{"title":",,,The Mature Minor Doctrine: Can Minors Unilaterally Refuse Medical Treatment?","authors":"M. Hayes","doi":"10.17161/1808.26574","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17161/1808.26574","url":null,"abstract":"In 1960, the Journal of the American Medical Association published an article describing a surprisingly simple and remarkably effective lifesaving technique.1 The technique, now known as cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), enabled medical professionals to “restor[e] spontaneous circulation” to patients suffering from cardiac arrest.2 Once administration of CPR became standard procedure, however, medical professionals recognized that it may not always be in a patient’s interest to attempt resuscitation.3 Rather, resuscitating a terminal patient already near death may cause the patient to endure a painful last few days of life. Recognizing this, doctors and nurses looked for a way to curb the unnecessary “suffering inflicted on many terminally ill patients by repeated resuscitation attempts that only prolonged death.”4 Hospital staffs adopted “procedures to delay or deny resuscitation attempts in situations in which they believed CPR would not be beneficial.”5 Doctors designated certain patients for “less-than-full” resuscitation attempts; word of mouth or symbols on a patient’s chart","PeriodicalId":83417,"journal":{"name":"University of Kansas law review. University of Kansas. School of Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45038980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A hallmark of the American precedent-based legal system is consistency. From jurisdiction to jurisdiction, state court to federal court, legal doctrines built upon the foundation of historic precedent are generally applied with uniform—or at least recognizably similar—rules and guidelines, leading to predictable results.1 That is, unless the subject is waiver of arbitration rights. Under what circumstances does a party involved in litigation waive the right to enforce a valid arbitration agreement? Why does it—or should it—matter if the plaintiff asserts class-action claims? And what may prompt a court to revive previously waived arbitral rights? Those three questions at the heart of this article are seemingly straightforward. But the answers to them are anything but. In the United States, arbitration is increasingly used to resolve disputes in many diverse areas, including those involving consumer, commercial, anti-trust, securities, foreign investments and employment law.2 This
{"title":",,,Searching for Clarity Amid Confustion: An Examination of the Standards for Determining Waiver and Revival of the Right to Arbitrate","authors":"J. Lewis, Dustin M. Dow","doi":"10.17161/1808.27485","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17161/1808.27485","url":null,"abstract":"A hallmark of the American precedent-based legal system is consistency. From jurisdiction to jurisdiction, state court to federal court, legal doctrines built upon the foundation of historic precedent are generally applied with uniform—or at least recognizably similar—rules and guidelines, leading to predictable results.1 That is, unless the subject is waiver of arbitration rights. Under what circumstances does a party involved in litigation waive the right to enforce a valid arbitration agreement? Why does it—or should it—matter if the plaintiff asserts class-action claims? And what may prompt a court to revive previously waived arbitral rights? Those three questions at the heart of this article are seemingly straightforward. But the answers to them are anything but. In the United States, arbitration is increasingly used to resolve disputes in many diverse areas, including those involving consumer, commercial, anti-trust, securities, foreign investments and employment law.2 This","PeriodicalId":83417,"journal":{"name":"University of Kansas law review. University of Kansas. School of Law","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67512520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":",,,Coasean Blackmail: Protection Markets and Protection Rackets","authors":"Sidney W. DeLong","doi":"10.17161/1808.27484","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17161/1808.27484","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":83417,"journal":{"name":"University of Kansas law review. University of Kansas. School of Law","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67512507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
“[M]ay the odds be ever in your favor!”1 That phrase from the cultural phenomenon The Hunger Games might soon come from the mouths of court clerks before every regulatory takings case. Historically, the law surrounding regulatory takings has been muddled.2 But the Supreme Court confused the field further when it decided Murr v. Wisconsin on June 23, 2017.3 This Note analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision and the potential consequences it holds for private property owners. Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the Supreme Court’s brand-new Takings Game.4 May the factors be ever in your favor.5 Regulatory takings claims are governed by the Fifth Amendment’s Taking Clause, which states that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”6 Murr presented the Court with the challenge of determining whether a regulatory taking occurred when the boundaries of the relevant parcel were still in dispute.7
{"title":",,,May the Factors Be Ever in Your Favor: How Murr v. Wisconsin Sows Confusion in the Regulatory Taking Fields","authors":"Ryan J. Ott","doi":"10.17161/1808.27487","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17161/1808.27487","url":null,"abstract":"“[M]ay the odds be ever in your favor!”1 That phrase from the cultural phenomenon The Hunger Games might soon come from the mouths of court clerks before every regulatory takings case. Historically, the law surrounding regulatory takings has been muddled.2 But the Supreme Court confused the field further when it decided Murr v. Wisconsin on June 23, 2017.3 This Note analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision and the potential consequences it holds for private property owners. Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the Supreme Court’s brand-new Takings Game.4 May the factors be ever in your favor.5 Regulatory takings claims are governed by the Fifth Amendment’s Taking Clause, which states that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”6 Murr presented the Court with the challenge of determining whether a regulatory taking occurred when the boundaries of the relevant parcel were still in dispute.7","PeriodicalId":83417,"journal":{"name":"University of Kansas law review. University of Kansas. School of Law","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67512581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
One of the advantages of being a legal historian is the need and pleasure to search out documents relevant to one’s research no matter where they may be. During my early career, when I focused on the history of Roman and medieval legal history, these searches took place primarily in museums and archives, often in rather wonderful places such as Paris, Rome, and the Vatican. When I began teaching law in the U.S. and researching American legal history at the University of Illinois College of Law, I found myself visiting obscure small towns in central and southern Illinois searching out letters and documents for the Lincoln Legal Papers Project. When I moved to the University of Kansas School of Law in 1994, I decided to begin to research Kansas legal history. Over the past two decades this research has led to a number of published papers as well as a book on the history of the Federal District Court in Kansas.2 Over the years that I have been doing research on Kansas legal history, I have not only scoured all of the available libraries and archives in the state relevant to the subject, but I have also made it a habit to attend estate auctions and book sales which might contain relevant unknown materials. I have had a number of successes in these outings, including the discovery of a one volume diary kept by Kansas Supreme Court Justice Daniel Mulford Valentine3 which contained the only known contemporary manuscript account of Abraham Lincoln’s visit to and speech at Leavenworth, Kansas in 1859.
{"title":",,,An Unknown 1859 Notaries' Ledger from Douglas County, Kansas","authors":"M. Hoeflich","doi":"10.17161/1808.26572","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17161/1808.26572","url":null,"abstract":"One of the advantages of being a legal historian is the need and pleasure to search out documents relevant to one’s research no matter where they may be. During my early career, when I focused on the history of Roman and medieval legal history, these searches took place primarily in museums and archives, often in rather wonderful places such as Paris, Rome, and the Vatican. When I began teaching law in the U.S. and researching American legal history at the University of Illinois College of Law, I found myself visiting obscure small towns in central and southern Illinois searching out letters and documents for the Lincoln Legal Papers Project. When I moved to the University of Kansas School of Law in 1994, I decided to begin to research Kansas legal history. Over the past two decades this research has led to a number of published papers as well as a book on the history of the Federal District Court in Kansas.2 Over the years that I have been doing research on Kansas legal history, I have not only scoured all of the available libraries and archives in the state relevant to the subject, but I have also made it a habit to attend estate auctions and book sales which might contain relevant unknown materials. I have had a number of successes in these outings, including the discovery of a one volume diary kept by Kansas Supreme Court Justice Daniel Mulford Valentine3 which contained the only known contemporary manuscript account of Abraham Lincoln’s visit to and speech at Leavenworth, Kansas in 1859.","PeriodicalId":83417,"journal":{"name":"University of Kansas law review. University of Kansas. School of Law","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67512861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In Peretz v. United States, a bare majority of the Supreme Court held that the “additional duties” clause of the Federal Magistrates Act permits a magistrate judge—with a defendant’s consent—to preside over voir dire at a felony trial. The majority also did not perceive any constitutional danger arising from the exercise of the “judicial Power of the United States” by an Article I officer. At first glance, the result appears to be a common-sense victory for efficiency, and the vast majority of citations to Peretz do not involve reflection upon proper statutory interpretation, structural analysis, or the significance of certain judicial functions. Rather, Peretz has been cited ad nauseum for the
{"title":",,,Consent Cannot Control: Peretz v. United States and Federal Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction in Felony Cases","authors":"K. Fields","doi":"10.17161/1808.27480","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17161/1808.27480","url":null,"abstract":"In Peretz v. United States, a bare majority of the Supreme Court held that the “additional duties” clause of the Federal Magistrates Act permits a magistrate judge—with a defendant’s consent—to preside over voir dire at a felony trial. The majority also did not perceive any constitutional danger arising from the exercise of the “judicial Power of the United States” by an Article I officer. At first glance, the result appears to be a common-sense victory for efficiency, and the vast majority of citations to Peretz do not involve reflection upon proper statutory interpretation, structural analysis, or the significance of certain judicial functions. Rather, Peretz has been cited ad nauseum for the","PeriodicalId":83417,"journal":{"name":"University of Kansas law review. University of Kansas. School of Law","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67512496","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Current American jurisprudence on digital assets (e.g. Bitcoin) is woefully underdeveloped due to the rapid development and adoption of blockchain technology—creating an intellectual gold rush with agencies, attorneys, and techies all shouting their positions (on securities laws, particularly) into the wind. This Comment enters the ether in an endeavor to counter prevailing federal agency narratives about the role of securities laws regarding “ICOs”—introducing the reader to the most pertinent features of blockchain technology and Initial Coin Offerings, introducing the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (the “SEC”) current regulatory approach, and applying the seminal Howey is-it-a-security test. Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) are the online sale of cryptographic assets used to launch a cryptocurrency, finance a blockchain application development project, or sell access to features of a blockchain application.1 ICOs, also called Token Sales or Token Generation Events, are financing mechanisms popularly viewed as a hybrid of a Wall Street Initial Public Offering of Stock (IPO),2 venture capital,3 and crowdfunding (like Kickstarter).4 ICOs can be used to facilitate a broad range of
{"title":",,,Initial Coin Offerings as Investment Contracts: Are Blockchain Utility Tokens Securities?","authors":"Nate Crosser","doi":"10.17161/1808.27486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17161/1808.27486","url":null,"abstract":"Current American jurisprudence on digital assets (e.g. Bitcoin) is woefully underdeveloped due to the rapid development and adoption of blockchain technology—creating an intellectual gold rush with agencies, attorneys, and techies all shouting their positions (on securities laws, particularly) into the wind. This Comment enters the ether in an endeavor to counter prevailing federal agency narratives about the role of securities laws regarding “ICOs”—introducing the reader to the most pertinent features of blockchain technology and Initial Coin Offerings, introducing the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (the “SEC”) current regulatory approach, and applying the seminal Howey is-it-a-security test. Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) are the online sale of cryptographic assets used to launch a cryptocurrency, finance a blockchain application development project, or sell access to features of a blockchain application.1 ICOs, also called Token Sales or Token Generation Events, are financing mechanisms popularly viewed as a hybrid of a Wall Street Initial Public Offering of Stock (IPO),2 venture capital,3 and crowdfunding (like Kickstarter).4 ICOs can be used to facilitate a broad range of","PeriodicalId":83417,"journal":{"name":"University of Kansas law review. University of Kansas. School of Law","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67512570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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