Contemporary European Politics最新文献

The EU is clearly committed to its response to the climate and environmental crisis. Transformative policy solutions and targets have been set within the Union to restore 90% of degraded ecosystems and reach climate neutrality by 2050. The EU also remains one of the biggest donors of climate and environmental development aid. Green growth, good governance, adaptation and mitigation strategies, technology, corporate social responsibility, and other locales of change are intended to lead toward a more sustainable, secure and equitable future. These policies are commendable, but what potential do they have as transformative capacities? This article examines the underlying value systems that legitimise current EU climate and environmental policy for the purpose of critically reflecting on the Union's ability to effect fundamental changes to social, political and economic systems. Via a discourse and visual analysis on speeches, policy documents and images, the outcome suggests that policy development ought to reflect on human-nature interconnectedness to overcome the limitation of its eco-modernist and utilitarian value system.

This Special Collection explores the evolving relationship between the island of Ireland and the European Union (EU) against a backdrop of profound political, economic and geopolitical change. Brexit, shifting EU security priorities, growing global trade uncertainty and other challenges have disrupted long-standing patterns of Irish engagement with Europe, with distinct consequences for both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Addressing themes ranging from crisis governance and external relations to peacebuilding, taxation and identity politics, the contributions highlight the diverse ways in which Ireland's European future is being reshaped. Organised around the dual contexts of the Republic and Northern Ireland, and complemented by cross-border analyses, this Special Collection highlights the importance of an all-island perspective. Collectively, the articles shed light on broader questions concerning small states in the EU, the management of crises, the long and demanding journey of building peace and the interplay between domestic and European change, while emphasising both Ireland's vulnerabilities and its agency as it navigates an uncertain European and global order.

Whereas a considerable literature emphasizes the role and function of municipalities and regions in the European Union (EU) as an expression of multilevel governance, a parallel literature has emerged which projects a view of the EU as an example of multilevel administration. This latter literature directs attention towards emerging vertical linkages implying new chains of accountability and control, yet it is unclear whether and how the subnational level fits into this assumed multilevel union administration. Moreover, its hierarchical focus contrasts with how, especially, the multilevel governance literature has tended to emphasize the opportunities arising from EU governance as much as the potential constraints. Drawing on a study of administrative EU work in Norwegian and Swedish municipalities, the paper argues that insights from the two literatures should be combined to gain a fuller understanding of how the subnational level adapts to an emerging integrated administrative space.

Euroscepticism has become a mainstream phenomenon in European politics since the concept's first appearance in The Times of 11 November 1985. The post-Maastricht Treaty period was an important initial turning point, but Euroscepticism became especially visible during the crises that hit the European Union more recently. Along the way, ‘Euroscepticism’ has become a catch-all label referring to a broad range of positions. Our work engages with the resulting conceptual confusion. Since Taggart's famous 1998 article on the concept, ‘Euroscepticism’ has been examined from different perspectives. However, despite initial conceptual discussions following the publication of Taggart's article, conceptual work on Euroscepticism has become rare. Our paper presents an argumentation for relaunching this conceptual debate. We introduce our idea of ‘concept’ as a theoretical problem deriving from the necessity to face an unknown, blurred entity, and make a case for treating Euroscepticism as a sensitising concept. To illustrate our argument, we discuss a historical timeline to show that Euroscepticism cannot be disconnected from the history of the European project. We also present three generations of Euroscepticism research and how they deal with the phenomenon. We conclude with suggestions for new conceptual endeavours in the study of Euroscepticism.

When it comes to Europeanisation on a subnational level the Danish–German border region of Schleswig does not provide a prominent example of best practise in an EU context. It was never a first mover, and compared to others, it is still lagging behind in several aspects. There are historic reasons for this reluctance, and the article explores the question of Europeanisation on a subnational level from a historical perspective. The border was established in 1920 and has generally been considered an achievement, and even the celebrated Bonn-Copenhagen Declarations of 1955—recognised as a successful solution to the pending recognition of national minority rights on both sides of the border—contained no incentives towards cross-border cooperation or how to overcome the division. Its consequences are essential for a discussion of Europeanisation, including setbacks following the Danish entry into the EEC in 1973, the Euroregion, the Schengen agreement, the construction of a wild boar fence to keep out the African Swine Fever, the reintroduced border controls and the COVID-19 restrictions. Whereas the region remains a rather insignificant player compared to the role of the national governments, not least its development in later years shows a more pragmatic stance in the border region towards cross-border contacts which can be seen as a sign of Europeanisation.

The partnership principle is a key mechanism to promote multilevel policy-making in the EU and thus a driver of top-down, horizontal and bottom-up Europeanisation. It enables subnational governments to participate in Cohesion Policy as well as in other related policy areas and has facilitated the integration of regional and local authorities with the EU's system of governance. Although previous funding periods strengthened the partnership principle, certain caveats have challenged its effective operation. Particularly, in response to crises, centralised decision-making and the focus on economic recovery have undermined the engagement in multilevel policy-making. The paper traces how the EU's governance of the 2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic shaped the partnership principle as a driver of Europeanisation and European integration of regional and local government. It demonstrates how reforms introduced as response to crisis have gradually constrained subnational government's participation in EU policy-making with lasting effects for future programming periods.

Border regions located on the periphery of nation states stand to benefit in many ways from the process of European integration; at the same time, however, they highlight and even magnify the persistent obstacles that hinder and retard cross-border cooperation. In the course of Europeanization debates, the subnational level has been seen as closer to citizens than abstract Brussels, but it finds itself in a sandwich position in the interplay between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’. This article addresses this ambivalence and explores perspectives for cross-border horizontal Europeanization with a focus on the local level, which has not yet received sufficient attention. Against the background of the debate on horizontal Europeanization—closely linked to border studies—, the SaarLorLux (i.e. German-French-Luxembourg) border region is used here as a case study. On the basis of quantitative and qualitative surveys at the local level, it becomes clear that municipal decision-makers do indeed see the cross-border region as a laboratory of European integration. However, they demand more room of their own for manoeuvre to deepen cooperation. Even if municipalities in the border region are more positive about the future than those further away from the border, there are a number of challenges that need to be addressed if they are to make a more successful contribution to Europeanization.

This paper explores experts' opinions towards EU industrial and climate policy amidst significant geopolitical and economic challenges. Utilizing a twin conjoint experiment, we investigate policy preferences among experts attending the Bruegel Annual Meetings in 2024, focusing on industrial and climate policy trade-offs. The paper addresses critical issues such as fiscal discipline, market competition, the formation of European champions, and supply chain strategies, particularly in the context of competition with the United States and China. We find a mild consensus among experts for a policy mix that includes increased investment in strategic industries, market competition, and a shift toward “friendshoring” supply chains, favoring countries with aligned political interests. Climate policy preferences reveal stronger support for decarbonization, with experts favoring policies that prioritize environmental goals over firm competitiveness and fiscal discipline. The paper's contribution is twofold. First-off, we pilot and demonstrate the feasibility of exploiting professional gatherings to deploy small-scale conjoint experiments. Hence, we contribute in advancing the study of expert preferences, demonstrating the (qualified) feasibility of experimental methods by means of one of the first conjoint experiments conducted among EU policy experts, providing insights into their preferences regarding policy trade-offs. Second, we are able to identify clear expert preferences in both industrial and climate policy, despite the low sample size. While the results indicate preferences for compromise solutions in industrial policy, climate policy preferences appear more coherent and climate-oriented.

Can the positions of national political parties on the ideological spectrum explain MEPs' efforts, and even contestation, to highlight specific issues through parliamentary written questions (PWQs)? While existing literature extensively explores the representativeness and pluralistic capture of PWQs in the European Parliament, it has yet to operationalize PWQs from the perspective of MEPs' issue preferences. Building on the link between salience theory, which argues that parties compete not only on policy substance but also on shifting issue salience, and the transformation of the structure of contestation in European politics, which posits that sociocultural issues have become more decisive than the traditional left-right spectrum, this study reveals how salience through PWQs is a component of patterns of contestation in the EP. The highly politicized and divisive context of Turkey within the EU makes it an ideal case study for examining contestation over issue salience. As parties understand what Turkey's salience represents to the public, choosing to emphasize or de-emphasize it becomes a political decision aligned with their political stance. This study introduces a novel methodology to analyse contestation over issue salience, examining all PWQs (n = 2484) on Turkey from EP7 to EP9 (2009–2024). The findings challenge the prevailing literature that attributes PWQ patterns solely to cultural or institutional factors, suggesting that ideological influences, particularly the socio-cultural dimension, provide a more accurate explanation for the patterns of contestation on issue salience than the traditional left-right dimension. Meanwhile, national disputes, such as Turkey's disputes with Cyprus and Greece, along with domestic political developments like Brexit, also impact MEPs' salience preferences through PWQs.

Post the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, the EU has increasingly adopted climate and energy policy as a matter of security, developing a paradigm of climate-energy-security nexus in the climate policymaking and diplomacy of the EU. This paper argues that the connotations of such a nexus showcase the increasing securitization and Eurocentrism in the EU's climate action, a significant change from its historical role as a ‘leader-by-example’ in undertaking climate action. Beyond showcasing the theoretical framings of securitization and Eurocentrism, the paper seeks to highlight how the key policies of the ‘internal’ European Green Deal, especially the REPowerEU and CBAM, are increasingly influenced by these ideals. The paper also examines the Eurocentric narratives in the ‘external’ outreach of EU's climate diplomacy, evolving beyond colonial epistemologies to reflect watered down ambitions and promote green mineral extraction under the broader narrative of green transition.