European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook最新文献

Turmoil and gridlock have been two key features of 2024 in France. From a situation of minority government with no viable alternative, snap elections were called by President Macron. These elections resulted in a situation with no winner, all electoral blocks claiming victory, and none being able to form a government with a chance to survive. After a summer of Olympics and hesitations, a right-wing-oriented government emerged, building its strategy around the expected benevolence of the radical right Rassemblement National. The government proved one of the shortest-lived ever, incapable of passing a budget for the country.

German politics tends to be rather stable, yet 2024 marked a particularly volatile year with four major elections. In the state elections in Saxony, Thuringia, and Brandenburg, as well as the European Parliament (EP) elections, the parties of the federal governing coalition suffered heavy losses, while the radical-right Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland) and the newly founded left-conservative Alliance Sahra Wagenknecht (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht) made significant gains. Following the EP elections, German Christian Democrat Ursula von der Leyen (Christlich Demokratische Union) was re-elected as European Commission President. Amid a deepening economic recession and intensifying public controversy over migration that fuelled public discontent with the federal government, internal tensions within the coalition over fiscal policy ultimately culminated in a government crisis. In December, social democratic Chancellor Olaf Scholz (Social Democratic Party of Germany/Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) initiated a vote of confidence, which he deliberately lost, prompting the collapse of the coalition. As a result, snap elections were scheduled for February 2025.

The year 2024 was a year of elections and voting in Ireland. It saw two government-initiated referendums fail. That caused the resignation of a Taoiseach (Prime Minister) and party leader and his replacement with a younger colleague as leader of Fine Gael. The following local and European elections crystallised the drop in support for Sinn Féin that polls had forecast in the previous year, while two of the governing parties’ support held up reasonably well. Probably because of the results of those elections, a general election was called at the end of the year. Though a government had not been formed by the end of 2024, it was clear that the new government would be a variant of the outgoing one, with the Green Party replaced by a number of independent TDs (Teachta Dala, MPs) supporting the government, with several independents serving as ministers.

In 2024, both presidential and parliamentary elections took place in Iceland. Halla Tómasdóttir replaced Guðni Th. Jóhannesson as president, after Jóhannesson unexpectedly declared on 1 January that he would not be standing for a third presidential term. Prime Minister Katrín Jakobsdóttir, leader of the Left Greens, resigned her post in April when she decided to run for president. Subsequently, the leader of the Independence Party, Bjarni Benediktsson, became Prime Minister. To the surprise of many, Jakobsdóttir, a most popular politician for many years, lost the presidential election. Within the highly unpopular government coalition, open disagreements intensified. In October, Benediktsson dissolved the coalition unilaterally and called for a snap election. The government parties jointly lost 25 percentage points, as well as their parliamentary majority. No left-socialist party was represented in Parliament for the first time since 1937. The number of parliamentary parties was reduced from eight to six. Three opposition parties close to the center gained 23 points, and three female party leaders formed a majority coalition.

The year 2024 was marked by a series of significant electoral events in the Czech Republic, including elections to the European Parliament, the Senate, and regional councils. ANO 2011 emerged as the dominant political force across all three contests, while parties in the governing coalition, particularly the Czech Pirate Party and the Civic Democratic Party, experienced electoral losses. New political alliances, such as Přísaha (Oath) and Stačilo! (Enough!), secured representation in the European Parliament. The September regional elections were shaped by severe flooding in the Moravian-Silesian and Olomouc regions. Following poor electoral performances, the Czech Pirate Party exited the government, and Cabinet reshuffles ensued. Parliament enacted electoral reform by introducing voting by mail for citizens living abroad. The Senate elections altered the balance of power in the upper chamber, and leadership changes followed within the Czech Pirate Party and the Christian and Democratic Union–Czechoslovak People's Party.

In 2024, Slovakia faced deepening political polarisation, highlighted by the attempted assassination of Prime Minister Fico, which briefly prompted calls for unity before being exploited by the ruling coalition to escalate attacks on the media and civil society. The government pushed through a controversial ‘assassination law,’ major reforms to the Penal Code and measures to tighten control over public broadcasting, cultural institutions and civil society—drawing comparisons to democratic backsliding in Hungary. Key elections saw Pellegrini win the presidency, and the opposition Progressive Slovakia (Progresívne Slovensko) narrowly outpoll Direction-Social Democracy (Smer–sociálna demokracia) in the European Parliament vote. By year's end, concerns mounted over the government's attempts to consolidate power and declining democratic standards.

Hungary's political landscape underwent a significant transformation in 2024, marked by the emergence of the Respect and Freedom Party/Tisztelet és Szabadság Párt (TISZA) as a major opposition force. Sparked by the ‘clemency scandal’, TISZA capitalised on public discontent and quickly rivalled the ruling Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union/Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Szövetség (Fidesz) party in the European parliamentary and local elections. While Fidesz maintained dominance in rural areas and national institutions, it lost ground in urban centres, particularly Budapest. The scandal led to high-profile resignations, including President Katalin Novák and former Justice Minister Judit Varga. Institutional changes, such as constitutional amendments and the launch of the Sovereignty Protection Office, reflected shifting priorities. Key policy debates revolved around economic stagnation, healthcare, transportation and education. On the international stage, Hungary's EU Council presidency, support for Ukraine negotiations, and controversial diplomacy—particularly with Russia and China—drew mixed reactions, highlighting tensions between domestic sovereignty and EU integration.

The year 2024 was particularly eventful for Lithuania, marked by parliamentary elections, presidential elections, European Parliament elections, and a referendum. Gitanas Nausėda was re-elected for a second term as President, while the parliamentary elections led to a shift in government from a right-of-center coalition to a center-left Cabinet headed by Gintautas Paluckas. The referendum on dual citizenship failed due to insufficient voter turnout. National politics continued to be dominated by the issue of strengthening defence.

The year 2024 was an eventful year that began with the abdication of the Queen. The European Parliament (EP) election returned a decent result for the government and resulted in a fragmented Danish representation in Brussels with 10 out of 11 parties represented in both Parliament and EP, and the 15 MEPs (Members of the European Parliament) spread across seven EP party groups. The government program saw some realization, in particular with initiatives on stronger defense, including conscription for women, and a “Green Partite” deal. New ministries focusing on Europe, Green Tripartite, and Prepping were formed and reflect the current challenges and priorities, as Denmark takes on EU chairmanship in the fall of 2025, climate change calls for actions also for the agricultural sector, and societal preparedness is called for, not least given the international political situation.

In 2024, while Switzerland was no longer grappling with immediate crises, the lingering effects of an overlapping crisis remained evident. Public dissatisfaction grew, driven by perceptions that state interventions disproportionately favoured banks and large corporations, while the needs of ordinary citizens amid a cost-of-living crisis were sidelined. This contributed to a broader crisis of representation. This article examines how direct democracy functions as a channel for expressing such discontent, focusing on the historic approval of a popular initiative to increase public welfare spending despite a strained federal budget. It concludes with a discussion of three key political issues: the landmark European Court of Human Rights ruling in KlimaSeniorinnen and Others v. Switzerland, the domestic debate about austerity measures and the conclusion of negotiations on a new EU–Switzerland deal.